Reardon v. Osteen et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
MATTHEW REARDON,
Plaintiff.
V.
WILLIAM OSTEEN, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00203
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Matthew Reardon, proceeding pro se, brings this civil-rights action
arising from a traffic stop and DWI arrest that he alleges were part of a retaliatory
campaign by Texas and Mississippi officials. There are seven motions pending
before me: (1) Reardon’s motion to strike the affidavit of Defendant Jeff Busby and
for sanctions (Dkt. 61); (2) Defendant Jeff Busby’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 65);
(3) Defendants City of Galveston (the “City”) and City police officers William
Osteen 	and 	Jack 	Doraty’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	(collectively 	“Galveston
Defendants”) (Dkt. 68); 	(4) Kandis 	Beavers’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	(Dkt. 69);
(5) Reardon’s 	motion 	for 	a 	temporary 	restraining 	order 	(“TRO”) (Dkt. 84);
(6) Reardon’s motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint (Dkt. 85); and
(7) Reardon’s motion to expedite consideration of his motion for a TRO (Dkt. 86).
Based on my review of the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, I deny
Reardon’s 	motion 	to 	strike 	and 	for 	sanctions, 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	file 	a
supplemental complaint, and motion to expedite. I recommend that: (1) Busby’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted; (2) the Galveston
Defendants’ and Beavers’s motions to dismiss be granted; (3) the court sua sponte
dismiss Defendants Hoby James, Galveston County, and John Doe Officers 1–5 for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted; and (4) Reardon’s request
for a TRO be denied.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 14, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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BACKGROUND
The live pleading in this case is Reardon’s second amended complaint. See
Dkt. 58. For purposes of the pending motions to dismiss, I accept Reardon’s well-
pleaded factual allegations as true. I also consider the five video recordings, a blood
warrant and affidavit, and a drug toxicology report that the Galveston Defendants
attach to their motion to dismiss. 1
Reardon describes himself as a First Amendment auditor and citizen
journalist 	who 	records 	public 	meetings, 	files 	public-records 	requests, 	and
publishes his findings. On February 21, 2021, Beavers, then a Lafayette County,
Mississippi Sheriff’s Department deputy, stopped Reardon for an allegedly expired
tag and improper equipment. See id. at 13. Beavers stated that she “detected the
scent of marijuana emanating from [Reardon]’s vehicle” and “initiated a DUI
investigation.” Dkt. 58 at 13–14.
On November 24, 2021, Plaintiff was found guilty in Lafayette County
Justice Court of DUI and related misdemeanor charges. On December 2, 2021, the
justice court permitted Reardon’s counsel, Mitchell Driskell, to withdraw. The
Mississippi Court of Appeals recounts the following chain of events:
On December 3, 2021, Reardon, appearing pro se, filed in
justice court, as well as circuit court, a document entitled “Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment under M.R.C.P. 59(e) or in the Alternative
to Vacate Judgment Entered Pursuant to M.R.C.P. 60(b)(l, 2, 3, 4, 6).”
At the end of the twelve-page document, Reardon stated: “In the
interest of Judicial Economy, please take Judicial Notice of this
Motion to serve as Defendant’s Notice of Intent to Appeal the
Judgment/Order.”
On December 8, 2021, the justice court denied Reardon’s
motion. . . . The justice court made no mention of Reardon’s notice of
intent to appeal or that it should be filed in circuit court rather than
in justice court. On December 27, 2021, Reardon, appearing pro se,
filed 	in 	justice 	court 	a 	document 	entitled 	“Formal 	Notice 	of
1 Because these documents are referred to in Reardon’s complaint and central to his
claims, I may consider them without converting the pending motions to dismiss into
motions for summary judgment. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d
496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Defendant’s Intent to Appeal De Novo” in which he requested an
appeal and reconsideration and dismissal of his charges. Reardon
explained in a later motion that “in an effort to play things safe,” he
also tried to file a copy of this same notice in the circuit court, but a
clerk told him that his indigent status “was being revoked for other
matters” and that it would cost him approximately $150 to file his
notice. Reardon also stated that his notice of appeal was refused by
the circuit clerk’s office on December 27, 2021. Reardon did not file
the notice of appeal in circuit court at that time.
