Patterson et al v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Robert Lynn Patterson, Sr., and
Rosemary Patterson,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Baker Hughes Oilfield
Operations, Inc., et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action H-25-5715
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
In this personal injury action, Plaintiffs assert claims arising
from Robert Lynn Patterson, Sr.’s (Patterson) exposure to asbestos
on the outer continental shelf during the 1960s and 1970s. This
case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for full
pretrial case management. ECF No. 22. Pending before the court
is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Sever and Remand. ECF No. 16. The court
recommends that the motion be GRANTED, and that the Jones
Act claims be SEVERED and REMANDED to state court.
1. Background and Procedural Posture
Plaintiffs filed suit in the 234th District Court of Harris
County, Texas on November 6, 2025. ECF No. 1-4. The lawsuit
centers 	around 	Patterson’s 	exposure 	to 	asbestos-containing
drilling 	mud, 	which 	he 	alleges 	caused 	him 	to 	develop
mesothelioma. Id. at 17. Patterson sues Baker Hughes Oilfield
Operations, Inc. (Baker Hughes) individually and as the successor-
in-interest 	to 	Milchem 	Incorporated 	in 	its 	capacity 	as 	a
“manufacturer, contractor, and/or supplier of asbestos-containing
drilling muds, including but not limited to Milchem Drilling mud
and/or Flosal Drilling Mud.” Id. Patterson sued Chevron Phillips
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 01, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Chemical 	Company 	LP 	(CPChem) 	in 	its 	capacity 	as 	a
“manufacturer of asbestos-containing Flosal Drilling Mud.” Id.
Against 	those 	two 	entities, 	Patterson 	alleges 	various 	claims
including for failure to warn him of the dangers of the drilling mud,
and failing to properly design, manufacture, and test the drilling
mud. Id. at 22–23, 32–33.
Patterson sues Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL)
in its capacity as his former employer under the Jones Act. ECF
No. 1-4 at 17–18. During his time working for Union Oil from
approximately 	1961–1975, 	Patterson 	held 	various 	positions
including roustabout, trainee, and engineer on jack-up rigs. Id.
at 18. He also held various jobs on land. Id. When on offshore
jobsites, Patterson’s duties required him to personally handle, cut,
and 	install 	asbestos-containing 	parts, 	and 	to 	work 	in 	close
proximity to others performing similar duties, including to open,
dump, and mix asbestos-containing drilling mud. Id. at 18–19.
While 	with 	UNOCAL, 	Patterson’s 	work 	locations 	included
Vermillion Block 14 in Louisiana. Id. at 18.
In a pre-suit deposition, Patterson testified about the nature
and location of his work for Union Oil. Patterson stated that the
wells he worked on “were listed as an Outer Continental Shelf
number, so they would have been on the Outer Continental Shelf.”
ECF No. 1-1 at 4. He also confirmed that “the permits that were
issued were issued by the Department of the Interior for drilling
on the Outer Continental Shelf.” Id. Patterson testified that he
worked on Vermillion Block 14 and South Marsh Field Block 49.
Id. at 5–6. Those two fields were marked on Exhibit 6 to the
deposition, which shows them to be on the Outer Continental
Shelf. Id.; ECF No. 1-2. While working in those areas, Patterson
confirmed that he was working on a jack-up barge. Id. at 7. He also
confirmed that UNOCAL was engaged in oil field exploration and
production on the Outer Continental Shelf while he was employed
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there. Id. at 8. Patterson also confirmed that his exposure to
asbestos was “from the work [he] performed on [his] employer’s
behalf on the Outer Continental Shelf.” Id. Specifically, Patterson
claims that he was “exposed to asbestos while working on the
Diamond M jack-up rig on behalf of Union Oil Company . . . on the
Vermillion Field . . . during August ’64 through May ’65.” Id. at 9.
On 	November 	26, 	2025, 	CPChem 	removed 	this 	case 	to
federal court. ECF No. 1. Removal jurisdiction is predicated upon
the existence of a federal question under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq. ECF No. 1
at 1–2. CPChem obtained Baker Hughes’s consent to removal, but
did not obtain UNOCAL’s consent, because doing so CPChem
states was unnecessary. Id. at 6.
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Sever and Remand. ECF
No. 16. Plaintiffs seek to have the court sever the Jones Act claims
against 	UNOCAL 	from 	the 	claims 	against 	the 	other 	two
Defendants and to remand the Jones Act claims to state court. Id.
at 16. In its response, UNOCAL argues that Plaintiffs’ Jones Act
claims are fraudulently pleaded and that the court should thus
pierce the pleadings, retain jurisdiction over the Jones Act claims,
and dismiss those claims against UNOCAL. ECF No. 19.
2. Removal Jurisdiction
A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal can be based on
diversity jurisdiction if the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000
and 	the 	dispute 	is 	between 	citizens 	of 	different 	states. 	See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441; Priester v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co.,
832 F. App’x 240, 244 (5th Cir. 2020). A case may also be removed
if the case is one that “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. The
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defendant “has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that subject matter jurisdiction exists.” New Orleans &
Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2008).
