Lewis v. Ballard et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Austin Tyler Lewis,
Plaintiff,
v.
Deputy 	Jocelyn 	Ballard, 	Deputy
Glasgow, Deputy Robert Valentine,
Raphael Fernando, Harris County
Constable Precinct 7, Harris County
Juvenile 	Probation 	Office, 	Harris
County 	Attorney’s 	Office, 	and
Harris County, Texas,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-04916
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
In this civil rights suit, multiple defendants have filed motions to dismiss
Plaintiff Austin Tyler Lewis’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Dkt. 6
(Deputy Robert Valentine’s original motion); Dkt. 14 (Harris County’s, Harris
County Attorney’s Office’s, and Harris County Juvenile Probation Office’s
motion); Dkt. 15 (Rafael Pruneda’s motion); Dkt. 16 (Deputy Jocelyn Ballard’s
motion); Dkt. 17 (Deputy Valentine’s renewed motion). 	Because Lewis failed
to respond, the motions are deemed unopposed. See S.D. Tex. L.R. 7.4. Having
carefully reviewed the motions, Lewis’s pleading, and the applicable law, it is
recommended that Deputy Valentine’s original motion to dismiss (Dkt. 6) be
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 15, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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denied as moot, the remaining motions to dismiss be granted, and that Lewis’s
claims be dismissed with prejudice. Lewis’s claims against Defendants Deputy
Glasgow and Harris County Constable Precinct 7 (“Precinct 7”) should also be
dismissed.
Background
The following facts are alleged in Lewis’s live, first amended complaint.
See Dkt. 7. They are taken as true at this stage.
This suit stems from an incident on January 12, 2023. 	On that date,
Lewis entered the Harris County Juvenile Probation Office “to submit a public
records 	request” 	and 	began 	recording 	video 	footage 	in 	the 	public 	areas,
purportedly 	as 	a 	“journalist 	documenting 	government 	activity 	for 	news-
gathering 	purposes 	....” 	See 	id. 	at 	2-3. 	After 	the 	staff 	summoned 	law
enforcement, Investigator Rafael Pruneda (mistakenly named as Raphael
Fernando) and Deputy Glasgow (first name not identified) arrived, detained
Lewis, and began questioning him. Id. at 3. Another deputy, Jocelyn Ballard,
handcuffed and searched Lewis and put him in a patrol car, without explaining
why he had been arrested. Id.
The same day, after Lewis was released, he went to the Precinct 7 office
to file a complaint and request records about his earlier detention. 	Id. at 4.
While at the office, Deputy Valentine ordered Lewis to turn off his camera. Id.
When Lewis refused, Deputy Valentine directed him out of the building and
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barred his reentry. 	Id. 	Following these events, Lewis submitted multiple
public 	records 	requests 	for 	access 	to 	body-worn 	camera 	footage, 	reports,
photographs, and videos of his arrest, which were ignored. Id. at 4-5.
On October 9, 2025—more than two years after the incident—Lewis filed
this suit, alleging that the various deputies violated his First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the Harris County entities should be
liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). 	Dkt. 1 at 3. 	His original complaint embeds a request for equitable
tolling, asserting without specifics that “Defendants engaged in concealment
and spoliation of evidence and continue to refuse compliance with lawful
records requests.” Id.
Deputy Valentine filed a motion to dismiss Lewis’s original complaint.
Dkt. 6. 	Lewis did not respond to Deputy Valentine’s motion, but filed an
amended complaint, Dkt. 7, which multiple defendants moved to dismiss
(collectively, the “Moving Defendants”). 	Dkt. 14 (Harris County’s, Harris
County Attorney’s Office’s, and Harris County Juvenile Probation Office’s
motion); Dkt. 15 (Investigator Pruneda’s motion); Dkt. 16 (Deputy Ballard’s
motion); Dkt. 17 (Deputy Valentine’s motion). 	Lewis did not respond. 	The
motions are ripe for resolution.
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Legal standard
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Rather,
“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken
as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will
reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” 	See Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56). When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.” 	Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. 	Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d
287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
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(per curiam)). 	But “regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or
is 	represented 	by 	counsel, 	conclusory 	allegations 	or 	legal 	conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss.” 	Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Tex., 73 F.4th 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)); see
also Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“[P]ro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the
right to relief above the speculative level.”).
Analysis
As an initial matter, Deputy Valentine’s motion to dismiss Lewis’s
original complaint (Dkt. 6) is moot because Lewis has since filed an amended
complaint (Dkt. 7), and Deputy Valentine has filed a renewed motion to dismiss
(Dkt. 17). 	But as Deputy Valentine and his fellow Moving Defendants assert,
most of Lewis’s claims are untimely. And although it is unclear when Lewis’s
Fourteenth Amendment “due process and spoilation” claim accrued, this claim
fails because he fails to allege a cognizable constitutional violation. 	Because
those deficiencies foreclose every theory of recovery, regardless of the named
defendant, all of Lewis’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
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I. 	Lewis’s First and Fourth Amendment claims are barred by the
statute of limitations.
