Tyrone v. Lumpkin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
RAYVEION TYRONE,
(TDCJ # 01972349)
Petitioner,
versus
ERIC GUERRERO,
Respondent.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:24-cv-04663
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
The petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC
§2254 by Petitioner Rayveion Tyrone is dismissed. Dkt 3.
1. Background
Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas
corpus to challenge a disciplinary proceeding that occurred
at the Clements Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice–Correctional Institutions Division on May 21,
2024. He proceeds here pro se.
Petitioner alleges that he was charged in disciplinary
case 20240136743 with failing to obey an order after he
refused to comply with an order to remove a sheet that was
covering his cell door. A properly noticed disciplinary
hearing was held. Petitioner attended the hearing with
counsel substitute and gave a statement. The charging
officer’s report was admitted into evidence, and her
testimony was taken. Based on that evidence, the hearing
officer found Petitioner guilty and assessed punishment of
the loss of recreation privileges for fifteen days and the loss
of commissary privileges for forty-six days. Petitioner
didn’t lose any good-time credits, and he wasn’t demoted in
line class. Dkt 15-1 at 4.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 14, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Petitioner timely filed a Step 1 grievance appeal. Id at
7–8. He disputed the truthfulness of the testimony
presented at the hearing, but he didn’t raise any issues
about the procedures before or at the hearing. Ibid. The
grievance appeal was denied, with a finding that the
verdict was supported by the evidence and all due process
requirements had been satisfied. Id at 8.
Petitioner filed a Step 2 grievance appeal, which
likewise challenged the evidence rather than the
procedures used. Id at 9–10. That appeal was also denied.
Id at 10.
Petitioner filed the subject petition here in November
2024. Dkt 3. He contends that he was denied his due
process right to obtain evidence and present it at the
hearing. Id at 6. He contends that he was denied parole
because of the disciplinary conviction. Ibid. In a
supplemental memorandum, he also asserts that he was
denied good-time credits, was demoted in line class, and
was placed in restrictive housing as a result of this
disciplinary conviction. Dkt 4 at 3. As relief, he asks that
the disciplinary conviction be vacated and a new parole
hearing scheduled. Dkt 3 at 7.
Eric Guerrero is now the Executive Director of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional
Institutions Division and is automatically substituted as
Respondent. See FRCP 25(d). He answered the petition
and filed copies of the state-court records relating to this
disciplinary case. Dkt 15. Petitioner didn’t file a reply, and
his time to do so has now expired.
2. Legal standard
The federal writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary
remedy available when a prisoner is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 USC §§2241(c)(3), 2254(a); see also
Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 631 (1993). In the
context of prison disciplinary proceedings, a prisoner’s
right to habeas corpus relief is governed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolff v
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McDonnell, 418 US 539, 556–57 (1974). But the Due
Process Clause protects a prisoner charged with a prison
rules violation only when the disciplinary proceeding could
result in a sanction that infringes on a protected liberty
interest. See Sandin v Conner, 515 US 472, 484 (1995).
Protected liberty interests may arise under either the
Constitution or state law. See Kentucky Department of
Corrections v Thompson, 490 US 454, 460 (1989). Under
the Constitution, convicted prisoners have a protected
liberty interest in freedom from conditions of confinement
that “present a dramatic departure from the basic
conditions of [the prisoner’s] sentence.” Sandin, 515 US at
485. But the Constitution doesn’t create a protected liberty
interest in any expectation of release before the expiration
of a valid sentence. See Greenholtz v Inmates of Nebraska
Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 (1979).
Likewise, the Constitution doesn’t create a protected
liberty interest in good-time credits for satisfactory
behavior. Wolff, 418 US at 557; Madison v Parker, 104 F3d
765, 768 (5th Cir 1997).
In addition, standard changes in the conditions of a
prisoner’s confinement don’t implicate the Constitution.
Sandin, 515 US at 484. Thus, neither the loss of the
opportunity to earn good-time credits nor placement in
administrative segregation, without more, implicate
constitutional protections. Luken v Scott, 71 F3d 192, 193
(5th Cir 1995, per curiam). The imposition of commissary,
recreation, and cell restrictions also don’t trigger the
protection of the Constitution. Madison, 104 F3d at 768
(commissary and cell restrictions); Odneal v Hinojosa,
357 F Appx 598, 599 (5th Cir 2009, per curiam) (recreation
restrictions).
