USA v. Tyler

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
TIMOTHY LEE TYLER 	§
§
§	Movant
vs. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-02101
§ 	CRIM NO. 4:21-CR-0017-1
§ 	CRIM NO. 4:22-CR-408-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	§
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Movant Timothy Lee Tyler's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. (Civ. Doc. l;
Crim. Doc. 86). 1 Tyler challenges his aggregated 480-month sentence for manufacturing
and distributing child pornography. 	He alleges that his trial counsel, Mr. Darryl Austin,
rendered ineffective assistance 	of counsel in connection with his 	guilty plea. 	The
Government filed a motion for summary judgment in response to Tyler' s motion, and Tyler
filed a reply. 	(Crim Docs. 93 & 96). 	Having considered the motion, response, reply, and
relevant law, the motion for relief under § 2255 is DENIED, the motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED, the related civil action is DISMISSED with prejudice, and a
certificate of appealability is DENIED for the reasons that follow.
1 Citations to "Crim. Doc.---" refer to docket entries in Crim. A. No. 4:21-cr-17-1; citations to "Civ.
Doc. ---" refer to docket entries in Civ. A. No. 4:25-cv-2101. 	The docket entries concerning this
motion to vacate and responsive briefing in Crim. A. No. 4:22-cr-408-1 mirror those in No. 4:21-
cr-l 7; for clarity, the citations to the criminal matters shall refer to thos e docketed in No. 4:21-cr-
17.
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United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 21, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court limits its recitation of the background facts to those necessary to address
the issues raised in this motion to vacate. 2 Tyler' s sentence is the result of guilty pleas in
two cases that were consolidated for the purposes of sentencing, Crim. Nos. 4:21-cr-l 7 and
4:22-cr-408. 	Criminal case no. 4:21-cr-l 7 originated in Texas. 	Criminal cause no. 4:22-
cr-408 was originally filed in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, in cause no. 2:19-cr-139-
PP, but was consolidated with cause no. 4:21-cr-l 7 after Tyler signed a "Consent to
Transfer of Case for Plea and Sentence (Under Rule 20)" indicating that he consented to
the disposition of the case in the Southern District of Texas, wished to plead guilty in the
Wisconsin case, and waived a trial for that matter. 	Crim. No. 4:22-cr-408 at Doc. No. 1.
According to the facts in the plea agreement for both cases, 3 the Texas case (4:21-
cr-l 7) originated from a tip from an undercover FBI agent who was working a Kik 4 group
in which members discussed renting their own minor daughters or the daughters of others.
The agent interacted online with Tyler, who used the alias "Luke Hendrix." Tyler and the
agent 	messaged 	each 	other 	several 	times, 	discussing 	sexually 	abusing 	their young
daughters and talking about renting or swapping them. Tyler later sent the agent videos of
child pornography. 	FBI issued an emergency disclosure to Kik that identified the IP
address as a Suddenlink customer. 	In response to a subpoena, Suddenlink identified the
2 For a detailed account of the facts that formed the basis of this case, such may be found at Crim.
Doc. 27 at 8-14 (Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea) (under seal), and a summary may be found at
Crim. Doc. 93 at 3-5 (Motion for Summary Judgment).
3 See Crim. Doc. 27 at 8-14 (under seal).
4 According to its Wikipedia page, Kik is a "freeware instant messaging app from the Canadian
company Kik Interactive." See Kik (app) - Wikipedia (last accessed on Apr. 17 , 2026).
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owner of the account, and agents went to the address in Conroe where the IP address was
located. 	They interrogated the homeowner, who lived with his wife and nine children at
the house, who insisted that he never sent anyone child pornography. 	The homeowner
stated that he recently assisted Tyler, who was a family friend, by posting Tyler's bail and
agreeing to be responsible for him. Tyler had been in jail on a charge of indecency with a
child when the homeowner bailed him out. At the time, Tyler also had pending charges in
the Eastern District of Wisconsin for distributing and possessing child pornography and
was subject to pretrial release conditions in that case.
