Doe v. Deer Park Independent School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JANE DOE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS §
NEXT FRIEND OF JANIE DOE, MINOR §
CHILD, §
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-2778
§
DEER PARK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL §
DISTRICT, §
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Defendant Deer Park Independent School District’s
Motion to Dismiss.1 ECF 5. After considering the pleadings, the parties’ arguments,
and the applicable law, the Court RECOMMENDS that Deer Park Independent
School District’s Motion (ECF 5) be GRANTED, and Plaintiffs be granted leave to
amend their Title IX claim only.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
Plaintiff Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of her daughter, Janie Doe, sued
Deer Park Independent School District (“DPISD”) alleging that, on May 23, 2023,
Robert James Yarbrough, a DPISD school bus driver, sexually assaulted Janie on a
1 The District Judge referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), the Cost and Delay Reduction Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act,
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. ECF 9.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 12, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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DPISD school bus. ECF 1-1 at ¶¶ 2, 11. Plaintiffs claim that witnesses saw
Yarbrough take Janie to the back of the school bus where he pushed her down and
proceeded to sexually assault her. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiffs claim that Yarbrough had
been “tickling” Janie for two years, at one time kissed her, and would slip his hand
under her shirt and shorts . Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiffs also allege that the Principal and
two teachers at Janie’s school were previously made aware of Yarbrough’s conduct
but failed to stop him. Id. at ¶ 13.
Plaintiffs have brought claims against DPISD pursuant to the Texas Tort
Claim Act for negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud by
nondisclosure, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ¶¶ 14–35. Additionally, Plaintiffs
allege a cause of action for violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Id. at ¶¶ 37–41.
Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages. Id. at ¶¶ 45–46.
On June 13, 2025, DPISD properly removed this case federal court invoking
the Court’s federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. ECF 1 at ¶¶ 5–9. On
June 30, 2025, DPISD filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF 5) to which Plaintiffs
responded (ECF 7) and DPISD replied (ECF 8). DPISD’s Motion is ripe for
consideration.
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II. Legal Standards.
A. Rule 12(b)(1).
“[A] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when
the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Tsolmon
v. U.S., Civil Action No. H-13-3434, 2015 WL 5093412, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 28,
2015) (quoting Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 756 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 2014)).
When there is a challenge to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the party
asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction exists. Id. (citing
Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Tex. v. U.S., 757 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2014); Gilbert
v. Donahoe, 751 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2014)). “Lack of subject matter jurisdiction
may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed
facts.” Id. (quoting Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)). When a
defendant moves to dismiss based on the allegations in the complaint alone, those
allegations are presumed to be true. Patterson v. Weinberger, 644 F. 2d 521, 523
(5th Cir. 1998).
B. Rule 12(b)(6).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
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550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the conduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court “accepts all
well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Alexander v. AmeriPro Funding, Inc., 848 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.
2004)). However, the court does not apply the same presumption to conclusory
statements or legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Generally, a court may consider only the allegations in the complaint and any
attachments thereto in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Collins v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). If a motion to dismiss refers to
matters outside the pleading it is more properly considered as a motion for summary
judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). “A district court may rely on evidence outside the
complaint, without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary
judgment, if that evidence is either (a) a document attached to the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, referred to in the complaint, and central to the plaintiff's claim; or (b) a
matter subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. George v. SI
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Group, Incorporated, 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022). Going beyond the pleadings
is otherwise error. Id.
In ruling on DPISD’s Motion, the Court considered the Deer Park Police
Department report regarding the investigation into Yarbrough’s alleged sexual
assault, which Plaintiffs attached to their Response. ECF 7-1. DPISD raises no
objection to Plaintiffs’ reliance on the report. Courts may consider documents
attached to an opposition to a motion to dismiss when “the documents are referred
to in the pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims.” Brand Coupon Network,
L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014); Jesse Kevin
Duplechain, M.D., (II) v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 594 F. Supp. 3d 729, 732
(W.D. La. 2022).2 Alternatively, the Court takes judicial notice of the Deer Park
Police Report pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 201. See Dubash v. City of Houston, No.
4:23-CV-3556, 2024 WL 4351351, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. CV H-23-3556, 2024 WL 4355196 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
30, 2024) (taking judicial notice of a police report on a 12(b)(6) motion); See also
Ramirez v. Smith, No. MO:24-CV-00268-DC-RCG, 2025 WL 2203082, at *3 (W.D.
Tex. July 10, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. MO:24-CV-00268-
DC, 2025 WL 2202375 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2025) (same); Shields v. City of Houston,
2 While the police report is not explicitly referenced, Plaintiffs’ allegations in the Original Petition
appear to derive from the police report attached to Plaintiffs’ Response (ECF 7) to DPISD’s
Motion to Dismiss. See ECF 7-1 at 8 (containing the allegations in the Petition verbatim).
