Sabrosura Music LLC et al v. Gazca et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
SABROSURA MUSIC LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VIRGIL R. GAZCA, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-961
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
This is a copyright dispute over “Cumbia King” Rodolfo “Fito” Olivares’s work “La
Cobra.” (Docket Entry No. 38). Sabrosura Music LLC and Olivia Records LLC allege that Virgil
Gazca and Richard Elizondo released a song also titled “La Cobra” on various digital streaming
platforms, including Apple Music and Spotify. 	(Id. ¶ 1). Sabrosura and Olivia alleges that this
song contains “unauthorized samples of both the sound recording and musical composition of
Fito’s track.” (Id. ¶ 2). Sabrosura and Olivia allege that Duck Down Music, Inc. is the “distributor
of the infringing work.” (Id. ¶ 39).
Duck Down has moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that Sabruosura and Olivia
do not have standing, personal jurisdiction over Duck Down is improper, and the complaint fails
to state a claim. 	(Docket Entry No. 52). 	Duck Down argues that Sabruosura and Olivia lack
standing because they have sued the wrong entity; the “distributor allegations concern DNF
[Partners, LLC],” not Duck Down. (Id. at 6). Based on Duck Down’s argument, Sabrosura and
Olivia moved to join DNF Partners, Inc. and DNF Partners LLC. (Docket Entry No. 59). Based
on the pleadings, the motion, the record, and the applicable law, the court grants the motion to
dismiss, (Docket Entry No. 52), without prejudice and with leave to amend. The court grants in
part the motion to join DNF Partners, Inc. and DNF Partners LLC. 	(Docket Entry No. 59).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 23, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Sabrosura and Olivia may add them as defendants to their amended complaint, which must be filed
no later than July 27, 2026.
The court grants the motion to dismiss because the single, bare allegation that Duck Down
is a distributor is insufficient to state a claim and establish personal jurisdiction. 	“Under the
Copyright Act, copyright owners have the exclusive rights to copy, distribute, and digitally
transmit their copyrighted works.” Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., 146 S. Ct. 959, 964
(2026) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106). 	“So, for example, if a musician has a copyright for a song
recording, others generally cannot copy and share that recording without the musician’s
permission.” 	Id. 	But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require more than a conclusory
allegation of the legal wrong—in this case, distribution. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). 	Sabrosura and Olivia must plead the “factual content,” see id., that allows the court to
draw the legal conclusion that Duck Down unlawfully distributed the infringing work. 	The
complaint does not explain what wrongful distribution acts Duck Down performed. (See generally
Docket Entry No. 38). The court concludes that paragraph 39, without more, is a legal conclusion
that does not state a claim for relief. See Interscope Recs. v. Rodriguez, No. 06CV2485-B (NLS),
2007 WL 2408484, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007) (a “bare conclusory statement” that the
defendant 	“downloaded, 	distributed 	and/or 	made 	available 	for 	distribution 	to 	the 	public
copyrighted works” was insufficient); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 283
(D. Conn. 2008) (same); Live Face on Web, LLC v. Megapreventionrx, LLC, No. CV 15-7143
(JHR/AMD), 2016 WL 3561770, at *3 (D.N.J. June 29, 2016) (same).
Additional factual allegations are necessary not only to state a claim, but also to establish
personal jurisdiction. 	“Courts have held that defendants who distribute allegedly infringing
products to a state are subject to personal jurisdiction in that state on copyright-infringement claims
arising out of those distributions.” Collins v. Doe, No. CIV.A. H-10-2882, 2012 WL 1414246, at
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*5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2012). In Ham v. La Cienga Music Company, the Fifth Circuit suggested
that personal jurisdiction over copyright claims against a music distributor would be proper if the
defendant distributed the infringing work in Texas. 4 F.3d 413, 416 & n.13 (5th Cir. 1993); accord
Luv N’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir. 2006). A music distributor does
not need to target Texas specifically, but the distributor must have placed the infringing work into
the stream of commerce “with the expectation that it would be purchased by or used by consumers
in the forum state.” 	See Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987)). The complaint’s bare
allegation that Duck Down was the infringing work’s distributor is insufficient to show that Duck
Down “reasonably expected that” the copies it distributed “would be sold or used in Texas.” Zoch
v. Magna Seating (Germany) GmbH, 810 F. App’x 285, 290 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
In short, the complaint allegations do not state a claim or establish personal jurisdiction
against Duck Down because they do not explain how Duck Down caused the infringing work to
be distributed, sold, or used, and how those acts related to Texas. The motion to dismiss, (Docket
Entry No. 52), is granted. Because Sabrosura and Olivia may be able to amend their complaint to
state a claim and establish personal jurisdiction, the dismissal is without prejudice and with leave
to amend no later than July 27, 2026.
The motion to join DNF Partners, Inc. and DNF Partners LLC, (Docket Entry No. 59), is
granted in part. The plaintiffs have leave to amend to substitute these entities for Duck Down or
to plead claims against these entities in the alternative.
SIGNED on June 23, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
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Lee H. Rosenthal
Senior United States District Judge
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