Tran v. Strategic Dental Executives, LLC et al DO NOT DOCKET. Case remanded to 56th District Court of Galveston County, Texas.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
TRI T. TRAN,
Plaintiff.
V.
STRATEGIC DENTAL
EXECUTIVES, LLC et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00377
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
On November 20, 2025, all pretrial matters in this removed case were
referred to me. See Dkt. 5. Today, I sua sponte recommend that this case be
remanded to the 56th District Court of Galveston County, Texas.
BACKGROUND
On November 19, 2025, 	Defendant 	Strategic 	Dental 	Executives, 	LLC
removed this case from state court based on federal question jurisdiction. See
Dkt. 1. Plaintiff Tri T. Tran does not assert any federal claims in his state court
petition. Rather, Tran asserts two claims that arise only under Texas state law: (1) a
Texas common law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and
(2) a breach of contract claim. See Dkt. 1-1 at 8–11. Despite Tran’s assertion of only
Texas state law claims, Strategic Dental argues that “resolution of [Tran’s wrongful
termination claim] depends upon resolution of a substantial question of federal
law—namely, whether Defendants’ actions violated the Occupation[al] Health and
Safety Act” (“OSHA”). Dkt. 1 at 4–5. Despite acknowledging that OSHA “does not
provide a private cause of action,” Strategic Dental insists that “the crux of [Tran]’s
primary claim, as plead, is for retaliation under Section 11(c) of [OSHA].” Id. at 5.
On November 21, 2025, I issued an opinion and order, explaining to the
parties why “I do not think that there is a substantial federal question presented in
this case, and therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Dkt. 6 at 3. I
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 19, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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invited the parties to brief the question of subject matter jurisdiction, which they
did. See Dkts. 10, 11. With the benefit of that briefing, I will now explain why federal
question jurisdiction is lacking and this case must be remanded to state court.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Only state-court actions that originally could
have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “The removing party bears
the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was
proper.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.
2002). “Accordingly, “doubts regarding whether removal jurisdiction is proper
should be resolved against federal jurisdiction” and in favor of remand. Acuna v.
Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000).
The two primary sources of federal district courts’ original jurisdiction are
diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. See U.S. Const., art. III, § 2,
cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32. Diversity jurisdiction allows district courts to decide
cases that are between citizens of different states when the amount in controversy
involves 	more 	than 	$75,000. 	See 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 1332(a).1 	Federal 	question
jurisdiction exists where a claim arises “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because “the plaintiff is the master of the
complaint, the well-pleaded-complaint rule enables him, by eschewing claims
based on federal law, to have the cause heard in state court.” Holmes Grp., Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (cleaned up).
1 The parties’ citizenships are not disclosed in the record. Even if the parties are diverse,
“the Court only looks at the originally pleaded jurisdictional grounds put forth by
Defendant.” Taylor v. Peak Behavioral Health, Servs. LLC, 735 F. Supp. 3d 784, 790
(W.D. Tex. 2024). Strategic Dental asserted only federal question jurisdiction in its
removal. Thus, the parties citizenship is irrelevant because the court cannot consider
diversity jurisdiction as a basis for Strategic Dental’s removal of this lawsuit.
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“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the
‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only
when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. An action arises under federal law “only
in those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law
creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends
on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Singh v. Duane Morris LLP,
538 F.3d 334, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation modified). The “test for jurisdiction
over federal issues embedded in state-law claims between nondiverse parties” is
this: “does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing
any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).
Federal courts must presume “that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction”
unless the party asserting federal jurisdiction carries its burden to establish
otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
ANALYSIS
The only two claims that Tran advances in his petition are state law claims:
(1) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and (2) breach of contract. In
its Notice of Removal, Strategic Dental asserted that this “Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law breach of contract claim,” not original federal
question jurisdiction. Dkt. 1 at 6. Thus, the only question I must address is whether
Tran’s wrongful discharge claim raises a substantial federal question.
Before going any further, it is worth reviewing the elements of Tran’s
wrongful discharge claim, which is a judicial creation. “In Sabine Pilot, the Texas
Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine
covering ‘only the discharge of an employee for the sole reason that the employee
refused to perform an illegal act.’” Hawthorne v. Star Enter., Inc., 45 S.W.3d 757,
760 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied) (quoting Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v.
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Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985)). “In order to prevail under a Sabine Pilot
cause of action, a plaintiff must prove two things: (1) that the plaintiff refused to
perform an illegal act, and (2) that this refusal was the only reason that he or she
was terminated.” Hawthorne, 45 S.W.3d at 760.
Strategic Dental argues that Tran’s petition “forecloses a claim under Sabine
Pilot and is instead, plainly a whistleblower claim under OSHA.” Dkt. 10 at 26. 2 In
other words, Strategic Dental believes that there is federal question jurisdiction
not because Tran’s Sabine Pilot claim raises a substantial federal question; rather,
Strategic Dental believes that there is a substantial federal question because Tran’s
Sabine Pilot claim is an OSHA whistleblower claim in disguise. There are two
problems with Strategic Dental’s argument.