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No. 4:24-CV-01291, 2024 WL 3448017, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 17, 2024) (taking
judicial notice of an incident report as a “matter of public record”).
III. Analysis
Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case in its entirety, arguing: (1) the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all of Plaintiffs’ tort claims because they
are barred by governmental immunity; (2) Jane Doe lacks individual standing to sue
under Title IX; (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief
under Title IX; and (4) Plaintiffs’ punitive and emotional damages claims are barred
as a matter of law. ECF 5. Plaintiffs respond that: (1) governmental immunity does
not apply to its Title IX claim because it is a federal cause of action; (2) Jane Doe is
suing only suing in her representative capacity; (3) the Original Petition alleges a
plausible claim under Title IX; and (4) it is premature to dismiss their damages
claims. As set forth below, Defendants’ first, second, and fourth arguments are not
seriously contested and support dismissal. With respect to Defendant’s third
argument, the Court finds that, as pled, Plaintiffs’ Original Petition fails to state a
plausible claim for relief.
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A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ tort claims, claims
on behalf of Jane Doe individually, and claims for punitive and
emotional damages should be granted.
1. Tort Claims
“School districts in Texas retain their sovereign/governmental immunity from
all common law claims unless the Texas Legislature has expressly waived immunity
in a specific statute.” A.W. v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 F. Supp. 3d 973, 1006
(S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d sub nom. King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d
754 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Mission Consolidated I.S.D. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653,
655 (Tex. 2008)). The Texas Tort Claims Act “generally waives governmental
immunity to the extent that liability arises from the ‘use of a motor-driven vehicle
or motor-driven equipment’ or from ‘a condition or use of tangible personal or real
property.’” Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 655–66 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 101.021). “For school districts, the Act’s waiver is even narrower, encompassing
only tort claims involving the use or operation of motor vehicles.” Id. at 656 (citing
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.051); See A.W. v. Humble, 25 F. Supp. 3d at
1006 (“Under the TTCA the only permissible tort claim against a school district is a
claim based on misuse of a motor vehicle.”).
Although Plaintiffs allege that Yarbrough’s tortious conduct occurred on a
DPISD school bus, that fact alone does not trigger the waiver of sovereign immunity
for torts involving motor vehicles. See Monroe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:24-
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CV-00139, 2024 WL 3627777, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2024) (“… it is well-
established that the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity where the
vehicle merely provides the site of a plaintiff’s injuries, without more.”) (emphasis
in original); See also LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d
49, 51 (Tex. 1992) (“When an injury occurs on a school bus but does not arise out
of the use or operation of the bus, and the bus is only the setting for the injury,
immunity for liability is not waived.”). Because sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs’
negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, invasion of privacy,
and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, they should be
dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Jane Doe Claims
Parents do not have standing to pursue individual claims under Title IX. See
Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled
on other grounds Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629 (1999) (“nothing in the statutory language provides a parent with a personal
claim under title IX.”) (internal brackets omitted). Plaintiffs do not dispute this legal
conclusion and confirm in their Response Jane Doe is bringing this suit only in her
representative capacity as next friend of Janie Doe in accordance with FED. R. CIV.
P. 17(c). ECF 7 at 10. To the extent the caption of Plaintiffs Original Petition, which
identifies Plaintiffs as “Jane Doe, Individually and as next friend of Janie Doe,
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Minor Child,” (ECF 1-1 at 3, emphasis added), causes confusion on this point, any
Title IX claim on behalf of Jane Doe individually should be dismissed for lack of
standing.
3. Punitive and Emotional Damages
Neither punitive nor emotional distress damages are available under Title IX.3
See Doe v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F. Supp. 3d 870, 882 (S.D. Tex. 2019)
(holding under Title IX “punitive damages are unavailable as a matter of law”); See
McGowan v. S. Methodist Univ., 715 F. Supp. 3d 937, 954 (N.D. Tex. 2024) (same);
Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 222 (2022) (precluding
recovery for emotional distress damages under Spending Clause statutes).
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Cummings because it addressed the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116. Id. at 217. Writing for the majority in Cummings,
Chief Justice Roberts explained that statutes enacted under the Spending Clause are
contractual in nature: “by conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise by
the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between
the Government and the recipient of funds.” Id. at 219; See McGowan, 715 F. Supp.
3d at 954 (Spending Clause statues “operate like a contract between the federal
3 Similarly, the Texas Tort Claims Act does not permit Plaintiffs to recover exemplary damages
for their tort claims against DPISD. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.024.
