Doty v. Sun Auto & Tire Service et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT CbURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CHARLES THOMAS DOTY, 	§
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
V. 	§ 	Civil Action No. H-25-4874
§
SUN AUTO & TIRE SERVICE, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Sun Auto & Tire Service's Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 5). Having considered the motion,
submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines that the pending motion
should be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This is a case involving an employment related dispute. Plaintiff Charles
Thomas Doty ("Doty"), a certified automotive technician, brings suit against his
former employer Defendant Sun Auto & Tire Service ("Sun Auto"). Doty alleges
that he experienced discrimination during his employment with Sun Auto, which
included: (1) being subject to "increased scrutiny" and "schedule manipulation" his
Caucasian co-worker was not; (2) performing "advanced mechanical work" beyond
his job classification without additional compensation; and (3) being presented with
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 05, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 1 of 11

four "fabricated" disciplinary write-ups. 1 Doty further alleges that he was ultimately
terminated on March 22, 2025, to "make room" for the district and store managers
to hire a "friend from high school" to replace Doty. 2
Based on the foregoing, on August 28, 2025, Doty filed suit in the Fort Bend
County 	268th 	Judicial 	District 	Court 	alleging 	claims 	for 	race 	and 	religious
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII")
and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), "unpaid wages and
misclassification" under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and Texas Labor
Code, and negligent supervision and retention under Texas common law. 3 On
October 13, 2025, Sun Auto removed the case to this Court pursuant to the Court's
diversity jurisdiction. On October 20,. 2025, Sun Auto filed a motion to dismiss
Doty's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 4 Doty did
not respond to the pending motion to dismiss within either the original response date
required under the federal rules, or the date of this Order.
1 See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 8-11.
2 See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 10.
3 See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 6-26.
4 See Defendant's Rule 12{b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, Document No. 5 at 1-15.
2
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 2 of 11

IL 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)( 6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces
does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' ... it demands more than . . . 'labels
and conclusions."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, " [t]he
'court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff."' In re Katrina Canal Breeches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.
2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F .3d 464,
467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
"Conversely, 'when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court."' Cuvillier
v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).
3
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 3 of 11

III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Sun Auto moves to dismiss Doty's complaint, contending that Doty fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doty did not respond to the motion
to dismiss, 	failing to rebut or offer evidence to 	counter any 	of Defendants'
contentions. 	Pursuant 	to 	Local 	Rule 	7.4, 	failure 	to 	respond 	is 	taken 	as 	a
representation ofno opposition. S.D. Tex. Local R. 7.4. Regardless ofDoty's failure
to respond to the pending motion to dismiss, the Court will consider, in tum, each
claim Sun Auto contends should be dismissed.
A. Race and Religious Discrimination Under Title VII and TCHRA
Doty brings claims for racial and religious discrimination pursuant to Title
VII and the TCHRA, alleging that Sun Auto discriminated against him because Doty
is both African American and Christian. Sun Auto contends that Doty's complaint
fails to set forth facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. Doty offers no rebuttal.
Federal courts evaluate Title VII claims for racial and religious discrimination
under the McDonnel Douglas 	burden-shifting analysis in instances where the
plaintiff has pled no direct evidence of discrimination. 	See Russell v. McKinney
Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. 	Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). "Under that framework, the plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which requires a showing that the
plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at
4
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 4 of 11

issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the
employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside his protected group or was
treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected
group." McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007). The Fifth
Circuit has consistently held that the "similarly situated" standard is met only when
the plaintiff shows that their circumstances and the comparator non-protected class
member's circumstances are "nearly identical." See Perez v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal
Justice, 395 F.3d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 2004).
Here, Sun Auto contends that Doty "has presented no facts to establish that he
was replaced by someone outside the protected class or similarly situated individuals
outside his protected class were treated more favorably." 5 Sun Auto further contends
that Doty failed to show a single similarly situated comparator that was treated more
favorably than him. Sun Auto further contends that Doty fails to plead facts that
establish that race or religion were the reasons for his termination. A review of the·
Complaint in this matter reveals the only comparator offered by Doty is a Mechanic,
a job duty that Doty describes in his complaint as being "outside of the scope of [his]
job description" which "require[ d] 	specialized training and certification." 6 Doty
5 See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Document No. 5
at 7.
6 See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 9.
5
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 5 of 11

further notes in his complaint his status as a "General Service Technician," which,
by 	Doty's 	own 	admission, 	does 	not 	have 	nearly 	identical 	job 	duties 	and
responsibilities to his comparator required under strong Fifth Circuit precedent. 7
Additionally, a review of boty's complaint reveals an admission by Doty that the
"real reason" for his termination was his managers desire to make room for a high
school friend, undercutting Doty's burden to show that his race or religion was the
basis for his termination. 8
Having considered the foregoing and the Fifth Circuit's strong guidance that
the circumstances of the plaintiff and the comparative non-protected claim member
must be nearly identical, the Court finds that Doty has failed to plead sufficient facts
to bring a Title VII or TCHRA claim that is anything more than speculative.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Doty's 	claims 	for 	racial 	and 	religious
discrimination should be dismissed. The Court will now consider Doty's claims for
retaliation under Title VII and TCHRA.
B. Retaliation Under Title VII and TCHRA
Doty brings claims for retaliation pursuant to Title VII and the TCHRA,
alleging that Sun Auto retaliated against him because Doty is both African American
7 See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 8-9.
8 See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 10-11.
6
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 6 of 11

