Campos v. K&N Holdings LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
TAYLOR CAMPOS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
K&N HOLDINGS LLC,
Defendant.
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ORDER
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-1897
Before the Court is Defendant K&N Holdings LLC's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss.
(Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff Taylor Campos ("Plaintiff") responded in opposition. (Doc. No. 11 ).
Defendant replied. (Doc. No. 13). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this employment discrimination lawsuit against Defendant, her former
employer, for pregnancy discrimination. Defendant is a luxury appliance business selling kitchen
appliances 	and 	custom 	cabinetry. 	(Id.). According 	to 	her 	Complaint, 	Plaintiff began 	her
employment at Defendant's Houston showroom in May 2023 working as a scheduler, which was
an hourly role. (Doc. No. 1 ,i 7).
In July 2023 , Plaintiff learned of her pregnancy and immediately informed Defendant. She
further claims that in September 2023, she sent her supervisor, Shawn Edge, a text message sharing
her due date of April 20, 2024. (Id. ,i 8).
A month later, in August 2023, Plaintiff became a salaried employee when she accepted a
new position as a Return Merchandise Authorization ("RMA") Coordinator. (Id. ,i 9). Plaintiff
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 31, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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alleges that Defendant moved her into this role after the existing RMA Coordinator, Amador
Rodriguez, was struggling with some of the duties. (Id.). At that point, Defendant effectively split
the RMA Coordinator role into two positions, employing both Rodriguez and Plaintiff. (Id. ,r 10 ).
Plaintiff was permitted a partial remote working arrangement since her duties focused on
communication with distributers, and Edge told Plaintiff he "did not want her in the warehouse
now that she was pregnant." (Id.).
On Friday December 8, 2023 , Edge asked to speak with Plaintiff seemingly "out of the
blue." (Id. ,r 15). In that discussion, Edge explained that Defendant's CEO, Blair Drenner, no longer
wanted Plaintiff working from home, so she would be required to be in the office full time moving
forward . (Id. ,r 16). Next, Edge presented Plaintiff with a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP")
she would be placed on. (Id. ,r 17). Before this meeting, Plaintiff had received no prior indication
that her work was not up to Defendant's standards. (Id.) . Furthermore, the terms of her PIP did not
match the customary terms of Defendant's typical PIPs. Plaintiff's PIP had no quantifiable metrics
to track her progress and its length was only to last 13 days, whereas Defendant's PIPs ordinarily
lasted 30 days or more. (Id. ,r 18). At the meeting, Edge explained the PIP arose from a discussion
with Drenner about Plaintiff's role in the company, and Edge suggested that Plaintiff was no longer
a good fit for her position due to her pregnancy. (Id. ,r 19). At this time, Rodriguez was not placed
on a PIP. (Id. ,r 17).
That 	next 	Monday, Plaintiff agam 	talked 	to 	Edge 	about 	the 	PIP, expressmg 	her
disagreement with it, and asking him for specific examples of her deficient work performance. (Id.
,r 20). Edge again alluded to her pregnancy, suggesting she was not the right person for the job. He
then told Plaintiff he would speak with Drenner about the PIP; however, Plaintiff could not resume
work in the meantime. (Id. ,r 22). Plaintiff refused to sign the PIP until she heard the outcome of
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Edge's conversation with Drenner. After that, Edge told Plaintiff to turn in her company laptop and
work phone before she left the office. (Id. 122). When Plaintiff later called Edge for an update, he
told her that she had quit. (Id. 1 23). She insisted that she did not quit her position, and Edge
suggested she come back to the office if she wanted to talk more about the situation. (Id. 1 20).
When she got back to the office, Plaintiff met with Drenner, who maintained that she had quit,
presented her with a letter that falsely claimed she terminated her own employment because she
refused to sign the PIP, and refused to speak with her further for "legal reasons." (Id. 124).
