SWN Production Company, LLC et al v. St. Paul Fire And Marine Insurance Company et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
SWN PRODUCTION COMPANY, LLC,
et al.
Plaintiff,
v.
ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-3208
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., one of the defendants in this case, asks the court to
abstain and to transfer in favor of a parallel Louisiana proceeding.1 (Docket Entry No. 24). St.
Paul argues that the Louisiana case was filed before it received notice of this Texas lawsuit; that
this suit and the Louisiana case present identical primary parties and issues; and that deference to
the Louisiana case would serve judicial efficiency. (Id. at 1). Pipe Pros, the other defendant in
this case (but not a party in the Louisiana case), has filed a statement of support, asserting that
abstention will “prevent piecemeal litigation” and that, because Louisiana law predominates,
deference to Louisiana law will “avoid federal-state friction in deciding matters of state law.”
(Docket Entry No. 27 at 3). The plaintiffs responded in opposition. (Docket Entry No. 31). St.
Paul did not file a reply to the response.
1 Although St. Paul includes as an exhibit a petition for damages in Bowman v. Independence Contract
Drilling, Inc., No. 71954, (Docket Entry No. 24-3), another Louisiana case, the Louisiana case upon which
its motion for abstention is actually based is St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. SWN Production
(Louisiana) LLC, No. 73919, (Docket Entry No. 24 at 1; Docket Entry No. 24-4).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 01, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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As a general rule, federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise their
jurisdiction in proper cases. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976). This obligation “does not evaporate simply because there is a pending state court
action involving the same subject matter.” 	Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Arkansas Elec.
Coops., Inc., 48 F.3d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Colorado River at 813–14). Federal courts
may abstain from deciding an action to preserve “traditional principles of equity, comity, and
federalism.” 	Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138, 1142 (8th Cir. 1990); accord
Evanston Ins. Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1988). “Abstention doctrines are
limited ‘federalism-flavored carveouts’ to that obligation, created ‘[o]ut of respect for the
legitimate interests of the state, and to avoid needless friction’ with their officials.” ODonnell v.
Harris County, 808 F. Supp. 3d 738, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting Netflix, Inc. v. Babin, 88 F.4th
1080, 1084–85 (5th Cir. 2023)). Whether a federal court should abstain from hearing an action
under one of the abstention doctrines is within the court’s discretion. See Brown v. Pac. Life Ins.
Co., 462 F.3d 384, 394 (5th Cir. 2006).
The court denies the motion to abstain and transfer. As an initial matter, this court cannot
“transfer” this case to a Louisiana state court. The statutory bases for transfer are horizontal; they
apply only to transfer from one federal court to another. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); 1406. There is
no statutory authority for a vertical transfer to a state court in a different case. See Cadence Bank
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civ. Action No. H-23-2678, 2024 WL 3868233, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 19, 2024); accord Wilken Partners, L.P. v. Chammps Operating Corp., No. SA-10-CA-0562-
XR, 2011 WL 13238540, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2011) (“This court may only transfer to another
federal district court; it may not transfer to a state court.”).
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Next, the defendants have provided no persuasive reason for this court to abstain.2 St. Paul
does not identify any particular abstention doctrine but rather points generically to a case from the
District of Puerto Rico where the court considered “multiple abstention doctrines.” (Docket Entry
No. 24 at 5 & n.14 (citing Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Acevedo-Vila, 545 F. Supp.
2d 207, 218–19 (D.P.R. 2008)). The doctrines identified in Federacion are Burford abstention,
Pullman abstention, and Younger abstention. 545 F. Supp. 2d at 211–15. Although not mentioned
in Federacion, however, much of St. Paul’s short motion and Pipe Pros’ even shorter statement of
support appear to involve Colorado River abstention,3 which is based on considerations of “[w]ise
judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive
disposition of litigation.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two
Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1975)).
None of these doctrines provide a basis for this court to abstain. 	First, the complaint
requests only damages, (Docket Entry No. 1-6 at 14, 17), so Younger abstention does not apply.
See Blue Mint Pharmco, LLC v. Tex. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 667 F. Supp. 3d 473, 486 (S.D. Tex.
