Edwards v. McDermott International, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MIRIAM EDWARDS, et al.,
Plaintiffs.
V.
MCDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18-cv-04330
AMENDED1 OPINION AND ORDER APPOINTING
LEAD PLAINTIFF AND APPROVING LEAD COUNSEL2
Pending before me are competing motions for appointment of lead plaintiff
and approval of lead counsel for the § 10(b) MDR Subclass. See Dkts. 656, 658,
661, 687. The subclass is defined as “all persons and entities . . . who purchased or
otherwise acquired common stock of McDermott International, Inc. (NYSE: MDR)
between December 18, 2017, and January 23, 2020, both dates inclusive (‘10(b)
Class Period’), seeking to pursue remedies against McDermott and certain of its
officers and/or directors named as Defendants for violations of the federal
securities laws under Exchange Act §§ 10(b) and 20(a) and SEC Rule 10b-5.”
Edwards v. McDermott Int’l, Inc, No. 4:18-cv-04330, 2024 WL 3085177, at *2
(S.D. Tex. June 21, 2024), aff’d sub nom. Nova Scotia Health Emps.’ Pension Plan
1 On May 18, 2026, I issued an Opinion and Order Appointing Lead Plaintiff and
Approving Lead Counsel. Dkt. 689. On May 26, 2026, Majid Alghaslan filed a motion for
reconsideration, requesting that I reconsider my statement that Alghaslan’s approach to
presenting loss calculations constituted a disqualifying conflict of interest. See Dkt. 691. I
orally granted that motion for reconsideration on the record at a May 28, 2026 hearing.
This amended opinion and order follows.
2 “Motions for appointment of plaintiff and approval of lead counsel are nondispositive
matters properly addressed by a magistrate judge in an Order and Opinion, rather than a
Memorandum and Recommendation.” Plymouth Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Apache Corp., 556 F.
Supp. 3d 712, 720 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (collecting cases).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 29, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., No. 24-20326, 2025 WL 2814735 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 2025).
The 	City 	of 	Pontiac 	Reestablished 	General 	Employees’ 	Retirement 	System
(“Pontiac”); 	the 	Coligado 	Shareholder 	Group, 	collectively, 	and 	alternatively,
Christopher Coligado, individually; and Majid Alghaslan are vying to be appointed
lead plaintiff in this securities class action litigation.
After 	reviewing 	the 	briefing, 	the 	applicable 	law, 	and 	considering 	the
arguments of counsel, I appoint Christopher Coligado as lead plaintiff and approve
his selection of Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP as lead counsel and
Reynolds Frizzell LLP as liaison counsel of the § 10(b) MDR Subclass.
BACKGROUND
This securities class action was filed on November 15, 2018, against
McDermott and certain of its executives for alleged violations of §§ 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Exchange Act. After the filing of competing lead plaintiff motions, all
applicants 	other 	than 	the 	Nova 	Scotia 	Health 	Employees’ 	Pension 	Plan
(“NSHEPP”) withdrew their motions or filed notices of non-opposition to the
appointment of NSHEPP as lead plaintiff for the putative § 10(b) class. See
Dkts. 25, 45, 47, 65, 81. On June 4, 2019, Judge Alfred H. Bennett appointed
NSHEPP as lead plaintiff for all claims related to §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act. See Dkt. 84. On September 6, 2019, this case was reassigned to the
docket of Judge George C. Hanks, Jr. See Dkt. 94.
On October 4, 2019, NSHEPP filed an amended class action complaint on
behalf all persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired the common
stock of McDermott between December 18, 2017 and September 17, 2019, both
dates inclusive. See Dkt. 105. The Amended Complaint alleged, among other
things, that Defendants made false or misleading statements of material fact in
connection with McDermott’s 2018 merger with Chicago Bridge & Iron Company,
N.V. (“CB&I”).
On July 17, 2020, the Coligado Group filed a separate putative class action
asserting §§ 10(b) and 20(a) claims against McDermott officers. See Ahnefeldt v.
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Dickson, No. 4:20-cv-02539 (S.D. Tex.). The Coligado Group alleged different
purported misstatements from a later, non-overlapping class period, running from
September 20, 2019 to January 23, 2020. The Coligado Group, Alghaslan, and
NSHEPP, among others, moved for lead plaintiff appointment in Ahnefeldt. See
Ahnefeldt Dkts. 21, 23, 25. On March 31, 2021, Judge Hanks granted NSHEPP’s
motion to consolidate Ahnefeldt with Edwards. See Dkt. 164. On September 29,
2021, Judge Hanks appointed NSHEPP lead plaintiff “[t]o the extent that the
consolidation with the Edwards lawsuit has not mooted” the Ahnefeldt lead
plaintiff motions. Ahnefeldt Dkt. 49.
