Woodson v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC et al The Clerk shall reject all submissions from Woodson unless explicitly authorized.

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Case 4:25-cv-04700 Document 73 Filed 03/02/26 in TXSD Page1of/7
United States District Court

Southem District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 02, 2026
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
Joshua DeAnthony Woodson, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§ Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-04700
V. §
§
Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, §
LoanCare, LLC, Robertson, §
Anschutz, Schneid, Crane & §
Partners, PLLC, §
§
Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

On February 27, 2026, Plaintiff Joshua DeAnthony Woodson filed an
“Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [(“TRO”)] and
Preliminary Injunction” to prevent a foreclosure sale of his property, which is
scheduled for March 3, 2026. Dkt. 70. He also requests that his motion be
resolved before Defendants have an opportunity to respond. This Court should
deny the motion.

Woodson made a similar request at the outset of this case, which this
Court denied. See Dkt. 7. As the Court observed, Woodson had ample advance
notice about the scheduled foreclosure proceeding (then set for October 7,
2025), yet waited until October 1, 2025 to seek relief. See id. at 1-2. But now,

Woodson is attempting a similar ploy. This time, he waited until two business

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days before the March 3, 2026 (re-)scheduled foreclosure sale to renew his
request for temporary relief. And Woodson asks this Court to grant his request
without giving Defendants a chance to respond. As explained below, Woodson’s
unjustified delay alone provides ample reason to deny relief. 	But he also
cannot satisfy other requirements for an injunction.
“The standards governing a request for a preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order are the same.” United States v. Brooks, 2006 WL
2323057, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2006). To obtain relief, a movant “must show
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of
irreparable harm absent the injunction, (3) that the harm she will suffer
without the injunction outweighs the cost to comply with the injunction, and
(4) that the injunction is in the public interest.” 	Harrison v. Young, 48 F.4th
331, 339 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Jefferson Cmty. Health Care Ctrs., Inc. v.
Jefferson 	Par. 	Gov’t, 	849 	F.3d 	615, 	624 	(5th 	Cir. 	2017)). 	Due 	to 	its
“extraordinary” nature, courts cannot grant preliminary injunctive unless “the
movant has clearly carried the burden” of persuasion on all four factors. 	See
Guy 	Carpenter 	& 	Co. 	v. 	Provenzale, 	334 	F.3d 	459, 	464 	(5th 	Cir. 	2003).
Ultimately, the decision whether to grant such relief lies in the district court’s
sound discretion. 	See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985).
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Here, the emergency is one of Woodson’s own making. 	Woodson laid
behind the log and ambushed Defendants with an eleventh-hour request. Even
setting aside Woodson’s impairment of Defendants’ ability to respond, his
unjustified delay undermines Woodson’s position that irreparable harm would
result unless he obtains a TRO or injunction. Segars Props., LLC v. US Bank
Nat’l Ass’n, 2014 WL 61159, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2014) (denying preliminary
injunction request filed on the eve of a scheduled foreclosure sale, observing
that 	plaintiffs 	“manufactur[ed] 	an 	‘emergency’”). 	Woodson’s 	evident
gamesmanship also tips the equities heavily against his request. See, e.g., Las
Americas Immigrant Advoc. Ctr. v. Paxton, 2024 WL 4430543, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 27, 2024) (balance of equities strongly disfavors last-minute requests for
TRO that lack any explanation for the belated filing). For those reasons alone,
the motion should be denied.
But Woodson also fails to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits.
First, Woodson’s referenced claims against Defendant LoanCare, LLC, and
Defendant Robertson, Anschutz, Schneid, Crane & Partners, PLLC (“RASCP”)
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), see Dkt. 70 at 3, are
barred as a matter of law. Neither LoanCare, who services the loan, see Dkt. 45
at 2, nor RASCP, the law firm retained to enforce non-judicial foreclosure
proceedings, see id.—qualifies as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. 	See
Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466, 477 (2019) (“[T]hose who