2023) (“The Younger doctrine requires dismissal of suits for injunctive and declaratory relief, but
not suits for money damages.”). 	Second, Burford abstention concerns a federal court’s
interference with the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies; it does not apply to
2 The plaintiffs also argue that the defendants have waived abstention because they concurrently filed
motions for summary judgment. (Docket Entry No. 31 at 8). Waiver in the abstention context is generally
more forgiving than waiver in other contexts, however. See ODonnell v. Harris County, 808 F. Supp. 3d
738, 760 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (discussing waiver and Younger abstention). In the context of arbitration, the
Fifth Circuit has also held that a party seeking arbitration did not waive its right to arbitrate merely because
it filed a concurrent motion for summary judgment. See Keytrade USA, Inc. v. Ain Temouchent M/V, 404
F.3d 891, 987 (5th Cir. 2005). Regardless, because the defendants’ motion to abstain plainly fails on the
merits, the court finds it appropriate to reach the merits.
3 The motion for abstention does not mention Colorado River directly but instead cites to a case weighing
the Colorado River factors. (Docket Entry No. 24 at 5 & n.17). Oddly, the plaintiffs’ response brief also
does not directly cite Colorado River, although the plaintiffs do run through most of the multi-factor
analysis. (See generally Docket Entry No. 31).
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this kind of simple breach of contract suit. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381,
392 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining the limits of Burford abstention). Third, under Pullman abstention,
“a federal court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction ‘when difficult and unsettled
questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be
decided.’” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 283 F.3d 650, 652
(5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984)). 	That is
plainly not relevant here.
Nor does Colorado River require abstention. This doctrine applies “when there are parallel
proceedings in federal and state court.” Diamond Offshore Co. v. A&B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d
531, 540 (5th Cir. 2002). “Suits are ‘parallel,’ for the purposes of determining whether Colorado
River abstention applies, if they ‘[i]nvolve the same parties and the same issues.’” Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting RepublicBank Dallas Nat’l Ass’n v. McIntosh, 828 F.3d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir.
1987)). “Generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that ‘the pendency of an action
in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having
jurisdiction. . . .’” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268,
282 (1910)). Colorado River abstention applies only in “exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 813.
The factors that determine whether these circumstances are present are “(1) whether there is a res
over which one court has established jurisdiction; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3)
whether maintaining separate actions may result in piecemeal litigation; (4) which case has
priority-not simply looking at which case was filed first; rather, focusing on the relative process
made in each case; (5) whether state or federal law controls; and (6) the adequacy of the state
forum to protect the federal plaintiff’s rights.” 	Boccard USA Corp v. TigPro, Inc., Civ. Action
No. H-07-0177, 2007 WL 1894154, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2007).
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Applying these factors, abstention is not warranted.4 First, no res or property is at issue.
The absence of this factor is not neutral but rather weighs against abstention. See Evanston Ins.
Co., 844 F.2d at 1191; see also Stewart v. W. Heritage Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 2006);
Am. Family Life Assur. Co. of Columbus v. Biles, 714 F.3d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Second, there is no indication or argument that the federal forum is inconvenient or that this factor
is implicated. Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.2d at 1192. The contract at issue contains a Texas forum
selection clause. (Docket Entry No. 24-1 at 17). An enforceable forum selection clause means
that this factor does not weigh in favor of abstention.5 See Boccard, 2007 WL 1894154, at *10.
St. Paul and Pipe Pros do not argue that the federal forum is inconvenient; rather, St. Paul merely
notes that the Louisiana forum “is” adequate and convenient. (Docket Entry No. 24 at 4). The
relevant question, however, is whether “the inconvenience of the federal forum is so great that this
factor points toward abstention.” 	See Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.3d at 1192. 	Even assuming,
without deciding, that the second factor does weigh toward abstention, it would not outweigh the
rest of the factors.
