Burson v. Oil Patch Group, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JACKIE BURSON, 	§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 4:23-cv-1530
OIL PATCH GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.
JUDGE PALERMO’S
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 1
Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment against
Plaintiff. ECF No. 28. Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sole claim,
arguing that “Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, pursue his claim[] against
Defendant under the judicial (bankruptcy) estoppel doctrine” because “Plaintiff’s
decision to file this lawsuit contradicts prior sworn statements he made, and legal
positions he knowingly took, in his recent bankruptcy proceedings.” 2 ECF No. 28
at 6. 	After considering the briefing, evidence, and applicable law, the Court finds
that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 28, should be denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked for Defendant, an oilfield rental and service company. 3
1 Based on the consent of all parties, the assigned district judge transferred all proceedings. ECF
No. 12.
2 Plaintiff filed a response, ECF No. 35, and Defendant filed a reply, ECF No. 36.
3 The parties dispute whether Plaintiff was an independent contractor or employee. ECF Nos. 1, 8.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 25, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Plaintiff and Defendant’s relationship ended in March or April 2022. Pl. Dep., ECF
No. 28-3 at 64:20-65:2.
On October 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the Northern
District of Texas. In re Burson, No. 22-31901 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. filed Oct. 12, 2022).
In his Bankruptcy Petition, Plaintiff disclosed a personal injury claim for his
daughter related to an automobile accident, but he did not memorialize an FLSA
claim for unpaid wages or retaliation against Defendant. Bankr. Pet., ECF No. 28-4
at 5, 8, 14. At a meeting of creditors while the bankruptcy proceedings were ongoing,
Plaintiff disclosed to Jeff Mims, the Bankruptcy Trustee (“Trustee”), that he had
FLSA claims against Defendant, claims for lost wages and retaliation. Nov. 15, 2022
Creditor Meeting Transcript, ECF No. 35-1 at 3–8.
At Plaintiff’s bankruptcy counsel’s suggestion, the Trustee directed an
amendment be filed to include the FLSA claims, but less than a week after the
creditor meeting and before the amendment was filed, the Trustee reported to the
bankruptcy court that no distributions from the estate would be made and that all of
its assets would be abandoned based on “information about [the] case as reported in
the schedules filed by the debtor(s) or otherwise found in the case record[,]” and
because no claims had been asserted. ECF No. 35-1 at 3–8.; Bankr. Docket Sheet,
ECF No. 35-2 at 3. The bankruptcy court issued a no-asset discharge of $152,429.53
That issue is not currently before the Court.
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debt and closed the proceedings. Id.
In April 2023, three months after his bankruptcy discharge, Plaintiff sued
Defendant, raising a claim for retaliation under the FLSA, claiming that Defendant
wrongfully discharged Plaintiff for joining a lawsuit to recover unpaid overtime, in
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). ECF No. 1.
Shortly after filing his response to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
filed a motion to stay, asking the Court to stay the case “so that he can move the
bankruptcy court to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding and administer his claims
against [Defendant] as assets of the bankruptcy estate.” ECF No. 37. The Court
denied Plaintiff’s motion to stay but permitted Plaintiff thirty days to petition the
bankruptcy court, noting that if the bankruptcy court refused to reopen Plaintiff’s
bankruptcy proceeding, then the Court would proceed with the pending motion for
summary judgment. ECF No. 39.
After a hearing at which Plaintiff and Defendant announced an agreement to
reopen, the bankruptcy court entered an agreed order and reopened Plaintiff’s
bankruptcy proceeding. In re Burson, No. 22-31901, ECF No. 30. The Court entered
a stay while the Trustee decided whether to prosecute this case for the benefit of the
bankruptcy estate. ECF No. 52. On December 1, 2025, Plaintiff notified the Court
that the Trustee elected to retain and pursue Plaintiff’s claims in the instant suit on
behalf of the bankruptcy estate, retaining Plaintiff’s counsel. ECF No. 53. The Court
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lifted the stay and now takes up the motion for summary judgment.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A court should grant summary judgment when,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Davenport v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 891
F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). A genuine issue of
material fact exists only if a rational jury, reviewing the complete record, could
return a verdict for the non-movant. McMichael v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc., 934 F.3d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Initially, “[t]he movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the
record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Royal
Am. Constr., Inc. v. Roofing Designs by JR, LLC, No. CV H-21-02440, 2025 WL
43585, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2025) (quoting Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401
F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–
25 (1986))). “If the movant carries that burden, then the burden shifts to the non-
movant to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Fed.
