Leon v. Joe Corley Detention Facility

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ALVARO BARRERA LEON, 	§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Petitioner,
VS. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-1341
WARDEN, JOE CORLEY DETENTION
FACILITY, et al.
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Alvaro Barrera Leon is detained 	in the custody of officials with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 	Proceeding pro se, the petitioner filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1) and several motions
for emergency relief (Dkt. 2; Dkt. 6; Dkt. 9). 	The most recent motion states that the
petitioner has a hearing in immigration court set for April 8, 2026.
The petition and supporting documents state that the petitioner is a national of Cuba;
that upon entry to the United States he was inspected and released into the country under
Form I-220A; that he has complied with all requirements and appeared for all supervision
appointments; that he has no criminal history and does not pose a danger or flight risk; and
that he applied for legal permanent resident status and is actively pursuing immigration
relief; and that he was detained on November 13, 2025, when he appeared for a scheduled
check-in appointment and has been detained since; and that he has been afforded no process
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 02, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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to challenge the legality of his detention. He further states that he recently graduated from
high school and was preparing to attend college; that he was steadily employed before his
detention; that he has strong family support and a stable residence; that his detention has
caused significant emotional and psychological deterioration; and that his detention
impedes his ability to meet with his counsel and pursue immigration relief. 	He attaches
letters of support from his family (Dkt. 1-3). 	He brings a claim under the Due Process
Clause, among other claims. He seeks immediate release from custody.
The Court entered an order for an expedited answer and instructed the respondents
to show cause why the petitioner should not be immediately released from custody (Dkt.
7). The federal respondents then filed a motion to dismiss the petition or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment (Dkt. 8). 	The respondents oppose habeas relief, arguing that the
petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and is not entitled to
relief under the Due Process Clause. They do not contest the facts recited by the petitioner.
They state that the petitioner entered in 2021 and was initially detained and released; that
a Notice to Appear issued on November 11, 2025, shortly before his detention; and that a
second Notice to Appear issued on March 26, 2026 (Dkt. 8, at 2; Dkt. 8-1). 	The petitioner
then filed a reply (Dkt. 10).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit held in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), that two petitioners who has been present in the United States
for many years, and who had not been apprehended by immigration officials before the
detention at issue in the case, were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). The Court does not base this opinion on the statutory text but instead turns
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to the petitioner’s claim that his re-detention violates his rights under the Due Process
Clause (Dkt. 1, at 23-24). The Court has previously addressed due-process claims in the
context of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	See Rozo-Teran v. Bondi, Civil Action No. 4:26-243 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 16, 2026); Navarette-Garcia v. Bradford, Civil Action No. 4:26-1503 (S.D. Tex.
Mar, 16, 2026); Delgado-Rodriguez v. Tate, Civil Action No. 26-650, 2026 WL 517983
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026).
The Constitution guarantees due process of law to every person in the United States,
regardless of the person’s immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
(the Due Process Clause “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); see A.A.R.P. v
Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (procedural due process protections apply to removal
proceedings for persons detained under the Alien Enemies Act).
