Brown et al v. Stensland et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Ken Brown, Individually and on
Behalf of Minors, K.B. I and
K.B. II,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Matthew Stensland, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action H-25-2908
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 12. Pending
before the court are Defendant Deputy Joshua Bass’s Motion to
Dismiss, 	ECF 	No. 15, 	and 	Defendant 	Stensland’s 	Motion 	to
Dismiss, ECF No. 16. The court recommends that both motions be
GRANTED, 	and 	the 	claims 	against 	Stensland 	and 	Bass 	be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The court also recommends
that all claims against all Defendants that have yet to be served
be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
1. Facts and Procedural History
Before turning to the facts, it is necessary to discuss the
sources from which those facts are drawn. Of course, the court
considers 	Plaintiffs’ 	Amended 	Complaint. 	ECF 	No. 	13 	(Am.
Compl.). Defendants also submitted Stensland and Bass’s body-
worn camera (BWC) recordings. Plaintiffs argue that the court
may not review the BWC videos in deciding the instant motions,
and that if it does, the court must convert the motions to Motions
for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 19 at 2. The court disagrees.
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, the court
must limit itself to: (1) the facts in the complaint; (2) documents
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 11, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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attached to the complaint; and (3) matters of which the court may
take judicial notice. Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938
F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019). The court also has discretion to
consider exhibits attached to the complaint, as well as exhibits
attached to a motion to dismiss, if they “are central to the claim
and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). Such
exhibits may include the video from an officer’s body-worn camera.
See Perdomo v. City of League City, No. 25-40106, 2026 WL 40954,
at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026).
Plaintiffs 	concede 	that 	the 	deputies’ 	alleged
“unconstitutional 	actions 	[were] 	captured 	on 	video” 	through
Defendants’ body-worn cameras. Am. Compl. at 34. Therefore, the
videos are central to Plaintiffs’ claims. The videos are referenced
multiple times in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Plaintiffs allege that “the
encounter and subsequent events were captured on body-worn
camera footage.” Id. at 6. They assert that the Harris County
Sheriffs’ Office used the videos to conduct an internal review, but
that “[t]he video evidence . . . was ignored and met with deliberate
indifference.” 	Id. 	Plaintiffs 	also 	allege 	that 	“[Harris 	County
Sheriff’s Office] supervisors have the power to destroy camera
footage, and have a practice of engaging in exactly those actions[,]
then alleging the video is no longer available.” Id. at 34. This is
clearly not the situation here, as defendants Stensland and Bass
provided the relevant videos. Because the videos are both central
to 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	and 	referenced 	throughout 	the 	Amended
Complaint, the court considers the video evidence as part of the
pleadings.
Moreover, 	“where 	video 	recordings 	are 	included 	in 	the
pleadings, as is the case here, the video depictions of events,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, should be
adopted over the factual allegations in the complaint if the video
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‘blatantly 	contradicts’ 	those 	allegations.” 	Harmon 	v. 	City 	of
Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)); see also Perdomo, 2026 WL
40954, at *2 (rejecting the plaintiff’s “factual allegations in favor
of the video evidence” because plaintiff’s allegations did not align
with the officer’s BWC video). The court “should not discount the
nonmoving party’s story unless the video evidence provides so
much clarity that a reasonable jury could not believe his account.”
Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2018).
Accordingly, 	the 	factual 	allegations 	in 	Plaintiffs’ 	Amended
Complaint are accepted unless they are blatantly contradicted by
video evidence. The court notes the factual discrepancies and
indicates when it has discounted Plaintiffs’ version of events in the
analysis that follows.
Citations to the video are to the name of the officer and the
minutes and seconds from time stamp on the video. For example,
Stensland 	BWC, 	at 	10:18, 	refers 	to 	Stensland’s 	BWC 	at 	ten
minutes and eighteen seconds.
A. Background Facts
On or about March 19, 2023, Ken Brown, Jr. (Brown) drove
his mother to a nail salon at a strip mall in Harris County, Texas.
Am. Compl. at 3. Brown’s two sons—K.B. I, who was then 16-
years-old, and K.B. II, then 14-years-old—were passengers in the
vehicle. Id. Upon arriving at the strip mall, Brown parked the
family’s vehicle in front of an adjacent business. Id. at 4. Video
shows that he parked the vehicle approximately half-in and half-
out of a designated handicap spot. The part of the vehicle not in
the handicap space was in a zone marked with diagonal yellow
stripes. A handicap placard was placed on the dashboard in the
lower passenger-side corner. The vehicle had no license plates. The
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improperly parked vehicle is shown in these screenshots from the
BWC. The images show the lack of license plates.
Stensland BWC, at 10:22, 11:25.
Brown accompanied his mother inside the salon, while K.B. I
and K.B. II remained in the vehicle. Am. Compl. at 4. Deputies
from the Harris County Sheriff’s Office began to observe the
vehicle. It is clear from Stensland’s video that he can see the
improperly parked car and its lack of license plates. It is also clear
that Stensland and other officers saw K.B. I leave the vehicle and
enter a washateria near the salon. Stensland BWC, at 00:50.
The Amended Complaint alleges that the deputies “began
engaging with the minors without justification,” and “[d]espite the
absence 	of 	any 	reported 	criminal 	activity . . . [deputies]
approached 	the 	vehicle 	and 	proceeded 	to 	detain 	K.B. I.”
Am. Compl. at 4. Stensland’s BWC completely contradicts this
narrative. As mentioned, the car was improperly parked and
lacked license plates. The video shows Stensland and Villarreal
entering the washateria and Stensland commanding K.B. I to
come with him outside, while another deputy commands K.B. II
and others he was with to stay inside. Stensland BWC, at 1:17–
1:50. Outside the washateria, Stensland asked K.B. I “what was
up” with the vehicle, to which K.B. I responded that it was not his
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car and that it was somebody else’s car. Stensland then asked why
he was in it, to which K.B. I responded that it was a friend’s car
and that he did not know where the friend was. K.B. I claimed that
he was just “grabbing something” out of the car. Stensland told
K.B. I that he saw K.B. I get out of the driver’s side of the car, at
which point Stensland handcuffs K.B. I. Stensland BWC, at 1:45–
2:10. Stensland immediately asked whether the car was stolen,
which K.B. I denied. Id. at 2:13.