In 2022, Reardon began filing documents related to his appeal
in circuit court. On January 7, 2022, Reardon filed an affidavit of
poverty and a motion to hear his December 3, 2021 motion, which he
claimed had remained “unanswered.” He also filed a petition to
appoint counsel.
In April 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on Reardon’s
pending motions. Reardon mentioned several times that he attempted
to file his notice of appeal in circuit court as well as justice court “so
that all bases were covered,” but he testified a court clerk told him that
nothing else could be filed in this matter until the other open matters
in his case were heard. Reardon initially appeared pro se, but midway
through the hearing, he requested that his former public defender,
Driskell, who happened to be in the courtroom, be appointed counsel
again in this matter because “[i]t’s been a lot to keep up with.” The
circuit court agreed, finding statutory law required the court to
appoint Reardon counsel. Regarding Reardon’s appeal, the parties
and circuit court acknowledged that the justice court had never ruled
on Reardon’s December 27, 2021 motion to reconsider; therefore,
there was no final judgment from which to appeal. The parties agreed,
however, that Reardon would withdraw that motion from justice court
so he could proceed in circuit court. The circuit court found Reardon’s
December 3 motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied by the
justice court and was not properly before the court. At the hearing, the
circuit court declined to rule on whether Reardon had properly
perfected an appeal but did not overrule the justice court’s decision
finding Reardon indigent.
Dkt. 58-4 at 3–6.
On April 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a federal civil rights action in the Northern
District of Mississippi. See Reardon v. Mississippi, No. 3:22-cv-050 (N.D. Miss.).
“On April 18, 2022, Driskell, on behalf of Reardon, filed a corrected notice
of appeal and demand for a jury trial . . . , noting that the justice court found
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Reardon could proceed in forma pauperis; thus, no cost or appearance bonds were
required.” Dkt. 58-4 at 6 (cleaned up).
On May 20, 2022, the Lafayette County Attorney, Bela Chain, “filed a
response arguing that both requests were untimely and unperfected.” Id. “For the
next two years, the circuit court docket shows that no action was taken on
[Reardon’s] appeal.” Id.
On June 28, 2022, Reardon was arrested on an aggravated stalking charge
as he entered the Lafayette County Chancery Court for a scheduled child-custody
hearing. See Dkt. 58 at 16. On September 30, 2022, Reardon pleaded guilty to
aggravated stalking. See id. at 17. “As a condition of that plea, [Reardon] received
five years suspended on unsupervised probation and was banished from Lafayette
County, Mississippi for five years, with forty-five days to vacate the county.” Id. at
18. Thus, Reardon had until Monday, November 14, 2022, to leave Lafayette
County.
At a November 3, 2022 revocation hearing, Reardon “was found to have
violated his banishment conditions and sentenced to one year in Mississippi state
prison.” Id. at 21. Reardon alleges that his suspended sentence was revoked due
entirely to false testimony by Beavers. 2 See id.
On June 28, 2023, Reardon’s civil rights action in the Northern District of
Mississippi was dismissed and the case was closed. See Reardon v. Lafayette
County, No. 3:22-cv-50, 2023 WL 4241668, at *14 (N.D. Miss. June 28, 2023).
Reardon was released from prison on August 1, 2023. See Dkt. 58 at 22.
Upon his release, he published a video concerning Beavers’s allegedly false
November 2022 testimony. See id. “Approximately 40,000 members of the public
viewed the publication within one week.” Id.
2 Taking Reardon’s allegations as true, it is unclear to me how Reardon’s sentence could
have been revoked on November 3, 2022, for violating a banishment condition that did
not take effect until November 14, 2022.
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On August 10, 2023, Reardon left Mississippi for Galveston, Texas. See id.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on August 11, 2023, Reardon was stopped in Texas by
Defendant William Osteen, a Galveston Police Department officer, and arrested
for driving while intoxicated after refusing a field sobriety test. See Dkt. 68-6 at 3.
Reardon alleges that his “[f]riends and associates were physically present”
when he was arrested and were “willing to take immediate custody of [his] vehicle.”
Dkt. 58 at 29. Reardon claims that he “explicitly communicated this desire,” but
that the officers on scene “caused the vehicle to be towed.” Id.