On September 29, 2021, NSHEPP filed a motion to (1) expand the putative
class period to encompass the class period in the now-consolidated Ahnefeldt case,
(2) add Pontiac as an additional, non-lead, named plaintiff and proposed class
representative, and (3) add Pontiac’s counsel Robbins Geller as additional, non-
lead plaintiffs’ counsel. See Dkts. 189–90. The same day, NSHEPP also filed a
motion for class certification. See Dkts. 191–92.
On October 19, 2021, this case was referred to me for all pretrial purposes.
See Dkt. 204. On November 2, 2021, I permitted NSHEPP to supplement its
complaint to expand the putative class period to encompass the Ahnefeldt class
period, but I denied NSHEPP’s request to add Pontiac and Robbins Geller to the
suit. See Dkt. 216.
On October 28, 2022, at the court’s request, NSHEPP refiled its motion for
class certification. See Dkts. 305–06. On February 29, 2024, I recommended that
class certification be denied without prejudice to the refiling of a motion to certify
two separate subclasses. See Dkt. 508 at 41. I made this recommendation after it
came to light that NSHEPP was a CB&I shareholder that only acquired McDermott
stock as result of the merger and thus has a fundamental conflict with purchasers
of McDermott stock. See id. at 23–26. Judge Hanks adopted my February 29, 2024
memorandum and recommendation on March 23, 2024. See Dkt. 526.
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On April 24, 2024, at my request, Judge Hanks withdrew his March 23, 2024
order 	adopting 	and 	remanded 	the 	motion 	for 	class 	certification 	for
reconsideration. See Dkt. 544. That same day, I issued an amended memorandum
and recommendation, recommending that the motion for class certification be
granted in part because NSHEPP has standing to pursue its claims on behalf of a
representative class of CB&I shareholders that acquired McDermott stock in the
Merger. See Dkt. 546 at 11–14, 26. I also recommended that the parties who timely
moved for lead plaintiff in this action be permitted to move for lead plaintiff of the
§ 10(b) MDR Subclass.
On May 21, 2024, the Coligado Group requested that it also be permitted to
move for lead plaintiff of the § 10(b) MDR Subclass. See Dkt. 555. On June 21,
2024, 	Judge 	Hanks 	adopted 	my 	April 	24, 	2024 	memorandum 	and
recommendation, and expanded the group permitted to move for lead plaintiff of
the § 10(b) MDR Subclass to include the parties that moved for appointment as
lead plaintiff in Ahnefeldt. See Dkt. 579. NHSEPP and Defendants cross-appealed
the court’s decision on class certification. On October 3, 2025, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the court’s decision. Judgment issued as mandate on December 10, 2025.
See Dkt. 641.
The candidates for lead plaintiff of the § 10(b) MDR Subclass submitted
their briefing in January 2026. Given the unique procedural posture of this case, I
permitted Defendants and NSHEPP to offer their thoughts as well. I held a hearing
on the lead plaintiff submissions on April 27, 2026. Following that hearing, I gave
the Coligado Group an opportunity to inform the court if it would like to move, in
the alternative, for Christopher Coligado to be appointed individually as lead
plaintiff. On May 12, 2026, the Coligado Group notified the court of its intention
to move, in the alternative, for Christopher Coligado to be considered individually
as lead plaintiff. See Dkt. 687.
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DISCUSSION
A. 	A PPOINTMENT OF L EAD PLAINTIFF
1. 	The Lead Plaintiff Process
Enacted roughly 30 years ago, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”) provides the procedure for selecting a lead plaintiff in a securities class
action lawsuit. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B). “[O]ne goal of the PSLRA is to have
the plaintiff class represented by a member with a substantial financial interest in
the recovery as incentive to monitor the litigation to prevent its being ‘lawyer-
driven.’” In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 128 F. Supp. 2d 401, 411–12 (S.D. Tex.
2000); see also Berger v. Compaq Comput. Corp., 279 F.3d 313, 313 (5th Cir.
2002) (“[T]he lead plaintiff should be an investor capable of understanding and
controlling the litigation.”).
Under the PSLRA, the lead plaintiff is to be the “most capable of adequately
representing the interests of class members.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). There
is a rebuttable presumption that that the most adequate plaintiff is the person or
group of persons that: (1) filed a complaint or timely moved to be appointed lead
plaintiff; (2) “has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class”; and
(3) “otherwise, satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Id. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I); see also Berger v. Compaq Comput.
Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 478 n.1 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing the PSLRA’s process for
selecting the most adequate plaintiff). This presumption may be overcome only by
proof that the presumptive lead plaintiff will not fairly and adequately protect the
class’s interests or will be subject to unique defenses that will render it incapable
of adequately representing the class. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
Although “the PSLRA does not specify how a court should decide which
plaintiff has the ‘largest financial interest’ in the relief sought,” district courts in
the Fifth Circuit often consider four factors to determine which plaintiff has the
largest financial interest. Welch v. Meaux, No. CV 19-1260, 2020 WL 4758269, at
*3 (W.D. La. Aug. 17, 2020). Those factors are: “(1) the number of shares
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purchased; (2) the number of net shares purchased; (3) the total net funds
expended by the plaintiffs during the class period; and (4) the approximate losses
suffered by the plaintiffs.” In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 440 (S.D.
Tex. 2002). “Courts consistently consider the fourth factor—the approximate
losses suffered—as most determinative in identifying the plaintiff with the largest
financial loss.” Strong v. AthroCare Corp., No. A-08-CA-574, 2008 WL 11334942,
at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2008).
There are two methods for calculating losses: first in, first out (“FIFO”) and
last in, first out (“LIFO”). FIFO is a method of accounting “where stocks which
were acquired first are assumed to be sold first for the purpose of loss calculations.”
Kaplan v. Gelfond, 240 F.R.D. 88, 94 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Under LIFO, “stocks
which were acquired most recently are assumed to be sold first.” Id. “The LIFO
method is often used by district courts trying to determine losses when deciding
who to appoint as lead plaintiff.” Plymouth Cnty. Ret. Sys., 566 F. Supp. 3d at 717.
2. 	The Coligado Group Has the Largest Financial Interest
In their opening briefs in moving for appointment as lead plaintiff of the
§ 10(b) MDR Subclass, the Coligado Group claimed to have suffered $1,860,605.94
in losses (Dkt. 659-3 at 2); Alghaslan claimed to have suffered $1,764,737.76 in
losses (Dkt. 661 at 3); and Pontiac claimed to have suffered $419,089 in losses
(Dkt. 656 at 3). As an individual, Christopher Coligado lost approximately
$586,833.30, which is more than Pontiac. See Dkt. 669 at 7. Thus, it seems
straightforward that the Coligado Group has the largest financial interest. 3
3 In his opposition briefing, Alghaslan offered a new loss calculation, insisting that it is he
who has the largest financial interest. In fact, Alghaslan’s new loss calculations halve his
fellow movants’ losses. See Dkt. 669 at 7. If Alghaslan thought this loss calculation was
important for the court to consider, he should have included it in his opening brief at least
as far as his own losses were concerned. We are not writing on a blank slate here. The
movants went through this process nearly six years ago, so Alghaslan knew that the
Coligado Group would claim greater losses than him. I will not consider Alghaslan’s new
loss calculations in determining who has the largest financial interest.
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The Coligado Group has the largest financial interest and is presumptively
entitled to lead-plaintiff status, assuming it meets the requirements of Rule 23.
3. 	The Coligado Group Is Too Large to Be Lead Plaintiff
Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking certification must demonstrate that:
(1) 	the 	class 	is 	so 	numerous 	that 	joinder 	of 	all 	members 	is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). “In a PSLRA motion to appoint lead plaintiff, the court
considers only whether the proposed plaintiff has made a ‘preliminary showing’
that two of Rule 23’s requirements—typicality and adequacy—are satisfied.”
Kakkar v. Bellicum Pharms., Inc., No. 4:18-cv-00338, 2019 WL 1367653, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2019) (cleaned up).
Although the inquiry at this stage of the litigation in selecting the Lead
Plaintiff is not as searching as the one triggered by a subsequent
motion for class certification, the proposed Lead Plaintiff must make
at least a preliminary showing that it has claims that are typical of
those of the putative class and has the capacity to provide adequate
representation for those class members.
Enron, 206 F.R.D. at 441. The “test for typicality is not demanding. It focuses on
the similarity between the named plaintiffs’ legal and remedial theories and the
theories of those whom they purport to represent.” Mullen v. Treasure Chest
Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). “The adequacy
inquiry serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class
they seek to represent.” In re Deepwater Horizon, 785 F.3d 1003, 1015 (5th Cir.
2015) (cleaned up).