Moments after Stensland placed K.B. I in handcuffs, Brown
approached and began to demand that his son be removed from the
handcuffs. Stensland BWC, at 2:31–2:35. He believed that the
deputies 	were 	subjecting 	his 	children 	to 	“unwarranted
surveillance and kidnapping.” Am. Compl. at 4. Brown “requested
that the deputies release [K.B. I] while explaining that he was the
father of the child.” Id. Plaintiffs allege that the deputies then
“targeted their unlawful acts toward Mr. Brown” and detained
him. Id. at 5. The video shows that Brown was visibly upset and
that the deputies were concerned that he was going to interfere
with their investigation. They handcuffed Brown and asked him
about 	the 	car, 	which 	he 	admitted 	was 	his. 	Stensland 	BWC,
at 3:07–25.
Deputies 	asked 	Brown 	for 	his 	identification. 	Stensland
BWC, at 4:03. They also asked whether there was “anything
illegal” in the car, which Brown denied. Id. at 4:16. Deputies also
asked Brown whether K.B. I was actually his son, given that K.B. I
had moments before claimed that the vehicle belonged to a friend.
Id. at 4:47. The video shows that Stensland was suspicious of the
information he was receiving from both Brown and his son about
the ownership of the vehicle. Id. at 4:56–5:03 (asking Brown why
K.B. I would lie about the ownership of the vehicle). To further
investigate the ownership of the vehicle, Stensland approached
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K.B. I and asked why he would say that the car belonged to a
friend, when it actually belonged to his father. Id. at 5:51.
Stensland and other deputies then went to investigate the
vehicle. Stensland BWC, at 8:54. Stensland looked through the
window of the vehicle and immediately saw what he recognized as
a 	marijuana 	grinder 	in 	the 	center 	console. 	Id. 	at 	9:00–9:09.
Villanueva also saw in plain view what appeared to be an open
container of alcohol. Id. at 9:15. Stensland searched the vehicle
without a warrant and discovered more marijuana, as well as two
firearms in the center console. Id. at 12:14–13:59. Based on this
discovery, Stensland contacted the District Attorney’s office, which
accepted 	charges 	for 	unlawfully 	carrying 	of 	a 	weapon. 	Id.
at 19:26–23:04. Deputies called for a tow truck to tow the vehicle,
although family members on the scene quite vigorously protested1
that action and were willing to take possession of the vehicle. See
id. at 12:42 (Stensland radioing for the tow truck), 15:15 (Brown’s
mother protesting as tow truck arrives), 27:20–27:30 (additional
family members showing up to the scene). Brown was eventually
transported to jail on a charge for Unlawful Carrying of a Weapon,
in violation of Texas Penal Code § 46.02.2 Id. at 35:40; 41:51–49:05.
1 The videos contain footage of a very heated and lengthy confrontation between
Brown’s family and the deputies. The family was apparently calling the police on the
deputies, and coming very close to interfering with the deputies’ investigation of the
car. Eventually, deputies had to move their investigation to another location to finish
inventorying and towing the vehicle. Brown’s family followed the deputies to the
second location and continued the confrontation. During this time, it is clear that
Stensland was becoming frustrated. He said something to the effect of “Unit 1, baby,
gang, 	gang,” 	and 	commented 	on 	one 	of 	the 	family 	members’ 	attire. 	While
unprofessional, these grumblings do not appear to have caused any harm, and they
do not shed any light on the otherwise entirely lawful actions of the deputies.
2 “[T]he district court may properly take judicial notice of public state court records.”
Stiel v. Heritage Numismatic Auctions, Inc., 816 F. App’x 888, 892 (5th Cir. 2020).
Accordingly, the court takes judicial notice of the public state court records in the
criminal case against Brown arising from this arrest. The State of Texas v. Ken Brown,
No. 245039001010 (Harris Co. Crim. Ct. at Law No. 2, Mar. 19, 2023). The criminal
case against Brown was dismissed for insufficient evidence on August 8, 2023.
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When 	the 	deputies 	finished 	searching 	the 	vehicle 	and
speaking to the prosecutor, K.B. I was released. Stensland BWC,
at 29:58. He was in custody for a total of approximately twenty-
eight minutes.
B. Procedural History
Brown, individually, and on behalf of K.B. I and K.B. II
(collectively, Plaintiffs) initiated this lawsuit in the 281st Civil
District Court in Harris County, Texas, on March 19, 2025. ECF
No. 1 at 1. Plaintiffs named Harris County, Harris County Sherriff
Ed Gonzalez, and Deputies Matthew Stensland, Joshua Bass,
Adolfo Villanueva, and Ciara Casmer as Defendants. ECF No. 1-5.
Plaintiffs’ 	Original 	Petition 	asserted 	causes 	of 	action 	under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 11–15. In brief, Plaintiffs alleged that Sheriff
Gonzalez is liable for failing to train, supervise, or discipline his
officers 	to 	protect 	individuals 	from 	constitutional 	violations,
including false arrest, false imprisonment, unreasonable seizures,
and excessive use of force. Id. Plaintiffs also alleged that the
named deputies are liable—with varying degrees of culpability—
for 	excessive 	force, 	unreasonable 	use 	of 	force, 	false 	arrest,
unreasonable search and seizure, First Amendment retaliation,
racial profiling, and failure to intervene to prevent the others’
constitutional violations. Id.
Stensland and Bass were served with process on May 28,
2025, and June 13, 2025, respectively.3 ECF No. 1 at 2. As the only
served 	defendants, 	Stensland 	and 	Bass 	removed 	this 	case 	to
federal court on June 23, 2025. Id. at 1. Five days later, Stensland
and Bass filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint.
ECF Nos. 7, 8.
3 As of the date of this Memorandum and Recommendation, the other named
defendants have not been served with process.
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Instead of responding to Stensland and Bass’s first Motions
to Dismiss, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on
July 21, 2025. ECF No. 13. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint names
the 	same 	defendants—Harris 	County, 	Sherriff 	Gonzalez, 	and
Deputies Stensland, Bass, Villanueva, and Casmer. Id. It omits
the 	previously 	asserted 	claims 	for 	excessive 	force 	and
unreasonable use of force but otherwise leaves Plaintiffs’ claims
unchanged. Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that the
named deputies committed violations of the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, including retaliation, unlawful search
and seizure, false arrest, malicious criminal prosecution, racial
profiling, and equal protection and due process violations. Id. It
also asserts a general Monell4 claim against Harris County and
Sheriff Gonzalez. Id. The Amended Complaint does not contain
any state law causes of action.
On August 4, 2025, Stensland and Bass filed Motions to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 15, 16. They
argue 	that 	all 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	against 	them 	should 	be
dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
Alternatively, they argue that even if qualified immunity does not
apply, 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	fail 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. Attached to both Motions are the videos
from Stensland and Bass’s BWCs. Id. Plaintiffs oppose Stensland
and Bass’s Motions to Dismiss. ECF No. 19.
2. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under 	Rule 	12(b)(6), 	the 	court 	determines 	whether 	the
plaintiff’s complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
4 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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reasonable 	inference 	that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the
misconduct alleged.” Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P.,
970 F.3d 576, 580 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to
a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Ultimately, the “[f]actual allegations [in the complaint]
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted).
Courts accept “all well-pleaded facts as true” and “view[]
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Allen v. Walmart
Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). “A plaintiff need only
plausibly allege facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim
to survive a motion to dismiss.” Cicalese v. Univ. Tex. Med. Branch,
924 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2019). “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on
the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even
if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual
proof of those facts is improbable[.]” Id. at 556.
Only statements of fact are to be taken as true. “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Conclusory allegations are “disentitled . . . to the presumption of
truth.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681. Thus, the court, in reviewing the
plaintiff’s complaint, may neither “accept conclusory allegations”
nor 	“strain 	to 	find 	inferences 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiffs.”
Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361
(5th Cir. 2004).
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3. Qualified Immunity Standard
Stensland and Bass have asserted a qualified immunity
defense against all of Plaintiffs’ claims. See ECF Nos. 15, 16.
Section 1983 provides redress for those who have been injured or
deprived of their rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Moody v. Farrell, 868 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2017). However, in a
lawsuit under Section 1983, “[q]ualified immunity shields from
civil 	liability 	‘all 	but 	the 	plainly 	incompetent 	or 	those 	who
knowingly violate the law.’” Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 845
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
State officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the
evidence 	demonstrates 	that 	the 	official’s 	conduct 	violated 	a
statutory or constitutional right and (2) that right was “clearly
established” at the time of the violation. McVae v. Perez, 120 F.4th
487, 492 (5th Cir. 2024).
A 	right 	is 	clearly 	established 	when 	it 	“is 	one 	that 	is
sufficiently 	clear 	that 	every 	reasonable 	official 	would 	have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Melton v.
Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). “This is a
‘demanding standard.’” Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 753
(5th Cir. 2024). Courts “can analyze the prongs [of the qualified
immunity test] in either order or resolve the case on a single
prong.” Perry v. Mendoza, 83 F.4th 313, 317 (5th Cir. 2023).
Where a defendant asserts qualified immunity as a defense
to a claim, “the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts that
demonstrate liability and defeat immunity.” Shaw v. Villanueva,
918 F.3d 414, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2019). At the motion to dismiss
stage, “a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must
plead 	specific 	facts 	that 	both 	allow 	the 	court 	to 	draw 	the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he
has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with
equal specificity.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir.
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2020). In other words, “plaintiff[s] must plead facts which, if
proved, would defeat [the] claim of immunity.” Allen v. Hays,
65 F.4th 736, 745 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Waller v. Hanlon,
922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019)) (alterations in original).
4. Claims 	Against 	Defendants 	Stensland, 	Bass,
Villanueva, and Casmer
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, read broadly, asserts claims
against 	Stensland 	and 	Bass 	for 	unlawful 	detention, 	unlawful
search, false arrest, retaliation, and racial profiling, in violation of
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs also
assert a claim against Casmer for malicious prosecution, and a
claim 	against 	Villanueva 	for 	racial 	profiling. 	Additionally,
Plaintiffs allege that Stensland, Bass, and Villanueva are liable for
failure to intervene to stop the constitutional violations of the
others.
In the instant motions, Stensland and Bass argue that all of
Plaintiffs’ claims against them should be dismissed because they
are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the analysis is the
same with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims against both the served and
the unserved defendants, the court extends the arguments raised
by 	Stensland 	and 	Bass 	to 	the 	unserved 	individual
defendants—Villanueva 	and 	Casmer. 	See 	Armendariz 	v.
Chowaiki, 	No. 	EP-14-CV-451-KC, 	2016 	WL 	8856919, 	at 	*19,
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2016) (collecting cases and observing that
many 	courts 	extend 	common 	defenses 	to 	the 	benefit 	of 	any
unserved or defaulting defendants).
The court addresses each of the claims in the order that they
are raised in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.
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A. Plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful detention of K.B. I
and 	Brown 	fail 	because 	their 	detention 	was
supported by reasonable suspicion.
Plaintiffs assert that Stensland and Bass violated K.B. I and
Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights by detaining them without
reasonable suspicion. Am. Compl. at 4–5. “Warrantless searches
and 	seizures 	are 	per 	se 	unreasonable 	under 	the 	Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.” Hankins v. Wheeler, 109 F.4th 839,
845–46 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d
1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 2014)). “One such exception is that ‘police
officers may stop and briefly detain an individual for investigative
purposes if they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot.’” Id. (quoting Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d
730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000)).
“To state a claim for unlawful detention, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) a detention occurred; and (2) the detention was not
based on reasonable suspicion . . . .” Coons v. Lain, 277 F. App’x
467, 470 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
Reasonable suspicion requires “a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014). The court’s
review of an officer’s reasonable suspicion determination requires
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the
officer’s own experience and specialized training, as well as their
“commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.”
Id. at 397; Rucker v. Marshall, 119 F.4th 395, 400 (5th Cir. 2024);
Degenhardt, 117 F.4th at 753. An officer is entitled to qualified
immunity 	so 	long 	as 	he 	is 	reasonable—even 	if 	mistaken—in
believing he had the requisite suspicion.” Rucker, 119 F.4th at 400.
Here, it is undisputed that K.B. I and Brown were detained.
Plaintiffs assert that their detention was not based on reasonable
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suspicion. Am. Compl. at 4. Plaintiffs allege that the Brown’s
vehicle was “lawfully” parked in a “private parking space for salon
customers.” Id. at 4, 8. They state that “the handicap placard was
in the car and . . . there were paper plates on the vehicle.” ECF No.
19 at 8. Plaintiffs allege that the deputies “approached the vehicle
and 	began 	engaging 	with 	[Brown’s 	sons] 	without
justification . . . [d]espite the absence of any reported criminal
activity and the fact that the vehicle 	was parked on private
property[.]” 	Am. Compl. 	at 	4. 	They 	assert 	that 	the 	deputies
“proceeded to detain K.B. I and placed him in the back of a police
squad car, despite having no reasonable suspicion . . . to justify the
detention.” Id.
Stensland’s 	BWC 	video 	blatantly 	contradicts 	Plaintiffs’
assertions. The video shows that deputies noticed the vehicle
because it was parked halfway in a handicap parking spot and
halfway in a no-parking zone, and it lacked properly displayed
license plates.5
As 	discussed 	above 	Stensland’s 	video 	shows 	that 	the
deputies had watched as the vehicle’s occupants exited the vehicle
and walked into a nearby washateria. Inside the washateria,
Stensland 	and 	Villanueva 	encountered 	three 	individuals,
including K.B. I. Stensland asked K.B. I to step outside with him.