Seeking dismissal, Moving Defendants argue that Lewis’s claims are
barred by limitations, and that there is no basis for tolling. Dkt. 14 at 5-8; Dkt.
15 at 5-8; Dkt. 16 at 5-8; Dkt. 17 at 5-8. 	Defendants are correct that Lewis’s
First and Fourth Amendment claims accrued more than two years before he
filed suit and are untimely. 	But it is unclear from Lewis’s pleading when the
events forming the basis of his Fourteenth Amendment claim occurred, so the
Court examines that claim separately. See infra Part II.
Although not explicitly invoked in the complaint, Section 1983 supplies
the federal cause of action for Lewis’s allegations that Defendants violated his
constitutional rights. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119-
20 (1992) (stating this principle). 	“Because no specified federal statute of
limitations exists for § 1983 suits, federal courts borrow the forum state’s
general or residual personal-injury limitations period.” Edmonds v. Oktibbeha
Cnty., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235,
249-50 (1989)). 	In Texas, the statute of limitations for personal-injury claims
is two years. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003.
The events giving rise to Lewis’s First and Fourth Amendment claims
occurred on the same day. 	Lewis claims that he was “retaliated against” for
“recording and requesting public records” on January 12, 2023 at the Harris
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County Juvenile Probation Office. Dkt. 7 at 2-4; 5. He complains that he was
wrongly arrested and subjected to excessive force during that same visit, and
that Deputy Valentine further “interfered with [his] protected recording by
intimidation” that same day. Id. So those claims accrued on January 12, 2023.
He therefore had until January 13, 2025—the first business day two years
after the incident occurred—to assert his claims. But Lewis filed this suit nine
months after the limitations period expired. See Dkt. 1 (filed October 9, 2025).
Those claims are time-barred.
Lewis did not respond to Moving Defendants’ timeliness challenge,
which bars him from doing so now. And his complaint failed to articulate any
valid basis for excusing his delay.
Because Texas’s statute of limitations governs all claims, so too does its
tolling principles. 	See Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892, 897 (5th Cir. 1998).
“As a general matter, equitable tolling pauses the running of, or ‘tolls,’ a
statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but
some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.”
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014). 	The Texas Supreme Court
“has not articulated a general test for determining when equitable tolling is
available ….” Levinson Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd., 670 S.W.3d.
622, 630 (Tex. 2023). But Texas has “recognized two doctrines that may delay
accrual 	or 	toll 	limitations: 	(1) 	the 	discovery 	rule 	and 	(2) 	fraudulent
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concealment.” Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 299 (Tex. 2015); see also
Moon v. City of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2018) (making the same
observation when analyzing timeliness of Section 1983 claims). 	Neither
exception applies.
The discovery rule “provides a ‘very limited exception to statutes of
limitations.’” 	King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 764 (5th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453,
455 (Tex. 1996), and applying tolling principles to Section 1983 claim). 	It
“defers accrual of the cause of action if ‘the nature of the injury incurred is
inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of injury is objectively verifiable.’”
Id. (quoting Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Tex. 1998)).
There is nothing inherently undiscoverable about Lewis’s injury. Lewis
was plainly aware of his encounters with the defendant officers when he was
arrested on January 12, 2023. The discovery rule does not apply.
Nor has Lewis plausibly alleged fraudulent concealment as a basis for
tolling the limitations period. Fraudulent concealment would require that the
defendant be “under a duty to make disclosure but fraudulently conceals the
existence of a cause of action from the party to whom it belongs.” 	See id.
(quoting Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983)). Moreover, tolling
based 	on 	fraudulent 	concealment 	ends 	when 	“a 	party 	learns 	of 	facts,
conditions, or circumstances which would cause a reasonably prudent person
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to make inquiry, which, if pursued, would lead to discovery of the concealed
cause of action.” Id. (quoting Borderlon, 661 S.W.2d at 909).
At 	most, 	Lewis’s 	complaint 	embeds 	a 	conclusory 	assertion 	that
Defendants concealed, failed to preserve, or destroyed records relating to his
arrest. 	See Dkt. 7 at 4-5. 	But Lewis cannot show that Defendants somehow
concealed the arrest itself. Because the statute of limitations expired long ago
and 	no 	basis 	for 	tolling 	applies, 	Lewis’s 	First 	Amendment 	and 	Fourth
Amendment claims against Moving Defendants should be dismissed.
II. 	Lewis lacks a Fourteenth Amendment interest in accessing his
arrest records.
