Washington v. Williams et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Abner L. Washington,
Plaintiff,
v.
Deborah Williams, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-02261
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This 	dispute 	stems 	from 	a 	dental 	procedure 	and 	related 	denial 	of
coverage for a corrective procedure. 	Defendants Tammie Trinh, DDS, and
Jefferson Dental Orthodontics filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Abner L.
Washington’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 	Dkt. 13.
Defendants Deborah Williams and Sonya Barbour filed a motion to dismiss
Washington’s 	claims 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	12(b)(1) 	and 	12(b)(6) 	or,
alternatively, for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Dkt. 17.
After carefully considering both motions, Dkt. 13, Dkt. 17, Washington’s
responses, Dkt. 18, Dkt. 20, Dkt. 23, Williams’s and Barbour’s reply, Dkt. 24,
the pleadings, and the applicable law, it is recommended that the motions to
dismiss be granted. Washington’s requests for hearings, Dkt. 26, Dkt. 36, and
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 07, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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his motion to sever his claims against Dr. Trinh and Jefferson Dental, Dkt. 35,
are all denied.
Background
The following allegations are taken as true at this stage. 	Dr. Trinh, a
dentist employed by Jefferson Dental, damaged Washington’s jawbone when
extracting six of his teeth. 	Dkt. 1 at 10. 	The procedure was undertaken to
enable Washington’s use of dentures and was covered by Medicaid. 	Id.
Because of the damage, Washington needs a bone graft and a bottom denture
plate. See id.; Dkt. 1-3 at 1. But Dental Quest Insurance, Inc. (“Dental Quest”)
denied coverage for those corrective procedures, even after a “State Fair
Hearing Appeal.” Dkt. 1 at 11. The complaint identified Williams and Barbour
as agents and representatives of Dental Quest. 	Id. at 9-10. 	But Washington
has clarified that those individuals work for Molina Healthcare Group (“Molina
Healthcare”), and not for Dental Quest. See Dkt. 20 at 2; Dkt. 23 at 3.
Dental Quest contracts with Molina Healthcare. 	Dkt. 20 at 2. 	Molina
Healthcare is 	an organization that manages healthcare 	benefits, 	see id.;
Dkt. 23 	at 4-5, which is commonly referred to 	as a 	health maintenance
organization (“HMO”). Washington is a member of Molina Healthcare’s Star-
Plus Program. Dkt. 18 at 3.
Washington sued Dr. Trinh, Jefferson Dental, Williams, and Barbour in
their individual and corporate capacities. 	Dkt. 1 at 2-3, 7 (case caption). 	He
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seeks declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Social Security Act (“SSA”), and Texas
Medicaid Program. 	He also asserts violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 7-8.
Dr. Trinh and Jefferson Dental moved to dismiss Washington’s claims,
Dkt. 13, as did Williams and Barbour, Dkt. 17. 	Washington filed multiple
responses to the motions, Dkt. 18, Dkt. 20, Dkt. 23. Williams and Barbour filed
a reply. Dkt. 24. Washington then filed a request for a hearing on the motions
to dismiss. 	Dkt. 26. 	More recently, Washington filed a motion to sever his
claims against Trinh. 	Dkt. 35. 	He then filed a request for a hearing on the
motion to sever. Dkt. 36.
Legal standard
A. 	Rule 12(b)(1)
“Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is ‘properly dismissed for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate’ the claim.” 	In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab.
Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Home Builders Ass’n, Inc. v.
City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)). “Lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction may be found in the complaint alone, the complaint supplemented
by 	the 	undisputed 	facts 	as 	evidenced 	in 	the 	record, 	or 	the 	complaint
supplemented 	by 	the 	undisputed 	facts 	plus 	the 	court’s 	resolution 	of 	the
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disputed facts.” 	Id. at 287. 	The plaintiff bears the burden to establish that
subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Id. at 286.
B. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Rather,
“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken
as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will
reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” 	See Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56). When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.” 	Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted). Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d
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287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
(per curiam)).
