Kinder Morgan, Inc. v. United States Department of Labor et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
KINDER MORGAN, INC., §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. §
§
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF §
LABOR, a federal administrative §
agency; THE OFFICE OF §
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, an §
administrative subdivision of § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-3651
the United States Department of §
Labor; LORI CHAVEZ-DEREMER, in §
her official capacity as §
Secretary of the United States §
Department of Labor; JOHN M. §
HERKE, in his official capacity §
as an Administrative Law Judge §
of the United States Department §
of Labor; and JAMES JACKSON, §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Kinder Morgan, Inc. ("Plaintiff") brought this action against
the United States Department of Labor, the Office of Administrative
Law Judges, Lori Chavez-Deremer, John M. Herke (collectively,
"Defendants"), and James Jackson, alleging that the administrative
procedures under the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act ("PSIA")
violate its rights under the Seventh Amendment and Article II of
the United States Constitution. Pending before the court is
Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for
Surrnnary Judgment, and Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 15, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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("Defendants' MTDn ) (Docket Entry No. 3 3) and Plaintiff I s Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry No. 4). For the reasons
stated below, Defendants 1 MTD will be denied and Plaintiff's Motion
for Preliminary Injunction will be granted.
The PSIA prohibits
employees that engage
I. Background
employers from discriminating against
in whistleblowing activity related to
pipeline safety. 49 U.S.C. § 60129(a)(1)(A). The Department of
Labor ("DOL0 ) and the Secretary of Labor are statutorily
responsible for investigating and adjudicating complaints alleging
whistleblower retaliation under the PSIA. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 60129(b)(1), (2). Employees who believe their employer violated
PSIA may file a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA"). Upon receiving the complaint, OSHA must
investigate the complaint and issue "written findings as to whether
or not there is reasonable cause to believe that [the employer] has
discriminated against [the employee] in violation of the [PSIA] .n
Id. § 60129(b) (2) (A); 29 C.F.R. § 1981.l0S(a). An employee or
employer may file an objection to OSHA's findings. 49 U.S.C.
§ 60129(b)(2)(A). DOL has delegated the statutory responsibility
for adjudicating PSIA whistleblower complaints to the Office of
Administrative Law Judges ("OALJ"). If an objection is filed, the
OALJ appoints an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to hold a hearing
on the record and to issue a final order. 29 C.F.R. § 1981.107.
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A party may obtain review of a final order in the United States
Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation allegedly
occurred or in which the complainant resided on the date of such
violation. 49 U.S.C. § 60129 (b) (4) (A).
On April 2, 2020, James Jackson, a former employee of
Plaintiff, filed a complaint with OSHA alleging that Plaintiff
violated the PSIA by terminating his employment because he had
raised safety concerns. 1 Finding that there was no "reasonable
cause to believe a violation of [the PSIA] occurred," OSHA
dismissed Jackson's complaint on January 6, 2021. 2 On February 4,
2021, Jackson filed an objection to OSHA's findings and requested
a hearing on the record. 3 The case was assigned to an ALJ on
March 10, 2021. 4 On December 15, 2023, the presiding ALJ scheduled
a two-week hearing on Jackson's claims that was to begin on
February 5, 2024. 5 However, after receiving the parties' motions
in limine, the ALJ canceled the administrative trial and instead
1 Complaint for Declaratory
("Complaint"), Docket Entry No. 1, p.
reference the pagination imprinted at
court's Electronic Case Filing system.
and Injunctive Relief
8 1 40. All page numbers
the top of the page by the
2Secretary's Findings, Exhibit C to Complaint, Docket Entry
No. 1-3, pp. 2, 4.
3 Complainant Jackson's Objections to DOL Findings and Request
for a Hearing, Exhibit D to Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1-4, p. 2.
4Notice of Case Assignment and Prehearing Order, Exhibit A to
Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1-1, p. 2.