The 	primary 	challenge 	that 	Alghaslan 	and 	Pontiac 	lodge 	against 	the
Coligado Group is that it is too large to be an adequate lead plaintiff. I agree, which
is why I began the hearing on these motions by stating that I was “unwilling to
appoint such a large group.” Dkt. 683 at 4. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has found it
“notable that the Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the position that
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a group of investors appointed to serve as lead plaintiffs ordinarily should
comprise no more than three to five persons.” Berger, 257 F.3d at 478 n.2
(emphasis added).
To be clear, I do not believe that the Coligado Group was assembled by
litigation counsel to aggregate enough losses to be lead plaintiff. To the contrary,
the Coligado Group formed on its own before selecting securities litigation counsel
through a group decision-making structure. See Dkt. 659-4 at 3–5. Thus, most of
the concerns that caution against appointing a group are not applicable to the
Coligado Group. Even so, 17 lead plaintiffs is too many. Moreover, while the
Coligado Group may not have been cobbled together by counsel, they still do not
have “a pre-litigation relationship based on more than their losing investment.” In
re Landry’s Seafood Rest., Inc., No. CIV.A. H-99-1948, 2000 WL 33999467, at *5
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2000). I will not set a record in the modern securities era for
the most lead plaintiffs to be appointed to a subclass. See Dkt. 667 at 12 n.6 (“While
two decisions since 2012 appointed groups exceeding the SEC’s presumptive limit,
neither even began to approach the Coligado Shareholder Group’s headcount.”). I
will, however, consider Christopher Coligado as a potential lead plaintiff. 6 See
Evangelista v. Late Stage Asset Mgmt., LLC, 784 F. Supp. 3d 542, 552 (E.D.N.Y.
6 In its opposition briefing, Pontiac offers case law holding that a judge does not abuse his
discretion in refusing “to pick apart the proposed group to find the most adequate
individual or individuals from within.” Dkt. 667 at 14 (quoting Ross v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Co., 2007 WL 895073, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007)). The important word here
is “discretion.” The PSLRA commits the decision of who to appoint lead plaintiff to the
court’s discretion. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (the court “shall appoint as lead
plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines
to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members” (emphasis
added)). Inasmuch as a judge does not abuse his discretion in refusing to consider a
proposed group as anything other than a whole, he also does not abuse his discretion in
considering an individual member of a proposed group. See Evangelista, 784 F. Supp. 3d
at 552 (collecting cases); accord Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1061,
1069 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“If the Court denies a motion to name lead plaintiffs, does the
[PSLRA] compel it to designate a lead plaintiff, or should it wait for another class member
to file a motion for the designation of lead plaintiff? The Court finds that the [PSLRA]
advocates the former approach.”).
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2025) 	(following 	“the 	longstanding 	practice . . . of 	considering 	the 	largest
shareholder of a rejected group as if he had moved to be appointed as lead plaintiff
alone” (quotation omitted)). 7
4. 	Christopher 	Coligado 	Is 	a 	Typical 	and 	Adequate 	Lead
Plaintiff
As noted before, Christopher Coligado, on his own, claims greater losses
than Pontiac. Thus, having determined that Alghaslan is an inadequate lead
plaintiff with a disqualifying conflict of interest, and the Coligado Group is too
large to be a lead plaintiff, I will consider whether Christopher Coligado—as the
movant with the next largest financial interest—is a typical and adequate lead
plaintiff. 8
“Typicality is achieved where the named plaintiffs’ claims arise from the
same event or course of conduct that gives rise to claims of other class members
and the claims are based on the same legal theory.” Enron, 206 F.R.D. at 441
7 While Alghaslan technically has the largest financial loss after the Coligado Group
collectively, I do not think it is prudent to consider Alghaslan as a lead plaintiff. Alghaslan
did not purchase his first share of McDermott stock until November 12, 2019. While it is
possible that the class period may continue to extend beyond that date, it is also possible
that the class period will be truncated to November 5, 2019, as previously contemplated.
See Dkt. 508 at 39–42. If that occurs, Alghaslan would no longer be a class member and
certainly could not be lead plaintiff—we would have to repeat this whole process again. I
simply cannot risk further delay to this already protracted litigation should the class
period ultimately end on November 5, 2019. Thus, I do not consider Alghaslan an
adequate lead plaintiff and will not consider him as the candidate with the next largest
financial loss.
8 The Coligado Group’s motion for Christopher Coligado to be considered individually, in
the alternative, came after the lead plaintiff briefing was complete. Even so, no party is
prejudiced by my considering Christopher Coligado individually now. Pontiac and
Alghaslan had an opportunity to attack each member of the Coligado Group individually.