The Court notes at the outset that the petitioner in this case challenges only his
detention, and not his right to relief from deportation or removal. District courts across the
country have recognized that “as-applied due process challenges to detention without a
bond hearing are not foreclosed” by Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
103 (2020), or other Supreme Court precedent. 1 Destino v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No. 1:25-
1 	In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen seeking “initial entry” to the
United States enjoys only the rights provided by statute because the “power to admit or exclude
aliens is a sovereign prerogative” over which the political branches have plenary authority.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40 (cleaned up) (considering case regarding noncitizen detained
25 yards from the border and for whom immigration officials rejected his “credible fear” claim for
purposes of political asylum). 	However, a challenge to detention, rather than to immigration
proceedings, does not implicate the “sovereign prerogative” on which Thuraissigiam relies. See
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CV-374-SE-AJ, 2025 WL 4010424, at *4 n.6 (D.N.H. Dec. 24, 2025) (noting a “growing
consensus” among district courts and collecting cases); see Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra, 806
F. Supp. 3d 690, 697-700 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 801 F. Supp. 3d 668,
681-85 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Bonilla Chicas v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-00131, 2026 WL
539475, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); Castro Coneo v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-09850
(NSR), 2025 WL 3754079, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2025); Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at
*5-*7. 	Many cases cited above also distinguish Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281
(2018), and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), from the detention challenge at issue in
this case. 	See, e.g., Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *7-*9; Destino, 2025 WL
4010424, at *3-*8; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *4-*8. 2 	The Court agrees with this
consensus and thus proceeds to review the petitioner’s constitutional claim. 3
Rincon v. Hyde, No. CV 25-12633-BEM, 2025 WL 3122784, at *5-*6 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2025)
(discussing “entry fiction” doctrine and its purposes).
2 	In Demore, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), a
statutory provision that provides for mandatory detention of non-citizens who have been convicted
of certain crimes, and held that the facial challenge failed. 	In so holding, the Court discussed
extensively the fact that Congress enacted § 1226(c) based on evidence of increasing criminal
activity by criminal aliens, as well as high rates of recidivism and flight. Demore, 538 U.S. at 518-
19. The Court also relied on the fact that a detainee under § 1226(c) was a “criminal alien” who
was detained for “the limited period of his removal proceedings.” Id. at 531; see id. at 529-31
(citing facts in the record showing that detention under § 1226(c) lasted for an average of 47 days,
and that 100% of the detentions lasted five months or less). 	Finally, the Court noted that the
detainee in Demore had been afforded procedural protections, including “the full procedural
protections our criminal justice system offers” for his prior convictions and the opportunity for a
“Joseph hearing” at which he would have been entitled to raise any non-frivolous argument to
demonstrate that he was not properly included in the mandatory detention category. Id. at 513-14
& n.3.
3 	See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304–05 (2001) (“a serious Suspension Clause issue
would be presented” if a statute deprived federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to review “pure
questions of law”).
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The petitioner claims that his re-detention without notice, despite his compliance
with all requirements imposed by the respondents, is punitive and violates his due-process
rights (Dkt. 1, at 6 (claiming that he is not a flight risk or danger to the community)). When
adjudicating a procedural due-process claim from a civil detainee, courts apply the three-
part test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing and balancing the following factors: (1) the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional 	or 	substitute 	procedural 	safeguards; 	and, 	(3) 	the 	Government’s 	interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
Regarding the first Mathews factor, the petitioner has a liberty interest that the Due
Process Clause protects. Freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
A noncitizen who has lived for years in the interior of the United States and established
connections in the country acquires a protectible liberty interest. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 107 (“aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in
deportation proceedings”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(“aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country”); Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (noncitizen has a “weighty” interest in his or her right
“to stay and live and work in this land of freedom” and to “rejoin . . . immediate family”).
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As stated above, Barrera Leon has lived in the United States since 2021 and has no
criminal history. 	He is actively seeking legal permanent resident status, was steadily
employed and preparing to attend college before his detention, and has strong community
and family ties. Moreover, the respondents briefly detained him and then released him into
the country at the time of his entry in 2021. 	His current detention began in November
2025, when he appeared as instructed for a check-in appointment at ICE, and the
respondents do not point to any condition of release he violated or other changed
circumstance justifying his re-detention. 	Therefore, the petitioner acquired a protected
liberty interest before the detention challenged in this case. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 107; Vieira, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 700; Gunaydin v. Trump, 784 F.Supp.3d 1175, 1187 (D.
Minn. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d. at 685-86; Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at
*12; Barros v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-488-KC, 2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
10, 2025). The first factor weighs heavily in the petitioner’s favor.