There, 	Stensland 	asked 	K.B. I 	who 	the 	vehicle 	belonged 	to.
Initially, K.B. I denied that it was his vehicle. Then, he stated that
it was “somebody else’s.” Stensland asked, why, then, did K.B. I
get out of the driver’s side of the vehicle. K.B. I explained that the
vehicle 	belonged 	to 	one 	of 	his 	friends, and 	that 	he was just
retrieving something from inside. It was at that moment that
Stensland detained K.B. I. As he placed K.B. I in handcuffs and
5 In Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Response to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs appear
to concede “[t]he fact that the vehicle . . . lacked license plates . . . .” ECF No. 19 at 10.
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told him that he was being detained, Stensland asked whether the
vehicle was stolen, which K.B. I denied. The story that K.B. I was
telling Stensland was suspicious and gave Stensland reason to
investigate further. 	Stensland was clearly concerned that the
vehicle might be stolen, and that concern appears to have been
reasonable, even if it was mistaken.
Moments after Stensland placed K.B. I in handcuffs, Brown
approached. He believed that the deputies were subjecting his
children 	to 	“unwarranted 	surveillance 	and 	kidnapping.”
Am. Compl. at 4. Brown “requested that the deputies release
[K.B. I] while explaining that he was the father of the child.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege that deputies then “targeted their unlawful acts
toward Mr. Brown” and detained him. Id. at 5.
The video directly refutes Plaintiff’s allegations. When the
two plaintiffs were detained, the deputies knew that the vehicle
lacked properly displayed license plates. They knew that someone
had parked the vehicle halfway in a handicap spot and halfway in
a no-parking zone. And they knew that the last person whom they
had observed in the driver’s side of the vehicle—K.B. I—gave them
various non-committal answers about the vehicle’s ownership.
They also knew that Brown was K.B. I’s father and possibly the
vehicle’s owner, and thus the person responsible for improperly
parking the vehicle, which lacked plates. It is also clear from the
video that officers were attempting to de-escalate the situation and
for that additional reason handcuffed Brown.
These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
do not permit an inference that the deputies lacked reasonable
suspicion when they detained K.B. I and Brown. Deputies, at
minimum, had the requisite level of suspicion to detain both
plaintiffs. See Williams v. Bolin, 694 F. Supp. 3d 904, 914 (S.D.
Tex. Sep. 26, 2023) (finding probable cause where officers arrested
the plaintiff because “his truck was parked a few inches over the
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line into the handicapped parking space” and “his vehicle was
unregistered”). Thus, Stensland and Bass are entitled to qualified
immunity on this claim. Plaintiffs’ claims against Stensland and
Bass for the unlawful detention of K.B. I and Brown should be
DISMISSED.
B. Plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful detention of K.B. II
fails because K.B. II was not detained.
Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	K.B. II 	was 	unlawfully 	detained
without 	justification 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment
because, while he was not physically restrained, K.B. II asserts
that he did not feel free to leave. Am. Compl. at 4. To state a claim
for unlawful detention, a plaintiff must allege that a detention, or
seizure, occurred. Coons, 277 F. App’x at 470. “[A] person has been
‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in
view 	of 	all 	the 	circumstances 	surrounding 	the 	incident, 	a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). This
test “is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he
was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the
officer’s 	words 	and 	actions 	would 	have 	conveyed 	that 	to 	a
reasonable person.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628
(1991).
Plaintiffs assert that “K.B. II was not physically restrained
or placed in custody” but “he reported that he did not feel free to
leave.” Am. Compl. at 4. Plaintiffs also assert that K.B. II was
“detained 	and 	interrogated 	by 	officers . . . .” 	Id. 	at 	7. 	These
allegations are entirely conclusory. There are no facts set forth in
the complaint from which the court can conclude that K.B. II was
detained.
Moreover, 	none 	of 	the 	video 	footage 	supports 	these
allegations. K.B. II is never shown in the vehicle or outside the
washateria when K.B. I is detained. In the video, when Stensland
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and Villanueva enter the washateria, K.B. I can be seen sitting
and talking to two other individuals. Stensland BWC, at 1:23–
1:31. 	After 	Stensland 	asked 	K.B. I 	to 	step 	outside 	with 	him,
Villanueva told the other two individuals to “stay right there.” Id.
at 1:37. Villanueva temporarily remained inside the washateria
with the other two. Id. at 1:51. However, as Brown approached
Stensland 	and 	K.B. I, 	Villanueva 	exited 	the 	washateria 	to
intercept Brown. Id. at 2:44. The two other individuals remained
inside. A few minutes later, both individuals that had been inside
the washateria walked toward the exit of the washateria and sat
down. 	Id. 	at 	3:03–3:06. 	The 	two 	reappeared 	on 	video
approximately twenty-four minutes later. Id. at 27:30. As the
deputies 	searched 	Brown’s 	vehicle, 	both 	individuals 	walked
toward the scene with others, including those identified as Brown’s
wife and mother. Id. K.B. II is never heard identifying himself on
camera, nor engaging with officers in any other capacity.
Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that permit the inference
that a reasonable person in K.B. II’s shoes would have believed
that he was not free to leave. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint
does not demonstrate that K.B. II was “seized” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. Because no Fourth Amendment seizure
occurred, there was no constitutional violation, and Stensland and
Bass are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Plaintiffs’
claim against Stensland and Bass for the unlawful detention of
K.B. II should be DISMISSED.
C. Plaintiffs’ 	claim 	for 	unlawful 	search 	of 	their
vehicle 	fails 	because 	deputies 	reasonably
believed that they had probable cause to justify
the warrantless search.
Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	Stensland 	and 	Bass 	violated 	their
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search by
searching their vehicle in the absence of a warrant, Plaintiffs’
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consent, or reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs committed a crime.
Am. Compl. 	at 	8. 	“A 	warrantless 	search 	is 	presumptively
unreasonable unless the circumstances fall under an exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” United States v.
Clayton, 	98 	F.4th 	256, 	261 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Guzman,
739 F.3d 241, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2014)). The automobile exception
permits “a warrantless search of a readily mobile vehicle . . . when
law enforcement has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
contraband or evidence of a crime.” Id. at 263. In other words, “if,
under the totality of the circumstances, officers have probable
cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, they are
authorized to search the [vehicle] without a warrant.” United
States v. Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United
States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154–55 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Additionally, the plain-view exception permits a warrantless
search where “(1) the police lawfully entered the area where the
item 	was 	located; 	(2) the 	item 	was 	in 	plain 	view; 	(3) the
incriminating nature of the item was ‘immediately apparent;’ and
(4) the police had a lawful right of access to the item.” United
States v. Rodriguez, 601 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
Horton 	v. 	California, 	496 	U.S. 	128, 	136–37 	(1990)). 	The
incriminating nature of an item is immediately apparent if the
officer has “‘probable cause’ to believe that the item is either
evidence of a crime or contraband.” Id.