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engage in only nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings are not debt collectors
within the meaning of the Act.”); Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197,
1208 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the legislative history to 15 U.S.C.
§ 1629a(6) “indicates conclusively that a debt collector does not include ... a
mortgage servicing company”); Montgomery v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 459 F.
App’x 424, 428 n.1 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[M]ortgage lenders are not ‘debt collectors’
within the meaning of the FDCPA.”).
Second, 	Woodson’s 	assertion 	that 	he 	has 	“standing” 	to 	challenge
Defendant 	Lakeview 	Loan 	Servicing, 	LLC’s 	chain 	of 	assignments 	is
irrelevant. 1 	See Dkt. 70 at 3. 	In addition to being wholly conclusory, that
theory 	is 	found 	nowhere 	in 	his 	amended 	complaint 	and 	is 	therefore
disregarded. See Dkt. 45 (no mention of this).
Third, Woodson’s vague reference to “Retaliatory Foreclosure” does not
justify an injunction. 	See Dkt. 70 at 3. 	The cited portions of his pleading
complain about certain statements during this litigation by Lakeview—who is
the mortgagee, see Dkt. 45 at 2—by LoanCare, or their attorneys concerning
service 	of 	process, 	requests 	for 	extension, 	and 	various 	facts 	and 	legal
1 Notably, too, Woodson’s allegation alludes to a theory that Lakeview cannot
foreclose unless it produces the original note. 	That is not a viable theory. 	See
Arrington v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2013 WL 1352227, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2,
2013) (“Production of the original note, however, is not necessary to foreclose
pursuant to a deed of trust in Texas.” (collecting authorities)).
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propositions in briefs filed with this Court. 	See Dkt. 45 ¶¶ 37-44. 	Those
allegations have no bearing on whether Lakeview or any entity acting on its
behalf is entitled to exercise its right to non-judicial foreclosure.
For somewhat different reasons, Woodson’s breach-of-contract claim also
fails to support injunctive relief. 	According to this theory, Woodson had a
forbearance agreement with Defendants for March, April, and May 2025,
which Defendants violated by initiating foreclosure proceedings on May 28,
2025. See Dkt. 70 at 3. But even assuming that were true—despite Woodson’s
failure 	to 	present 	evidence 	substantiating 	his 	allegations—it 	would 	only
prevent Defendants from foreclosing for non-payment during the three months
specified in that agreement. 	It would not prevent Defendants from exercising
the right to foreclose if Woodson failed to make mortgage payments after the
forbearance agreement expired by its own terms.
Yet 	Woodson 	provides 	no 	specifics 	regarding 	the 	current 	notice 	of
foreclosure, apart from the date and time of the scheduled sale. 	He has
proffered nothing substantiating a nexus between the purported breach of a
narrow forbearance agreement that ended almost a year ago and the imminent
foreclosure sale that was scheduled sometime after Woodson filed this suit. As
a result, Woodson cannot show a likelihood that his breach-of-contract claim,
even if proved, would entitle him to enjoin the foreclosure sale. 	Cf. Beaullieu
v. I.R.S., 2011 WL 4343807, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 9, 2011) (denying request for
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TRO to release a levy when the operative statute did not permit that relief);
Nogales v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 524 F. Supp. 3d 538, 544-45 (N.D. Tex. 2021)
(denying plaintiff’s request for TRO to compel his early release when plaintiff’s
allegations, even taken as true, would not entitle him to the requested relief),
aff’d, 2022 WL 851738 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022) (per curiam). 	The lack of any
demonstrated 	link 	between 	Woodson’s 	breach-of-contract 	theory 	and 	the
current foreclosure sale also underscores why the balance of equities weighs
against issuing a TRO or preliminary injunction.
In 	short, 	Woodson 	has 	not 	substantiated 	an 	entitlement 	to 	the
extraordinary relief he seeks. His motion for TRO and preliminary injunction
should be denied.
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Joshua
Deanthony Woodson’s Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 70) be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
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Case 4:25-cv-04700 Document 73 Filed 03/02/26 in TXSD Page 7 of 7

Signed on March 2, 2026, at Houston, Texas.

Jom. A

Yédane Y. HS

United States Magistrate Judge