State laws may also create protected liberty interests.
But the Supreme Court holds that only those state-created
substantive interests that “inevitably affect the duration of
[a prisoner’s] sentence” qualify for constitutional protection
under the Due Process Clause. Sandin, 515 US at 487; see
also Orellana v Kyle, 65 F3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir 1995, per
curiam). In Texas, only prisoners eligible for release to
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mandatory supervision have a constitutional expectancy of
early release and thus a protected liberty interest in the
good-time credits that they have earned. See Malchi v
Thaler, 211 F3d 953, 957–58 (5th Cir 2000) (addressing
mandatory supervision scheme in place before September
1, 1996); Teague v Quarterman, 482 F3d 769, 776–77
(5th Cir 2007) (addressing mandatory supervision scheme
in place before and after September 1, 1996). Texas
prisoners have no right to be released on parole, and they
therefore have no protected liberty interest in any possible
release to parole. Madison, 104 F3d at 768.
Even when disciplinary proceedings implicate
constitutional protections, those proceedings “are not part
of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due
a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff,
418 US at 556. Procedural protections in the context of
prison disciplinary proceedings therefore aren’t the same
as due process protections in the criminal law context.
Instead, due process in this context requires only that
prisoners be afforded (i) written notice of the claimed
violation at least twenty-four hours before a disciplinary
hearing, (ii) a written statement by the fact finders as to
the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary
action, and (iii) the right to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence where such would not be unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. Id
at 564–66.
The finding of guilt must also be “supported by some
evidence in the record.” Edwards v Balisok, 520 US 641,
648 (1997), quoting In re Johnston, 745 P2d 864, 867 (Wash
1987). But if these minimal constitutional standards are
satisfied, no due process violation occurs.
3. Analysis
Petitioner complains that his due process rights were
violated during the proceedings in disciplinary case
20240136743. To the contrary, the record of those
proceedings shows that no protected liberty interest was
affected.
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For one thing, Petitioner didn’t lose good-time credits
as a result of these proceedings. He instead lost only
recreation time and commissary privileges. The loss of
those privileges doesn’t trigger the protection of the
Constitution because they are “merely changes in the
conditions of his confinement” that “do not implicate due
process concerns.” Madison, 104 F3d at 768.
What’s more, these penalties aren’t the type of atypical,
significant deprivations that would be actionable in federal
habeas corpus proceedings. Ibid; see also Odneal,
357 F Appx at 599: “[P]unishments such as loss of
recreation and commissary privileges, cell restriction, and
change in time-earning status do not implicate due process
concerns.”
Last, because Petitioner has no liberty interest in
release to parole, any possible effect this disciplinary
proceeding may have had on his release to parole didn’t
implicate due process protections.
Petitioner alleges in his supporting memorandum that
he was denied good-time credits, demoted in his time-
earning level, and placed in restrictive housing as a result
of this disciplinary conviction. Dkt 4 at 3. The record of the
proceedings relating to this specific disciplinary charge
simply doesn’t show that those sanctions were imposed as
part of this action. Perhaps Petitioner had such sanctions
imposed at some point after the hearing. But they weren’t
imposed in the subject disciplinary proceeding and so can’t
support the relief requested in this action.
Petitioner doesn’t show that he is entitled to relief on
habeas corpus in connection with the disciplinary
proceedings in case 20240136743. His claims will be
dismissed as lacking in merit.
4. Certificate of appealability
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
requires a district court to issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when entering a final order that is adverse to
the petitioner. A certificate of appealability will not issue
unless the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the
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denial of a constitutional right.” 28 USC §2253(c)(2). This
requires a petitioner to demonstrate “that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Tennard v
Dretke, 542 US 274, 282 (2004), quoting Slack v McDaniel,
529 US 473, 484 (2000). When the court denies relief based
on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that
“jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right,” and that they “would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack,
529 US at 484.
It is determined that jurists of reason would not debate
whether any procedural ruling in this case was correct.
Petitioner hasn’t made the necessary showing for a
certificate of appealability.
5. Conclusion
The motion by Respondent for extension of time to file
an answer is GRANTED. Dkt 14.
Respondent’s answer is ACCEPTED as timely filed.
Dkt 15.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by
Petitioner Rayveion Tyrone lacks merit and is DENIED.
Dkt 3.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Any other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
Final judgment will enter separately.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on May 14, 2026 , at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
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