Probable cause exists “when the totality of the facts and
circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of
arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the
suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Haggerty v.
Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655–56 (5th Cir. 2004). When a court
reviews a police officer’s probable cause determination, it must
consider whether the officer believed, under the totality of the
circumstances, that there was a “fair probability” that a crime
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occurred. United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir.
1999). A “fair probability” requires more than bare suspicion, but
less than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Additionally, the
court’s 	review 	of 	the 	“totality 	of 	the 	circumstances” 	requires
consideration of an “officers’ training and experience as well as
their 	knowledge 	of 	the 	situation 	at 	hand.” 	United 	States 	v.
Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 1995). Even “[i]f an officer
reasonably but mistakenly believes that probable cause exists, he
is entitled to qualified immunity.” Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d
369, 375 (citing Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 206
(5th Cir. 2009)).
It is undisputed that the deputies initiated a warrantless
search of Brown’s vehicle. Plaintiffs assert that deputies had “no
lawful basis to justify the search.” Am. Compl. at 5. Again, the
BWC video blatantly contradicts Plaintiffs’ assertion.
After 	Stensland 	checked 	Brown’s 	driver’s 	license 	and
obtained 	K.B. I’s 	identifiers, 	Stensland 	returned 	to 	Brown’s
parked 	vehicle. 	Stensland 	BWC, 	at 	8:08–8:47. 	Stensland 	and
Villanueva walked up to the driver’s side of the vehicle to check
the Vehicle Identification Number and registration sticker. Id.
at 9:00–9:09. From the deputies’ position outside of the vehicle,
they observed what they believed to be a marijuana grinder and
an open container of an alcoholic beverage in the vehicle’s center
console. Id. Drug paraphernalia, such as a grinder, and open
containers of alcohol are considered contraband. See United States
v. Stoddard, 234 F. App’x 241, 244 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In close
proximity was drug distribution paraphernalia, including a scale
and a grinder.”); United States v. Martinez, No. CR C-08-29M,
2008 WL 620534, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2008) (“Furthermore, a
search of defendant’s vehicle revealed no contraband, such as open
containers of alcohol.”). Because this provided the officers with
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probable 	cause 	to 	believe 	that 	the 	Brown’s 	vehicle 	contained
contraband, they were authorized to search it without a warrant.
Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that their vehicle was parked on
private property. Am. Compl. at 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 35, 37. The court
accepts this as true. However, the fact that a vehicle is parked on
private property does not preclude application of exceptions to the
Fourth 	Amendment’s 	warrant 	requirement. 	See 	Sinisterra,
77 F.3d at 104–05 (“This court has concluded that . . . probable
cause alone suffices to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle
lawfully parked in a public place, as long as the scope the search
is 	reasonable.”) 	(emphasis 	in 	original) 	(internal 	quotations
omitted). 	“The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	held 	that 	the 	automobile
exception to the warrant requirement applies when a vehicle is
‘readily capable’ of ‘being used on the highways’ and it ‘is found
stationary 	in 	a 	place 	not 	regularly 	used 	for 	residential
purposes . . . .’” Id. at 104 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 392 (1985)).
The court recommends that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
claim against Stensland and Bass based on the search of Plaintiffs’
vehicle be DISMISSED.
D. Plaintiffs’ claim for false arrest fails because
Stensland 	reasonably 	believed 	probable 	cause
supported the arrest.
The court must consider whether Plaintiffs pleaded specific
facts allowing the court to draw the reasonable inference that
Stensland and Bass violated Brown’s Fourth Amendment right to
be free from arrest without probable cause. When “an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v.
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Such minor criminal offenses
may 	include 	misdemeanor 	offenses 	under 	the 	Texas
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Transportation Code, like “unlawfully parking in a handicapped
spot” and “failure to register a vehicle.” Williams, 694 F. Supp. 3d
at 914 (citing Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 681.011(g), 502.472,
502.471(c)).
However, if a police officer lacks probable cause when he
makes an arrest, it is a “false arrest.” Scott v. City of Mandeville,
69 F.4th 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2023). A plaintiff who claims that a
false arrest occurred “must clear a significant hurdle to defeat
qualified immunity.” Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir.
2001). “An officer is due qualified immunity, even if he did not have
probable cause to arrest a suspect, so long as a reasonable person
in his position would have believed that his conduct conformed to
the constitutional standard in light of the information available to
him and the clearly established law.” Perry v. Mendoza, 83 F.4th
313, 	317 	(5th 	Cir. 	2023) 	(internal 	quotations 	and 	citations
omitted). 	“Thus, 	plaintiffs 	must 	allege 	facts 	permitting 	an
inference that defendants lacked arguable (that is, reasonable but
mistaken) probable cause for the arrests.” Club Retro, 568 F.3d
at 207.
Plaintiffs assert that deputies lacked probable cause for
Brown’s arrest. Am. Compl. at 4. However, the vehicle was parked
halfway 	in 	a 	handicap 	parking 	spot 	with 	no 	license 	plates
displayed, and the police found a firearm and marijuana in the
vehicle. Brown was detained while the police investigated the
scene, including searching the vehicle, ownership of the vehicle,
and discussion of charges with the District Attorney. The District
Attorney accepted charges for unlawfully carrying a weapon and
Brown was arrested and brought to jail on that charge. All of this
is 	patently 	clear 	on 	the 	video. 	Under 	Texas 	Penal 	Code
§ 46.02(a-1), 	a 	person 	commits 	a 	Class 	A 	misdemeanor 	if 	he
possesses a firearm in a motor vehicle under his control while the
person is engaged in criminal activity other than a Class C traffic
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violation. The deputies had before them sufficient facts to arrest
Brown under that Section. Possession of marijuana is criminal
activity in the State of Texas. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 481.121 (making possession of a “usable quantity of marijuana”
under two ounces a Class B misdemeanor).
The fact that the case against Brown was later dismissed
due to insufficient evidence does not change the court’s analysis,
which is confined to the facts and circumstances known to deputies
at the time of Brown’s arrest. See also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.
Williams, 	76 	S.W.3d 	647, 	651 	(Tex. 	App.—Corpus 	Christi–
Edinburg 2002, no pet.) (“Insufficient evidence to convict does not
equate to a lack of probable cause to indict.”).
