Tran v. Houston Housing Authority Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Van Tran,
Plaintiff,
v.
Houston 	Housing 	Authority
Corporation,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-00149
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
In this employment dispute, Defendant Houston Housing Authority
Corporation (“HHA”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Van Tran’s third
amended complaint (Dkt. 31) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	Dkt. 32. 	After
carefully reviewing the motion, Tran’s response, Dkt. 33, HHA’s reply, Dkt. 36,
the pleadings, and the applicable law, it is recommended that HHA’s motion
to dismiss (Dkt. 32) be granted, and that Tran’s claims be dismissed with
prejudice.
Background
The following facts are taken as true at this stage. 	Tran is an Asian
American woman of Vietnamese national origin. 	Dkt. 31 at 2. 	She was
employed at HHA, first as an Assistant Supervisor, and then as a Special
Programs Supervisor from March 2023 until she was terminated on October 8,
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 19, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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2024. See id. at 2, 6. During this 16-month period, Tran alleges that she was
subjected to an “escalating pattern” of harassing conduct. Id. at 2.
Tran complains of discriminatory conduct by co-worker Jackee Carney.
Carney 	“repeatedly 	and 	intentionally” 	mispronounced 	Tran’s 	name, 	id.;
mocked Tran’s accent in front of other co-workers, id.; told Tran and another
Vietnamese coworker not to speak in Vietnamese, 	id. 	at 2-3; prohibited
Vietnamese 	employees 	from 	contributing 	traditional 	foods 	to 	workplace
celebrations, id. at 3; and exercised discretion in a discriminatory manner over
employee leave and holiday pay approvals, id. 	Tran describes two verbal
altercations with Carney, one culminating in Carney calling her “lazy” in front
of co-workers. 	See id. at 3, 4. 	Tran also claims that Carney and co-worker
Rakesha Thomas “sabotaged” her work product by intentionally providing
incorrect instructions. 	Id. at 3. 	That conduct allegedly led Tran to seek
support through the Employee Assistance Program, id. at 4-5, and to take
leave from February 5 to April 26, 2024, id. at 4.
Tran sought recourse through her direct supervisor, Gilda Jackson, HR
representatives, and HHA senior executives. See id. at 7. She maintains that
management and HR failed to intervene, protect her, or take corrective action.
Id. at 6-7. 	On October 25, 2023, Tran reported the incidents to Jackson, but
Jackson did not follow through by setting up a meeting between Tran and
Carney. 	Id. at 3-4. 	On November 20, 2023, following an altercation where
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Carney called Tran “lazy” in front of other employees, Tran requested and was
denied a meeting with Jackson. Id. at 4. Tran sought to address her grievances
with HR. 	Id. 	But instead of investigating, HR suggested Tran consider
stepping down, which she did not do. Id. Later, Tran filed a Level 1 Grievance
with the Senior Vice President of Administration at HHA. Id.
On August 28, 2024, Tran met with HR Administrator Justin Lee and
Jackson, and Tran was issued a verbal reprimand for telling a staff member to
seek assistance from an assistant supervisor before coming to Tran, even
though Tran says that was protocol. Id. at 5. According to Tran, the assistant
supervisor, who is African American, was not reprimanded. 	Id.; Dkt. 33 at 5.
After a series of hostile meetings with Lee in September 2024 where Tran was
accused of “dishonesty without evidence,” Tran was placed on administrative
leave on September 19, 2024, for allegedly disclosing confidential information.
Dkt. 31 at 5-6. HHA terminated her on October 8, 2024. Id. at 6.
Tran filed this suit on January 13, 2025, Dkt. 1, and then amended her
complaint. 	Dkt. 6. 	After HHA filed a motion to dismiss, Dkt. 14, this Court
granted leave for Tran to file a second amended complaint, which HHA again
moved to dismiss. 	Dkt. 20 (order granting leave to file); Dkt. 21 (second
amended complaint); Dkt. 22 (motion to dismiss). 	After an initial conference
where the Court addressed HHA’s motion to dismiss, the Court gave Tran one
final opportunity to plead her case. Dkt. 30 (order).