5Arnended Hearing Order and Filing Deadlines, Exhibit G to
Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1-7, p. 2.
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held a hearing on the parties' motions. 6 On August 5, 2024, the
ALJ 1 s law clerk emailed the parties' counsel to schedule a status
conference to discuss setting the date for the formal hearing. 7
Although the parties' counsel exchanged emails regarding potential
hearing dates, Jackson's counsel rejected each date that was
proposed by Plaintiff's counsel. 8 On July 24, 2025, the ALJ
scheduled a video conference for August 7, 2025, to discuss the
case with parties' counsel. 9
On August 6, 2025, Plaintiff brought this action in the
Southern District of Texas seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. 10 Plaintiff argues that the administrative proceedings
under the PSIA violate the United States Constitution by
(1) allowing the OALJ to conduct a hearing in violation of the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and (2) insulating ALJs
from presidential removal in violation of the Take Care Clause of
Article II. 11 Plaintiff asks this court to temporarily enjoin the
proceedings until the court is able to make a decision on the
6 Order Canceling Formal Hearing and Setting Preliminary
Motions Hearing Session, Exhibit H to Complaint, Docket Entry
No. 1-8, p. 2.
7Email from Law Clerk to Judge Herke, Exhibit J to Complaint,
Docket Entry No. 1-10, p. 13.
at 1-12.
9 Email from OALJ Shannon Shedd, Exhibit M to Complaint, Docket
Entry No. 1-13, p. 2.
10 complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 1, 22.
11Id. at 11-21.
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merits.12 On September 24, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss arguing that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. 13
Defendants also argue that even if the court has jurisdiction,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff's
claims are foreclosed as a matter of law. 14 Plaintiff filed a
response on October 15, 2025, and Defendants filed a reply on
December 4, 2025 . 15
II. Analysis
A. The court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
claims.
Defendants argue that the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because the PSIA expressly
strips district courts of jurisdiction .16 Plaintiff argues that the
12Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Docket Entry
No. 4, p. 10.
13Defendants I MTD, Docket Entry No. 33, pp. 8-9 .
at 9.
15Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Its Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and Response to Government's Motion to Dismiss, or in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Reply"), Docket
Entry No. 41; Federal Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion
to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
("Defendants' Reply"), Docket Entry No. 50.
16Defendants' MTD, Docket Entry No. 33, pp. 13-15. The
relevant part of the PSIA states:
(A) [] A person aggrieved by a final order of the
Commission entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain
review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals
for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal
(continued... )
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PSIA neither explicitly nor implicitly strips district courts of
jurisdiction over its claims .17
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts have original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. "With respect to federal agencies, however, Congress can
'divest[] district courts of their ordinary jurisdiction' by
substituting 'an alternative scheme of review' within an
agency-where the agency's final decision is reviewable by an
Article III court of appeals." Wulf eric I LLC v. U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, 793 F.Supp.3d 830, 838 (N.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting
Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 S. Ct. 890,
900 (2023)). "Sometimes Congress does so in explicit terms,
'providing in so many words that district court jurisdiction will
yield.'" Wulferic. LLC, 793 F.Supp.3d at 838 (quoting�, 143
S. Ct. at 900). "Other times, it does so implicitly, leaving open
16 ( .•.continued)
place of business, or for the District of Columbia
Circuit, by filing in such court, within sixty days after
the entry of the order, a written petition requesting
that the order be modified or set aside in whole or in
part.
(B) [] An order of the Secretary of Labor with respect to
which review could have been obtained under subparagraph
(A) shall not be subject to judicial review in any
criminal or other civil proceeding.
49 U.S.C. § 60129(b)(4).
17 Plaintiff's Reply, Docket Entry No. 41, pp. 11-14.
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the question whether the statutory review scheme is exclusive."
Wulferic, LLC, 793 F.Supp.3d at 838 (quoting id.).
1. The PSIA does not explicitly strip district courts of
their§ 1331 jurisdiction.