Analysis
Defendants’ motions to dismiss raise multiple challenges to this Court’s
jurisdiction to hear Washington’s claims and the viability of those claims. See
Dkt. 13; Dkt. 17. As explained below, Defendants’ contentions are not properly
characterized as jurisdictional questions. 	But Defendants are correct that
Washington’s 	federal 	claims 	under 	the 	ACA, 	SSA, 	and 	for 	various
constitutional violations through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not actionable and
should be dismissed on the merits. And because the only remaining claims are
governed 	by 	Texas 	state 	law, 	this 	Court 	should 	decline 	to 	exercise
supplemental 	jurisdiction 	and 	dismiss 	those 	state-law 	claims 	without
prejudice to being refiled in state court. 1
1 Dental Quest is not a named defendant, even though the Defendants appear to
believe that it is. 	Washington’s complaint names Williams and Barbour of “Dental
Quest,” see Dkt. 1, not Dental Quest itself, and he has conceded that those individuals
do not work for Dental Quest after all, Dkt. 23 at 3. 	Moreover, even assuming that
Washington intended to sue Dental Quest, he has not made any attempt to serve that
entity, and the deadline for doing so has long since expired. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)
(90 days).
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I. 	Washington’s federal claims are barred.
A. 	Washington has standing to assert those claims.
Defendants raise several issues that they characterize as jurisdictional.
Those arguments are more appropriately classified as challenges to the merits
of Washington’s claims. And Washington has standing to bring those claims.
For example, Dr. Trinh and Jefferson Dental assert that there is no
private right of action provided under the ACA, SSA, or Medicaid, see Dkt. 13
at 6. But courts resolve this issue on the merits, not through 12(b)(1) motions
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stewart v. Bernstein, 769 F.2d 1088
(5th Cir. 1985) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims because Title
XIX of the SSA (“Medicaid Act”) does not provide a cause of action for a
Medicaid recipient against their private provider of services); Tucker v. United
States, 2023 WL 4091280, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2023) (dismissing claims
under Title XVIII of the SSA and the ACA with prejudice for failure to state a
claim because petitioner failed to identify provisions of the Acts that provide a
private cause of action for her claims), adopted by 2023 WL 4089374 (N.D. Tex.
June 16, 2023), appeal dismissed, 2024 WL 467559 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2024), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 306 (2024).
The same goes for Williams’s and Barbour’s contention that they did not
cause Washington’s injury, which they mistakenly couch as a challenge to his
standing to sue. 	See Dkt. 17 at 14. 	The Article III standing inquiry asks
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“whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a particular lawsuit ....” Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 799
(2015) (emphasis added; alterations and quotation omitted). 	By arguing that
they do not work for the entity who denied coverage for William’s corrective
procedure, however, Williams and Barbour maintain that Washington has
sued the wrong defendants. 	That dispute goes to the merits of Washington’s
claims. 	See, e.g., Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 347 (3d Cir. 2016)
(rejecting 	analogous 	challenge 	to 	standing, 	concluding 	that 	whether 	the
defendant insurer (as opposed to its subsidiary) was responsible for the harm
“is better understood as a well-disguised challenge to the legal merits of
[plaintiff’s] case, not as a challenge to his standing to pursue it”); Acevedo v.
Duncan-Walker, 	2025 	WL 	2349793, 	at 	*3, 	5 	(E.D. 	Tex. 	July 	29, 	2025)
(argument that the plaintiff sued the wrong person was not a jurisdictional
challenge), adopted by 2025 WL 2345050 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2025).
Washington’s standing to sue Dr. Trinh and Jefferson Dental is even
more obvious. 	Although those Defendants focus on the denial of insurance
coverage, 	they 	overlook 	Washington’s 	explicit 	allegations 	that 	Dr. 	Trinh
performed 	negligent 	dental 	work 	that 	necessitated 	further 	corrective
procedures and caused him physical and emotional harm. See Dkt. 1 at 10-11
(negligence and malpractice allegations); id. at 11 (“Dr. Trinh was liable to
repair the damaged bone ….”); id. at 8 (accusing Dr. Trinh of “caus[ing]”
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“negligent acts, omissions, and reckless injuries and harm”). 	That is plainly
enough to show an injury fairly traceable to Dr. Trinh and his employer and
that damages would redress. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-
61 (1992). Defendants’ jurisdictional challenges lack merit.