The second Mathews factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the petitioner’s
liberty interest by the procedures used for his re-detention, as well as the probable value of
additional safeguards. 	“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question
remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Due process
requires adequate procedural protections to weigh the governmental interest against that of
the individual. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“[G]overnment detention violates [the Due
Process] Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate
procedural protections or, in certain special and narrow[,] nonpunitive circumstances
where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the
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individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint”) (cleaned up).
“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (cleaned up). 	Immigrant detainees “are entitled to
notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the case.” Trump v. J. G.
G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (cleaned up).
The respondents argue that the petitioner’s claim should be denied based on
Demore, 538 U.S. 510, which rejected a facial due-process challenge to a different statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 	However, the Court does not consider in this case whether
§ 1225(b)(2) is facially unconstitutional, that is, “unconstitutional in all of its applications.”
See United States v. Morgan, 147 F.4th 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6677,
2026 WL 568341 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026) (cleaned up); Bonillas Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at
*6. 	Instead, the Court considers whether § 1225(b)(2), “though constitutional in some
circumstances,” has been unconstitutionally applied to the petitioner. 	See Morgan, 147
F.4th at 526. 4
4 	Apart from the fact that it decided a facial challenge, Demore is distinguishable for
additional reasons. First, the statute at issue in Demore applied to a specific subset of non-citizens
convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). In contrast, § 1225(b)(2) is a broad, “catch-
all” provision. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 499 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287); see id. at
505 (holding that, although “[i]t is true that § 1226 applies to aliens in the United States,” the
application of § 1226 “does not preclude § 1225 from also applying to such aliens” because “the
two provisions overlap”). Moreover, as stated above, the Demore petitioners had received criminal
procedural protections, as well as the opportunity for a Joseph hearing, and were detained for an
average of 47 days. In the case at bar, however, the petitioner has received no procedures to protect
the liberty interest impacted by his current detention, and nothing in the record suggests that the
length of detention will be limited. Finally, unlike in Demore, nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) is justified by evidence of danger to the
community. 	For all of these reasons, Demore does not foreclose the petitioner’s as-applied
challenge. See Bonilla Chicas, 2026 WL 539475, at *7-*9 (distinguishing Demore); Destino, 2025
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Civil detention can be permissible based on the government’s showing that the
person is a danger to the community. 	See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
746, 748-49 (1987) (the government’s regulatory interest in community safety can
outweigh an individual’s liberty interest in avoiding pre-trial detention if the person poses
a danger) (collecting cases). In such cases, the civil detention must be “limited” and
“subject to strong procedural protections.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357(1997) (“We have consistently upheld [forcible civil
detainment of persons who pose a danger to public health and safety] provided the
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards”);
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (upholding bail reform statute which required the government,
“[i]n a full-blown adversary hearing,” to “convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and
convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person”).
Here, the respondents have made no showing that the petitioner’s current civil
detention is justified by his danger to the community, flight risk, or any other weighty
government interest, and do not contest the petitioner’s statement that he has no criminal
record. Rather, they argue that danger and flight risk are irrelevant under the plain language
of § 1225(b)(2), thus ending the inquiry (Dkt. 8, at 6-8 (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003)). However, the question of whether procedural safeguards for
the petitioner’s liberty interest are adequate is a constitutional question, not a statutory one,
WL 	4010424, 	at 	*8-*9 	(distinguishing 	Demore); 	Rincon, 	2025 	WL 	3122784, 	at 	*7-*8
(distinguishing Demore).
