Hickman v. Powell Industries, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
LEE ARTHUR HICKMAN,
Plaintiff,
versus
POWELL INDUSTRIES,
INC,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:25-cv-02696
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
ORDER ADOPTING
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Lee Arthur Hickman filed this lawsuit,
asserting claims pursuant to 42 USC §§1981 and
1981a(b)(1), for “disparate treatment” caused by “a hostile
work environment through harassment due to racial
discrimination.” Dkt 1 at 1–3.
Pending is a Memorandum and Recommendation by
Magistrate Judge Richard W. Bennett, recommending that
this case be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state
a claim. Dkt 25. In short, it states that the complaint
contains no allegations of discrimination or hostility based
on race and thus fails to meet Plaintiff’s burden of pleading
“but for” causation. Id at 9–10. Judge Bennett
recommended dismissal without prejudice, while allowing
Plaintiff until December 30, 2025, to file an amended
complaint, in the absence of which dismissal would be with
prejudice.
Plaintiff filed what is titled as an amended complaint.
But it states only objections, and so is construed as such.
Dkt 26.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 23, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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The district court reviews de novo those conclusions of
a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically
objected. See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C); see
also United States v Wilson, 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir
1989, per curiam). The district court may accept any other
portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no
clear error appears on the face of the record. See Guillory v
PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing
Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d
1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996, en banc); see also FRCP 72(b)
advisory committee note (1983).
Upon de novo review and determination, Hickman’s
objections lack merit.
Plaintiff objects that dismissal was improper because
he hadn’t yet had the opportunity to conduct discovery and
gather corroborating evidence to prove his claims. Dkt 26
at 3–5. This misperceives the burden applicable at the
pleading stage of litigation, where the sole inquiry is
whether the complaint provides “the plaintiff’s grounds for
entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that
when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.’” Cuvillier v Taylor, 503 F3d 397, 401 (5th
Cir 2007), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US
544, 555 (2007). The possibility that discovery may later
reveal supporting evidence is irrelevant to whether the
complaint’s factual allegations state a plausible claim for
relief. Here, the complaint was deficient in that regard. The
motion to dismiss was thus properly granted.
The objections to the Memorandum and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED.
Dkt 26.
No clear error otherwise appears upon review and
consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendation,
the record, and the applicable law.
The Memorandum and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Memorandum and
Order of this Court. Dkt 25.
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A further motion to dismiss has been filed, given the
curious nature of the filing at Docket 26. See Dkt 28. As
such, determination as to whether this action should be
dismissed with or without prejudice is reserved until
further action by the Magistrate Judge as to that pending
motion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on _______________, at Houston, Texas.
___________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
January 22, 2026
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