For approximately two weeks after being bailed out of jail, Tyler was at the Conroe
house from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. and then stayed at a nearby hotel each night. 	During that
time, the young girls in the Conroe house complained to their father that Tyler was taking
pictures of them. Tyler was arrested pursuant to a state warrant, and three of his cell phones
were seized. 	Tyler's LG cell phone contained numerous files of child pornography,
including pictures and videos of rape and torture of children. The LG phone also contained
Kik chats with the undercover agent and several other Kik users. Tyler's ex-wife identified
a girl in one of the images as her daughter and recognized several of the articles of clothing
and blankets in the scenes, including a blanket she identified as belonging to Tyler.
The Wisconsin case originated in 2019, after the Department of Justice received tips
in the spring of 2019 from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
CyberTipline reports from Imgur, another social media site for sharing images, that traced
back to Tyler at his mother and stepfather' s home in Milwaukee where Tyler was staying
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at the time. 	Milwaukee Police Department obtained a search warrant for the house, and
the search yielded five flash drives and a laptop computer located in Tyler's bedroom. One
flash 	drive reportedly 	contained 463 	images 	and 	162 videos 	of child pornography,
including rape of a child by an adult male. At the time, Tyler was a registered sex offender
under 	the 	supervision 	of the 	Wisconsin 	Department 	of 	Corrections. 	During 	an
interrogation by Wisconsin officials, Tyler admitted that he had relapsed back into using
child pornography and that he uploaded child pornography files in Imgur to share with
other users.
As noted above, the Wisconsin case (Crim. No. 4:22-cr-408) was transferred to
Texas and consolidated with the Texas case (Crim. No. 4:21-cr-17), and Tyler was
convicted after pleading guilty to Counts 2 and 4 of the indictment in Crim. No. 4 :2 l-cr-
17 , which charged him with distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
2252A(a)(2)(B) and 2252A(b)(l) (Count 2) , and possession of child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2) (Count 4), and to Count 2 of
the indictment in Crim. No. 4:22-cr-408, which charged him with possession of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2) (Count 2). 	In
exchange for his guilty pleas, the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in
cause nos. 4:21-cr-17 and 4:22-cr-408 and to recommend a one-point reduction in his
offense level pursuant to U.S .S. G. § 3E 1.1 (b) if his offense level exceeded 16 under
U.S .S.G. § 3El. l(a). Crim. Doc. 27 at 5. The plea agreement also warned Tyler that "any
estimate of the possible sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that he may have
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received from his counsel, the United States or the Probation Office, is a prediction and not
a promise, did not induce his guilty plea, and is not binding on the United States, the
Probation Office, or the Court." 	Id. at 4. 	The agreement specifically advised Tyler that
the Court is not bound by the Sentencing Guidelines because they are advisory, and he may
receive a sentence that departs from those guidelines in the discretion of the Court. 	Id. at
5.
At re-arraignment, 	Tyler 	indicated that 	he 	understood 	the 	terms 	of his 	plea
agreement and that distribution of child pornography carried a sentence of up to 40 years
with a mandatory minimum of 15 years. 	Crim. Doc. 71 	at 8. 	Tyler also stated he
understood 	that 	the 	possession 	charges 	each 	carried 	a 	20-year 	maximum, 	10-year
mandatory minimum sentence, and that his attorney had explained all of this to him. Id. at
9. 	Tyler indicated that he understood that the Court was not bound by the plea agreement
and that it was possible that the sentence would be greater than he anticipated. 	Id. at 10.
He also acknowledged that he was pleading guilty knowing that he could go to trial if he
did not want to plead guilty. 	Id. at 14. 	He affirmed the background facts that form the
basis of the charges against him, stated that he knew and understood the maximum
sentences and the mandatory minimum sentences involved, and indicated that he was
pleading guilty because he was guilty. Id. at 26 , 30-31. 	This Court found that Tyler was
fully competent of entering an informed plea, that he was aware of the charges and
consequences of his pleas, and that his pleas of guilty were knowing and voluntary pleas
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supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of the
offenses. Id. at 31-32.
