Fowler v. Lamar Consolidated Independent School District et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
C HELSA FOWLER, INDIVIDUALLY 	§
AND AS N EXT OF FRIEND OF H.D.F., 	§
A MINOR, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL A CTION N O. 4:25-cv-04370
§
L AMAR CONSOLIDATED I NDEPENDENT 	§
SCHOOL D ISTRICT, ET . AL., 	§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendant Lamar Consolidated Independent School
District’s (“District”) Motion to Dismiss.1 ECF 6. 	The District moves to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The District also raises an immunity defense. For the reasons discussed
below, the Court RECOMENDS that Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background.
This case concerns the alleged mistreatment of Plaintiff’s son by Daniel
Gamboa, a teacher at the District’s Adolphus Elementary School, during the 2024-
2025 school year. ECF 1-1 at 6-7. Plaintiff alleges Gamboa subjected her child to
1 The District Judge referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), the Cost and Delay Reduction Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act,
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. ECF 7.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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“unfair 	treatment, 	verbal 	mistreatment, 	and 	discriminatory 	conduct,
which caused Plaintiff’s son emotional distress. 	Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims Gamboa
also mistreated other African American students. Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that she
contacted school officials three times in October and November 2024 regarding the
mistreatment, but the District failed to take corrective action. Id. at 7-8.
Plaintiff brings claims for Texas common law negligence and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as well as claims under the Texas Constitution, and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Id. at 9. 	The District removed this case from state court on
September 15, 2025. ECF 1. The District filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF 6) and
then a Reply (ECF 10), explaining that Plaintiff failed to file a response. Under the
Local Rules, failure to file a response is taken as no opposition to the motion. S.D.
T EX. L OC. R. 7.4. However, “unopposed motions to dismiss that dispose of litigation
may not be automatically granted.” 	See Garza v. Formosa Plastics Corp., No.
CIV.A. V-10-54, 2011 WL 121562, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2011). The Motion is
ripe for adjudication.
II. 	Legal Standards.
A. 12(b)(1) standards.
When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the court “is free to weigh the
evidence and resolve factual disputes in order to satisfy itself that it has power to
hear the case.” Montez v. Dep’t of the Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 2004); Krim
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v. Pcorder.com, 402 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2005). The Court may consider any of
the following in resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the
complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed
facts. Hopkins v. Wayside Schs., No. 23-50600, 2024 WL 3738478, at *4 (5th Cir.
Aug. 9, 2024); Schaeffler v. United States, 889 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 2018). When
a Defendant files a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d
380, 388 (5th Cir. 2014). If the plaintiff fails to meet his burden, the case must be
dismissed. Id.
B. 12(b)(6) standards.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the conduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court “accepts all
well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Alexander v. AmeriPro Funding, Inc., 848 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing
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Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.
2004)). However, the court does not apply the same presumption to conclusory
statements or legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Generally, the court may consider only the allegations in the complaint and
any attachments thereto in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. If a motion to dismiss
refers to matters outside the pleading it is more properly considered as a motion for
summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). However, the court may take judicial
notice of public documents and may also consider documents a defendant attaches
to its motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) if the documents are referenced in the
plaintiff’s complaint and central to the plaintiffs’ claims. See Norris v. Hearst
Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000); King v. Life Sch., 809 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579
n.1 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
III. 	Analysis.
A. Defendant’s sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s tort claims.
“School districts in Texas retain their sovereign/governmental immunity from
all common law claims unless the Texas Legislature has expressly waived immunity
in a specific statute.” A.W. v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 F. Supp. 3d 973, 1006
(S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d sub nom. King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d
754 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Mission Consolidated I.S.D. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653,
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655 (Tex. 2008)). The Texas Tort Claims Act “generally waives governmental
immunity to the extent that liability arises from the ‘use of a motor-driven vehicle
or motor-driven equipment’ or from ‘a condition or use of tangible personal or real
property.’” Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 655–66 (quoting T EX. CIV. PRAC. & REM . CODE
§ 101.021). “For school districts, the Act’s waiver is even narrower, encompassing
only tort claims involving the use or operation of motor vehicles.” Id. at 656 (citing
T EX. CIV. PRAC. & R EM . CODE § 101.051); See A.W. v. Humble, 25 F. Supp. 3d at
1006 (“Under the TTCA the only permissible tort claim against a school district is a
claim based on misuse of a motor vehicle.”).
The factual allegations supporting Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress do not involve use of a motor vehicle.
Further, 	the 	TTCA 	expressly 	preserves 	sovereign 	immunity 	“for 	claims 	of
intentional torts.” 	Humphreys v. City of Ganado, Tex., 467 F. App'x 252, 256 (5th
Cir. 2012) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC . & REM . CODE § 101.057(2)). 	Therefore,
Plaintiff’s tort claims against the district are barred by sovereign immunity and
should be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff’s state constitutional claim should be dismissed because
the Texas Constitution Article I, § 3a does not provide a private
right of action for damages.
The Texas Constitution establishes that “[e]quality under the law shall not be
denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.” Tex. Const.
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art. I, § 3a. 	Plaintiff seeks money damages only for the alleged violation of § 3a.
ECF 1-1 at 9. 	Section 3a does not provide a private right of action for damages.