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Tran 	then 	filed 	a 	third 	amended 	complaint, 	alleging 	hostile 	work
environment and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 	Dkt. 31. 	HHA filed another motion to dismiss, Dkt. 32, to which Tran
responded, Dkt. 33, and HHA replied, Dkt. 36. 	The motion is ripe for
resolution.
Legal standard
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Rather,
“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken
as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will
reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” 	See Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56). When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-
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pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.” 	Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
Analysis
HHA moved to dismiss Tran’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 	Dkt. 32 at 1. 	It argues that Tran failed to
plausibly allege an actionable Title VII hostile work environment or retaliation
claim. 	Id. at 3, 9. 	Tran maintains that she sufficiently pleaded both claims.
Dkt. 33 at 1. But as concluded below, she failed to state either claim.
I. 	Tran did not plausibly allege a hostile work environment claim.
Tran brings a hostile work environment claim against HHA based on her
race and national origin. Dkt. 31 at 6-7; Dkt. 33 at 2. At the motion to dismiss
stage, Tran must plausibly allege that “(1) she belongs to a protected group;
(2) she 	was 	subjected 	to 	unwelcome 	harassment; 	(3) 	the 	harassment
complained of was based on race [or national origin]; (4) the harassment
complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; (5) the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed
to take prompt remedial action.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th
Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Johnson-Lee v. Tex. A&M Univ.-Corpus
Christi, 729 F. Supp. 3d 709, 721 (S.D. Tex. 2024) (citing Ramsey and applying
test at motion to dismiss stage). Those elements “are intentionally demanding
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‘to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code.’” 	Howard v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 447 F. App’x 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation
modified) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
HHA argues that Tran has not plausibly alleged elements three and four,
i.e., that the harassment was based on race or national origin or affected a
term, condition or privilege of employment. Dkt. 32 at 3. As concluded below,
Tran’s live complaint adequately links the asserted harassment to her race and
national origin. But HHA is correct that Tran has not adequately alleged that
the harassing conduct was severe or pervasive enough to support recovery.
Tran’s hostile work environment claim should be dismissed.
A. 	Tran sufficiently pleaded harassment based on her race
and national origin.
To sustain a Title VII hostile work environment claim, “Plaintiff must at
least plead some connection between the alleged harassment and her ….”
protected characteristic. Jones v. Rooms To Go, 2020 WL 3640003, at *5 (S.D.
Tex. July 6, 2020) (citing Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir.
2013)). 	HHA argues that Tran’s pleadings “ultimately amount to complaints
about [her] workload” not harassment based on race. Dkt. 32 at 3-4. But this
overlooks the allegations of harassment based on her Asian American identity
and Vietnamese heritage. Dkt. 33 at 2.
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According to the live complaint, Tran’s coworkers harassed her in ways
that implicated her race or national origin, including (1) mispronouncing her
name, Dkt. 31 at 2, (2) mocking her accent, 	id., (3) banning use of the
Vietnamese language, id. at 2-3, and (4) prohibiting Vietnamese foods at office
celebrations, id. at 3. Courts have characterized similar allegations as race or
national origin discrimination. 	See e.g., Keeler v. Brenntag Specialties, Inc.,
177 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1025 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (finding it plausible that a
comment about the plaintiff’s accent was based on racial animus); E.E.O.C. v.
Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(prohibiting 	non-English 	in 	the 	workplace 	reflects 	national-origin
discrimination); E.E.O.C. v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir.
2007) (mocking a worker’s diet and prayer rituals shows national-origin
discrimination); Nzabandora v. Univ. of Va., 2017 WL 4798920, at *3 (W.D.