At sentencing, defense counsel objected to a five-point enhancement for obtaining
valuable consideration in exchange for the child pornography and argued that only two
levels should be added under U.S.S.G. § 202.2. 	Crim. Doc. 75 at 4. The court overruled
that 	objection, 	finding 	that 	the 	enhancement 	applied 	because 	there 	was 	valuable
consideration for the exchange of child pornography. Id. at 5. Based on the Government's
contention that Tyler is a danger to society and unlikely to be rehabilitated given his
recidivism, it recommended a sentence of 80 years with each of the counts of conviction
running 	consecutively. 	The 	Government 	argued 	that Tyler 	is 	a documented 	child
pornography recidivist who was found possessing of hundreds of files of images of child
rape and torture and who had engaged in hands-on offenses like indecency with a child in
2015. Id. at 7-8. Defense counsel countered that Tyler was adamant that he did not produce
the images and that he would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty to that. 	Defense
counsel 	further 	contended 	that 	a 	life 	sentence, 	which 	is 	what 	the 	Government' s
recommendation would amount to, would not be appropriate, and argued for a sentence
range of 15 to 30 years. Id. at 13. Defense counsel contended that a long sentence would
signal to other criminal defendants that taking a plea and accepting responsibility is not
valued in any way and that they would not receive any benefit from doing so. 	Id. 	He
argued for the opportunity for Tyler to be rehabilitated and for a much shorter sentence
than the one the Government advocated.
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Tyler also addressed the Court, personally apologizing to his friends and their
household who had bailed him out of jail and taken him into their home. He acknowledged
that he needed punishment and stated that he works on improving himself every day to
fight his addiction.
The Court adopted the factual findings and guideline applications in the presentence
investigation report and sentenced Tyler in cause number 21-cr-l 7 to 360 months as to
Count 2 in cause number 2 l-cr-17; 240 months as to Count 4 in cause number 2 l-cr-17;
and 240 months as to Count 2 of22-cr-408 . Crim. Doc. 75 at 16 . Each of these sentences
were to run concurrently to each other but consecutive to the 120 months required under
18 U.S.C. § 3147 (providing an additional 120 months ifthe offense was committed while
the defendant was on pretrial release), for a total aggregated sentence of 480 months in
BOP custody, followed by a 20-year term of supervised release. Id. 	The Court noted that
the sentence was based on the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct, protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, and provide a
just punishment. Id. at 17.
Tyler appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment but remanded for
correction of a clerical error, finding that "the court' s intent was to impose the enhancement
[per 18 U.S.C. § 3147] on Tyler' s conviction of distribution in 2020 and that it is 'by merely
clerical mistake or oversight' that the judgments indicate otherwise." 	United States v.
Tyler, Nos. 23-20273, 23-20274, slip op. at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 31 , 2024) (citing United States
v. Bu endia-Rangel, 553 F.3d 378, 379 (5th Cir. 2008)).
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Tyler filed this motion to vacate under section 2255 after his appeal concluded. He
claims that defense counsel was ineffective regarding his plea of guilty and that he did not
understand the consequences of his plea. 	He claims that counsel told him that his
punishment range was likely to be between 15-20 years, whereas he received an aggregated
40-year sentence. 	He argues that he received no benefit from pleading guilty instead of
proceeding to trial.
II. 	LEGALSTANDARDS
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255
A§ 2255 motion is the primary means of collateral attack on a federal sentence once
a conviction has become final. Packv. Yu suff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotation
omitted). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional
rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal
and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v.
Vaughn , 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The four grounds upon which a
federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under§ 2255 are: " (l)
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2)
the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum sentence; or ( 4) the sentence is ' otherwise subject to collateral attack. ' "
United States v. Piacente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). "The scope
of relief under§ 2255 is consistent with that of the writ of habeas corpus." Id.
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The 	§ 	2255 	petitioner 	carnes 	the 	burden 	of establishing 	his 	claims 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence. Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980).
However, after a petitioner has been convicted and exhausted his appeals or waived the
right to appeal, a presumption arises that the petitioner "stands fairly and finally convicted,"
United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231 - 32 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982)), and "a collateral challenge may not do service for an
appeal." Frady, 456 U.S. at 165.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The 	Sixth Amendment to 	the 	United 	States 	Constitution guarantees 	criminal
defendants the right to have the assistance of counsel at trial. See U.S . Const. amend. VI;
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). The right to counsel includes "the right to the
effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the following two-prong
standard:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ' counsel' 	guaranteed the defendant by the 	Sixth
Amendment. 	Second, 	the 	defendant 	must 	show 	that 	the 	deficient
perfonnance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Strickland v. 	Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 	(1984). 	To prevail, a petitioner must
demonstrate both constitutionally deficient performance by counsel and actual prejudice
because ofthe alleged deficiency. See Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 390, 390- 91 (2000).
