Livingston v. Southern New Hampshire University

IN THE UNITED STATES DlSTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
TATYANA CRYSTAL
LIVINGSTON,
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Plaintiff,
•·t
v.
SOUTHERN NEW HAlvlPSHIRE
UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
§ 	Civil Action No. H-25-5085
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ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Southern New Hampshire University's
Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 7). Having considered the motion, submissions,
and applicable law, the Court determines that the motion should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This 	is an employment related dispute. Pro se Plaintiff Tatyana Crystal
Livingston ("Livingston") alleges that her former employer, Defendant Southern
New Hampshire University ("SNHU"), wrongfully terminated her in July of 2025.
Livingston alleges that she was approved for a "formal leave of absence" for
"emotional 	and mental 	recovery" 	in June 	of 2025 	following 	a 	car accident
~
Livingston was involved in. 1 Livingston further alleges that she ,received an "abrupt
1 See Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. 1, Exhibit 1 at 4.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 25, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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termination notice" on July 23, 2025, "despite ongoing communication attempts and
unresolved medical/bereavement leave matters.'?: Livingston further alleges that
prior to her termination she experienced "fluctuating expectations, frequent policy
changes, 	and . . . . . 	harassment 	through 	performance 	documentation 	she 	was
repeatedly told would not result in termination." 3
Based on the foregoing, on July 30, 2025, Livingston filed suit, pro se, in the
Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 1 against SNHU, asserting claims for: (1)
.wrongful termination; (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) retaliation;
(4) failure to accommodate underthe Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (5)
hostile work environment; and (6) administrative negligence. 4 Livingston seeks
damages in the amount of $245,000.00. The Court construes all pro se filings
liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). On October 24, 2025,
SNHU removed the case to this Court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction. On
November 3, 2025, SNHU filed a motion to dismiss Livingston's complaint pursuant
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. I, Exhibit I at 4-5.
2
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to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 5 Livingston did not respond to the
pending motion to dismiss by the original response deadline or the date of this Order.
IL 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces
does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' ... it demands more than ... 'labels
and conclusions."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "[t]he
'court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff."' In re Katrina Canal Breeches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.
2007) (quoting Martin K Eby Cons tr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 3 69 F .3d 464,
467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 	550 U.S. at 570.
"Conversely, 'when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
5 See 	Defendant Southern 	New 	Hampshire 	University's 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss,
Document No. 7 at 1-10.
3
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claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court."' Cuvillier
v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
SNHU moves to dismiss Livingston's complaint, contending that Livingston
fails to allege any facts stating a cognizable claim or exhaust her administrative
remedies under the ADA. Livingston did not respond to the pending motion to
dismiss, failing to rebut or offer evidence to counter SNHU's contentions. Pursuant
to Local Rule 7.4, failure to respond is taken as a representation of no opposition.
S.D. Tex. Local R. 7.4. The Court construes all prose filings liberally. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Regardless of Livingston's failure to respond to
SNHU' s motion to dismiss, the Court will consider the merits of the pending motion
before the Court.
A. State Law Claims
Livingston asserts five claims under state law: (1) wrongful termination; (2)
retaliation; (3) hostile work environment; (4) negligent infliction of emotional
distress; and (5) "administrative negligence." 6 SNHU contends th~t Livingston fails
to plead sufficient facts with respect to each state claim. Livingston offers no
6 See Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. I, Exhibit I at 4-5.
4
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rebuttal. The Court will consider, in tum, the merits of each claim Livingston asserts
under state law.
1. 	Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Administrative Negligence,
Retaliation, and Hostile Work Environment
Livingston 	alleges 	claims 	under 	Texas 	law 	for 	negligent 	infliction 	of
emotional distress, 	"administrative negligence," 	retaliation, 	and "hostile work
environment." 7 First, SNHU notes the Texas Supreme Court's rejection of negligent
infliction of emotional distress as a theory of liability under Texas law. See Boyles
v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex. 1993); Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512,
513 (Tex. 1993) (holding that no action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
exists 	in 	Texas). 	Second, 	SNHU 	contends 	that 	a 	claim 	for 	"administrative
negligence" does not exist under state or federal law. SNHU further notes for the
Court the well-established employment-at-will doctrine under Texas law, which,
"[b]y definition ... does not require an employer to be reasonable, or even careful,
in making its termination decisions." Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84
S.W.3d 604, 609 (Tex. 2002). Third, SNHU notes the Texas Supreme Court's
rejection of retaliation as a theory of liability under Texas law. See Butler v. Collins,