To determine whether a statute explicitly strips a district
court of its§ 1331 jurisdiction, courts "examine whether 'the text
expressly limit [s] the jurisdiction that other statutes
confer on district courts.'" Burgess v. Whang, 152 F.4th 579, 585
(5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bank of Louisiana v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp., 919 F.3d 916, 923 (5th Cir. 2019)). "For example,
in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care. Inc., 120 S. Ct.
1084 (2000) [,] the Supreme Court interpreted a Medicare regulation
to explicitly preclude district court jurisdiction when it read:
'No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer
or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 .
of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this
subchapter. ' "
S. Ct. at 1092).
Burgess, 152 F.4th at 585 (quoting Shalala, 120
Al though the text of the PSIA explicitly strips district
courts of jurisdiction over claims involving an order that has been
issued by the Department of Labor, the text does not strip district
courts of their jurisdiction over any other type of claim. 49
U.S.C. § 60129(b)(4)(A) and (B).
Relying on Burgess, which held that the text of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)(1) explicitly stripped district courts of jurisdiction
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over a plaintiff's constitutional claims, Defendants argue that the
text of the PSIA explicitly strips district courts of jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's claims.18 152 F.4th at 594. However, because the
statutory language discussed in Burgess substantially differs from
the statutory language here, Burgess is not controlling. See
Cochran v. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 20 F.4th 194,
204 (5th Cir. 2021) (discussing that Bank of Louisiana, which held
that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) explicitly stripped district courts of
jurisdiction, did "not mandate the outcome" for the Exchange Act
because "the statutory-review scheme at issue in [Bank of
Louisiana] differed in a key respect from the Exchange Act's: in
Bank of Louisiana, the scheme included an explicit statutory bar on
any court enjoining 'the issuance or enforcement of any .
[FDIC] order'" (quoting Bank of Louisiana, 919 F. 3d at 920)) ;
compare 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (" [NJ o court shall have jurisdiction
to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of
any notice or order under any such section, or to review, modify,
suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order.")
(emphasis added), with 49 U.S.C. § 60129(b)(4)(B) ("An order of the
Secretary of Labor with respect to which review could have been
obtained under subparagraph (A) shall not be subject to judicial
review in any criminal or other civil proceeding."} (emphasis
added). Unlike 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1), which refers to suspending
18Defendants' Reply, Docket Entry No. 50, p. 11.
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any order of the FDIC, the PSIA refers only to orders that have
been issued by the Department of Labor after a hearing on the
record has been held by an ALJ. Therefore, the PSIA does not
explicitly strip district courts of their § 1331 jurisdiction.
2. The PSIA does not implicitly strip district courts of
their§ 1331 jurisdiction.
To discern whether a statute implicitly strips district courts
of their § 1331 jurisdiction courts apply a two-step analysis.
Burgess, 152 F.4th at 586. "First, courts consider whether 'the
statutory scheme displays a fairly discernible intent to limit
jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (2010). To
answer this question, courts look to the "text, structure, and
purpose" of the statutory scheme." Elgin v. Department of
Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (2012). "Second, courts ask
whether 'the claims at issue are of the type Congress intended to
be reviewed within the statutory structure.'" Burgess, 152 F.4th
at 586 (quoting Free Enterprise, 130 S. Ct. at 3138). To answer
this question, courts examine whether (1) "preclusion could
foreclose all meaningful judicial review," (2) the suit is "wholly
collateral to a statute's review provisions," and (3) the claims
are "outside the agency's expertise." Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771, 779 (1994).