B. 	There is no private right of action under the SSA and ACA.
With respect to the merits of Washington’s federal claims, however,
Defendants are correct that neither the SSA nor the ACA provides a private
right of action. See Dkt. 13 at 6; Dkt. 17 at 23. Washington maintains that his
SSA and ACA claims are viable but identifies no authority supporting his
position. See Dkt. 18 at 6-7.
“[P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by
Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). Congress did not
provide for a private right of action in the SSA, including in the Medicaid Act,
42 U.S.C. 1396., et seq. See Stewart, 769 F.2d at 1092; Taylor v. St. Clair, 685
F.2d 982, 988 (5th Cir. 1982). 	Although the ACA provides a private right of
action for some discrimination claims, see Francois v. Our Lady of the Lake
Hosp., Inc., 8 F.4th 370, 378 (5th Cir. 2021) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a)),
the statute does not otherwise create a private right of action to challenge
coverage denials. See Apollo MedFlight, LLC v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tex.,
2019 WL 2539272, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2019) (collecting authorities
finding no private right of action under the ACA), adopted in part, rejected in
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part on other grounds by 2019 WL 4894263 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2019) (agreeing
that ACA claim was barred but further dismissing all other claims); see also,
e.g., Mosser v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 2018 WL 5728529, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 7,
2018) (recommending rejection of an ACA claim because “the ACA does not
create of private cause of action” to challenge coverage denial). 	Washington’s
claims under the SSA and the ACA should be dismissed.
C. 	Washington’s 	Section 	1983 	claims 	also 	fail 	because
Defendants are not state actors.
Washington 	brings 	claims 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	for 	alleged
constitutional violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Dkt. 1 at 7-8. 	Defendants argue that the Section 1983 claims lack merit
because Defendants are not state actors. 	See Dkt. 13 at 9; Dkt. 17 at 21.
Washington 	responds 	that 	Defendants’ 	conduct 	constitutes 	state 	action
because his healthcare was funded through Medicaid, and Molina Healthcare
acted as a regulator. 	See Dkt. 20 at 6; Dkt. 23 at 4-5 (citing Brentwood Acad.
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)).
“A claim for relief under section 1983 requires a showing of two elements:
first, 	that 	the 	claimant 	has 	been 	deprived 	of 	a 	right 	‘secured 	by 	the
Constitution and laws’ of the United States, and second, that the deprivation
was conducted ‘under color of any statute ... of any State.’” 	Frazier v. Bd. of
Trs. of Nw. Miss. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1283 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting
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Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)), amended on other
grounds, 777 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1985). 	In short, “[a] plaintiff must show that
the party charged with depriving the plaintiff of her federal right ... can be
fairly described as a state actor.” 	Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Grp.,
Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2003). 	Private individuals generally do not
qualify as state actors. Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 518 (5th Cir. 2005).
Washington, a Medicaid beneficiary, alleges that Dr. Trinh and Jefferson
Dental provided negligent dental care. See supra Part I.A. But as healthcare
providers, those defendants cannot be considered state actors “solely because
[they] 	receive[] 	medicare 	and 	medicaid 	funds 	and 	[are] 	subject 	to 	state
regulation.” 	Wheat v. Mass, 994 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming
dismissal of Section 1983 claim against a hospital and its physicians “[b]ecause
no state action was involved”); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012
(1982) (concluding that “nursing homes’ decisions to discharge or transfer
Medicaid patients” were not “state actions”). Washington offers no cognizable
basis to treat those defendants as state actors.
The same restriction forecloses Washington’s Section 1983 claim against
Williams and Barbour for their alleged involvement in Molina Healthcare’s
denial 	of 	insurance 	coverage. 	Federal 	courts 	have 	concluded 	that 	that
managed care organizations, including HMOs like Molina Healthcare, are not
state actors regardless of their receipt of government funding. 	See, e.g.,
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Gonzalez-Maldonado v. MMM Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 248 (1st Cir.