As another theory, Lewis alleges that Defendants violated his due
process rights by failing to preserve records related to his arrest and by
ignoring his requests for those records. Dkt. 7 at 4-5, 6. Lewis does not specify
when he made those requests—nor when Defendants purportedly lost those
records, see Dkt. 1 at 2-3—so it is unclear whether this claim is timely. 	But,
as Defendants correctly argue, Lewis’s failure to allege a cognizable right to
access those records forecloses his Fourteenth Amendment claim. See Dkt. 14
at 11; Dkt. 15 at 13-14; Dkt. 16 at 12-13; Dkt. 17 at 11-12.
“In a section 1983 cause of action asserting a due process violation, a
plaintiff must first identify a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and then identify a state action that resulted in a
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deprivation of that interest.” 	Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935
(5th Cir. 1995). 	Lewis fails to identify such a protected interest. 	Both the
Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have held that “[n]either the First
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to
government information or sources of information within the government’s
control.” 	U.S. v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 915 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978)); see also Plustache v. Harrison, 2023 WL
3197043, at *2 (5th Cir. May 2, 2023) (per curiam) (due process claim based on
denied records request “fails because there is no generalized constitutional or
federal right to access documents under the control of state agencies or their
political subdivisions.”). 	Because Lewis has no Fourteenth Amendment right
to the disputed records, this claim is barred as a matter of law.
III. 	Lewis’s 	claims 	against 	Deputy 	Glasgow 	and 	Precinct 	7 	are
equally deficient.
Defendants Deputy Glasgow and Precinct 7 have not been served nor
entered an appearance in this case. See Dkt. 25 (Return of Service Unexecuted
as to Precinct 7); Dkt. 26 (same as to Deputy Glasgow). 	But the deficiencies
detailed above apply equally to Lewis’s claims against those two defendants,
which warrants dismissing his claims against them, too.
A district court can dismiss claims on its own motion “as long as the
procedure employed is fair.” 	Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir.
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2021) (quotation omitted). 	That generally means a court must first provide
notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. See id. But that
extra step is unnecessary when there is no prejudice to the plaintiff because
the allegations against both defendants are identical, and the reasons for
dismissing claims against the moving defendant apply equally to a non-moving
defendant. 1 	See Taylor v. Acxiom Corp., 612 F.3d 325, 340 (5th Cir. 2010)
(affirming sua sponte dismissal of claims against non-movants upon concluding
that identical allegations against other defendants were properly dismissed);
Vanderbol v. Tuller, 2019 WL 5691818, at *15 & n.31 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2019)
(using 	this 	rationale 	to 	dismiss 	identical 	claims 	against 	nonmoving
defendants), adopted by 2019 WL 4686362 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2019).
Under that standard, dismissing Lewis’s allegations against Deputy
Glasgow and Precinct 7 sua sponte would not be prejudicial. 	The complaint
contains the same allegations against Deputy Glasgow as it does against
Deputy Ballard, Deputy Valentine, and Investigator Pruneda, see Dkt. 7 at 5-
6, and raises the same allegations against Precinct 7 as it asserts against the
other municipal defendants, see id. at 6. 	Lewis had the chance to dispute the
1 Notably, too, the ensuing period for objecting to the undersigned’s recommendation
further provides another opportunity for Lewis to be heard. 	See Brown v. City of
Central, 2024 WL 546340, at *9 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2024) (characterizing this objections
period following a magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss claims sua sponte
as providing a “fair procedure” before the Court determines whether to adopt the
recommendation).
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limitations defense and his lack of a protected due process right, but he chose
not to do so. Nothing suggests that Lewis has a unique and valid basis to avoid
dismissal of his claims against the last two defendants.
Moreover, it would be incongruous not to dismiss his claims against
Deputy Glasgow and Precinct 7 when they are equally barred. 	See Lewis v.
Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting “it would be ‘incongruous’ and
‘unfair’ to allow some defendants to prevail, while not providing the same
benefit to similarly situated defendants”); see also Brown, 2024 WL 546340, at
*2 	(affirming 	dismissal 	of 	claims 	against 	non-served 	and 	non-appearing
defendants when claims were also time-barred). 	Lewis’s claims against all
Defendants should be dismissed.
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Deputy Robert
Valentine’s initial motion to dismiss (Dkt. 6) should be DENIED as moot.
It 	is 	further 	RECOMMENDED 	that 	Defendants 	Harris 	County’s,
Harris County’s Attorney’s Office’s, and Harris County Juvenile Probation
Office’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 14), Investigator Rafael Pruneda’s motion to
dismiss (Dkt. 15), Deputy Jocelyn Ballard’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 16), and
Deputy Robert Valentine’s renewed motion to dismiss (Dkt. 17) be GRANTED,
and that Plaintiff Austin Tyler Lewis’s claims against those defendants be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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It is further RECOMMENDED that Lewis’s claims against Defendants
Deputy Glasgow and Harris County Constable Precinct 7 be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on May 15, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_____________________________________
Y	Y	Y	Yvvoon	nne Y. Hoo
United States Magistrate Judge
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