In Cochran a plaintiff brought suit in a federal district
court alleging that the administrative procedures under § 78y of
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were unconstitutional. 20
F.4th at 198.19 Applying the two-step analysis, the court found
that § 78y did not implicitly strip the district court of
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's constitutional claims. Id. at
199-212. First, the court found that the text of § 78y did not
implicitly strip the district court of jurisdiction because (1) the
statute was silent about people "who have not yet received a final
order" and about people "who have claims that have nothing to do
with" a final order, (2) the statute is phrased in permissive terms
and therefore cannot be interpreted to eliminate alternative routes
to federal court review, and (3) Congress used mandatory terms in
other parts of the statute. Id. at 199-201. Second, applying the
Thunder Basin factors, the court found that the claims at issue
were not of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within the
statutory structure because (1) the plaintiff's claims were wholly
collateral to the statutory scheme, 20 (2) the plaintiff's claims
19The relevant part of the statute reads:
A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission
entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain review of the
order in the United States Court of Appeals for the
circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of
business, or for the District of Columbia Circuit, by
filing in such court, within sixty days after the entry
of the order, a written petition requesting that the
order be modified or set aside in whole or in part.
15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).
20 The court found that because the plaintiff was seeking an
injunction, which is relief that the statutory scheme in§ 78y was
(continued... )
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were outside the SEC 1 s expertise, and {3) the statutory scheme
threatened to deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity for
meaningful review. 21 at 207-12.
The court concludes that the PSIA does not implicitly strip
the district court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff's constitutional
claims. First, the text of the PSIA, like § 78y, {1) is silent
about people "who have not yet received a final order" and about
people �who have claims that have nothing to do with" a final order
and {2) uses permissive language when referring to appealing to a
court of appeals. Compare id. at 200-201.
Second, under the Thunder Basin factors, Plaintiff's claims
are not the type of claim Congress intended to funnel through the
administrative procedures under the PSIA. Plaintiff's claims are
wholly collateral to the statutory scheme in the PSIA because
Plaintiff is asking for injunctive relief, which the PSIA is not
designed to offer.
§ 60129 (b) {3) (B) .
Cochran, 2 0 F.4th at 2 0 7 ; 4 9 U. S. C.
Plaintiff's claims are also outside OSHA's
expertise because the claim does not depend on a special
understanding of labor laws. Id. at 207-08; see also Carr v. Saul,
20 ( •••continued)
not designed to offer, the plaintiff's claims were wholly
collateral to the statutory scheme. Cochran, 20 F.4th at 207.
21The court found that because the plaintiff alleged that the
structure of the agency itself is what he was harmed by, § 78y did
not provide an adequate possibility of meaningful judicial review
for challenges to the structure of the statutory-review scheme.
Id. at 208.
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141 S. Ct. 1352, 1360 (2021) (noting that \\agency adjudications are
generally ill suited to address structural constitutional
challenges, which usually fall outside the adjudicators' areas of
technical expertise"). Moreover, if district courts did not have
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff would be deprived
of the opportunity for meaningful review because the PSIA does not
provide an adequate possibility of meaningful judicial review for
challenges to the structure of its statutory-review scheme. See
Cochran, 20 F.4th at 208-10.
Under the two-step analysis, it is clear that Congress did not
intend for the PSIA to strip district courts of their § 1331
jurisdiction. Therefore, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's claims.
B. Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for injunctive relief
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a).
Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a preliminary
injunction because the two layers of for-cause removal protection
applicable to DOL ALJs violates the Take Care Clause of Article II
of the Constitution.22 To be entitled to a preliminary injunction,
22Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Docket Entry
No. 4, pp. 8-9, 13. Plaintiff additionally argues that the
procedures under the PSIA violate the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial. Id. at 13-19. However, as discussed below, \\ [b] ecause
the court is entering a preliminary injunction based on the
unconstitutional removal restrictions, the court does not address
Plaintiff's Seventh Amendment claim." ABM Industry Groups, LLC v.
United States Department of Labor, 756 F.Supp.3d 468, 479 (S.D.
Tex. 2024).
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Plaintiff must establish "(1) a substantial likelihood that [it]
will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that [it] will
suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted,
(3) that the threatened injury to [it] outweighs the threatened
harm the injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the
preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest."