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and a statute may not deprive a person of rights that are constitutionally guaranteed.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Palm Valley Health Care,
Inc. v. Azar, 947 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (“the Constitution, not statutes, determine
the minimum procedures that due process requires”). 5 They identify no procedures
afforded 	to 	the 	petitioner 	to 	provide 	notice, 	an 	opportunity 	to 	be 	heard, 	or 	any
individualized determination regarding his current detention. To the extent the respondents
rely on the Notice to Appear dated March 26, 2026 (Dkt. 8-1), the document issued after
the petitioner was detained and, moreover, does not adequately address the petitioner’s
acquired 	liberty 	interest 	based 	on 	established 	connections 	in 	the 	country. 	See
5 	Moreover, Doe is distinguishable on several grounds. The plaintiff in Doe challenged a
Connecticut statute that mandated registry of sex offenders based only on the person’s past
conviction for a sex offense, arguing that the registry requirement without a hearing to show he
was currently dangerous violated his procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court held that,
because current dangerousness was irrelevant under the statute, the plaintiff had no procedural due
process right to a hearing. The Court joins other courts in holding that Doe is distinguishable from
the facts and issues in this case. 	See, e.g., Aliaga Zamora v. Bondi, No. SA-26-CA-00447-XR,
2026 WL 693054, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2026); Betancourth v. Tate, No. 4:26-CV-01169,
2026 WL 638482, at *2 & n.4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2026); Noyola v. Bondi, No. 1:26-CV-405-RP,
2026 WL 607266, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026); Diaz Yanez v. Bondi, No. EP-26-CV-00486-
DB, 2026 WL 690005, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026); Villegas Angel v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-
00384-DAE, 2026 WL 594368, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2026). First, the petitioner in this case
does not challenge a registry requirement, which the Doe Court assumed arguendo implicated a
liberty interest, but rather freedom from physical detention, “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 	Second, civil immigration detention is constitutional only
when it is justified by a sufficient, non-punitive purpose. Foucha v. La., 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992);
Betancourth, 2026 WL 638482, at *2 n.4; Diaz Yanez, 2026 WL 690005, at *2. Once a protected
interest is implicated, “the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.” Aliaga Zamora, 2026
WL 693054, at *5 (citing, inter alia, Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972)); Villegas
Angel, 2026 WL 594368, at *3. Third, the statutory language indicates that flight risk and danger
are not irrelevant to detention under § 1225(b), given that “noncitizens who are detained under
§ 1225(b) may be released on parole for humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, so long
as they present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” Noyola, 2026 WL 607266, at *3
(cleaned up) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)); Aguilar v. Bondi, No. 5:25-
CV-01453-JKP, 2025 WL 3471417, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2025).
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Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271; Landon, 459 U.S. at
34. It also does not show that the petitioner was afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard as to the justification for his detention. 	See J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 673 (immigrant
detainees “are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the
case”) (cleaned up).
In the absence of any available procedure to require the respondents to demonstrate
danger or another adequate justification for detention, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of the petitioner’s liberty interest is high. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 & n.7 (“When
protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount”)
(citing, inter alia, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 542 (1971)). When “the only mechanism Petitioner has to test the propriety of
his detention is DHS’s discretionary authority,” that is “no real test at all.” 	Tenemasa-
Lema v. Hyde, No. CV 25-13029-BEM, 2025 WL 3280555, at *9 (D. Mass. Nov. 25,
2025); see Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *13 (noting that the risk is heightened by the
likelihood of lengthy delays in removal proceedings). This risk of deprivation could be
addressed 	through 	an 	individualized 	assessment 	such 	as 	the 	bond 	hearings 	that
respondents, 	until 	late 	2025, 	routinely 	provided 	to 	assess 	a 	petitioner’s 	danger 	to
community and flight risk. 	See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (courts should assess whether
“additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would have “probable value”); Lopez-
Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (an individualized hearing would provide an opportunity
to be heard and a meaningful assessment of the petitioner’s dangerousness and flight risk,
and thus would “greatly reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty”); Barros,
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2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (risk of erroneous deprivation “can be easily ameliorated through
a bond hearing”). 	The Court concludes that the second Mathews factor weighs in the
petitioner’s favor.