Plaintiff claims her PIP "was nothing more than a thinly disguised and discriminatory plot
by Defendant to terminate her because of her pregnancy." (Id. 125). Accordingly, Plaintiff brought
this lawsuit against Defendant on April 25, 2025 , asserting one cause of action for pregnancy
discrimination in violation of Title VII. (Id. at 5) . Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 9) which is now ripe for ruling.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may file a motion to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule
l 2(b)( 6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. "
Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S . 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement ,'
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a
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defendant's liability, it ' stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief. "' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. In s. Co ., 509 F.3d 673 , 675 (5th Cir. 2007). The Court is not bound to accept factual
assumptions or legal conclusions as true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678- 79. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, the court assumes their veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief. Id.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Under Title VII, an employer may not "discharge any 	individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual 's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act specifies that "because of sex," as used in Title VII, includes
"because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." Id. § 2000e(k).
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act also requires that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." Id. A pregnancy
discrimination claim is analyzed under the same standards used for other Title VII discrimination
claims. See Garcia v. Woman 's Hosp. of Tex., 97 F.3d 810, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1996); Williams v.
Sterling Healthcare Servs., Inc. , 193 F. App 'x 328, 32-30 (5th Cir. 2006).
At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court's analysis of Plaintiff's Title VII claim is governed
by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N A. , 534 U.S. 506 (2002)-and not the evidentiary standard set forth
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in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under Swierkiewicz, "there are two
ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1)
an adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status."
Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted)
(citing Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013)).
Although Plaintiff need not submit evidence to establish a prima face case of discrimination
under McDonnell Douglas at the pleading stage, she must "plead sufficient facts on all of the
ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim to make [her] case plausible." Olivarez v. T-mobile
USA , Inc., 997 F.3d 595 , 600 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Chhim v. Univ. ofTexas at Austin, 836 F.3d
467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016)). When, like here, the plaintiff's Title VII claim depends on circumstantial
evidence, the plaintiff "will ultimately have to show that [s]he can satisfy the McDonnell Douglas
framework. " Olivarez, 997 F.3d at 600 (quoting Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767). In such cases, the Fifth
Circuit informs that "it can be helpful to reference that framework when the court is determining
whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged the ultimate elements of the disparate treatment claim."
Id.
"Under 	McDonnell 	Douglas, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	establish 	a 	pnma 	facie 	case 	of
discrimination." Id. "Specifically, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a finding ' that
[s]he was treated less favorably than others outside of [herJ protected class. "' Id. 	(quoting
Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422,427 (5th Cir. 2017)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable Title VII claim for three reasons:
(1) Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead that Defendant took any adverse employment action
against her; (2) Plaintiff's allegations demonstrate that she and her chosen comparator are not
similarly situated since they have distinct job responsibilities; and (3) Plaintiff's allegations
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demonstrate she was treated equally, not less favorabl y, to her allegedly similarly situated
coworker. The Court will address each argument in turn.
1. 	Adverse Employment Action
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead factual allegations sufficient to establish
that it terminated her employment. (Doc. No. 9 at 9) . Defendant claims that Plaintiff's allegations
demonstrate that she resigned from her employment and so her adverse employment action should
be analyzed as a constructive discharge, not a termination. The Court does not agree.
As the Court reads the Complaint, Plaintiff pleads that she was terminated, but that
Defendant falsely characterized her termination as a resignation. Plaintiff alleges that she was
presented with a seemingly unfair, unreasonable, and unexpected PIP. (Doc. No. 1 11 17-20).
When Plaintiff asked Edge for specific examples of where her work was deficient, he suggested
that perhaps she was not the right person for the job and alluded to her pregnancy. (Id. 11 21 - 22).
Edge then told her he would speak to his manager, but until then, Plaintiff could not return to work.
(Id. ,r 22). Plaintiff did not sign the PIP as she did not agree with it and was waiting on Edge 's
discussion with Brennan. (Id.) She was immediately told to turn in her company laptop and work
phone before she left. (Id.) .
