Martinez Ferrer v. Warden, Joe Corley Detention Facility

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
PABLO LUIS MARTINEZ
FERRER,
Petitioner,
versus
RAYMOND THOMPSON,
Respondent.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-04069
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Petitioner Pablo Luis Martinez Ferrer filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §2241 on May 21,
2026. Dkt 1. He proceeds here pro se. He acknowledges
illegal entry into the United States on a prior date but
nonetheless asserts that his present detention under
8 USC §1225(b) is unlawful as a violation of his due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id at 6–7.
A prior order noted the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 166 F4th 494, 502–08 (5th Cir
2026), which held that 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) subjects
anyone present in the United States without legal
admission to mandatory detention as an “applicant for
admission” deemed to be “seeking admission.” See Dkt 4
at 1–2. That order also conveyed a number of previous
decisions by the undersigned resolving several closely
related issues. Id at 2–6.
Initial screening of the petition determined that the
arguments presented raised only issues resolved in those
decisions. But Petitioner was granted an opportunity to
specify individual circumstances or additional arguments
supporting a different result. Id at 6.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Petitioner responded. Dkts 5 & 6. He recognizes the
decision in Buenrostro-Mendez and the prior decisions by
the undersigned but he nevertheless contends they don’t
apply to him because (i) he has been continuously detained
without a bond hearing since January 2026, (ii) he hasn’t
had any meaningful review of his detention, (iii) he has
complied with all immigration requirements since his
arrival, (iv) he has no criminal history and isn’t a danger to
the community, (v) the appeal of his removal order is
pending, and (vi) he suffers from asthma, which requires
regular medical attention. Dkt 5 at 1–2.
As to any statutory claim, Petitioner appears to
disagree with the Fifth Circuit’s determination in
Buenrostro-Mendez that individuals like himself, present
in the United States without legal admission, are subject
to detention under §1225(b)(2)(A). But the undersigned
previously reached the same conclusion based on the plain
language of the statute. See Montoya Cabanas v Bondi,
2025 WL 3171331 (SD Tex); Herrera Naranjo v Uhls,
2025 WL 3771447 (SD Tex). And even if inclined to
reconsider, the undersigned couldn’t grant Petitioner relief
contrary to Buenrostro-Mendez because a district court “is
bound by a circuit decision unless or until it is overturned
by an en banc decision of the circuit court or a decision of
the Supreme Court.” La Unión del Pueblo Entero v Abbott,
614 F Supp 3d 509, 525 (WD Tex 2022), quoting Perez v
Abbott, 250 F Supp 3d 123, 139 (WD Tex 2017). Petitioner’s
disagreement with prior decisions and binding Fifth
Circuit precedent isn’t a basis for habeas corpus relief.
As to the due process claims, due process arguments
similar to those raised by Petitioner were rejected by the
undersigned in Penafiel Clavijo v Thompson, 2026 WL
923310 (SD Tex), which held that procedural due process
doesn’t require an individualized custody determination
beyond the mandate of 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). The
undersigned later found that pre-removal-order detention
authorized by 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) doesn’t violate
substantive due process while deportation proceedings are
pending even when it exceeds the six-month period set out
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in Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678 (2001), as to post-
removal-order detention. See Herrera Estrada v
Thompson, 4:26-cv-01238 (SD Tex, April 27, 2026). Finally,
the petition and its attachments make clear that
Petitioner’s removal order is not yet final, so the
presumptively constitutional six-month post-final-order
detention period provided by Zadvydas hasn’t yet begun.
Petitioner’s contentions concerning his compliance
with earlier immigration orders, lack of criminal history,
and pending appeal may bear on the question of whether
he should ultimately be removed. But they don’t bear on
the question of whether he may be detained during the
pendency of such removal proceedings. As such, he hasn’t
shown that his current detention violates his rights under
the Due Process Clause.
And as to claim based on a medical issue, it isn’t
properly raised in this habeas corpus action. Solano-
Hurtado v Garcia, 2026 WL 916966, *3 (SD Tex):
“Conditions-of-confinement claims improperly raised in a
habeas corpus petition must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.” Any such claims must instead be raised in a
civil rights action. See Melot v Bergami, 970 F3d 596, 599
(5th Cir 2020).
* * *
Because Petitioner hasn’t established that his
detention violates either the Constitution or federal law, he
isn’t entitled to relief on habeas corpus in this action.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus by Petitioner
Pablo Luis Martinez-Ferrer is DENIED. Dkt 1.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED as unnecessary.
Final judgment will enter separately.
The Clerk will mail this Order to Petitioner and email
this Order to USATXS.CivilNotice@usdoj.gov to provide
notice of this disposition to Respondents.
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SO ORDERED.
Signed on ______________ , at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
June 16, 2026
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