Because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that permit an
inference that deputies lacked arguable probable cause for Brown’s
arrest, 	the 	court 	recommends 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	claim 	against
Stensland and Bass for false arrest be DISMISSED.
E. Plaintiffs’ claim for malicious prosecution also
fails because deputies reasonably believed that
there was probable cause to support the arrest.
Stensland 	argues 	that 	the 	court 	should 	not 	consider
Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim against him, as it is a “new
claim” asserted in Plaintiffs’ Response. ECF No. 20 at 1. A motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the allegations in the
pleadings. Walker, 938 F.3d at 735. It is true that Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint does not explicitly assert a claim of malicious
prosecution against Stensland. However, because the Amended
Complaint 	does 	include 	such 	a 	claim 	against 	Casmer, 	and
Plaintiffs plead identical facts against Casmer and Stensland, the
court will consider the claim.
To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
show 	“(1) the 	commencement 	or 	continuance 	of 	an 	original
criminal 	proceeding; 	(2) its 	legal 	causation 	by 	the 	present
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defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original
proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present
plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding;
(5) malice; and (6) damages.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262,
279 (5th Cir. 2023).
Plaintiffs assert that Stensland and Casmer “submitted a
sworn 	affidavit 	in 	support 	of 	a 	criminal 	charge 	against
Mr. Brown[,]” which “contained materially false statements” and
“omitted key facts.” Am. Compl. at 5. These key facts include that
“the incident occurred on private property, not as part of a legal
traffic stop, and the initial ‘suspects . . . two Black males’ were
children.” Id. (alterations in original). They assert that Stensland
also “failed to advise intake that [Brown] was not inside the car,
the car had been parked[,] and he did not witness him driving.” Id.
at 37. As to Bass, Plaintiffs’ assert that “Bass failed to provide a
report,” and, like Stensland, Bass “failed to advise intake that
Plaintiff, Ken Brown, was not inside the car; the car had been
parked and he did not witness him driving.” Id. Plaintiffs argue
that, “[a]s a direct result of [the officers’] false allegations[,] Ken
Brown’s case went forward and [he] was prosecuted.” Id. at 38.
Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity because “officers are not shielded when they
mislead judicial officers.” ECF No. 19 at 10. In support of this
assertion, confoundingly, Plaintiffs cite Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 345 (1986), which held, in part, that a police officer was
entitled to qualified immunity even though the officer’s “request
for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest.”
The court has already determined that Plaintiffs have not
alleged, and could not allege, facts that permit the inference that
deputies lacked arguable probable cause for Brown’s arrest—the
same arrest that initiated the prosecution upon which Plaintiffs’
potential malicious prosecution claim is based. That deputies did
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not witness Brown inside of or driving the car is of no importance
to the deputies’ probable cause determination, as Brown admitted
to being the driver of the vehicle. That the car had been parked in
a 	public 	area 	also 	does 	not 	negate 	deputies’ 	probable 	cause
determination because the way that the vehicle was parked is
exactly what drew deputies’ attention to the vehicle in the first
place.
Therefore, because Plaintiffs have not stated facts that allow
the inference that deputies’ lacked probable cause to arrest Brown
and 	initiate 	the 	criminal 	case 	against 	him, 	the 	malicious
prosecution claim against Stensland, Bass, and Casmer should be
DISMISSED.
F. The 	impoundment 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	vehicle 	did
not 	violate 	Plaintiffs’ 	clearly 	established
constitutional rights under the First or Fourth
Amendments.
It is undisputed that deputies impounded Plaintiffs’ vehicle.
Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	this 	action 	violated 	their 	constitutional
rights. However, based on Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, it is
difficult to discern which constitutional rights Plaintiffs believe
that the impoundment violated. The court addresses Plaintiffs’
potential claims under the Fourth Amendment and the First
Amendment.
To the extent that Plaintiffs intended to assert that the
deputies’ 	decision 	to 	impound 	the 	vehicle 	amounted 	to 	a
warrantless seizure under the Fourth Amendment, their claim
fails. “Impounding a vehicle qualifies as a seizure subject to a
Fourth 	Amendment 	analysis.” 	Degenhardt, 	117 	F.4th 	at 	756.
The “community caretaker exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant 	requirement 	permits 	law 	enforcement 	officers 	to
“impound 	vehicles 	in 	furtherance 	of 	‘public 	safety’ 	or
‘community caretaking functions’ such as removing ‘disabled or
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damaged 	vehicles’ 	and 	‘automobiles 	that 	violate 	parking
ordinances . . . jeopardizing both the public safety and the efficient
movement 	of 	vehicular 	traffic.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	South 	Dakota 	v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368–69 (1976)) (cleaned up). The court’s
consideration 	of 	whether 	the 	community caretaking 	exception
applies 	“hinges 	upon 	the 	reasonableness 	of 	the . . . impound
viewed in the context of the facts and circumstances encountered
by the officer.” Id. (quoting United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d
203, 208 (5th Cir. 2012)).
According to Plaintiffs, the usual course of action for “a
vehicle illegally parked in a disabled parking space would be to
issue a citation to the registered owner,” not to tow it. Id. at 9. They
argue that the deputies should have allowed Brown’s wife or
mother, who were on-scene, to take possession of the vehicle. Id.
at 10. They assert that “[h]andicap parking . . . tows are unlawful
unless 	there 	have 	been 	numerous 	prior 	handicap 	parking
violations, but there had not been any violations in the past.” Id.
Plaintiffs cite no authority to support their assertions.
Throughout their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seemingly
ignore the fact that the vehicle lacked license plates. In Texas,
it is illegal to operate on a public highway any vehicle that does
not properly display two license plates. Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
§ 504.943(a). Simply by taking control of the vehicle and driving it
to another location, the driver—Brown’s wife or mother—would be
committing 	a 	criminal 	offense. 	Because 	merely 	operating 	the
vehicle would be a violation of state traffic laws, it is not a violation
of any clearly established constitutional right for the deputies to
apply 	the 	community 	caretaking 	exception 	and 	impound 	the
vehicle. Stensland and Bass are entitled to qualified immunity on
this claim.
To the extent that Plaintiffs intended to assert a claim for
First Amendment retaliation because of the deputies’ decision to
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impound the vehicle, that claim also fails. Plaintiffs allege that the
deputies 	retaliated 	against 	them, 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	First
Amendment, by towing their vehicle despite the presence of family
members who could have taken possession of the vehicle, when it
is not the typical course of action to tow a vehicle that is improperly
parked in a handicap parking spot. Am. Compl. at 35.