Va. Oct. 24, 2017) (finding hostile work environment where, among other
things, co-workers criticized plaintiff’s food and culture).
Tran 	also 	alleges 	facially 	neutral 	conduct, 	like 	hostile 	interactions
between her and Carney, Dkt. 31 at 3-4, and alleged “sabotage[]” of her work,
id. at 3. 	Tran’s subjective belief that those actions were discriminatory is not
enough to show that those acts were motivated by her race or national origin.
See Price v. Valvoline, L.L.C., 88 F.4th 1062, 1067 (5th Cir. 2023). Regardless,
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Tran’s 	other 	allegations 	adequately 	assert 	harassment 	based 	on 	race 	or
national origin.
B. 	Tran 	had 	not 	adequately 	alleged 	severe 	or 	pervasive
harassment.
The remaining question is whether the asserted harassment rises to an
actionable level. 	According to HHA, Tran alleges only “isolated and random”
acts that are insufficient to alter the terms or conditions of her employment.
Dkt. 32 at 5. 	Tran counters that the alleged harassment was severe and
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. Dkt. 33 at 7.
To maintain a hostile work environment claim, the challenged conduct
must be “both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did
perceive to be so.” 	Whittington v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 2025 WL 1864956, at *5
(5th Cir. July 7, 2025) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787). Tran pleaded that
the work environment was subjectively offensive. 	For example, she explains
that the harassment led her to seek support through her Employee Assistance
Program and to take FMLA leave. 	Dkt. 31 at 4-5. 	But the conduct of which
she complains does not meet the Fifth Circuit’s strict standard for objectively
offensive conduct.
“To determine whether the victim’s work environment was objectively
offensive, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including (1) the
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frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or merely an offensive utterance; and
(4) whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance. 	No single
factor is determinative.” 	WC&M Enters., 496 F.3d at 399 (internal citations
omitted). “[T]he required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with
the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” 	Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc.,
655 F.3d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 2011).
Case law reflects that no specific act that Tran describes, on its own, is
sufficiently severe to create a hostile work environment. 	Compare Garcia v.
Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 4341811, at *1, 2, 6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29,
2012) (finding “no single incident of harassment alleged by Plaintiff,” including
co-workers 	mocking 	her 	accent 	and 	her 	supervisor 	forbidding 	Hispanic
employees from speaking Spanish, was so severe to be sufficient on its own),
adopted by 2012 WL 4358633 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2012); WC&M Enters.,
496 F.3d 	at 	401 	(co-workers 	mocking 	plaintiff’s 	diet 	was 	not 	severe
harassment), 	with 	Woods v. Cantrell, 29 F.4th 284, 285 (5th Cir. 2022)
(reversing dismissal of hostile work environment claim because a supervisor
called plaintiff the N-word in front of his fellow employees). 	Tran cites no
authority deeming analogous conduct to constitute “severe” harassment.
Tran’s hostile work environment claim therefore rises and falls on
whether the conduct was sufficiently pervasive. 	For this standard, it is not
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enough merely to assert that the challenged conduct happened frequently.
Indeed, courts have dismissed claims that lacked adequate factual detail to
show that the actions meet the legal threshold for pervasive harassment. See
Vargas v. Panini Am., Inc., 2025 WL 1347479, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2025)
(dismissing claim, despite plaintiff’s allegation that co-workers “repeatedly”
engaged in the complained of conduct, because plaintiff failed to provide
sufficient detail, including how frequent the conduct was or over how long a
period it occurred); Hernandez v. Ho’olaulima Gov’t Sols., LLC, 2024 WL
3648280, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2024) (finding inadequate allegations of
pervasive harassment, where the plaintiff did not provide “factual allegations
detailing the conduct’s prevalence”). And the Fifth Circuit has found that “one
subjectively offensive utterance ... every few days” is not actionable under Title
VII 	when 	the 	utterances 	“were 	not 	severe, 	physically 	threatening, 	or
humiliating.” 	Steward v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted).