714 S.W.3d 562, 571 (Tex. 2025) (holding that there is "no common law cause of
7 See Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. 1, Exhibit I at 4.
5
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action for workplace discrimination or retaliation). Fourth, SNHU notes other
federal district courts in Texas which found "no case law establishing a common law
tort for 	'hostile and toxic work environment in 	Tex~s. "' 	Bhakta 	v. 	Caraday
Healthhcare, LLC, 2021 WL 8362164, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2021). Livingston
offers no rebuttal. Considering the aforementioned clear guidance that negligent.
infliction of emotional distress, administrative negligence, common-law retaliation,
and hostile work environment are not valid claims under Texas state law, the Court
determines that these four claims should be dismissed. The Court will now consider
Livingston's wrongful termination claim.
2. 	Wrongful Termination
Livingston alleges a claim for wrongful termination after she was terminated
by SNHU on July 23, 2025. SNHU contends that Texas is an at-will employment
state, which requires Livingston to allege that she possessed an agreement that
guaranteed employment for a specific term that prohibited termination without good
cause. SNHU further notes for the Court an employer's broad discretion to terminate
under the well-established employment-at-will doctrine. See Montgomery Cnty.
Hosp. Dist. V. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998) (holding that "employment
may be terminated by the employer or the employee at will, for good cause, bad
cause, or no cause at all."). Livingston offers no rebuttal.
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A thorough review of Livingston's complaint reveals no facts plead indicating
that she held a contract that guaranteed continued employment with SNHU for a
specific term. SNHU further contends that Livingston's complaint fails to show any
contractual language between the parties to suggest that Livingston is not subject to
the general rule that SNHU could terminate her at will under Texas law. Based on
the foregoing, the Court determines that·tivingston is an at-will employee and is
thus ineligible to state a claim for wrongful termination. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Livingston's claim for wrongful. termination should be dismissed. The Court
will now considerLivingston's sole federal claim arising under the ADA.
B. Federal Claim
Livingston alleges a federal claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA.
SNHU contends that Livingston failed to exhaust administrative remedies that are
mandatory before asserting an ADA claim in federal court. Livingston offers no
rebuttal.
"Before a plaintiff may file her ADA claim in federal court, she must exhaust
her administrative remedies." Patton v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp., 874 F.3d 437, 443 (5th
Cir. 2017) (citing Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam)). "Specifically, the plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice or within
300 days if the charge is filed with a state or local agency." Id. (quotation omitted).
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Exhaustion is complete when the plaintiff "receives a statutory notice of right to
sue." Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376,379 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Dao,
96 F.3d at 788-89). After receiving the notice of right to sue, the plaintiff has 90
days to file a civil action. See id.
Here, a review of Livingston's complaint reveals that she fails to allege any
facts confirming that she filed a charge 	of discrimination with the EEOC or
comparable state agency such as the Texas Workforce Commission. Livingston's·
complaint also. fails to allege any facts regarding whether she received a statutory
notice of a right to sue. Considering the Fifth Circuit's strong guidance that a failure
to engage with the administrative process is "a precondition to filing suit in district •
court," the Court determines that Livingston failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies with regards to her ADA claim. See Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F .3d
787, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). Accordingly, the Court determines that
Livingston's federal claim arising under the ADA should be dismissed.
Even construing the complaint liberally, the Court finds that Livingston states
no plausible claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to SNHU.
Accordingly, having considered the foregoing, submissions, and applicable law, the
Court determines that the pending motion should be granted, and Livingston's
claims against SNHU in this matter should be dismissed.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant Southern New Hampshire University's Motion to
Dismiss (Document No. 7) is GRANTED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff Tatyana Crystal Livingston's claims against SNHU.
are DISMISSED. The Court further
TIDS IS A FINAL JUDGMENT.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 	2.S'day of November, 2025.
9
DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge
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