Newton Green v. O'Malley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JACQUELINE C. N.G,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-cv-4383
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff 	Jacqueline 	C. 	N.G. 	(“Plaintiff”) 	filed 	this 	lawsuit 	against
Defendant Frank Bisignano1 (“Commissioner”) seeking review of the denial of
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 1). Pending before
the Court2 are the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 	(ECF Nos.
11, 17). 	Based on a review of the motions, arguments, and relevant law, the
Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 11) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 	17) 	be 	DENIED. 	The 	Court 	FURTHER 	RECOMMENDS 	the
1 Frank Bisignano was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7,
2025. Bisignano is “automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. FED. R. CIV. P.
25(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection
shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner
of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
2 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 3).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 22, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED and the case be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed a claim for disability insurance benefits on May 3, 2021,
alleging disability starting on August 1, 2019. (ECF No. 8-3 at 21).3 Plaintiff’s
claims were initially denied by the Social Security Administration on June 17,
2022, and again on reconsideration on August 4, 2023. 	(Id.). 	On August 30,
2023, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (Id.).
On March 5, 2024, Administrative Law Judge Kelly Matthews (the “ALJ”) held
a telephonic hearing. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the
hearing. 	(Id.). 	Byron J. Pettingill, a vocational expert (“VE”), appeared and
testified at the hearing. (Id.).
On April 29, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not
disabled at Step Five.4 	(Id. at 21–36). 	At Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from August 1, 2019, the
alleged onset date, through June 30, 2022, her date last insured. 	(Id. at 23).
3 The Administrative Record in this case can be found at ECF No. 8.
4 In considering a disability claim, an ALJ must conduct a five-step evaluation that
examines: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets
or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5)
whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. 	Masterson v.
Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
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At Step Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:
“history of cerebral vascular accident (CVA), left homonymous hemianopsia,
diabetes mellitus, and major depressive disorder (MDD) (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).”
(Id.). 	At Step Three, the ALJ found Plaintiff: “did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one
of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526)” 	(Id. at 25). 	The ALJ determined that
Plaintiff has the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except she
can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; but never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant’s vision is limited, so she can have
only occasional exposure to workplace hazards such as unprotected
moving machinery, unprotected heights, or commercial driving.
She should not work where peripheral vision is frequently needed
such as on 	an assembly line where 	objects would be coming
towards her on either side where she would need to use her
peripheral 	vision. 	She 	is 	able 	to 	understand, 	carry 	out 	and
remember detailed but not complex instructions.
(Id. at 27). 	At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform any
past relevant work. 	(Id. at 34). 	At Step Five, the ALJ found there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform—such 	as 	a 	kitchen 	helper, 	hospital 	cleaner, 	and 	dining 	room
attendant—and therefore Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under the
Social Security Act. (Id. at 35–36).
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Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review on September 4, 2024. (Id. at 2). Thus, the ALJ’s
decision represents the Commissioner’s final decision in the case. See Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000).
II. 	Legal Standard
The Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner on a Social
Security disability claim is exceedingly deferential. Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d
600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012). “[R]eview of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited
to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standard.’” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Perez 	v. 	Barnhart, 	415 	F.3d 	457, 	461 	(5th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	When 	the
Commissioner’s decision is reached by applying improper legal standards, the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	Singletary v. Bowen, 798
F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion’ and constitutes
‘more than a mere scintilla’ but ‘less than a preponderance’ of evidence.”
Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)). “‘Any findings of fact by the Commissioner
which are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.’” 	Heck v. Colvin,
674 F. App’x 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602).
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Even 	so, 	judicial 	review 	must 	not 	be 	“so 	obsequious 	as 	to 	be
meaningless.” 	Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotations
omitted). 	The substantial evidence standard is not a rubber stamp for the
Commissioner’s 	decision 	and 	involves 	more 	than 	a 	search 	for 	evidence
supporting the Commissioner’s findings. Singletary, 798 F.2d at 822–23; Cook
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). 	Rather, a reviewing court must
scrutinize the record as a whole, taking into account whatever fairly detracts
from the substantiality of evidence supporting the Commissioner’s findings.
Singletary, 798 F.2d at 823. The court “‘may not reweigh the evidence . . . , nor
try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its] judgment for the [Commissioner’s],
even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision.’”