2012) (finding HMO was not a state actor because “neither government
regulation … nor government funding … converts” the private entity into a
state actor); N.J. Primary Care Ass’n Inc. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
722 F.3d 527, 537 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Gonzalez-Maldonado, 693 F.3d at 248)
(no constitutional violation because managed care organizations are “non-state
actors”); Child.’s Hosp. of Phila. v. Horizon NJ Health, 2008 WL 4330311, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2008) (applying Blum, 457 U.S. 991 to find that “[t]he
mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself
convert” an HMO that operated a Medicaid managed care plan’s action into a
state action). Washington has alleged no facts and asserted no theory meriting
a different conclusion. Thus, even if Molina Healthcare’s coverage denial could
properly be attributed to Williams and Barbour, their conduct on the HMO’s
behalf does not qualify as state action. The Section 1983 claims are barred.
II. 	The lack of viable federal claims favors declining supplemental
jurisdiction over Washington’s state law claims.
Washington’s 	remaining 	Texas 	Medicaid 	Program, 	negligence, 	and
malpractice claims arise under state law. 	See Detgen ex rel. Detgen v. Janek,
945 F. Supp. 2d 746, 755-56 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (distinguishing between Medicaid
requirements set by federal law under the Social Security Act and those
required by state law), aff’d, 752 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 2014); Hinojosa v. Perez,
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214 F. Supp. 2d 703, 706 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (negligence claim against healthcare
providers did not raise a federal question); Buerger v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 982 F.
Supp. 1253, 1255 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (medical malpractice is “clearly [a] state law
claim[]” and presents no federal question). 	Defendants argue that this Court
should 	decline 	to 	exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	those 	claims,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Dkt. 13 at 11; Dkt. 17 at 25. Although
Washington disagrees, he requests in the alternative that his claims be
“transfer[red] to a state court ....” See Dkt. 18 at 5-6. But “there is no authority
to transfer a case from a federal to a state court.” Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d
1409, 1412 (5th Cir. 1983). 	Instead, the appropriate result is to dismiss
Washington’s state law claims without prejudice to refiling them in state court.
A “district court[] may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim” if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has” federal question
jurisdiction. 	28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 	In fact, a court “ordinarily should [] kick
the case to state court” in this circumstance. 	Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.
Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 32 (2025) (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to dismiss state claims without
prejudice “when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed.”
Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation
omitted); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 246 (5th Cir. 1999). 	This is
especially true if a case is at an early stage in litigation. 	See United Mine
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Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Brookshire Bros. Holding v.
Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009).
Little has happened beyond Defendants’ filing of motions to dismiss. The
parties have not expended significant resources on discovery or other issues.
The trial date is more than a year away. 	See Dkt. 33 at 2 (February 16, 2027
trial date). 	Dismissal of Washington’s federal claims therefore warrants
declining jurisdiction over his remaining state law claims.
III. 	Plaintiff’s motions are denied.
Washington has also filed various procedural motions. 	All are denied.
On August 1, 2025, Washington filed a request for a hearing on Defendants’
motions to dismiss. 	See Dkt. 26. 	The parties have already had ample
opportunity to address the issues in their briefing and at the September 5, 2025
initial conference. Washington’s request for a further hearing is denied.
Washington also filed a motion to sever his claims against Dr. Trinh. See
Dkt. 35. This motion is subject to being stricken for failure to confer. See Judge
Ho’s Procedures § 5(d)(5)(i). But because the entire case should be dismissed,
see supra Part II, the motion is moot. 	Washington’s further request for a
hearing on his motion to sever is denied. See Dkt. 36.
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Recommendation and Order
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants
Tammie 	Trinh’s 	and 	Jefferson 	Dental 	Orthodontics’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss
(Dkt. 13) and Defendants Deborah Williams’s and Sonya Barbour’s motion to
dismiss (Dkt. 17) be GRANTED.
It is further RECOMMENDED that all claims asserted by Plaintiff
Abner L. Washington under the Social Security Act, the Affordable Care Act,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and Washington’s
remaining state law claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s requests for hearings (Dkt. 26, Dkt. 36)
and motion to sever his claims (Dkt. 35) be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on November 7, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_____________________________________
Y	Y	Yvvvonne Y. H	H	H	Hoooo
U	United States Magistrate Judg
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