First, I will assume arguendo that Strategic Dental is right, and that Tran’s
Sabine Pilot claim is really an OHSA whistleblower claim in disguise. Strategic
Dental already knows that OSHA “does not provide a private cause of action.”
Dkt. 1 at 5. If Tran’s Sabine Pilot claim is “construed as a direct challenge under
OSHA,” 	then 	it 	would 	be 	“properly 	dismissed” 	for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction “because OSHA does not give rise to a private cause of action.” Lyle v.
Magnolia State Enter., Inc., 105 F.3d 654 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Brooks v.
Alcon, No. 4:20-cv-00306, 2021 WL 1553969, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2021)
(“Brooks’ claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because OSHA does not create a private right of action, and the Court does not
have jurisdiction over her claims.”); Aranyosi v. Delchamps, Inc., No. 97-0251,
1997 WL 118389, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 1997) (“The court first finds that there is
no federal question jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have not pled a cause of action
2 Strategic Dental makes this argument for two reasons. First, when Tran submitted his
OSHA Online Whistleblower Complaint Form, which is attached to his Original Petition,
he failed to check the box for “Refusing to perform a task the employee believes is
dangerous or illegal” in the second that asks why he believes he suffered an adverse
employment action. Dkt. 10 at 11 (citing Dk. 1-1 at 41). Second, “the words ‘illegal acts’
appear nowhere in the Original Petition.” Dkt. 10 at 26.
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pursuant to OSHA and indeed OSHA § 11(c) does not provide a private right of
action and remedy to Plaintiffs.”). At the risk of stating the obvious, if a district
court is required to dismiss a claim directly filed in federal court for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the federal statute being sued upon does not create a
private right of action, then that federal statute cannot be the basis for removal. 3
See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[I]t would ‘flout’
congressional 	intent 	to 	allow 	a 	federal 	court 	to 	exercise 	federal 	question
jurisdiction over a removed claim for violation of a federal statute that does not
provide 	a 	private 	cause 	of 	action.” 	(quoting Merrell 	Dow 	Pharm. 	Inc. 	v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986))).
Second, if we want to talk about disguises, Strategic Dental’s argument that
Tran’s “so-called Sabine Pilot claim fails on its face” is not so much a jurisdictional
argument as it is an argument why Tran fails to state a claim. Dkt. 10 at 11. A Texas
state court is more than capable of ascertaining whether Tran’s wrongful discharge
claim fails because (1) “the words ‘illegal acts’ appear nowhere in the Original
Petition” or (2) because Tran is actually bringing “a whistleblower claim under
OSHA,” which is no claim at all. Id. at 26. There is simply nothing here for a federal
court to decide.
One last point to short-circuit the noise: even if I assume, for the sake of
argument, that Tran’s wrongful discharge claim raises a federal question, Strategic
Dental has done nothing to show that the (unidentified) federal question is actually
disputed or substantial. The word “disputed” does not even appear in Strategic
Dental’s Notice of Removal. Strategic Dental asserts that “resolution of Plaintiff’s
primary claim depends upon a substantial question of federal law,” but Strategic
Dental never articulates what that question is, why that question is in dispute, and
most importantly, why that dispute is substantial. Dkt. 1 at 4. Even in its Brief in
3 It is true, as Strategic Dental notes, that plaintiffs “may not avoid federal question
jurisdiction by characterizing a federal claim as a state claim.” Dkt. 10 at 27 (quoting
Firefighters’ Ret. Sys. v. Regions Bank, 598 F. Supp. 2d 785, 791 (M.D. La. 2008)). But
that assumes that there is a federal claim in the first place.
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Support of Removal, Strategic Dental merely pays lip service to “actually disputed
and substantial”—those words appear only once when quoting the legal standard.
Dkt. 10 at 9. Thus, setting aside all the other problems with Strategic Dental’s
Notice of Removal, it would fail anyway because Strategic Dental has never
identified—beyond hand-waiving at OSHA—what federal question is actually
disputed and substantial. This is an independent and sufficient reason to remand
this case to state court.
CONCLUSION
Because a federal claim is not evident on the face of the original petition, and
because Tran’s state law claims do not raise an actually disputed, substantial
federal question, Strategic Dental has failed to invoke this court’s federal question
jurisdiction. Accordingly, I recommend that this case be remanded to the 56th
District Court of Galveston County, Texas.
Generally, the parties have 14 days from service of this Memorandum and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Because the holidays are upon us, I will extend the deadline for
either side to object to my memorandum and recommendation until Friday,
January 9, 2026. Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this ___ day of December 2025.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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