“[O]perative facts and pleadings are evaluated at the time of
removal.” 	In 	re 	Deepwater 	Horizon, 	745 	F.3d 	157, 	162–63
(5th Cir. 2014). Here, the case was removed based on a federal
question. Defendants CPChem and Baker Hughes argue that the
claims against them arise under OCSLA. The issue is that the
claims against UNOCAL are under the Jones Act, and such claims
are expressly not removable. McDonald v. Enermech Mech. Servs.,
Inc., No. 23-CV-0126, 2023 WL 4109786, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 30,
2023).
Section 1441(c) sets forth the procedure to follow when a civil
action contains both claims that arise under federal law, as well as
those that are not removable:
(1) If a civil action includes—
(A) a claim arising under the Constitution, laws,
or 	treaties 	of 	the 	United 	States 	(within 	the
meaning of section 1331 of this title), and
(B) 	a 	claim 	not 	within 	the 	original 	or
supplemental jurisdiction of the district court or a
claim 	that 	has 	been 	made 	nonremovable 	by
statute,
the entire action may be removed if the action
would be removable without the inclusion of
the claim described in subparagraph (B).
(2) Upon removal of an action described in paragraph
(1), the district court shall sever from the action
all claims described in paragraph (1)(B) and shall
remand the severed claims to the State court from
which the action was removed. Only defendants
against whom a claim described in paragraph
(1)(A) has been asserted are required to join in or
consent to the removal under paragraph (1).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
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3. Analysis
The court turns first to whether Plaintiffs’ claims against
CPChem and Baker Hughes arise under OCSLA. Under 43 U.S.C.
§ 1349(b)(1)(A), the district courts of the United States have
exclusive jurisdiction over cases and controversies arising out of,
or 	in 	connection 	with 	“any 	operation 	conducted 	on 	the 	outer
Continental Shelf which involves exploration, development, or
production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer
Continental Shelf, or which involves rights to such minerals . . . .”
Because a plaintiff need not expressly invoke OCSLA in order for
it to apply, courts employ a “but-for” test to determine whether a
cause of action arises under OCSLA. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745
F.3d at 163. A claim arises under OCSLA if (1) the activity that
caused the injury constituted an “operation conducted on the Outer
Continental 	Shelf” 	that 	involved 	exploration 	or 	production 	of
minerals, and (2) the case arises out of or in connection with the
operation. Id.
Here, the but-for test is easily met. Not only do Plaintiffs
concede that the claims against CPChem and Baker Hughes arise
under 	OCSLA, 	ECF 	No. 	16 	at 	4, 	but 	Patterson’s 	deposition
testimony confirms that OCSLA applies. Patterson confirmed that
he was working on the Outer Continental Shelf when he was
exposed to asbestos, that the work he was performing was in
furtherance of exploration for minerals, and that the asbestos
exposure was in connection with that work. This is sufficient to
demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ claims against CPChem and Baker
Hughes arise under OCSLA.
Plaintiffs’ claims against UNOCAL are under the Jones Act
and thus do not “arise under” federal law for purposes of federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Box v. Eco Servs. Ops.
Corp., 802 F. Supp. 3d 986, 988 (S.D. Tex. 2025). And, again, Jones
Act claims are expressly not removable. Id. at 989. Thus, for
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purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), this case includes both claims that
arise under federal law—OCSLA—and claims that are “made
nonremovable 	by 	statute”—Jones 	Act. 	The 	statute 	expressly
requires that the Jones Act claims be severed and remanded to
state court.
UNOCAL argues that the court should not follow the statute
but should instead retain jurisdiction over the Jones Act claims,
pierce the pleadings, determine whether the Jones Act claims are
fraudulently pleaded, and, if so, dismiss them. The court disagrees.
Such a procedure is necessary only when a fraudulently pleaded
claim would frustrate federal jurisdiction. McDonald, 2023 WL
4109786 at *4. Because the statute allows for the court to retain
jurisdiction over the OCSLA claims while returning the Jones Act
claims to state court, even if the latter claims are fraudulently
pleaded, federal jurisdiction is not frustrated. Id.; see also Tauriac
v. 	Staffing 	the 	Universe, 	LLC, 	No. 	4:24-CV-04290, 	2025 	WL
1886775, at *6 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2025) (noting a line of authority
addressing “hybrid” OCSLA and Jones Act cases where courts
have opted to sever and remand the Jones Act claims, rather than
pierce the pleadings, because the existence of the Jones Act claim
does not frustrate federal jurisdiction), R. & R. adopted, 2025 WL
1886005 (S.D. Tex. July 8, 2025). The court will not pierce the
pleadings and will not retain jurisdiction of the Jones Act claims.
Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that the court should
remand the entire case because UNOCAL’s consent to removal was
not obtained. Again, the statute explicitly addresses this issue.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), Only defendants against whom a claim
described in paragraph (1)(A) has been asserted are required to
join in or consent to the removal under paragraph (1). Paragraph
(1)(A) 	addresses 	claims 	arising 	under 	federal 	law 	within 	the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. That would include OCSLA claims,
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not 	Jones 	Act 	claims. 	So 	only 	Baker 	Hughes’s 	consent 	was
required.
4. Conclusion
The court recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion to Sever and
Remand, 	ECF 	No. 	16, 	be 	GRANTED 	in 	part. 	The 	court
recommends that the Jones Act claims be severed and remanded
to state court.
The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum 	and 	Recommendation 	to file 	written 	objections.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Failure to timely file
objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77
(5th Cir. 1988).
Signed at Houston, Texas, on April 1, 2026.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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