K.T. v. Natalia I.S.D., No. SA-09-CV-285-XR, 2010 WL 1484709, at *6 (W.D. Tex.
Apr. 12, 2010); Vincent v. W. Tex. St. Univ., 895 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1995) (no pet.). Therefore, this claim should be dismissed.
C. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the District should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
1. The alleged facts do not demonstrate unequal treatment or
discriminatory intent.
The Fourteenth Amendment2 guarantees the right to equal protection. U.S.
Const. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). See also City
of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (explaining that
the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.”). 	Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows an individual to
seek redress for a violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights. The essential elements
of a § 1983 claim are: (1) a violation of a constitutional right (2) by a person acting
2 Construing pro se Plaintiff’s petition liberally, the Court interprets her § 1983 claim as alleging
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See ECF 1-1 at 9 (“Defendants, acting under color of
state law, discriminated against Plaintiff’s child based on his race, depriving him of equal
protection”).
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under color of state law. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th
Cir. 2000). 	To plead racial discrimination as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause as part of a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must allege (1) that they were treated
differently from a similarly situated individual of a different race, and (2) that the
differential 	treatment 	was 	motivated 	by 	discriminatory 	intent.” 	Quiroz 	v.
Hernandez, 167 F.4th 254, 261 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch.
Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 412 (5th Cir. 2015). 	“To establish discriminatory intent, a
plaintiff must show that the decision maker singled out a particular group for
disparate treatment and selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose
of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable group.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Plaintiff alleges Gamboa subjected her child to “unfair treatment, verbal
mistreatment, and discriminatory conduct.” 	ECF 1-1 at 7. 	These conclusory
allegations lack specific facts and fail to show Gamboa treated Plaintiff’s son
differently than similarly situated individuals outside his protected class. 	See
Harrower as next friends of J.H.1 v. Eastland Indep. Sch. Dist., 786 F. Supp. 3d 998,
1022 (N.D. Tex. 2025) (explaining that Section 1983 complaints must plead specific
facts alleging cognizable constitutional violations). 	Although Plaintiff alleged
Gamboa mistreated other African American students, that allegation does not
support 	an 	inference 	of 	discriminatory 	intent 	because 	Plaintiff 	provides 	no
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comparison with similarly situated, non-African American students. See Mohamed
for A.M. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 252 F. Supp. 3d 602, 616 (N.D. Tex. 2017)
(dismissing plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause claim because plaintiff failed to
allege “that the [school district] treated [plaintiff’s son] differently because of his
race or religion than other students involved in similar disciplinary situations.”);
Mandawala v. Ne. Baptist Hosp., 16 F.4th 1144, 1151 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining
that “bare and conclusory [evidence] . . . does not come close to allowing a
reasonable inference of intentional discrimination.”).
2. Plaintiff fails to plead a Monell claim.
Local government entities, such as a school district, can only be liable under
§ 1983 when the constitutional violation “was the result of the school district’s
official policy, custom, or practice.” 	A.W. v. Humble, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
Therefore, in addition to the § 1983 requirements discussed above, Plaintiff must
plausibly allege “1) a policymaker; 2) an official policy; 3) and a violation of
constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom.” Rivera v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A policy can be shown through: written policy statements, ordinances, or
regulations; “a widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to
constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy;” and a single decision in
“rare circumstances” when the specific act that forms the basis of the § 1983 claim
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is performed by the final policy-making authority. 	Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph,
925 F.3d 209, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to allege the involvement of the District as a policymaker
or the existence of a policy. 	Plaintiff fails to allege the District’s policymaker, its
Board of Trustees, had any actual or constructive knowledge of a purported policy
or was involved in any way in Gamboa’s mistreatment of her son. 	“Texas law is
clear that final policymaking authority in an independent school district . . . rests
with the district's board of trustees.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241,
1245 (5th Cir. 1993). 	Absent allegations that the alleged discrimination resulted
from the District’s official policy, custom, or practice, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims must
be dismissed. 	See A.W. v. Humble, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 (dismissing a § 1983
claim 	because 	the 	complaint 	failed 	“to 	allege 	facts 	capable 	of 	linking 	any
unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom to [the] Board of Trustees.”); Fletcher
v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:14CV359, 2016 WL 3381296, at *6 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 9, 2016) (dismissing a § 1983 claim against a school district because plaintiff
failed to plead that the district’s board had actual or constructive knowledge of the
events at issue), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:14CV359, 2016 WL
1383879 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2016). Further, the allegations that Gamboa mistreated
other African American students is insufficiently specific or numerous enough to
allege a pattern that constitutes a customary policy. 	See Jackson v. Valdez, 852 F.
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App'x 129, 135 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining that for a pattern to be a policy it must
include numerous, similar, and specific incidents).
IV. 	Conclusion and Recommendation.
For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant
Lamar Consolidated Independent School District’s Motion (ECF 6) be GRANTED
and all claims against it be DISMISSED.
The 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	shall 	send 	copies 	of 	the 	memorandum 	and
recommendation to the respective parties, who will then have fourteen days to file
written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 	Failure to file written
objections within the time period provided will bar an aggrieved party from attacking
the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on
other grounds.
Christina A. Bryan
United States Magistrate Judge
Signed on April 20, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
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