Pontiac launched specific attacks against Daniel Gad and Jayaprakash and Aarthi
Srinivasan. See Dkt. 667 at 14, 20. For his part, Alghaslan argued that Gad, Amit Somani,
and Jignesh and Krutika Chandarana were all “susceptible to unique defenses.” Dkt. 669
at 16. Thus, Pontiac and Alghaslan had ample opportunity to attack Christopher
Coligado’s typicality and adequacy as an individual. That they did not advance any
arguments against Christopher Coligado individually—despite attacking other members
of the Coligado Group individually—further supports that Christopher Coligado is the
best choice to be lead plaintiff of the § 10(b) MDR Subclass.
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(quotation omitted). The claims of the class representative need not be identical to
the claims of the class to satisfy typicality. The typicality requirement is satisfied
so long as “claims arise from a similar course of conduct and share the same legal
theory,” even when there are “factual differences.” Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280
F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
Here, if successful in proving its injury and losses resulting from Defendants’
allegedly false and misleading statements and omissions, Christopher Coligado
will necessarily prove the conduct underlying the claims of all members of the
§ 10(b) MDR Subclass and establish the elements of those claims. Like all members
of the § 10(b) MDR Subclass, Christopher Coligado suffered damages from his
purchases 	of 	McDermott 	securities 	at 	artificially 	inflated 	prices 	based 	on
Defendants’ 	false 	and/or 	misleading 	statements 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	federal
securities laws and, as such, his “legal and remedial theories have the same
essential characteristics as the class claims.” Cambria Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v.
Venator Materials PLC, No. H-19-3464, 2019 WL 5328877, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
21, 2019). Accordingly, Christopher Coligado’s claims are typical of those of other
§ 10(b) MDR Subclass members.
Christopher Coligado similarly satisfies the adequacy requirement, which
“serves to uncover conflicts of interest between the named plaintiffs and the class
they 	seek 	to 	represent.” 	Enron, 	206 	F.R.D. 	at 	441 	(quotation 	omitted).
Representation is adequate when counsel for the class is qualified and competent,
and the interests of the representative are not antagonistic to the interests of
absent class members. See Parker v. Hyperdynamics Corp., No. 4:12-cv-999, 2013
WL 623164, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2013) (adequacy is shown by “[1] the zeal and
competence of the representatives’ counsel and [2] the willingness and ability of
the representatives to take an active role in and control the litigation and to protect
the interests of absentees.”) (quotation omitted)).
No member of the putative § 10(b) MDR Subclass has established that
Christopher Coligado has any conflicts of interest or is subject to any unique
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defenses, nor is the court aware of any. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC,
186 F.3d 620, 625–26 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Differences between named plaintiffs and
class members render the named plaintiffs inadequate representatives only if those
differences create conflicts between the named plaintiffs’ interests and the class
members’ interests.”). Christopher Coligado’s interests are clearly aligned with the
interests of the § 10(b) MDR Subclass, and there is no evidence of any antagonism.
Christopher 	Coligado 	is 	a 	well-educated 	professional 	who 	made 	significant
investments in McDermott and was damaged in connection with Defendants’
alleged violations of the federal securities laws. As an investor with a substantial
financial interest in prosecuting this action, Christopher Coligado—through his
leadership of the Coligado Shareholder Group—has made significant efforts to
ensure adequate representation for the § 10(b) MDR Subclass. Thus, Christopher
Coligado is both a typical and adequate lead plaintiff.
B. 	A PPOINTMENT OF L EAD COUNSEL
The PSLRA provides that “[t]he most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.” 15 U.S.C.
§78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). “While the appointment of counsel is made subject to the
approval of the court, the [PSLRA] clearly leaves the choice of class counsel in the
hands of the lead plaintiff.” In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 734 (9th Cir. 2002).
A district court should defer to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel unless it is
necessary to “protect the interests of the [plaintiff] class.” In re Waste Mgmt., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 128 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
Here, Christopher Coligado has selected Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman &
Herz LLP as lead counsel and Reynolds Frizzell LLP as liaison counsel of the
§ 10(b) MDR Subclass. These law firms have substantial experience in securities
class action lawsuits and possess the resources necessary to pursue this action. It
is not my role to conduct a nationwide search to determine the best lawyer or law
firm to represent the class. I am satisfied that Christopher Coligado has made a
reasonable choice of counsel, and I will not disturb his selection.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Christopher Coligado is appointed lead
plaintiff of the § 10(b) MDR Subclass, and Christopher Coligado’s selection of Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP as lead counsel and Reynolds Frizzell LLP
as liaison counsel of the § 10(b) MDR Subclass is approved.
SIGNED this ____ day of May 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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