Canal Authority of States of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572
(5th Cir. 1974).
1. Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must
establish "a substantial likelihood that [it] will prevail on the
merits." Id. "To assess the likelihood of success on the merits,
we look to 'standards provided by the substantive law.'" Janvey v.
Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 596 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Roho, Inc. v.
Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1990)). Under the Take Care
Clause "the President must have adequate power over [executive]
officers' appointment and removal." Jarkesy v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 34 F.4th 446, 463 (5th Cir. 2022), aff'd and
remanded, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, 144 S. Ct.
2177 (2024), and adhered to, Jarkesy v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 132 F.4th 745 (5th Cir. 2024) (per curiam)
( "Jarkesy I"). "Yet not all removal restrictions are constitu-
tionally problematic." Id. Both inferior and principal officers
may retain some amount of for-cause protection from firing. Id.
However, "a problem arises when both of those protections act in
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concert." Id. To determine when the two layers of for-cause
removal are unconstitutional, the court must look to whether the
inferior officers serve "sufficiently important executive
functions, and whether the restrictions on their removal are
sufficiently onerous, that the President has lost the ability to
take care that the laws are faithfully executed." Id. at 463-64.
In Jarkesy I a plaintiff alleged that the removal process for
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") ALJs violated the Take
Care Clause because the SEC ALJs could only be removed by the SEC
Commissioners if good cause was found by the Merits System
Protection Board ("MSPB") and the SEC Commissioners and members of
the MSPB could also only be removed for cause. Id. at 464. The
Fifth Circuit held that the two layers of for-cause removal
afforded to SEC ALJs was unconstitutional because the principal
officers could not "intervene in their inferior officers' actions
except in rare cases, [and therefore] the President lack[ed] the
control necessary to ensure that the laws [were] faithfully
executed." Id.
The DOL and the Secretary of Labor are statutorily responsible
for investigating and adjudicating complaints alleging whistle
blower retaliation under the PSIA. See 49 U.S.C. § 60129(b) (1),
(2). However, the DOL and the Secretary of Labor have delegated
their statutory responsibility for adjudicating PSIA whistleblower
complaints to the OALJ.23 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1981.l0S(a),(c),
23 Here, the ALJ presiding over the administrative proceedings
against Plaintiff is an ALJ with OALJ. Notice of Case Assignment
(continued... )
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1981.107(a). The DOL ALJs fulfill executive functions by
exercising powers Congress vested in the Secretary of Labor that
relate to OALJ proceedings, including presiding over OALJ hearings,
controlling the admission of evidence, imposing sanctions for
violations of procedural rules, determining whether an employer has
violated the PSIA's whistleblower provision, and awarding relief.24
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.12(b0(1),(5),(9), 18.35(c)(2), 18.50(d)(3),
18.57(c), 18.64(d)(2),(g), 18.72(h), 18.92, 18.95(a); see also 29
C.F.R. §§ 1981.106(a), 1981.109(b). Despite the fact that DOL ALJs
serve sufficiently important executive functions, the President can
only remove them if good cause is found by the MSPB. 5 u.s.c.
§ 7521(a). And in turn, the President may remove members of the
MSPB only for cause, namely, "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office." Id. § 1202(d). Therefore, like the SEC
ALJs in Jarkesy I, DOL ALJs receive two layers of protection from
removal. Because the Fifth Circuit has held that statutory removal
restrictions that create two layers of for-cause removal are
unconstitutional, Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits.
23 ( ••• continued)
and Prehearing Order, Exhibit A to Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1-1,
p. 2.
24 The DOL is the administrative agency that is responsible for
investigating and adjudicating complaints alleging whistleblower
retaliation under the PSIA. � 49 U.S.C. § 60129(b)(1), (2). The
Secretary of Labor, Lori Chavez-Deremer, as the "head" of DOL, is
in charge of carrying out the DOL's responsibilities under the
PSIA. 29 U.S.C. § 551.
