Cagiza et al v. Mullin et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
C ARMEN BERTA C. DE SAITUMA CAGIZA , §
ET AL., 	§
Plaintiffs, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL A CTION N O. 26-CV-4573
§
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, 	§
SECRETARY OF H OMELAND SECURITY, 	§
ET AL. 	§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Petition for Writ of Mandamus on June 10, 2026. 1 ECF 1. 	The Court
ordered Defendants to file an expedited response. 	ECF 	8. 	Prior to expiration of the
time for Defendants to file a responsive pleading, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion
for TRO and a First Amended Complaint.2 ECF 16; ECF 18. 	The Court ordered
Defendants to file an expedited response to the TRO. 	ECF 23. 	On July 15, 2026,
Defendants filed their Response to Motion for TRO and their Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint. 	ECF 24; ECF 25. Plaintiffs filed in a Reply in support of their Motion for
TRO and a Response to the Motion to Dismiss. ECF 26; ECF 27. Plaintiffs also filed
1 The District Judge referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), the Cost and Delay Reduction Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act, and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. ECF 7.
2 Plaintiffs also filed Declarations in support of the TRO. 	ECF 19; ECF 20; ECF 21. 	The
Supplemental Declaration at ECF 19 was incorrectly docketed as a motion. The Clerk is directed to
correct the docket to reflect that ECF 19 is a Supplemental Declaration in Support of the Motion for
TRO at ECF 16.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 22, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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supplemental authority and an update regarding their USCIS case status. ECF 28; ECF
29. For the reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion
for TRO (ECF 16) be DENIED.
I. 	Background
Plaintiffs are Angolan nationals residing in Fort Bend County, Texas. ECF 1 at
3. 	Plaintiffs’ original Complaint asserted claims under the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(1),
706(2)(A) and, alternatively, under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C § 1361, asserting that
Plaintiffs’ applications for immigration benefits3 were being unreasonably delayed due
to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Policy Memoranda PM-602-0192
and PM-602-0194 implementing an adjudication hold on applications from nationals of
several countries, including Angola. 	The Complaint sought an order compelling
adjudication of Dr. Caziga’s Form I-140 and both Plaintiffs’ Forms I-765 and I-485, as
well as a refund of Dr. Caziga’s premium processing fee. ECF 1 at 22.
After Plaintiffs filed the Complaint, DHS revoked the adjudication hold in
accordance with the decision in Dorcas Int'l Inst. of Rhode Island v. United States
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 26-CV-132-JJM-PAS, 2026 WL 1622708 (D.R.I.
June 5, 2026). 	On July 1, 2026, USCIS denied Dr. Caziga’s Form I-140 application.
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint acknowledges these procedural developments and
asserts claims under the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), 706(2)(A), (C), based on:
3 Carmen Berta C. De Saituma Cagiza (Dr. Cagiza) filed a Form I-140 with premium processing fee
on January 16, 2026. ECF 18 ¶24. Dr. Cagiza and Mr. Cagiza filed Forms I-485, and Forms I-765
on April 27, 2026. Id. ¶27.
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unreasonable delay in processing the Forms I-765 and I-485; arbitrary and capricious
denial of Form I-140 under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); and, in the alternative, Mandamus
under 28 U.S.C. §1361. 	Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for TRO pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65 alleges they are suffering severe financial harm, including
potential foreclosure on their home, and seeks a TRO enjoining any adverse action on
the Forms I-485 and I-765 (pending Dr. Caziga’s efforts to reverse the July 1, 2026 I-
140 denial), and seeks to compel prompt adjudication of the Forms I-765 following
resolution of the I-140.
Plaintiffs later filed a Supplemental Notice indicating Dr. Cagiza had submitted
a new Form I-140 and a Form I290B motion to reopen the denial of the original Form
I-140. ECF 29.
II. 	TRO Standards
The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm
until the court makes a final decision on injunctive relief. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v.
Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cnty., 415 U.S. 423,
439 (1974). To obtain a TRO, an applicant must satisfy the following four elements:
(1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) substantial threat of irreparable
injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any harm the order might cause to the
defendant; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest. Enrique Bernat
F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2000).
While a TRO generally merely preserves the status quo, a mandatory injunction
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“seeks to alter the status quo” and “mandates that defendants take some action
inconsistent with the status quo.” Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, No. 3:17-CV-00179,
2018 WL 1566866, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018). 	A party seeking a mandatory
injunction “bears the burden of showing a clear entitlement to the relief under the facts
and the law.” Justin Indus., Inc. v. Choctaw Sec., L.P., 920 F.2d 262, 268 n.7 (5th Cir.
1990).
III. 	Analysis
Defendants argue Plaintiffs are not entitled to a TRO because they cannot meet
their burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.4 Plaintiffs,
on the other hand, argue they are likely to succeed because the I-140 denial was arbitrary
and capricious and the now-vacated country hold unlawfully withheld a decision on the
Forms I-765. ECF 16 at 7-10. 	For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with
Defendants that Plaintiffs are not entitled to a TRO.
A. Plaintiffs cannot show a likelihood of success on the claim asking the Court
to set aside the I-140 denial.
Under the APA, a court may set aside a final agency action it finds was “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Joseph v.
Dir. of Texas Serv. Ctr., United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 24-40249,
2025 WL 458001, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2025) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Plaintiffs
argue that the decision denying Dr. Caziga’s Form I-140 application was arbitrary and
4 Defendants agree that Plaintiffs are entitled to a refund of the premium processing fee and represent
that the refund request has been initiated. ECF 24-1.
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capricious and should be reversed because the ruling “contradicts its own findings,”
used unreasonable benchmarks for assessing both Dr. Caziga’s accomplishments and
the significance of her patent work, and did not apply a “holistic review.” ECF 16 at 9.