Tran characterizes the challenged conduct as a “16-month campaign of”
“repeated and escalating harassment” based on her race and national origin.
Dkt. 33 at 6; Dkt. 31 at 5. 	Conspicuously lacking, however, are factual
particulars regarding the frequency of the claimed harassment. See, e.g., Dkt.
31 at 2 (Carney mocked Tran’s accent “[i]n multiple instances”); id. at 6 (Tran
was subjected to “repeated mispronunciation of her name”). Merely saying in
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conclusory fashion that the conduct happened “multiple” times or on “repeated”
occasions does not plausibly allege that it was pervasive. This is especially so
because Tran worked at HHA for more than 16 months. 	Without specifics
illuminating 	the 	conduct’s 	frequency, 	Tran’s 	attempt 	to 	depict 	it 	as 	an
“escalating pattern” is merely rhetorical and legally conclusory.
Moreover, the exact frequency of the harassing conduct plainly lies
within Tran’s personal knowledge. 	After all, none of it would qualify as
harassment unless it were directed at Tran herself. 	Tran’s failure to provide
factual specifics on this point—i.e., whether the acts occurred daily, weekly,
monthly, or at some other interval—even after twice amending her pleading,
reinforces that the claim fails to meet the legal standard for recovery.
Other allegations concerning disparate treatment cannot salvage Tran’s
hostile work environment claim. 	See Dkt. 31 at 3, 5. 	First, Tran has not
plausibly alleged that she was treated worse than similarly situated employees
of a different race or national origin. 	For instance, Tran complains that she
was reprimanded for redirecting a staff member’s request for assistance to an
assistant supervisor, Dkt. 31 at 5, whereas the assistant supervisor was not
reprimanded. But Tran initiated the chain of events, making her not similarly
situated to the assistant supervisor to whom Tran sent the subordinate. Tran
also pleads that she was once denied holiday pay that was granted to “similarly
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situated African American employees … under the same circumstances.” 	Id.
at 3. That allegation is conclusory and thus inadequate.
Second, because the alleged harassment is not severe or pervasive,
asserted acts of disparate treatment—even assuming they were adequately
pleaded—cannot backfill Tran’s hostile work environment claim. 	See Vargas,
2025 WL 1347479, at *5 (allegations that plaintiff received worse treatment
than 	employees 	of 	a 	different 	race 	“cannot 	sustain” 	the 	hostile 	work
environment claim when the four factors indicate that the environment was
not objectively hostile); see also Robinson v. Paulson, 2008 WL 4692392, at *20
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2008) (disparate treatment allegations cannot “transform”
conduct that is neither severe nor pervasive into a hostile work environment
claim). 	Tran’s 	lack 	of 	plausible 	allegations 	that 	the 	harassment 	was
adequately severe or pervasive defeats her hostile work environment claim.
II. 	The retaliation claim also fails.
HHA argues that Tran’s retaliation claim should be dismissed because
she has not pleaded a causal link between a protected activity and an adverse
action. 	See Dkt. 32 at 9. 	Tran maintains that she has met the causation
element because her allegations show “temporal proximity and escalating
retaliatory conduct.” Dkt. 33 at 9.
At the motion to dismiss stage, “a plaintiff alleging Title VII retaliation
must plead facts showing: ‘(1) that [she] engaged in [protected] activity ...,
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(2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link
existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.’”
Cuellar v. Sw. Gen. Emergency Physicians, P.L.L.C., 656 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th
Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). 	“Protected activity is defined as opposition to
any practice rendered unlawful by Title VII ….” Lewis v. Bd. of Supervisors of
La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 134 F.4th 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2025)
(quotation omitted). 	And an “adverse employment action” is one “that a
reasonable employee would have found ... materially adverse,” meaning that it
was “likely to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,
the courts, and their employers.” 	See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quotation omitted).