Johnson v. Colvin, 595 F. App’x 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrell v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal: (1) the ALJ failed to consider all of
Plaintiff’s severe impairments; and (2) the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported
by substantial evidence and results from legal error because it is not supported
by any medical source of record and does not include the limiting effects of all
of Plaintiff’s impairments. 	(ECF No. 17 at 7). 	Conversely, Commissioner
contends substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 12 at 4–
5).
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a. Step Two Finding
First, Plaintiff argues the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding
that Plaintiff is capable of the physical demands of medium work. 	(ECF No.
17 at 8). 	Specifically, Plaintiff contends her “vision impairments, combined
with [her] bilateral knee impairments and obesity would prevent Plaintiff from
performing the exertional requirements of medium work.” (Id. at 10–11). For
support, 	Plaintiff 	relies 	on 	an 	examination 	by 	Dr. 	Mark 	Sanders 	from
December 2022. (Id. at 8–9).
In response, the Commissioner argues the ALJ’s Step Two finding was
supported by substantial evidence. 	(ECF No. 21 at 3). 	The Commissioner
notes that Plaintiff relies upon “her singular appointment with Dr. Sanders to
argue 	that 	her 	knee 	impairment 	was 	severe.” 	(Id.). 	However, 	the
Commissioner adds that other examinations, both before and after Plaintiff
saw Dr. Sanders, failed to show any abnormalities or limitations. 	(Id.). 	For
support, the Commissioner points out that the ALJ summarized, at length, a
physical consultative examination of Plaintiff’s visit with Dr. Cynthia Cotton
in April 2022, who noted Plaintiff had a normal gait, could walk on heels and
toes without difficulty, had a normal tandem walk, could hop on each foot,
could squat 90%, had a normal stance, did not need help getting on and off the
table, and could rise from a chair without difficulty. (Id.; ECF No. 8-9 at 480).
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At Step Two of the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ fully discussed the December
2022 visit that Plaintiff relies upon in her motion. 	(See ECF No. 8-3 at 24).
However, 	the 	ALJ 	recognized 	that, 	during 	the 	same 	visit, 	“the 	general
neurological examination in the extremities revealed the absence of abnormal
coordination in any extremity.” (Id. (citing ECF No. 8-11 at 61)). The ALJ also
noted that nearly one year later, in October 2023, treatment records showed
that Plaintiff could move all four extremities. (Id. (citing ECF No. 8-11 at 64)).
Thus, the ALJ found “[t]he objective medical findings regarding [Plaintiff’s
bilateral knee degenerative joint disease] impairment fails to support a degree
of limitation that significantly limits the claimant’s mental or physical ability
to perform work related activities.” (Id.). As such, the ALJ explained that the
impairment was not considered severe because the record does not establish
that it causes significant limitations in the claimant’s ability to perform basic
work activities. (Id.).
Plaintiff does not address the evidence the ALJ relied on in coming to
her conclusion. 	Rather, Plaintiff appears to simply disagree with the ALJ’s
findings. 	The question before this Court is whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision. Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602. “Substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” 	Perez, 415 F.3d at 461 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotations omitted). 	Plaintiff’s “burden is not to highlight evidence contrary
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to 	the 	ALJ’s 	ruling, 	but 	to 	show 	that 	there 	is 	no 	substantial 	evidence
supporting the ALJ’s decision.” 	Jones v. Saul, No. 4:20-cv-772, 2021 WL
2895867, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2021).
“In applying the substantial evidence standard, the court scrutinizes the
record to determine whether such evidence is present, but may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s.” 	Perez, 415 F.3d
at 461. 	Based on the evidence relied upon by the decision, the ALJ’s finding
that Plaintiff’s bilateral knee degenerative joint disease was not severe is
supported by substantial evidence. Further, “Plaintiff’s disagreement with the
ALJ’s . . . finding 	does not carry Plaintiff’s burden 	of 	establishing that
substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination.” Mary C. R. v.
Kijakazi, No. 3:20-cv-286, 2021 WL 4476764, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2021).
Plaintiff also briefly mentions her vision impairments and obesity. (ECF
No. 17 at 10–11). The ALJ acknowledges Plaintiff’s issues with vision loss and
obesity at Step Two, noting “the claimant’s obesity has not been addressed by
an acceptable medical source, and there is no evidence of limited functioning,
secondary to obesity.” 	(ECF No. 8-3 at 24). 	Further, the ALJ addressed
Plaintiff’s vision issues and found the evidence did not support a finding that
it should limit Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id. at 28). The ALJ also specifically addressed
the medical records Plaintiff mentions in her motion. 	(Id. at 30). 	Again,
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outside 	of 	disagreeing 	with 	the 	ALJ’s 	findings, 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	show
substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination.