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R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “The non-movant must ‘go beyond the pleadings,’ using competent
summary judgment evidence to cite ‘specific facts’ showing a genuine issue for
trial.” Id. (quoting McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir.
2017) (quoting Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005))).
“The court must review all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant
and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant.” Id. at *3
(quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).
III. 	DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by judicial estoppel.
ECF No. 28. Plaintiff responds that Defendant has not established that Plaintiff had
a motive to conceal his retaliation claim and equitable considerations favor that this
case should be administered as an asset of the bankruptcy estate and not dismissed
in Defendant’s favor. ECF No. 35 at 11.
“Judicial estoppel is ‘a common law doctrine by which a party who has
assumed 	one 	position 	in 	his 	pleadings may 	be 	estopped 	from 	assuming 	an
inconsistent position.’” Levitz v. Alicia’s Mexican Grille, Inc., No. CV H-19-3929,
2020 WL 710013, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting In
re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Brandon v.
Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1988))). “The doctrine was created not
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for the protection of litigants, but to protect the judiciary itself ‘by “preventing
parties from playing fast and loose with the courts to suit the exigencies of self
interest.”’” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d
at 205 (quoting Brandon, 858 F.2d at 268)). “[T]he doctrine is generally applied
where ‘intentional self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining unfair
advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice.’” Id. (quoting In re
Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d at 206 (quoting Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F.2d
510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953))). 4
“Judicial estoppel is particularly appropriate where . . . a party fails to disclose
an asset to a bankruptcy court, but then pursues a claim in a separate tribunal based
on that undisclosed asset.” Cornish v. Hudson Group Retail, LLC, No. CV H-18-
977, 2018 WL 6413158, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2018) (quoting Jethroe v. Omnova
Solutions, Inc., 412 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also Royal Am. Constr., 2025
WL 43585, at *3 (“Courts have recognized the importance of judicial estoppel when
bankruptcy proceedings are involved because bankruptcy aims to ‘”bring about an
equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate among creditors holding just demands”
and to “grant a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.”’”) (quoting Reed v.
4 Where judicial estoppel is raised in the context of a bankruptcy case, federal law applies. Levitz,
2020 WL 710013, at *2 (quoting Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 205); see also Matheson Tri-Gas,
Inc. v. E-B Display Co., Inc., No. 3:20-CV-0296, 2021 WL 1701062, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29,
2021) (“The Fifth Circuit has generally considered judicial estoppel a matter of federal procedure
and has applied federal law.”) (citing Hall v. GE Plastic Pacific PTE Ltd., 327 F.3d 391, 395 (5th
Cir. 2003) (citing Ergo Science, Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 600 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Kothe v. R.C.
Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930))).
Judicial estoppel is appropriate where: “(1) the position of the party against
which estoppel is sought is plainly inconsistent with its prior legal position; (2) the
party against which estoppel is sought convinced a court to accept the prior position;
and (3) the party did not act inadvertently.” Levitz, 2020 WL 710013, at *2 (quoting
Jethroe, 412 F.3d at 600 (citing Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 205–06)). “However,
judicial estoppel is not governed by ‘inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive
formula for determining [its] applicability,’ and numerous considerations ‘may
inform the doctrine's application in specific factual contexts.’” Id. (quoting Love v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting New Hampshire v.
Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001))).
Disclosure in bankruptcy filings is designed to “permit the court, the trustee,
and the creditors to evaluate the debtors’ financial condition at the date of bankruptcy
and ascertain what assets may be available for distribution to creditors.” Royal Am.
Constr., Inc., 2025 WL 43585, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2025) (quoting In re Superior
Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 2004). “Application of judicial estoppel
in appropriate cases seeks to further that goal.” Id. The Court finds that this purpose
would not be served in this case.
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A. 	Plaintiff Asserted Inconsistent Legal Positions.
“As to the first element, in the context of bankruptcy, the plaintiff must be
asserting a legal position in the civil action that is plainly inconsistent with [his] prior
position in the bankruptcy action.” Cornish, 2018 WL 6413158, at *2. “A plain
inconsistency results when a debtor fails entirely to disclose claims in their
bankruptcy but then pursues those claims in a different court.” Royal Am. Constr.,
Inc., 2025 WL 43585, at *3 (citing Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. MCorp Mgmt.
Solutions, Inc., 157 B.R. 100, 103 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (applying judicial estoppel to
claims not disclosed in the schedules and plan)). Some courts decline to find
inconsistency when a debtor at least mentioned their claims. Id. (citing Delaney v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 408 F.Supp.2d 240, 243 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 5, 2005) (holding
that judicial estoppel did not apply even when debtor erroneously disclosed their
claim as a personal injury claim when it was not)).