The causation requirement is aimed at “the ultimate question in a
retaliation case: whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff
because the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct.” 	Starnes v. Wallace, 849
F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). 	At the pleading stage, a
plaintiff must “allege facts permitting at least an inference of her employer’s
knowledge of her protected conduct in order to establish the required causal
link between her conduct and the alleged retaliation.” 	Wright v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2021).
A causal link can sometimes be shown by alleging temporal proximity
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. 	See Jan.
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v. City of Huntsville, 74 F.4th 646, 653 (5th Cir. 2023). 	While not a rigid
inquiry, the Fifth Circuit has found that “a time lapse of up to four months” is
sufficient. See Smith v. Kendall, 2024 WL 4442040, at *7 (5th Cir. Oct. 8, 2024)
(quoting Evans v. City of Hou., 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Tran alleges two events that qualify as adverse employment actions: her
September 19, 2024 placement on administrative leave and her October 8,
2024 termination. See Dkt. 31 at 6; Yates v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 115 F.4th
414, 420 (5th Cir. 2024) (placement on administrative leave can constitute an
adverse employment action); Cuellar, 656 F. App’x at 709 (“Termination, of
course, is a Title VII adverse employment action.”). 	But Tran identifies no
causal link between those actions and any protected activity.
Although the complaint alleges that Tran submitted several “internal
reports to her direct supervisor … to HR representatives … and to HHA senior
executives,” Dkt. 31 at 7, it provides few specifics about when those reports
were submitted. 	On October 25, 2023, Tran allegedly reported the incidents
with Carney to her supervisor and then attempted to meet with that supervisor
on November 20, 2023 to address the issues. 	See id. at 3-4. 	Those events
occurred nearly a year before she was placed on leave in September 2024—far
too long to infer a causal relationship between the two events. 	Tran also
describes meetings with an HR representative leading up to her placement on
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leave, see id. at 4-5, but nothing indicates that she engaged in any protected
activity during these meetings.
“Absent an inference of causation due to temporal proximity,” a plaintiff
should plead “that the employer knew about the employee’s protected activity.”
Cox v. DeSoto Cnty., Miss., 407 F. App’x 848, 851 (5th Cir. 2011). Tran alleges
that certain HR personnel and managers “knew of Plaintiff’s complaints … and
escalated adverse actions against her.” Dkt. 33 at 9 (citing Dkt. 31 at 7-8). But
“it is well established that, ‘in determining whether an adverse employment
action 	was 	taken 	as 	a 	result 	of 	retaliation, 	our 	focus 	is 	on 	the 	final
decisionmaker.’” Cox, 407 F. App’x at 851-52 (quoting Ackel, 339 F.3d at 385).
Tran does not allege that the HR personnel or managers to whom she
complained 	were 	the 	ones 	who 	ultimately 	decided 	to 	place 	her 	on
administrative leave or to terminate her employment. 	Dkt. 31 at 6 (alleging
only that Tran “was placed on administrative leave” and “HHA terminated”
her); see Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2015)
(no 	causal link where there 	was 	an 8-10 month gap between plaintiff’s
complaint to HR and his termination, and plaintiff did not show that the
supervisor who terminated him knew of the complaint); Norsworthy v. Hou.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 2022 WL 3043411, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2022) (dismissing
a retaliation claim where no facts indicated that the individuals responsible
for the adverse actions knew of the plaintiff’s grievances).
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Without sufficient allegations that Tran’s complaints were close enough
in time to the adverse actions, or that HHA’s decisionmakers who took the
adverse actions against her knew of her protected activity, Tran has not
plausibly alleged that actions were causally related to any protected activity.
Her retaliation claim should be dismissed.
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant
Houston Housing Authority’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 32) be GRANTED, and
that all of Plaintiff Van Tran’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on December 19, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_______________________________________
Y	Yvvvvoon	n	n	nne Y. H	Hooo
U	United States Magistrate Judge
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