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government and the parties receiving federal funds.”). Federal courts in Texas
applying Cummings have found that it also bars recovery of emotional distress
damages for Title IX claims because Title IX is a Spending Clause statute. See e.g.,
McGowan, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 954–55 (“Courts have routinely applied the Cummings
Court’s reasoning to cases involving Spending Clause statutes, including Title IX.”)
(citing cases); Loera v. Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:21-CV-00031, 2023 WL
6130548, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2023) (rejecting an argument that Cummings did
not apply to Title IX claims); Bonnewitz v. Baylor Univ., No. 6:21-CV-00491-ADA-
DTG, 2022 WL 2688399, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 12, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, No. W-21-CV-00491-ADA, 2022 WL 21603105 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 2, 2022) (citing to Cummings, “[d]amages for emotional distress are not
recoverable for violations of anti-discrimination statutes, including Title IX.”); Roe
v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CV H-18-2850, 2025 WL 1678080, at
*4 (S.D. Tex. June 13, 2025) (“District courts in this circuit apply Cummings to Title
IX claims.”). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive and emotional distress
damages should be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted.
To prevail on a Title IX claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that an official who
had the authority to institute corrective measures had actual knowledge of
Yarbrough’s alleged sexual misconduct and responded with deliberate indifference.
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J. T. v. Uplift Educ., No. 23-10773, 2024 WL 5118486, at *3 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024)
(citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998)). DPISD
argues that Plaintiffs’ Original Petition fails to plausibly allege facts that show
DPISD had actual knowledge of Yarborough’s prior sexual assault of Janie or that
DPISD responded with deliberate indifference.
To begin with, it is important to note that Plaintiffs’ do not allege that DPISD
was deliberately indifferent to the alleged sexual assault on May 25, 2023. Plaintiffs
acknowledge that the Deer Park Police Department investigated that incident and,
while no criminal charges were brought, DPISD terminated Yarborough as a result.
Plaintiffs’ claim in this case is that DPISD had actual knowledge of prior assaults
and did nothing to prevent them. Plaintiffs’ Petition alleges the following facts
related to DPISD’s alleged knowledge and deliberate indifference:
11. On or about May 25, 2023, Janie Doe [] was sexually assaulted
by Robert James Yarbrough, a Deer Park ISD bus driver, while on a
Deer Park ISD school bus. Yarbrough was seen walking Janie Doe to
the rear of the bus and push[ing] her down onto the seat and
proceed[ing] to sexually assault her. The video footage obtained from
the bus showed Janie Doe go to the back of the bus, Yarbrough follows
her and then begins to appear to “tickle” Janie Doe. Janie Doe the lies
down in the back seat and Yarbrough is bent over her saying “one last
time,” which lasts for a few seconds. Yarbrough then goes back to the
front of the bus.
12. It was later discovered that Yarborough has been “tickling” Janie
Doe for two years and kissed her. Janie Doe advised that Yarbrough
forced her to the back of the bus and that this has been happening since
first grade. Janie Doe advised that Yarbrough usually slips his hands
under her shirt and shorts. Janie Doe also advised that she gets
“tickled” on her legs, arms, and under arms, and it is always in the same
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spots. Yarbrough also “tickled” Janie Doe on the bottom of her shorts
and touched her butt.
13. The principal of the school was notified about the “tickling”
along with Janie Doe’s [first and second grade teachers]. Nothing was
done to stop Yarbrough.
ECF 1-1 at ¶ 11-13. The Deer Park Police Report, attached to Plaintiffs’ Response
to the Motion to Dismiss, states that Janie advised during a forensic interview a
month after the May 25, 2023 incident that Yarbrough had been tickling her since
the first grade and he “was caught, but continued to do it.” ECF 7-1 at 8. The Police
Report also states:
[Janie] advised that the Principal of the school was told about the
tickling, along with her teacher Mrs. Fields. [Janie] advised that
[redacted] parents also caught [Yarbrough] tickling students. [Janie]
advised that the school Principal told [Yarbrough] to stop, but he
continued.
Id. Taken as a whole, Plaintiffs’ pleadings allege that Janie’s Principal and two
teachers had actual knowledge that Yarbrough had tickled Janie. Even if accepted
as true, these allegations fail to show DPISD had actual knowledge prior to May 25,
2023 that Janie faced a substantial risk of sexual assault.
Title IX requires more than a showing that the school district “should have
known there was a substantial risk of abuse.” J.T. v. Uplift Educ., 679 F. Supp. 3d
540, 550 (N.D. Tex. 2023) (citing M.E. v. Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist., 840 Fed. Appx.
