State Of Texas v. Garcia, Sui Juris

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
State of Texas
v.
Erik Salvador Garcia
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-05371
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
On November 10, 2025, Defendant Erik Salvador Garcia filed a notice of
removal from a state criminal case where he was convicted of a misdemeanor
speeding offense. See Dkt. 1; Dkt. 1-1 at 13 (copy of citation). Consistent with
the Court’s duty to examine its jurisdiction, and pursuant to its obligation to
promptly examine notices of removal of criminal prosecutions, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1455(b)(4), it is recommended that this case be remanded to state court.
Background
On August 15, 2023, Garcia was cited for speeding. 	Dkt. 1-1 at 25. 	He
was convicted on December 6, 2023, in the Municipal Court of Pasadena,
Texas. 	Id. at 17-18. 	Nearly two years later, and long after the deadline for
appeal had expired, Garcia sent to the Municipal Court a “motion to set aside”
the state-court judgment, claiming that the court “lacked lawful authority over
[his] person and property” and that his not-guilty plea was entered despite his
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 10, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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objection. 	See Dkt. 1-1 at 4-5 (October 8, 2025 submission). 	The Municipal
Court did not take any action on that motion. Garcia then purported to remove
the case to this Court, invoking federal question jurisdiction. See Dkt. 1 (filed
November 10, 2025).
Analysis
Because 	the 	underlying 	proceeding 	is 	a 	criminal 	prosecution, 	the
governing statute requires this Court to “examine the notice [of removal]
promptly” and order a summary remand “[i]f it clearly appears on the face of
the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should not be
permitted ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4). That is case here.
Garcia’s 	notice 	of 	removal 	invokes 	“federal 	question 	jurisdiction,”
asserting 	that 	the 	proceedings 	below 	violated 	his 	due-process 	and 	Sixth
Amendment rights. 	Dkt. 1 at 1. 	But this is a criminal action, not a “civil
action[] arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”
over which this Court can exercise federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. 	And even in civil actions, federal question jurisdiction looks solely to
the 	plaintiff’s 	claims, 	without 	regard 	to 	the 	defendant’s 	defenses 	or
counterclaims. 	See Bernhard v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 523 F.3d 546, 551 (5th
Cir. 2008) (“[A] federal court has original or removal jurisdiction only if a
federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint
....”); see also Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S.
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826, 831 (2002) (“[A] counterclaim—which appears as part of the defendant’s
answer, not as part of the plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the basis for
‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804, 808 (1986) (“A defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to
confer federal jurisdiction.”). The State of Texas charged Garcia with speeding,
which is a purely state law offense. There is no federal question jurisdiction.
The undersigned has also considered other potential avenues for removal
and 	determined—pursuant 	to 	its 	duty 	to 	do 	so 	promptly, 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1455(b)(4)—that this case does not fit within the limited instances where a
criminal prosecution can be removed. 	Procedurally, the deadline for removal
lapsed years ago, as Garcia has already been convicted. 	See id. § 1455(b)(1)
(deadline for removal is “30 days after the arraignment ... or at any time before
trial, whichever is earlier”). 	And regardless of timing, this is not the type of
prosecution that can be removed.
The case was not brought against the United States, a federal agency, or
a federal officer, does not involve a property holder whose title derives from a
federal officer, and involves no other circumstance specified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442. 	The 	only 	other 	avenue 	for 	removal 	is 	reserved 	for 	criminal
prosecutions either:
(1) 	[a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the
courts of such State a right under any law providing for the
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equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all
persons within the jurisdiction thereof; [or]
(2) 	[f]or any act under color of authority derived from any law
providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the
ground that it would be inconsistent with such law.
Id. § 1443. 	The Supreme Court has specified two requirements to remove
under Section 1443(1): (1) “the right allegedly denied the removal petitioner”
must “arise[] under a federal law ‘providing for specific civil rights stated in
terms of racial equality,’” and not “constitutional or statutory provisions of
general applicability”; and (2) it must be shown that the relevant federal right
cannot be enforced in the state court, which “normally requires that the ‘denial
be manifest in a formal expression of state law,’ such as a state legislative or
constitutional provision, ‘rather than a denial first made manifest in the trial
of the case.’” 	Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1975) (quoting
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792, 799, 803 (1966)).
Garcia’s notice of removal fails to meet either § 1443(1) or (2). Regarding
Section 1443(1), Garcia has not alleged that the prosecution violates any
federal right safeguarding racial equality, nor that a specific Texas law denies
him any such race-based right. To the contrary, he merely invokes due-process
and other rights that apply to all criminal defendants. 	See Dkt. 1-1 at 35-36
(alleging 	that 	his 	Fifth, 	Sixth, 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	rights 	were
violated because he was not provided adequate notice or a hearing, he was
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forced to sign the citation “under threat of arrest,” that his defenses were
restricted by the State, and that the court entered a not guilty plea on his
behalf “without conducting a lawful arraignment”); Cnty. of Yazoo, Miss. v.
Prewitt, 2023 WL 7381440, at *1-2 (5th Cir. Nov. 7, 2023) (per curiam)
(affirming summary remand of speeding-ticket case that did not satisfy 28
U.S.C. § 1443(1), including because the statutes that defendant invoked were
not “stated in terms of racial equality”) (quotation omitted).
Nor does Section 1443(2) apply. 	That provision is “available only to
federal officers and to persons assisting such officers in the performance of
their duties.” City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 815 (1966).
Accordingly, there is no basis for federal question jurisdiction. 	And
because “it clearly appears on the face of the notice and exhibits annexed
thereto that removal should not be permitted,” this case should summarily be
remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4).
Recommendation and Order
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Erik Salvador Garcia’s claims should
be REMANDED to the Municipal Court of the City of Pasadena.
It is ORDERED that the February 27, 2026 initial conference (Dkt. 4)
is hereby CANCELED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
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R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on December 10, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_________________________________________
Yvon	n	nn	n	nee Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
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