To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff
“must 	show 	that 	(1) they 	were 	engaged 	in 	constitutionally
protected activity, (2) the defendants’ actions caused them to suffer
an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing to engage in that activity, 	and (3) the defendants’
adverse 	actions 	were 	substantially 	motivated 	against 	the
plaintiffs’ exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.’” Izen v.
Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations
omitted). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish a
‘causal 	connection’ 	between 	the 	government 	defendant's
‘retaliatory 	animus’ 	and 	the 	plaintiff's 	‘subsequent 	injury.’”
Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 730 (5th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he law was clearly established in
the Fifth Circuit of the United States that it was a violation of the
[F]irst 	[A]mendment 	of 	the 	Constitution 	to 	retaliate 	against
individuals by towing a vehicle under a circumstance that is not
the 	usual 	course . . . .” 	Am. 	Compl. 	at 	35 	(citing 	no 	cases 	in
support). They plead that the impoundment of the vehicle was
directly linked to the handicap-parking violation, which typically
only warrants the issuance of a citation. Id. at 9.
Plaintiffs’ 	Amended 	Complaint 	does 	not 	contain 	any
assertion that the Plaintiffs were engaged in a constitutionally
protected activity at the time deputies decided to tow the vehicle.
Plaintiffs also failed to assert that the deputies towed the vehicle
because Plaintiffs engaged in a constitutionally protected activity.
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In 	their 	Response 	to 	Defendants’ 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss,
Plaintiffs argue that they “pleaded the deputies retaliated by
towing Brown’s vehicle after he engaged in the lawful protected act
of using words to protest his minor son’s unlawful detention.”
ECF No. 19 at 12. Were it true that Plaintiffs had included this
allegation in their Amended Complaint, their First Amendment
retaliation claim still would not survive Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss. There is nothing to suggest that the deputies’ decision to
tow 	the 	vehicle 	was 	substantially 	motivated 	against 	Brown’s
exercise of “using words to protest” K.B. I’s detention. And even if
the court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add
these assertions, their claim would fail. The assertion that the
decision to tow the vehicle was substantially motivated by Brown’s
verbal protest is blatantly contradicted by Stensland’s BWC. The
video shows that Stensland radios for a tow truck only after
beginning a search of the vehicle and discovering one of the
firearms in the console. Stensland BWC, at 12:42.
Because 	Plaintiffs’ 	Amended 	Complaint 	does 	not
demonstrate 	that 	they 	were 	engaged 	in 	a 	constitutionally
protected 	activity, 	and 	because, 	even 	if 	they 	had 	alleged 	a
constitutionally protected activity, they have not shown that such
activity substantially motivated the deputies’ decision to tow their
vehicle, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for First Amendment
retaliation.
Since Plaintiffs have not established that their rights under
the Fourth Amendment or First Amendment were violated by the
impoundment of their vehicle, Stensland and Bass are entitled to
qualified immunity on these claims. The court recommends that
these claims against Stensland and Bass be DISMISSED.
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G. Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for violations
of 	Equal 	Protection 	under 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment.
Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	they 	were 	racially 	profiled 	and
subject to targeted surveillance, absent criminal conduct, because
they are Black males. Am. Compl. at 6, 26. “To make out an equal
protection 	violation, 	a 	party . . . must 	‘prove 	the 	existence 	of
purposeful 	discrimination 	motivating 	the 	state 	action 	which
caused the complained-of injury.’” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 748
(5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 306
(5th Cir. 1997)). In the context of racially selective enforcement,
like racial profiling, “the plaintiff must allege and prove that [they]
received 	treatment 	different 	from 	that 	received 	by 	similarly
situated individuals and that the unequal treatment stemmed
from a discriminatory intent.” Stout v. Vincent, 717 F. App’x 468,
471–72 (5th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiffs allege that “Ken Brown, as a Black male, is a
member of a constitutionally protected class, along with his sons.”
Am. Compl. at 6. Plaintiffs make the bald assertion that “[i]t was
Villanueva’s ‘idea’ to racially profile and violate Ken Brown and
his son’s rights to be free from unlawful seizure . . . .” Id. at 36.
They allege that “deputies targeted two Black teenagers sitting
quietly in a parked vehicle[.]” ECF No. 19 at 7. Plaintiffs argue
that “no crime had been committed[,]” so “there was no other basis
for the detention other than racial profiling in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 36. In support of this assertion,
Plaintiffs allege that the deputies “made statements implying that
the stop was pretextual and retaliatory in nature[,]” such as “we
don’t do that, GANG, GANG.” Id. at 7. Additionally, Plaintiffs
assert that “deputies ignored the presence of Brown’s wife and
mother but pursued arrest and tow actions inconsistent with
lawful parking enforcement.” ECF No. 19 at 7.
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The court accepts as true that deputies said, “We don’t do
that, GANG, GANG.” Even so, that assertion is insufficient to
establish that officers were motivated by racial discrimination.
The “GANG, GANG” comment is at the very end of the video and
is made from one officer to another apparently as part of an inside
joke. The comment is made after the decision to arrest and tow
were already made and after K.B. I was released.
The basis for Plaintiffs’ first example of racially selective
enforcement is the deputies’ decision to detain K.B. I and Brown.
As previously discussed, the video contradicts plaintiffs’ assertion
that “there was no other basis for the detention other than racial
profiling.” The video shows that deputies began observing the
vehicle because of the way it was parked and its lack of license
plates. After watching K.B. I exit the driver’s side of the vehicle,
deputies approached and, ultimately, detained him. Plaintiffs did
not allege that this treatment was different from that received by
similarly situated individuals. They did not point to examples of
any 	non-Black 	individuals 	who 	were 	improperly 	parked 	in 	a
handicap spot, in a vehicle lacking license plates, and were not
subject to an investigatory stop by law enforcement.
The basis for Plaintiffs’ second example of racially selective
enforcement is deputies’ decision to tow their vehicle. Plaintiffs
assert that law enforcement typically issues a citation for vehicles
that are improperly parked in handicap spots, while the Brown’s
vehicle was towed. Am. Compl. at 9. Plaintiffs did not identify a
situation in which officers did not tow a vehicle belonging to a non-
Black person arrested for a misdemeanor, who had also improperly
parked 	a 	vehicle, 	and 	whose 	vehicle 	had 	no 	license 	plates
displayed.
Accordingly, 	Plaintiffs 	failed 	to 	allege 	that 	there 	are
similarly situated individuals who have been treated differently
because of their race. It is also clear that the deputies had valid
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reasons for taking the actions that they did. There are no facts
from which the court can infer a motivation based on 	racial
animus.
Because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that they
received 	treatment 	different 	from 	that 	received 	by 	similarly
situated individuals, or that the unequal treatment stemmed from
officers’ discriminatory intent, their claim for racial profiling fails.