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The first prong of the governing standard is only satisfied where the petitioner shows
that 	"counsel's 	representation 	fell 	below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of reasonableness."
Strickland, 466 U.S . at 687. Scrutiny of counsel's performance is "highly deferential," and
a reviewing court must make every effort "to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689. To prove the second prong-
prejudice- 	a petitioner must demonstrate a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel ' s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694 .
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id.
The two-part Strickland standard applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims
arising out of a guilty plea. United States v. Smith , 915 F.2d 959,963 (5th Cir. 1990). To
establish prejudice in relation to a guilty plea, the petitioner must demonstrate that there
was a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S . 52, 59 (1985).
To establish prejudice regarding a term of sentencing, a petitioner must demonstrate that
"there was a reasonable probability that, but for [defense counsel]' s actions, [he] would
have received a lesser sentence than he did." United States v. Grammas, 376 F.3d 433,438
(5th Cir. 2004).
A guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings except
for challenges to involuntariness and ineffective assistance of counsel that "directly
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affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itse lf. " United States v. Hollin s, 97 F. App 'x
477, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. White , 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir.
2002)). 	Such waiver includes "all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except
insofar as the alleged ineffectiveness relates to the voluntariness of the giving of the plea."
Smith v. Estell e, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). 	"When a
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the
offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating
to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea."
Tollett v. He nderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). "A s a general rule, therefore, a convicted
defendant may not collaterally attack a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea." Taylor v.
Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1991).
A guilty plea is valid only if entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, "with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Bradshaw v.
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 , 183 (2005); United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir.
2000). 	A plea is intelligently made when the defendant has "real notice of the true nature
of the charge against him." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A plea is "voluntary" if it does not result from force, threats,
improper promises, misrepresentations, or coercion. United States v. Amaya, 111 F .3 d 3 86 ,
3 89 (5th Cir. 1997). 	A guilty plea is valid where "the plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Hill, 474
U.S . at 56 ; United States v. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381 , 385 (5th Cir. 2012).
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Ill 	DISCUSSION
Tyler claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in connection with his
guilty plea. He alleges that counsel was ineffective by ( 1) failing to properly calculate the
Sentencing Guidelines and notify Tyler accurately about his sentence exposure; (2) failing
to explain the relative consequences of pleading guilty versus going to trial; (3) failing to
review discovery material and the applicable law; and (4) failing to investigate exculpatory
or mitigating evidence. Tyler claims that counsel' s errors led to his decision to plead guilty,
and but for counsel' s errors, he would have proceeded to trial. 	In his reply, he represents
that he "pleaded guilty because of the assurances of his counsel that he would receive a
sentence of 15-20 years ' imprisonment." 	Crim. Doc. 96 at 4. 	He contends that his plea
was not made with awareness of its true consequences and that absent counsel ' s errors, he
would have proceeded to trial. Id.
The record indicates otherwise. His counsel objected to an enhancement under the
Guidelines and argued for a sentence range of 15-30 years. 	Counsel contended that
rehabilitation would 	be the 	best route 	for 	Tyler, coupled with 	supervision. 	Tyler's
allegation that counsel assured him that he would receive a sentence of between 15 and 20
years and that Tyler relied on that representation is contradicted by the record, where the
plea agreement and re-arraignment admonitions repeatedly informed him of the possible
long sentences he could receive.
The record further reflects that defense counsel stated at sentencing that he was not
expecting the minimum possible sentence for Tyler (which Tyler' s claim of 15-20 years
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would represent) but pleaded for a much lower sentence than the one the Government
sought. See Crim. Doc. 75 at 12-15. Tyler does not show that his counsel 's performance
fell below a reasonable level or that Tyler entered an involuntary, unknowing plea based
on this record. Tyler fails to show that counsel's performance fell below the range of
reasonable competence, given the set of circumstances and the evidence against Tyler in
both cases, along with his criminal history of prior sex offenses.