Defendant argues that this element is met because although Plaintiff had a
duty to disclose all his assets, he took the position in his schedules to his Bankruptcy
Petition that he did not have an actual or potential lawsuit against Defendant for
retaliation. ECF No. 28 at 10–11. Plaintiff does not dispute this element.
The Court finds that indeed this element is met. The record demonstrates that
Plaintiff failed entirely to disclose his retaliation claim against Defendant in his
schedules or other bankruptcy filings. The bankruptcy court entered a no-asset
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discharge. Although Plaintiff orally disclosed this claim to the Trustee, he did not
notify the bankruptcy court. 	See Barber v. Wolfgang Puck Worldwide, Inc.,
No. 1:21-CV-03928, 2022 WL 16841701, at *3 (W.D. La. Nov. 9, 2022) (notifying
bankruptcy counsel, but not bankruptcy court insufficient), see also Royal Am.
Constr., Inc., 2025 WL 43585, at *3 (citing In re Oparaji, 698 F.3d 231, 235 (5th
Cir. 2012) (stating that the Fifth Circuit, when evaluating judicial estoppel, looks in
part to whether there is a perception that “one or both courts were misled[.]”)).
B. 	The Bankruptcy Court Accepted Plaintiff’s Prior Position.
“The second prong for judicial estoppel requires that the bankruptcy court
accept the debtor’s prior position.” Royal Am. Constr., Inc., 2025 WL 43585, at *5
(citing Reed, 650 F.3d at 574). “Judicial acceptance can occur when the court accepts
the debtor’s position either on a preliminary matter or as part of a final disposition.”
Id. (citing In re Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d at 335).
Defendant argues that this element is met because the bankruptcy court
discharged Plaintiff’s debt after accepting Plaintiff’s schedules that did not include
his retaliation claim. ECF No. 28 at 12. Plaintiff does not dispute this element.
Here, although the bankruptcy court subsequently reopened the bankruptcy
case, before then, the bankruptcy court accepted Plaintiff’s position—it granted
Plaintiff a no-asset bankruptcy discharge based on the representations in his
schedules, which did not include the instant case’s claim. See Johnston v. Petco
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Animal Supplies Stores, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-3987-P, 2016 WL 4791929, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 10, 2016) (although the bankruptcy court subsequently considered and
denied the plaintiff’s motion to reopen, the trial court found the second element met
because the bankruptcy court entered a discharge); see also Royal Am. Constr., Inc.,
2025 WL 43585, at *5 (“Because of the failure to adequately disclose the value of
the claims against Hartford and Royal American, the Plan did not alert creditors that
those claims might be a potential asset or source of funds from which the creditors
could be satisfied. The bankruptcy court accepted Roofing Designs’ valuation of its
claims against Royal American and Hartford.”). The second element is met.
C. 	There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether Plaintiff Acted
Inadvertently.
The final prong for judicial estoppel requires that the debtor did not act
inadvertently, which “is shown when the debtor either lacks knowledge of the
undisclosed claims or has no motive to conceal the claims.” Royal Am. Constr., Inc.,
2025 WL 43585, at *5 (citing Reed, 650 F.3d at 574; In re Flugence, 738 F.3d 126,
130 (5th Cir. 2013)). “A motivation to conceal may be shown if the debtor has a
potential financial benefit from the nondisclosure.” Id. (citing U.S. ex rel. Long v.
GSDMIdea City, LLC, 798 F.3d 265, 273 (5th Cir. 2015)).
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff had knowledge of the undisclosed
claim but dispute whether Plaintiff was motivated to conceal the claim. Defendant
argues that this element is met because Plaintiff’s deposition testimony clearly
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demonstrates that he knew of the facts giving rise to his retaliation claim prior to
filing for bankruptcy and by concealing his claim, he “maximized the amount of debt
discharged” and kept the potential recovery from the retaliation claim for himself.
ECF No. 28 at 14–15. Defendant contends that orally disclosing the claim to the
Trustee does not establish inadvertence. ECF No. 28 at n.5. Plaintiff responds that
Plaintiff is not a sophisticated party and did disclose the retaliation claim to the
Trustee, demonstrating he lacked the motive to conceal the claim. ECF No. 35 at 15.
The Court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this
element 	is 	met, 	and 	therefore, 	summary 	judgment 	on 	judicial 	estoppel 	is
inappropriate at this junction. Although there is evidence that Plaintiff would
potentially financially benefit from not disclosing a claim by securing an FLSA
retaliation judgment without the creditors’ knowledge, there is also evidence that
Plaintiff lacked the motivation to conceal his retaliation claim.