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2. Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that not issuing
a preliminary injunction will result in an irreparable
injury.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must
establish "a substantial threat that [it] will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted." Callaway, 489 F.2d at
572. "[A] showing of '[s] peculative injury is not sufficient;
there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of the
applicant."' Janvey, 647 F.3d at 600 (quoting Productos Carnie,
S.A. v. Central American Beef and Seafood Trading Co., 621 F.2d
683, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1980)). The Supreme Court has "made clear
that" a plaintiff is subjected to "'a here-and-now injury'" when
they are subjected to a "proceeding by an unaccountable ALJ"
because "it is impossible to remedy once the proceeding is over."
Axon, 143 S. Ct. at 903 (quoting Seila Law LLC v. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2196 (2020)).
Plaintiff has shown that it may be subjected to a proceeding
by an unaccountable ALJ in the near future. Between August 5,
2024, and July 24, 2025, the presiding ALJ made several attempts to
schedule a status conference to discuss setting the date for the
formal hearing.25 On July 24, 2025, the presiding ALJ scheduled a
video conference between the parties' counsel for August 7, 2025.26
25Email from Law Clerk to ALJ Herke, Exhibit J to Complaint,
Docket Entry No. 1-10, p. 13; 7/22/2025 Email from OALJ, Exhibit M
to Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1-13, p. 4.
267/22/2025 Email from OALJ, Exhibit M to Complaint, Docket
Entry No. 1-13, p. 2.
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Because Plaintiff alleges that it would be subjected "to an
illegitimate proceeding, led by an illegitimate decisiorunaker, " 27
and because the proceeding may be scheduled in the near future, 28
Plaintiff has established that it will suffer irreparable injury if
the injunction is not granted.
3. The balance of harms and the public interest weigh in
favor of issuing a preliminary injunction.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must
establish "that the threatened injury to [it] outweighs the
threatened harm the injunction may do to defendant" and "that
granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
interest." Callaway, 489 F.2d at 572. "Where the goverrunent is a
defendant, the balance of harms and the public interest factors
merge." Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 741 F.Supp.3d 630, 641 (W.D. Tex. 2024). "The
goverrunent suffers no cognizable harm from stopping 'the
perpetuation of unlawful agency action.'" Id. (quoting League of
Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
"Nor would an injunction preventing unlawful agency action
'disserve the public interest'" because it is neither "in the
public interest to have an increasingly expansive Executive Branch
that 'slip[s] from the Executive's control . . . [n]or is it in the
27Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 20 1 96.
28See 7/22/25 Email from OALJ, Exhibit M to Complaint, Docket
Entry No. 1-13, p. 4 (ALJ Herke's request for a video conference on
August 5, 2025, to discuss the current status of the case).
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public interest for an agency to infringe upon the constitutional
imperative that 'the judiciary remain[] truly distinct from .
the executive.'" Space Exploration Technologies Corp., 741
F.Supp.3d at 641 (quoting Louisiana v. Biden, 55 F.4th 1017, 1022
(5th Cir. 2022)).
Therefore, the balance of harms and public interest weigh in
favor of granting a preliminary injunction.
III. Conclusion and Order
For the reasons explained above, the Federal Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
(Docket Entry No. 33) is DENIED; and Plaintiff's Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry No. 4) is GRANTED.
Defendants, the United States Department of Labor, Secretary of
Labor Lori Chavez-Deremer, the Office of Administrative Law Judges,
Administrative Law Judge John M. Herke, and James Jackson, are
hereby enjoined from proceeding any further with OALJ case number
2021-PSI-000002 and any related adjudicative proceeding(s) within
the Department of Labor against Kinder Morgan, Inc., including
without limitation any hearing before an Administrative Law Judge,
pending further order of this court.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 15th day of December, 2025.
SIM LAKE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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