773, 775 (5th Cir. 2020)). Title IX requires actual knowledge, which means that a
district official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
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drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exits, and [s]he must also draw the
inference.” Id. (change in original) (citing Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist.,
106 F.3d 648, 659 (5th Cir. 1997)). Here, Plaintiffs allege only that the Principal
and teachers knew that Yarbough had tickled Janie. There is no allegation they had
any knowledge of the additional details that Janie shared during her forensic
interview following the May 25, 2023 incident.
Tickling, while inappropriate, is not sexual assault. The Principal’s
knowledge of tickling is not enough to show that she had actual knowledge of a
substantial danger to Janie. For example, in J. T. v. Uplift Educ., the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that “red flags,” such as a teacher’s darkened
room and blocked window view in close proximity to an administrator, did not show
actual knowledge. 2024 WL 5118486, at *4. Similarly, in Doe v. Northside I.S.D.,
884 F. Supp. 2d 485, 493 (W.D. Tex. 2012), knowledge that teacher had prior
counseling sessions about troubling MySpace interactions with a student, “boundary
issues” and “chumminess” with students, and being alone in a classroom with
plaintiff at a suspicious time, did not provide “actual notice” to the school district
that a student was being assaulted by the teacher.
Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the actual
knowledge element of a Title IX claim, the Court need not address whether DPISD
acted with deliberate indifference. A school district is “deliberately indifferent when
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its ‘response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the
known circumstances.’” Menzia v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 47 F.4th 354, 361 (5th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. at 648) (emphasis
in original). “[A] complete failure to act is an obvious case of deliberate
indifference.” Harrower as next friends of J.H.1 v. Eastland Indep. Sch. Dist., –––
F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, No. 1:24-CV-168-H, 2025 WL 1504305, at *11 (N.D. Tex.
May 27, 2025) (quoting Menzia, 47 F.4th at 363).
This is not a case in which the school district completely failed to act. The
record before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss shows that when the Principal was
informed that Yarbrough tickled Janie, the Principal told Yarbrough to stop. ECF
7-1 at 8. Because the actual knowledge of the Principal and teachers was limited to
“tickling,” the corrective measure of telling Yarbrough to stop, even if not effective,
was reasonable in light of the known circumstances.
C. Leave to Amend should be granted and pre-amendment discovery
should be denied.
Plaintiffs request that if the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss, they be given
“an opportunity to conduct discovery and address any pleading deficiencies in the
complaint.” ECF 7 at 12-13. DPISD does not object to granting leave to amend the
Title IX claim, but objects to what it terms “plausibility discovery.” ECF 8 at 2-4.
District courts generally give a plaintiff leave to amend a deficient pleading
unless there is a permissible reason to deny leave, such a undue delay, bad faith,
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repeated failures to cure deficient pleadings and futility. Matter of Life Partners
Holdings, Inc., 926 F.3d 103, 125 (5th Cir. 2019). Leave to amend however, does
not come with automatic entitlement to pre-pleading discovery. As the Supreme
Court explained in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009):
Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.
Plaintiffs’ request wholly fails to explain what purpose the requested discovery
would serve beyond undercutting the very purpose of Iqbal and its companion Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771
F.3d 580, 593 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “plaintiffs must satisfy the pleading
requirements of Rule 8 before the discovery stage, not after it”); Vega v. Davis, 572
F. App'x 611, 616 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that motion to dismiss should
be denied before discovery due to “profound informational asymmetries”); Carter
v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 521 F. App'x 725, 728 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding discovery “is
not a device to enable the plaintiff to make a case when his complaint has failed to
state a claim” (citation omitted)). Some cases justify pre-dismissal discovery, such
as cases where jurisdiction or venue is challenged. See Salaiz v. Oscar Mgmt. Corp.,
No. EP-22-CV-00114-DCG, 2025 WL 1794447, at *7 (W.D. Tex. June 25, 2025)
(allowing jurisdictional discovery to proceed). However, this is not such a case.
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Therefore, the Court recommends granting leave to amend, but denying leave to
conduct discovery.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation.
For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that DPISD’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF 5) be GRANTED, with leave to amend. Specifically, the
Court RECOMMENDS:
• Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud by nondisclosure, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress should be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction;
• To the extent Jane Doe brings claims under Title IX in her individual capacity,
those claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE due to lack of
standing;
• Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive and emotional distress damages should be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Court further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs be granted leave to file an
Amended Complaint within 21 days of an Order Adopting this Memorandum and
Recommendation, if any, alleging a claim on behalf of Janie Doe under Title IX.
The Clerk of the Court shall send copies of the memorandum and
recommendation to the respective parties, who will then have fourteen days to file
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written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file written
objections within the time period provided will bar an aggrieved party from attacking
the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on
other grounds.
Christina A. Bryan
United States Magistrate Judge
Signed on November 12, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
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