The third Mathews factor is the respondents’ interest in the petitioner’s mandatory,
unreviewable detention at issue here. The respondents have not addressed this factor and
do not argue their interest in detaining the petitioner under § 1225(b). To the extent the
respondents rely on their general interest in enforcing the statute, their interest is
insufficient to extinguish the petitioner’s right to due process. 	See Loudermill, 470 U.S.
at 541; Rincon, 2025 WL 3122784, at *6 (“legislation cannot detract from the privilege
afforded by the constitution”) (cleaned up) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 565 (1892), overruled on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972)). Although courts have recognized a legitimate governmental interest in preventing
a detainee’s flight and in protecting the community from any danger posed by the detainee,
see, e.g., Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1189, these interests could be addressed by
providing individualized hearings, as discussed above.6 Moreover, to the extent the purpose
of the detention is punitive, the purpose is impermissible in the context of civil immigration
6 	Courts “generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively
minimal.” Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 21, 2025); see Tenemasa-Lema, 2025 WL 3280555, at *10. 	Additionally, courts have
recognized that detention itself imposes significant costs and burdens. 	See Hernandez-Lara v.
Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting the “substantial social costs” of detention that
separates families and removes breadwinners, caregivers, parents, siblings, and employees from
the community) (citing Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 855 (2d Cir. 2020)); Sampiao v.
Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 34 (D. Mass. 2025) (noting that detention of those who have been denied
release on bond or the opportunity to seek release “requires the government to continue funding
and overseeing [the petitioner’s] detention”).
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proceedings. 	See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. 	The respondents have not contested the
petitioner’s facts, including that he has no criminal record, strong community and family
ties, and is pursuing legal permanent resident status. The third factor therefore weighs in
the petitioner’s favor.
Because all three Mathews factors weigh in the petitioner’s favor, he is detained
without due process of law. 	The Court concludes, in accordance with numerous other
courts considering the question, that detention under § 1225(b)(2) as applied to this
petitioner, without an individualized assessment or any notice or opportunity to be heard,
violates the petitioner’s right to procedural due process. The petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Brown v. Davenport, 596
U.S. 118, 128 (2022) (“federal courts may grant habeas relief as law and justice require”)
(cleaned up).
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The remedy for unlawful detention “is, of course, release.” Id.;
see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (based on statutory language of 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and the common-law history of the writ, “the essence of habeas corpus
is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). Because the respondents do
not acknowledge any process available to the petitioner, “there is no process to await.” See
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Aroca v. Mason, No. 2:26-CV-00057, 2026 WL 357872, at *19 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 9, 2026)
(cleaned up) (collecting cases). 7 After reviewing the authorities and all matters of record,
the Court determines that release is the appropriate habeas relief for the unlawful detention
in this case.
The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:
1. 	The respondents’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 8) is DENIED.
2. 	The petitioner’s petition for habeas relief (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED.
3. 	The respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE the petitioner from custody to a
public location, under conditions of release no more restrictive than those in
place prior to the detention at issue in this case, within 48 hours of this order.
4. 	The respondents are further ORDERED to inform the petitioner of the time and
location of release at least three hours before the release. 	Because the
petitioner proceeds pro se, the respondents are ORDERED to also notify any
and all persons in their records as contacts for the petitioner, including
immigration counsel and/or family members and friends of the petitioner, of the
time and location of release at least three hours before the release.
5. 	The respondents are further ORDERED to return to the petitioner, at the time
of his release from custody, any and all identification documents taken from him
at the time of or during his detention.
7 	In light of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez, and because the
respondents do not argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies, the Court does not order a bond
hearing under § 1226(a). See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL
25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases).
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6. 	Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of the petitioner under this
present detention is PROHIBITED and ENJOINED.
7. 	The respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report updating the Court
within 72 hours of this order.
8. 	All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on 	, 2026.
__________________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
$SULO
___________________________________________________________________________________________
GEOR	R	R	R	R	RGE C HANKS JR
Case 4:26-cv-01341 Document 11 Filed 04/02/26 in TXSD Page 14 of 14