The EB-1 visa Dr. Caziga seeks through her Form I-140 is the hardest
immigration visa to obtain and the standard for granting an application is “extremely
restrictive.” 	Joseph, 2025 WL 458001, at *1 (explaining “[t]hose with extraordinary
ability are rare, which means this exception is ‘extremely restrictive’—indeed it is
colloquially referred to as the ‘Einstein’ or ‘genius’ visa.”). 	Judicial review of EB-1
decisions is limited to “whether the agency considered the relevant facts and articulated
a satisfactory explanation for its decision[.]” 	Id. at *3. This standard is so deferential
that the Fifth Circuit noted in Joseph that “[w]e have not found a single circuit court
opinion reversing USCIS’s denial of an EB-1 visa.” Id. at *1 n.1. Despite Dr. Caziga’s
extremely impressive credentials (see, e.g, ECF 18 ¶21), the deferential standard of
review for the claim that the denial of the I-140 was arbitrary and capricious
demonstrates that Plaintiffs cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits of the
underlying APA claim.
B. Plaintiffs cannot show a likelihood of success on the claims to compel or
enjoin action on the Forms I-485 and I-765.
Plaintiffs seek to impose a timeline for adjudication of their Forms I-765 while
preserving the status of their Forms I-485. 	ECF 16 at 2. 	However, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to grant either form of relief. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot show a likelihood
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of success on the merits for these claims.
Under the APA §706(1), courts have jurisdiction to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. §706(1). Yet, section 706(1)
grants jurisdiction only “where a plaintiff asserts that an agency [1] failed to take a
discrete agency action that [2] it is required to take.” Li v. Jaddou, No. 22-50756, 2023
WL 3431237, at *1 (5th Cir. May 12, 2023) (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All.,
542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)). The Fifth Circuit holds that “[a] court's authority to compel
agency action is limited to instances where an agency ignored ‘a specific, unequivocal
command’ in a federal statute or binding regulation.” Id. (citing Fort Bend Cnty. v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 59 F.4th 180, 197 (5th Cir. 2023)); Cheejati v.
Blinken, 106 F.4th 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2024) (same). Now that the adjudication hold has
been vacated, the agency is not refusing to take required action. Thus, the rationale for
the exercise of jurisdiction in Dorcas Int'l Inst. of Rhode Island v. United States
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 26-CV-132-JJM-PAS, 2026 WL 1622708, at *13
(D.R.I. June 5, 2026), is absent in this case.
Because no statute mandates that a Form I-765 be adjudicated within a certain
time period, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ request to impose a strict
timeline on adjudication of their Forms I-765. See D’Cruz v. United States Citizenship
& Immigr. Servs., No. CV H-24-340, 2024 WL 4523307, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2024)
(holding “when a statute or binding regulation mandates no ‘certain timeframe’ within
which USCIS must act the Court has no jurisdiction under APA Section 706(1)”
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(citations omitted)). 	Further, the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), applies not only to USCIS’s ultimate decisions,
but also to “actions taken in the course of the decision-making process—including the
pace at which that process is undertaken.” Cheejati, 106 F.4th at 394.
The decision whether to grant an I-765 Employment Authorization Document
and the decision whether to grant an I-485 adjustment of status application are
discretionary decisions. Villafranca v. Cowan, No. CV B-18-39, 2018 WL 8665002, at
*10 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-CV-039,
2018 WL 8665000 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2018) (employment authorization); Nguyen v.
Jaddou, No. CV H-23-2106, 2023 WL 11947184, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2023)
(adjustment of status). While Plaintiffs emphasize that they are not asking the Court to
grant any immigration benefit (ECF 16 at 2), the Court still lacks jurisdiction to compel
or enjoin the agency to take or refrain from taking a discretionary action within a
specific time frame. 	Li, 2023 WL 3431237, at *1; D’Cruz, 2024 WL 4523307, at *2.
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the requested relief, Plaintiffs cannot show
a likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claims.
IV. 	Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’
Emergency Motion for TRO (ECF 16) be DENIED. 	The Court will set a prompt
hearing on Plaintiffs’ request for a Preliminary Injunction and Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.
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The 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	shall 	send 	copies 	of 	the 	memorandum 	and
recommendation to the respective parties, who will then have fourteen days to file
written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 	Given the emergency
circumstances and pro se Plaintiffs’ electronic filing access (ECF 22), the Court finds
good cause to shorten the usual 14-day objection period. 	It is ORDERED that
objections 	must 	be 	filed 	within 	7 	days 	of 	entry 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation.5 Failure to file written objections within the time period provided
will bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual findings and legal conclusions on
appeal. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds.
5 When exigent circumstances demand it, the Court may reduce the 14-day period to file objections.
See, e.g., Stephenson v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 216CV00071JRGRSP, 2019 WL 1066177, at *6 (E.D.
Tex. Feb. 26, 2019) (reducing objections period to two days), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 216CV00071JRGRSP, 2019 WL 1063368 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2019); Chang v. Noem, No. SA-
25-CV-1259-FB (HJB), 2025 WL 3657324, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2025) (reducing to seven days
in immigration habeas case), report and recommendation adopted, No. SA-25-CV-1259-FB, 2025
WL 3670503 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2025); Blackmon v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Just. Allan B. Polunsky
Unit, No. 9:22-CV-182-MJT-CLS, 2023 WL 5833411, at *20 n.28 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2023)
(reducing the objections period to 10 days due to deadlines for other filings), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 9:22-CV-182-MJT-CLS, 2023 WL 5430326 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22,
2023). See also United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (explaining that the time
limit for objections set in 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) is a maximum, not a minimum, and that the Court
may require a response in a shorter period if exigent circumstances require).
Christina A. Bryan
United States Magistrate Judge
Signed on July 22, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
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