At the creditor’s hearing before Trustee, Plaintiff stated that “Oil Patch Group
. . . asked me to come back, but they actually told me that the only way they would
keep me employed was to cancel the lawsuit,” and that his FLSA counsel advised
that he possibly had a retaliation claim, but they needed additional time to
investigate. ECF No. 35-1 at 5–6. Plaintiff represented that he did not include the
lawsuit in his schedule because although he had signed the FLSA counsel’s
representation letter, he had no knowledge as to whether the retaliation claim had
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been filed or not. ECF No. 35-1 at 7. The Trustee responded to Plaintiff’s
representations with the directive to amend the schedules to list the unpaid wages
claim and reach out to FLSA counsel for clarification as to whether the retaliation
claim had been filed and other information about the retaliation claim. ECF No. 35-
1 at 7, 8. The Trustee then elicited testimony from Plaintiff about his employment
status to determine whether he was exempt or not. ECF No. 35-1 at 7–8.
Plaintiff voluntarily disclosed the retaliation claim to the Trustee and agreed
to amend the schedule to include the previously undisclosed matters—but a week
after the meeting and before the amendment was completed, the Trustee reported to
the bankruptcy court that no distributions from the estate would be made, and all its
assets would be abandoned. ECF Nos. 35-1 at 3–8.; 35-2 at 3. There is no evidence
before the Court as to what happened between the meeting on November 15, 2022,
and the Trustee’s report a week later, on November 23, 2022. 5 ECF No. 35-2 at 3.
In reliance on this representation, the bankruptcy court issued a no-asset discharge
of $152,429.53 debt and closed the proceedings. ECF No. 35-2 at 3.
The current record shows there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Plaintiff had a motive to conceal his undisclosed retaliation claim. Summary
judgment is denied because this element is unmet. But even if this element was met,
the Court finds that equitable considerations weigh against granting summary
5 In 2022, Thanksgiving Day was observed on November 24th.
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judgment based on judicial estoppel, as discussed more in depth below.
D. 	Equitable Considerations Weigh Against Invoking Judicial Estoppel.
Plaintiff argues that the Court should not invoke judicial estoppel because
reopening the bankruptcy proceedings and allowing the Trustee to pursue the
retaliation claim on behalf of the estate “benefits the bankruptcy estate and the
debtors and achieves the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.” ECF No. 35 at 14.
Significantly, the Fifth Circuit has said that “there is no per se rule estopping
any party who fails to disclose potential claims to a bankruptcy court.” Matter of
Parker, 789 F. App’x 462, 464 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Long, 798 F.3d at 271). The
doctrine of judicial estoppel “is equitable in nature,” and “should be applied flexibly,
with an intent to achieve substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Reed, 6 650 F.3d at 574).
“Because of the equitable nature of the doctrine, ‘trial courts are not required to
apply it in every instance that they determine its elements have been met.’” Id.
(quoting Long, 798 F.3d at 271).
Here, 	invoking 	judicial 	estoppel 	may 	have 	inequitable 	consequences.
Defendant would be excused from potential liability and Plaintiff’s creditors would
6 Prior to the bankruptcy proceeding reopening and Trustee’s expressed intention to pursue the
retaliation claim, Defendant argued that Reed and similar cases were inapplicable here because
Plaintiff sought to pursue his own retaliation claim, not the Trustee on behalf of the bankruptcy
estate—now, as discussed throughout, the Trustee will pursue the retaliation claim on the
bankruptcy estate’s behalf.
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not receive what they are possibly due under the Bankruptcy Code. 7 Based on
Plaintiff and Defendant’s agreement, the bankruptcy court reopened Plaintiff’s
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings and subsequently permitted the Trustee to pursue
the retaliation claim before the Court on the bankruptcy estate’s behalf. Any harm
to the judicial process was cured by revoking Plaintiff’s discharge and reopening his
bankruptcy proceedings. Summary judgment should not be granted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court ORDERS that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF
No. 28, is DENIED. The Trustee may pursue the instant case’s claim for the benefit
of Plaintiff’s creditors.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed at Houston, Texas, on March 25, 2026.
Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
7 According to Plaintiff’s last schedule in the bankruptcy proceeding, he owes $87,839.00 to
creditors who have claims secured by property and $64,590.53 to nonpriority unsecured creditors.
In re Burson, No. 22-31901, ECF No. 14.
Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
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