Warren v. Chi St Joseph Hospital

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ROSS THOMAS BRANTLEY, III, 	§
§
§
§
Petitioner,
vs.
ERIC GUERRERO,
Respondent.
§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-04842
§
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner Ross Thomas Brantley III (TDCJ #01851307) is a state inmate currently
in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") at the Wynne Unit.
Brantley filed a petition purportedly under 28 U.S.C . § 2241 to challenge his 2019 state
conviction in Tarrant County case number 1609793R. 	See Doc. No. 1. 	Because he is
collaterally attacking a state conviction or sentence, his petition is considered a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Brantley previously filed at least one other
petition for habeas corpus to challenge this same conviction, and, therefore, his petition
must be dismissed without prejudice as a successive petition.
I. 	SUCCESSIVE PETITION
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDP A"), which governs
Petitioner's claims, "made it significantly harder for prisoners filing second or successive
federal habeas applications under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to obtain hearings on the merits of their
claims." Graham v. Johnson , 168 F.3d 762, 772 (5th Cir. 1999). 	Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1 / 5
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 19, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:25-cv-01997 Document 18 Filed 12/19/25 in TXSD Page 1 of 5

§ 2244(b )(3 )(A), before a second or successive application is filed in a district court, the
applicant must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district
court to consider the application. 	This Court has no jurisdiction to consider claims in a
habeas action that is "second or successive" unless authorized by the Fifth Circuit. 	28
U.S.C. § 2244(b )(3)(A); see also Crone v. Cockrell, 324 F.3d 833 , 836 (5th Cir. 2003)
("'[Section] 2244(b)(3)(A) acts as a jurisdictional bar to the district court 's as serting
jurisdiction over any successive habeas petition until [the Fifth Circuit] has granted the
petitioner permission to file one"') (quoting United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773 , 774 (5th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam)).
"Although AEDPA does not set forth what constitutes a 'second or successive'
application, [the Fifth Circuit] has held that 'a later petition is successive when it: (1) raises
a claim challenging the petitioner 's conviction or sentence that was or could have been
raised in an earlier petition; or (2) otherwise constitutes an abuse of the writ. "' Crone, 324
F .3d at 83 7 (citations omitted). A subsequent petition is an abuse of the writ, and, therefore,
second or successive, "when it raises a claim that was, or could have been, raised in an
earlier petition." Id.
Court records indicate that Brantley previously filed a similar federal petition to
challenge his 2019 conviction in Tarrant County cause number l 609793R. 	S ee Brantley
v. 	Dir ., 	Tex. Dep 't of Criminal Justice, No. 4:23-cv-317 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 	13 , 2024)
(dismissing the petitioner's habeas claims with prejudice). Brantley raises the same claims,
or could have raised the same claims, in this petition that he asserted in his earlier petition.
2 / 5
Case 4:25-cv-01997 Document 18 Filed 12/19/25 in TXSD Page 2 of 5

Therefore, the instant petition is a successive petition subject to 28 U .S. C. § 2244(b ).
Cron e, 324 F.3d at 837.
This Court is required to dismiss this petition without prejudice because there is no
indication that Brantley has sought and received authorization from the Fifth Circuit to
proceed with a successive petition in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Burton v.
Stewart, 549 U.S. 14 7, 152 (2007) (holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to hear a
second or successive petition "contesting the same custody imposed by the same judgment
of a state court" and that a petitioner asserting new claims in connection with that state
court judgment must first seek authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing a
second challenge).
The issue of whether a habeas corpus petition is successive may be raised by the
district court sua sponte. See Rodriguez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1997).
"Indeed, the purpose of [28 U.S .C. § 2244(b )] was to eliminate the need for the district
courts to repeatedly consider challenges to the same conviction unless an appellate panel
first found that those challenges had some merit." Key, 205 F.3d at 774 (citing In re Cain,
137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998)). 	Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED without
prejudice to petitioner seeking authorization from the Court of Appeals to proceed in this
Court with his successive petition for any new claims.
II. 	CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a district court to issue
or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order that is adverse to the
3 I 5
Case 4:25-cv-01997 Document 18 Filed 12/19/25 in TXSD Page 3 of 5

petitioner. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. 	A certificate of appealability will not issue unless the
petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S. C.
§ 2253( c)(2), which requires a petitioner to demonstrate "that reasonable jurists would find
the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." 	Tennard,
542 U.S. at 282 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)) . 	Under the
controlling standard, this requires a petitioner to show "that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were ' adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further. "' Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Where denial of relief is based
on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show not only that "jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right,"
but also that they "would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling." Slack, 529 U.S . at 484 .
A district court may deny a certificate of appealability, sua sponte, without requiring
further briefing or argument. See Alexander v. Johnson , 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
For reasons set forth above, this court concludes that jurists of reason would not debate
whether the procedural ruling in this 	case was 	correct. 	Therefore, a certificate of
appealability will not issue.
III. 	CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows :
1. 	This petition is DISMISSED without prejudice as a successive petition.
4 / 5
Case 4:25-cv-01997 Document 18 Filed 12/19/25 in TXSD Page 4 of 5

5 / 5
2. 	A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
3. 	All pending motions, if any, are DENIED as MOOT.
The Clerk will enter this Order, providing a correct copy to all parti es of record .
. c.., R-.
SIGNED on this 	I 	I 	day of December 2025 .
ANDREW S. HANEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 4:25-cv-01997 Document 18 Filed 12/19/25 in TXSD Page 5 of 5