Third, “[t]he prevention of duplicative litigation is not a factor to be considered in an
abstention determination.” Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.2d at 1192. Although St. Paul and Pipe Pros
mention “piecemeal” litigation, their concern appears to be about duplicative litigation. (See, e.g.,
4 The plaintiffs argue that the court need not reach these factors because Pipe Pros is not a defendant in the
Louisiana action, and so the proceedings are not “parallel.” (Docket Entry No. 31 at 6). The “same parties”
prong is not necessarily so strict as that, however—parties do not need to be “precisely” identical so long
as the interests of all the parties named in either action “align undisputedly.” 	See African Methodist
Episcopal Church v. Lucien, 756 F.3d 788, 797 (5th Cir. 2014). 	In any event, “because abstention is
prohibited by Colorado River,” the court “need not” address the argument that the federal and state cases
are not parallel. Stewart, 438 F.3d at 493.
5 St. Paul’s motion for summary judgment challenges the contract’s choice of law provision but does not
appear to challenge the enforceability of the forum selection clause. (See Docket Entry No. 25). The forum
selection clause is not mentioned in St. Paul’s motion to abstain and transfer, which barely discusses transfer
at all, and is not mentioned in Pipe Pros’ statement of support.
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Docket Entry No. 24 at 4 (stating that adjudication in both forums “risks duplicative litigation”);
Docket Entry No. 27 at 2 (“The core legal issue—whether the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity
Act renders the indemnity and additional insured provisions of the relevant agreements null and
void—is identical in both forums.”). 	The primary concern of “piecemeal” litigation (and why
abstention is warranted in such circumstances) is that there will be inconsistent rulings over
property ownership; that is not at issue here. See Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.2d at 1185; Stewart,
438 F.3d at 492. And to the extent that there could be inconsistent judgments about the same “core
legal issue,” “a plea of res judicata after the completion of one suit could eliminate the problem
of inconsistent judgments.” Stewart, 438 F.3d at 492.
Fourth, St. Paul and Pipe Pros do not contest the plaintiffs’ argument that very little has
happened in the state-court litigation as compared to this federal case. (Docket Entry No. 31 at 5
(noting that this case has cross-motions for summary judgment pending and an upcoming Docket
Call, while “[t]he Louisiana Action, by contrast, has not advanced beyond rulings on venue and
has seen no merits development whatsoever.” (citing Docket Entry No. 24-6))). To the extent that
St. Paul argues that the Louisiana case was filed first (a point that the plaintiffs dispute), that is
irrelevant; the Fifth Circuit is clear that “[t]he order of obtaining jurisdiction does not speak for
abstention.” Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.3d at 1192. What matters instead is “how much progress
has been made in the two actions.” Id.; see also Boccard USA Corp., 2007 WL 1894154, at *12.
This factor weighs against abstention.
Fifth, that Louisiana state law is allegedly at issue is not determinative. “The absence of a
federal-law issue does not counsel in favor of abstention.” Evanston Ins. Co., 844 F.3d at 1193.
Rather, “[t]he presence of a federal law issue ‘must always be a major consideration weighing
against surrender [of jurisdiction],’ but the presence of state law issues weighs in favor of surrender
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only in rare circumstances.” Id. This breach-of-contract case involves, among other things, some
potential questions about the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act. Even so, neither St. Paul nor
Pipe Pros has pointed to anything “rare” about this case that could justify the application of
abstention; at most, Pipe Pros merely contends that Louisiana state law issues “predominate.”
(Docket Entry No. 27 at 3). That is not a “rare” circumstance justifying abstention. See Evanston
Ins. Co., 844 F.3d at 1193 (“This case does not involve rare circumstances under which the
presence of controlling issues of Louisiana law might make abstention appropriate.”).
Finally, the factor of adequate protection in state court is, at worst, neutral. Id. That is,
this factor can never weigh for abstention; it can only weigh against abstention or remain neutral.
Id. This factor does not weigh in favor of abstention. Boccard, 2007 WL 1894154, at *12.
In sum, the court cannot transfer this case to Louisiana state court; St. Paul and Pipe Pros
have provided this court with no persuasive reason to abstain; and in its own analysis, the court
has found no basis to abstain. 	The motion for abstention and to transfer in favor of parallel
Louisiana proceeding, (Docket Entry No. 24), is denied.
SIGNED on May 1, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
________________________________
Lee H. Rosenthal
Senior United States District Judge
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