When Plaintiff followed up with her supervisor later that day, he told her that she had quit,
to which Plaintiff disagreed, insisting she had not quit. (Id. 123). Edge suggested she return to the
office if she wanted to talk about it more, which she did. (Id. 123 - 24). On her return, she spoke to
her supervisor's manager who maintained that she had quit, presented her with a letter falsel y
claiming Plaintiff had terminated her own employment when she refused to sign the PIP, and
refused to discuss the matter with her further due to "legal reasons." (Id. ,r 24).
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Employment termination is an adverse employment action. Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79
F.4th 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2023) ("To adequately plead an adverse employment action, ... plaintiff
need only show that she was discriminated against, because of a protected characteristic, with
respect to hiring, firing, compensation, or the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment "' )
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)). Plaintiff repeatedly contests Defendant's characterization of
her termination as a resignation. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an
adverse employment action.
ii. 	"Similarly Situated" Comparators
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's factual allegations contradict any allegation that
Amador Rodriguez (Plaintiff's chosen comparator) is "similarly situated." (Doc. No. 9 at 6).
As the Court previously stated, the Fifth Circuit has instructed that the Court should not
"inappropriately heighten the pleading standard" by subjecting a plaintiff's allegations to the
McDonnell Douglas analysis at the 12(b)(6) stage. Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767. In this case, Plaintiff
has pleaded the two ultimate elements: 	(1) that she was effectively terminated from 	her
employment (despite it being characterized as a resignation) (Doc. No. 1 ,, 20- 24); and (2) that
her non-pregnant comparator was not issued a PIP and allowed to continue his employment. (Id.
,, 17 , 34). Moreover, at this stage, the Court must accept those allegations as true.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's allegations demonstrate that her work was "fundamentally
different from Rodriguez" and so she cannot identify any comparator who was similarly situated.
(Doc. No. 13 at 2). While this may ultimately prove to be true, the Court at this stage cannot so
rule as a matter of law. Plaintiff pleads that she and Rodriguez were both RMA coordinators (Doc.
No. 1 , 10) , Plaintiff was pregnant (Id. , 8), and Rodriguez was not (Id. , 34), Plaintiff received a
PIP (Id. ,, 17-18), and Rodriguez did not (Id. ,, 17, 36), and Plaintiff was ultimately terminated
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after her refusal to sign the PIP (Id. ,i,i 22-25). The factual inquiry as to whether Rodriguez and
Plaintiff are similarly situated in a way sufficient under McDonnell Douglas is an inquiry more
appropriate for summary judgment. Here, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support her claim
for disparate treatment under Title VII. See Olivarez, 997 F.3d at 600 (finding failure to state a
claim of sex discrimination when plaintiff's complaint contained "no allegation" of a similarly
situated employee); Burton v. Univ. of Hou. , No. 4:24-CV-576, 2025 WL 92960 (S.D. Tex . Jan. 14 ,
2025) (Hanen, J.) (finding pleading of "non-Black comparators" was sufficient to state a claim for
race discrimination under Title VII despite the fact that comparators might have different job
titles). To dismiss Plaintiff's claims at this stage, without discovery and holding her to the prima
facia McDonnell Douglas elements, would be to err. Defendant, however, remains free to raise the
same arguments again at a later stage.
m. 	Less Favorable Treatment
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that she was treated
less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group. For the same
reasons as above, an examination of this prong of the prima facie case at this stage is premature,
as Plaintiff is only required to plead the two essential elements, which, as explained above, she
has. Moreover, she has also pleaded that her comparator was not placed on a PIP when she was,
and, ultimately, was allowed to continue employment with Defendant. See (Doc. No. I ,r,r 17) .
These pleaded facts make it plausible that she was treated less favorably than her comparator who
is not in the protected class.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
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Signed on this the~ day of March, 2026.
t 	( 	\\
x 	~ \\-""Andrew S. Hanen s::::
United States District Judge
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