and Christian. Sun Auto contends that Doty's complaint fails to set forth facts
sufficient to state a claim for relief. Doty offers no rebuttal.
Title VII retaliation claims that are based on circumstantial evidence are
analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969
F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that: ( 1) he engaged
in activity protected by Title VII; (2) a materially adverse employment action against
him occurred; and (3) there was a causal link between his protected activity and the
adverse action. See Brown, 969 F.3d at 577. To satisfy the causation prong, a causal
link is established if the facts show that the adverse employment action was "based
in part on knowledge of the employee's protected activity." Medina v. Ramsey Steel
Co., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001).
Here, Sun Auto contends that Doty fails to plead that any alleged protected
activity was the cause of his termination. Sun Auto notes for the Court Doty
allegation that his manager's desire to hire a friend was the "real" reason why Doty
was terminated. 9 Doty offers no rebuttal. Based on the foregoing, submissions, and
applicable law, the Court determines that Doty's claims for retaliation should be
9 See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 10-11.
7
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 7 of 11

dismissed. The Court will now consider Doty's claims for unpaid wages and
misclassification brought under the FLSA and Texas Labor Code.
C. Wage Claims Under the FLSA and Texas Labor Code
Doty alleges that Sun Auto is liable under both the FLSA and Texas Labor
Code for not properly paying him higher wages for performing certain work at a
higher level than his experience. Sun Auto contends that Doty's claims for unpaid
wages and misclassification fail as a matter of law because they are not cognizable
under the FLSA or Texas Labor Code. Doty offers no rebuttal.
The 	FLSA provides 	civil 	causes 	of action 	only 	for 	"unpaid 	overtime
compensation" and "unpaid minimum wages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b ). "Without a claim
for either the minimum wage or the overtime premium rate, [a plaintiff] is not
alleging aFLSA violation." Karnav. BP Corp. N Am.,Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 809,816
(S.D. Tex. 204), aff'd, 609 F. App'x 814 (5th Cir. 2015). Similar to the FLSA, the
Texas Labor Code does not provide a cause of action for alleged failures to pay
wages at a certain rate. See Tex. Labor Code §§60.011, 60.018.
Here, Sun Auto contends that Doty fails to allege that he was not paid
minimum wage or overtime. Rather, a review of the complaint in this matter reveals
that Doty only alleges that Sun Auto failed to pay him at a higher rate for the tasks
he performed. Accordingly, the Court finds that Doty has failed to plead a recognized
claim under the FLSA or Texas Labor Code, and thus, his wage-related claims
8
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 8 of 11

should be dismissed. The Court will now consider Doty's claims for negligent
supervision and retention brought under state common law.
D. Negligent Supervision and Retention Under State Common Law
Doty asserts claims for negligent supervision and retention, alleging that Sun
Auto breached a duty to Doty by employing Dusty, "a mechanic who repeatedly
reported to work under the influence of drugs and alcohol, posed a danger to
coworkers and customers, and demonstrated a consistent pattern of unprofessional
and unsafe behavior in the workplace." 10 Sun Auto contends that Doty fails to plead
any facts that any harm or damages resulted from Sun Auto's retention of Doty' s
coworker Dusty. Doty offers no rebuttal. Considering both Texas and federal courts'
clear guidance that damages must be actual, and not merely speculative, the Court
finds that Doty's claims for negligent supervision and retention brought under state
common law should be dismissed.
E. Unserved Doe Defendants
Doty also asserts claims against "Does 	1-25," which Doty describes 	as
unidentified "agents, employees, and representatives of their fellow co-defendants
... vicariously liable for the acts of each other." 11 The Court notes that Doty filed
10 See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 21.
11 See Plaintiff's Original Petition, Document No. 1, Exhibit A at 7.
9
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 9 of 11

this case in state court on August 28, 2025. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m), service was required to be made upon all Defendants ninety days
later, by November 26, 2025. A review of the record in this case reveals that Doty
has failed to serve any of the unidentified Doe Defendants either by the timeline
required under the Federal Rules or by the date of this Order. Based on the foregoing,
the Court finds that Doty's claims against the unidentified Doe Defendants should
be dismissed.
Having considered the pending motion, submissions, and applicable law, the
Court finds that Doty states no plausible claim upon which relief can be granted with
respect to the defendants in this case. Accordingly, the Court determines that the
pending motion should be granted, and Doty's claims against all defendants in this
matter should be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS Defendant Sun Auto & Tire Service's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss (Document No. 5) is GRANTED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff Charles Thomas Doty's claims against all Defendants
are DISMISSED.
THIS IS A FINAL JUDGMENT.
10
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 10 of 11

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this _rday of December, 2025.
11
DAVID HITTNER,
United States District Judge
Case 4:25-cv-04874 Document 6 Filed on 12/05/25 in TXSD Page 11 of 11