The court recommends that Plaintiffs’ claim against Stensland,
Bass, and Villanueva for violation of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment should be DISMISSED.
H. Plaintiffs 	have 	not 	stated 	a 	cognizable 	claim
under the Fifth Amendment.
Plaintiffs allege that K.B. I and K.B. II were “detained and
interrogated by officers without being informed of their Fifth
Amendment 	right 	to 	remain 	silent.” 	Am. 	Compl. 	at 	7. 	This
allegation 	amounts 	to 	a 	Miranda 	violation. 	And 	a 	Miranda
violation does not confer a right to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 152 (2022). In their Response to
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs concede that “there is
no ‘Miranda’ claim” under Vega. ECF No. 19 at 8. This claim fails
should be DISMISSED.
I. 	Plaintiffs’ 	failure 	to 	intervene 	claims 	fail
because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged
any underlying constitutional violations.
Plaintiffs allege that Stensland, Bass, and Villanueva “each
failed 	to 	intervene 	to 	prevent 	the 	others’ 	violation 	of 	the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs because they had no incentive
to do so.” Am. Compl. at 41. A claim for failure to intervene is one
for 	bystander 	liability. 	Whitley 	v. 	Hanna, 	726 	F.3d 	631, 	646
(5th Cir. 2013). To state a claim for bystander liability, a plaintiff
must show that the officer “(1) knows that a fellow officer is
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violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” Id.
Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that the deputies
violated 	their 	constitutional 	rights 	in 	any 	way. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiffs cannot show the first element of the claim for bystander
liability against any of the individual defendants. Therefore, the
court recommends that Plaintiffs’ claims against Stensland, Bass,
and Villanueva for failure to intervene be DISMISSED.
J. Plaintiffs’ 	state 	law 	claims 	have 	not 	been
properly presented to the court.
In their Omnibus Response to Stensland and Bass’s Motions
to Dismiss, Plaintiffs state that their Amended Complaint “also
allege[s] 	facts 	to 	support 	Texas 	state-law 	claims 	for 	false
imprisonment, 	trespass, 	abuse 	of 	process, 	and 	intentional
infliction of emotional distress.” ECF No. 19 at 5. Stensland and
Bass assert that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does not allege
these state-law claims, and they request the court “to not consider”
these “new matters.” ECF Nos. 20 at 1, 21 at 1.
The court agrees that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does
not allege any state law claims against the named defendants.
Moreover, 	even 	if 	it 	did, 	the 	court 	would 	decline 	to 	exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. See The Lamar Co. v.
Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 976 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating
that generally, “a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over
remaining 	state-law 	claims 	when 	all 	federal-law 	claims 	are
eliminated before trial”). This case is in its very early stages,
discovery has been stayed (ECF No. 26), and the factors of judicial
economy, 	convenience, 	fairness, 	and 	comity 	weigh 	against
exercising supplemental jurisdiction.
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5. Claims 	Against 	Defendants 	Harris 	County 	and
Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez
Plaintiffs assert two Monell claims against Harris County
and Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez. Am. Compl. at 38. The
first is a supervisory liability claim based on Sheriff Gonzalez and
Harris County’s alleged failure to adequately train, supervise, or
discipline Stensland, Bass, Villanueva, Casmer, and other Harris
County Sheriff’s Office officers. Id. The second is a policy, practice,
or custom claim based on Harris County Sheriff’s Office’s alleged
history of unlawful arrests. Id. at 39–41.
To prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) an
official policy or custom; (2) the policymaker of that policy or
custom; and (3) a constitutional violation that the policy or custom
was the 	“moving force” behind. 	Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt. Co.,
41 F.4th 493, 509 (5th Cir. 2022). For Plaintiffs to prevail on their
Monell claims, they must show that they suffered a constitutional
violation. The court has already found that Plaintiffs did not allege
facts supporting any constitutional violations. Accordingly, the
court recommends that Plaintiffs’ claims against Harris County
and Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez be DISMISSED.
6. Allowing Plaintiffs to amend their complaint for a
second time would be futile.
Plaintiffs 	request 	leave 	to 	amend 	their 	complaint 	for 	a
second time “[s]hould the Court see fit to grant [the] Motion[s] to
Dismiss in whole or in part.” ECF No. 19 at 18. “Dismissing an
action after giving the plaintiff only one opportunity to state his
case is ordinarily unjustified.” Davoodi v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist.,
755 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jacquez v. Procunier,
801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986)). If the plaintiff seeks leave to
amend, 	she 	“must 	give 	the 	court 	at 	least 	some 	notice 	of
what . . . her amendments would be and how those amendments
would cure the initial complaint’s defects.” Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
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Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The
court may deny leave “[i]f the plaintiff does not provide a copy of
the amended complaint [or] explain how the defects could be
cured[.]” Id. (citation omitted). The court may also deny leave to
amend when amendment would be futile or when the plaintiff
chooses to stand on her complaint and argues that it satisfies the
pleading 	requirements. 	See 	Khoury 	v. 	Thota, 	No. 	20-20578,
2021 WL 3919248, at *4 (5th Cir. 2021) (affirming the district
court’s denial of leave to amend when the plaintiff chose to stand
on 	his 	complaint 	and 	argued 	that 	it 	satisfied 	the 	pleading
requirements); 	Wimm v. 	Jack 	Eckerd Corp., 	3 	F.3d 	137, 139
(5th Cir. 1993) (discussing futility of amendment as justification
for denying leave to amend).
Here, 	Plaintiffs 	merely 	“request[] 	the 	opportunity 	to
repled [sic] to add additional facts discovered . . . .” ECF No. 19
at 18. Plaintiffs give no indication of what their amendments
would 	be 	or 	how 	those 	amendments 	would 	overcome 	the
deficiencies raised by Stensland and Bass. There is nothing in
Plaintiffs’ Response to the instant motions that demonstrates that
Plaintiffs could overcome the deficiencies or somehow 	shed a
different 	light 	on 	the 	uncontroverted 	facts 	shown 	on 	video.
Accordingly, amendment would be futile and leave to amend is
DENIED.
7. Conclusion
The 	court 	recommends 	that 	Bass’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss,
ECF No. 15, and Stensland’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 16,
be GRANTED, and that all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims against
Defendants 	Stensland, 	Bass, 	Villanueva, 	and 	Casmer 	be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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The court also recommends that Plaintiffs’ Monell claims
against Defendants Harris County and Harris County Sherriff Ed
Gonzalez be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28
U.S.C. 	§ 636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72. 	Failure 	to 	timely 	file
objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th
Cir. 1988).
Signed at Houston, Texas, on February 11, 2026.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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