Andrews v. Sinoboom North America, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER ANDREWS,
Plaintiff,
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v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-cv-3896
SINOBOOM NORTH AMERICA,
LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court1 is pro se Plaintiff Christopher Andrews’s
(“Plaintiff”) Employment Discrimination Complaint (ECF No. 1) and
Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2). The Court
RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I. Background
On May 15, 2026, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an Employment
Discrimination Complaint (ECF No. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis (ECF No. 2) against Defendant Sinoboom North America, LLC
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 8).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 15, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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(“Sinoboom”). Plaintiff purports to bring a claim under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 as the basis for the Court’s
jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 1). The Complaint consists of a pre-printed
complaint form for employment discrimination, and Plaintiff states that he
filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on July 23, 2025, and received a Notice of Right to Sue
letter on January 22, 2026. (Id.).
As for the basis for the alleged discrimination, the Complaint provides a
checklist of protected characteristics—race, color, sex, religion, and national
origin—but Plaintiff has left all of these boxes blank, indicating none of them.
(Id. at 2). Plaintiff checked boxes indicating that Sinoboom “terminated the
plaintiff’s employment” and committed “[d]iscrimination of disable[d] child,
retaliation, and defamation [of] character.” (Id.) In response to the form
question asking “when and how the defendant discriminated against the
plaintiff,” Plaintiff wrote, “February 2025, refusing to keep time the same due
to my child disability, promoting others, pay raise, false accusations, calling
police while I was at work, unaware of termination, violation of HIPPA Law.”
(Id.). For relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court order Sinoboom “to stop
discriminating against [him]” and to “grant other relief, including injunctions,
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damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.” (Id. at 2–4). Notably, the form’s “Original
Complaint” page (Appendix B) is entirely blank. (Id. at 3.)
II. Legal Standard
When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court is required by
statute to screen the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That provision
directs that, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This screening obligation
applies even before the complaint is served on the defendant. See Ash v. Oxford
Mississippi Police Dep’t, No. 3:21-cv-00163, 2021 WL 4979420, at *1 (N.D.
Miss. Oct. 5, 2021).
To state a claim, a plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although pro
se pleadings are to be liberally construed, the court may not excuse a
complaint’s failure to demonstrate a non-frivolous claim. Ash, 2021 WL
4979420, at *1 (citing Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 932 F.2d 473, 478 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
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III. Discussion
A. Failure to State a Claim
To state a claim for employment discrimination under Title VII, a
plaintiff must allege, among other elements, that the adverse employment
action was taken because of the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331
(5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ‘ultimate question’ in a Title VII disparate treatment
claim remains ‘whether a defendant took the adverse employment action
against a plaintiff because of her protected status.’”) (emphasis in original).
Identifying the protected characteristic that forms the basis of the
discrimination claim is an essential element of a Title VII cause of action. Raj,
714 F.3d at 330–31.
Here, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. (ECF No. 1). The pre-printed form complaint lists five protected
characteristics under Title VII—race, color, sex, religion, and national origin—
and requires a plaintiff to indicate which characteristic forms the basis of his
discrimination claim; however, Plaintiff left every single box blank. (Id. at 2).
Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff identify a protected characteristic
under Title VII. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to raise
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a plausible inference that any adverse employment action was taken because
of a protected characteristic under Title VII.
The alleged discrimination that Plaintiff describes regarding time-
keeping, promotions, pay raises, false accusations, police contact, an
unexpected termination, and an alleged HIPAA violation, does not state a
claim under Title VII without an identified protected characteristic. See Raj,
714 F.3d at 331 (concluding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for disparate
treatment under Title VII, where his “complaint and speculation did not allege
any facts, direct or circumstantial, that would suggest LSU’s actions were
based on [his] race or national origin or that LSU treated similarly situated
employees of other races or national origin more favorably.”).
Because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, it is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
See Ash, 2021 WL 4979420, at *2 (recommending “Plaintiff’s complaint be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a non-frivolous claim and the
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis be denied as moot”);
Diamond v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 19-cv-1006, 2019 WL 6872842, at *1
n.1 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-cv-
1006, 2019 WL 6842551 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 16, 2019) (recommending dismissal
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without prejudice prior to service of process for failure to state a claim and
noting plaintiff’s in forma pauperis request was therefore moot).
B. Leave to Amend
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his failure to meet the specific
pleading requirements of Title VII should not automatically result in dismissal
with prejudice to re-filing. See Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 248 n.6 (5th
Cir. 2000). While pro se plaintiffs generally should be afforded at least one
opportunity to amend, exceptions exist when, for example, “the defect is simply
incurable or the plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity after being
afforded repeated opportunities to do so.” Id. Additionally, the Court need not
grant leave to amend, even to a pro se plaintiff, “if the plaintiff has already
pleaded his ‘best case.’” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009).
Here, Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend his Complaint. Given his
silence, it is unclear whether Plaintiff has pleaded his best case. See Bishop v.
Bennett, No. 3:24-cv-126, 2024 WL 5330028, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:24-cv-126, 2025 WL 209164 (S.D.
Miss. Jan. 15, 2025) (comparing cases). It is possible that Plaintiff could
identify a protected characteristic or provide additional allegations in support
of his claim(s) if given the opportunity to amend. Out of an abundance of
caution, and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court recommends that
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Plaintiff be allowed fourteen (14) days from the entry of this Memorandum and
Recommendation to file a motion seeking leave to amend his Complaint. If
Plaintiff fails to seek leave to amend within that time period, the Court
recommends that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. See id. at *3–4.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s
Employment Discrimination Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE unless Plaintiff timely files a motion seeking leave
to amend his Complaint within fourteen (14) days of this Memorandum and
Recommendation. If Plaintiff fails to timely move for leave to amend, the Court
RECOMMENDS that the Complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
and FURTHER RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED AS MOOT.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
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SIGNED in Houston, Texas on June 15, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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