As such, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to show that the ALJ erred in
evaluating 	the 	severity 	of 	her 	impairments 	or 	in 	accommodating 	her
impairments in the RFC. 	“This Court cannot resolve conflicts of or reweigh
the evidence.” Mary C. R., 2021 WL 4476764, at *5.
b. The RFC
Second, and similar to above, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s RFC fails to
include all of Plaintiff’s documented impairments. 	(ECF No. 17 at 12).
Plaintiff reiterates that the RFC does not account for her bilateral knee
impairments, vision impairments, or obesity. 	(Id.). 	As discussed, the Court
finds Plaintiff’s argument regarding her bilateral knee impairment and obesity
to be without merit. 	Further, as noted by the Commissioner (ECF No. 21 at
6), the ALJ specifically addresses Plaintiff’s vision in the RFC (ECF No. 8-3 at
27).
Plaintiff adds that the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s hypertension,
noting 	she 	has 	frequent 	bouts 	of 	confusion 	and 	received 	hypertension
diagnoses. 	(Id.). 	In 	response, 	the 	Commissioner 	argues 	“the 	ALJ
acknowledged 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	of 	confusion 	related 	to 	her 	one-time
experience 	of 	hypertensive 	encephalopathy, 	and 	general 	complaints 	of
difficulty with memory and concentration.” 	(ECF No. 21 at 8 (citing ECF No.
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8-3 at 30–31)). Further, “diagnosis is not, itself, a functional limitation.” Dise
v. Colvin, 630 F. App’x 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff also argues that the evidence fails to support a finding that
Plaintiff can perform detailed work. 	(ECF No. 17 at 13). 	The ALJ explained
that in finding Plaintiff could understand, carry out, and remember detailed
but 	not 	complex 	instruction, 	the 	ALJ 	considered 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations
regarding her memory. 	(ECF No. 8-3 at 32). 	However, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff reported she was able to follow instructions (Id. (citing ECF No. 8-7
at 33; ECF No. 8-7 at 63)). The ALJ also considered evidence where Plaintiff’s
memory functions were found to be fair. 	(Id. (citing ECF No. 8-9 at 469).
Again, while Plaintiff points out evidence to support her argument that she
cannot perform detailed work, the Court cannot reweigh evidence. 	What
Plaintiff fails to do is explain how the evidence the ALJ used to support her
decision should not amount to substantial evidence.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues substantial evidence does not support a finding
that Plaintiff can perform the six to eight hours of walking and standing
required for medium work. 	(ECF No. 17 at 16). 	The Commissioner responds
that “Plaintiff’s argument depends upon a recitation of clinical findings, many
of 	which 	the 	ALJ 	specifically 	discussed 	in 	the 	decision, 	including 	when
explaining the finding that Plaintiff could perform medium work.” 	(ECF No.
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21 at 9 (citing ECF No. 8-3 at 30–31)). 	In explaining the ALJ’s decision to
restrict Plaintiff to medium exertion, the ALJ stated the following:
The 	claimant’s 	restriction 	to 	medium 	exertion 	with 	postural,
visual, and environmental restrictions considers the combined
effects of her history of CVA, left homonymous hemianopsia, and
diabetes mellitus. This considers the findings of a defect in the left
periphery (Exhibit 13F/5) and decreased pinprick and light touch
sensation in her feet greater than the hands (Exhibit 25F/21).
However, treatment records show the claimant’s heart had a
regular rate and rhythm with no murmur (Exhibits 6F/4 and 7F/4),
and her gait was normal without an assistive device (Exhibit
13F/4). 	Her strength was five out of five in upper and lower
extremities, and her motor tone was normal (Exhibit 13F/5). 	The
claimant’s hand and finger dexterity were intact, and her grip
strength was five out of five bilaterally (Exhibit 13F/5).
(ECF No. 8-3 at 31). 	Plaintiff provides no argument as to how the evidence
relied upon by the ALJ in her decision does not amount to substantial evidence.
As 	discussed, 	it 	is 	evident 	that 	Plaintiff 	disagrees 	with 	the 	ALJ’s
decision. However, if the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence,
they are conclusive. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). Here,
the Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff
is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 11) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 	No. 17) be 	DENIED. 	The Court
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FURTHER RECOMMENDS the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED
and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on February 20, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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