Tyler does not state other specific facts to show that his plea was involuntary or
unknowing. 	Tyler's conclusory assertions that counsel did not research the Guidelines,
move to suppress evidence, or did not argue for mitigating circumstances are insufficient
to demonstrate deficient performance or actual prejudice. See United States v. Holmes, 406
F.3d 337,361 (5th Cir.) ("Mere conclusory allegations in support of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.") (quoting Green v.
Johnson , 160 F.3d 1029, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 871 (2005); Day v.
Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 540-41 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Lincecum v. Collins, 958 F.2d
1271 , 1279 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying habeas relief where petitioner "offered nothing more
than the conclusory allegations in his pleadings" to support a claim that counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence). A habeas corpus petitioner who
alleges counsel's failure to investigate must specify what the investigation would have
revealed and how it would have benefitted his case. See United States v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d
386, 393 (5th Cir.) (citing United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1989)),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 931 (2000).
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Further, Tyler cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that "but for
[counsel]'s actions, [he] would have received a lesser sentence than he did." Grammas,
376 F.3d at 438. 	The record reflects that, while still in Wisconsin in 2019 and before his
defense counsel was appointed in Texas, Tyler admitted to MPD officers that he had
relapsed back into child pornography and that he uploaded child pornography to Imgur to
share with others. 	Police found hundreds of images and videos on his hard drives in
Wisconsin, some of which depict rape and torture of children. 	Had he proceeded to trial,
these statements would have likely supported a guilty verdict, not just on the possession
charge in that case, but also the distribution charge that was dismissed because he pleaded
guilty.
Regarding the Texas case, Tyler was caught with images and videos on his LG cell
phone, along with the chats with the undercover agent. Had he proceeded to trial, he would
have faced all the charges from both cases, which included a charge for "sexual exploitation
of a child," for the purpose of producing child pornography in addition to the distribution
and possession charges. 	A jury likely would have heard about his statement to the iv1PD
regarding the possession and distribution counts in Wisconsin and the testimony of his ex-
wife in Texas stating that one of the children abused and depicted in the videos was her
daughter and identifying Tyler's possessions on the video.
Had Tyler proceeded to trial, a jury would have heard the prurient details of his
crimes, including evidence supporting Count 1 of the indictment in 4:21-cr-17, for sexual
exploitation of a child for the purpose of producing child pornography charge (which he
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adamantly denied and which charge was dismiss ed because of his guilty plea). That count
carried, with his previous convictions for child pornography, a minimum of 35 years and
maximum of life imprisonment. 	In addition, the Government argued for 80 years, and he
received half of the sentence that was sought by the Government. 	There is no showing
that, had he proceeded to trial, he would have received a lesser sentence than he did by
pleading guilty to the possession counts and distribution count charged in the consolidated
cases, with the most serious charge being dismissed in exchange for his plea. 	Therefore,
he also cannot show actual prejudice from counsel' s performance.
Because Tyler fails to show that hi s plea was involuntary and that it was caused by
ineffective assistance of counsel, his motion must be DENIED.
IV. 	CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Rule l l(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases requires a district court to
issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order that is averse to the
petitioner. 	A certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner makes "a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), which
requires a petitioner to demonstrate "that ' reasonable jurists would find the district court' s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong ."' Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 , 484 (2000)). 	This requires a
petitioner to show that "jurists of reason could disagree with the [reviewing] court's
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. " Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100,
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115 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 	The petitioner fails to meet
this threshold, and a certificate of appealability is denied.
V. 	CONCLUSION
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Tyler's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
by a Person in Federal Custody (Civ. No. l; Crim. No. 86 ; 4:22-cr-408 at Doc.
No. 68) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. 	Civil Cause No. 4:25-cv-2101 is CLOSED.
3. 	A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
4. 	All pending motions pertaining to this 2255 proceeding, if any, are DENIED as
MOOT.
SIGNED this ) -t-
'Z.. I 	day of April 2026.
/\v---b1~
ANDREW S. HANEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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