At 2:41 a.m. on August 11, 2023, while Reardon was in police custody,
Defendant 	Hoby 	James, 	a 	former 	Lafayette 	County 	Sheriff’s 	deputy, 	called
Galveston Police Department dispatch and asked to speak with “the officer that
arrested [Reardon].” Id. at 23. Reardon alleges that James told Galveston police
that Reardon had a final DUI conviction in Mississippi. See id. At 2:49 a.m., Osteen
obtained a search warrant for Reardon’s blood, which Osteen repeatedly refers to
as a “blood warrant.” See Dkt. 68-6. In an affidavit submitted with his application
for the blood warrant, Osteen detailed why he believed there was probable cause:
On Friday August 11th, 2023, at approximately 0152hours,
[Osteen] was called by Officer L. Murph to make his traffic stop
location in the 4300 block of Ave J. Upon making location, Officer
Murph advised [Osteen] that he observed a black 2013 Chevrolet
Equinox bearing MSLP: LXE1450 traveling eastbound in the 4700
block of Ave J at approximately 47 mph in a 35-mph speed zone.
Officer Murph advised [Osteen] that he observed the Equinox Fail to
Maintain a Single Marked Lane multiple times. Officer Murph advised
[Osteen] that he observed the Equinox Fail to signal when conducting
a Lane Change. Officer Murph advised [Osteen] that he observed the
Equinox to have his license plate obstructed. Officer Murph advised
[Osteen] that he conducted a traffic stop in the 4300 block of Ave J.
Upon making contact with [Reardon], . . . [Osteen] smelled an
odor of an unknown alcoholic beverage emitting from the vehicle.
[Osteen] observed [Reardon] to have watery, glossy eyes. [Osteen]
. . . asked [Reardon] if he had anything to drink tonight to which he
advised that he hasn’t had a drink in 3 years. [Osteen] asked
[Reardon] to step out of the vehicle. [Osteen] asked [Reardon] if he
would consent to Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST’s) to which
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he 	refused 	consent. 	Based 	on 	the 	above 	facts, 	[Osteen] 	placed
[Reardon] under arrest for Driving While Intoxicated. [Osteen] read
[Reardon] a copy of the DIC24 Statutory Warning using the LEADRS
recording and requested a specimen of his blood to which he refused.
Id. at 2. At 4:04 a.m. on August 11, 2023, Beavers also called the Galveston Police
Department to report that Reardon had a final DUI conviction in Mississippi. See
Dkt. 58 at 24.
“On September 6, 2023, . . . the Texas Department of Public Safety Houston
Crime Laboratory completed [part of] its analysis of [Reardon]’s blood” and
reported “no alcohol detected.” Id. at 26; see also Dkt. 59 at 1. This laboratory
report was transmitted to Osteen. See Dkt. 59 at 1. The report shows that Reardon’s
blood was “forwarded to the DPS Austin Crime Laboratory” for further drug
analysis. Id.
“On December 7, 2023, the Galveston grand jury indicted Plaintiff for
Driving While Intoxicated Third or More Offenses—a felony.” Dkt. 58 at 26.
Reardon alleges that the laboratory report showing no alcohol in his blood was
withheld from the grand jury. See id. Reardon remained in pretrial detention in
Texas for approximately 11 months. See id. at 27. During this time, Reardon’s
vehicle, which had been impounded during his arrest, was sold at public auction.
See id. at 29–30.
On February 1, 2024, the Texas Department of Public Safety completed the
remaining analysis of Reardon’s blood. See Dkt. 68-7. According to that report,
there was .13 milligrams per liter of methamphetamine in Reardon’s blood when
it was drawn on August 11, 2023. See id. at 3.
On March 25, 2024, Busby, the Lafayette County Circuit Clerk, created the
following letter:
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Dkt. 58-2 at 1. That same day, Steven Jubera, then an Assistant District Attorney
for Lafayette County, emailed Busby’s letter and several other documents related
to Reardon’s criminal prosecutions in Lafayette County to Galveston County
Assistant District Attorney Nasharria Serinash. See Dkt. 73-1 at 2. In his email,
Jubera explained:
Mr Reardon filed a motion on our civil docket that is attached, pro se,
which seems to be something like an appeal. When a lower court
convicts a defendant has an absolute right to appeal. That appeal is
filed on the criminal docket, not the civil one.
That is not a proper appeal from any judgement in lower court in
particular the DUI in question. I have a letter from our clerk attached
stating that there has not been a properly filed appeal from any
conviction pending in the circuit court.
Id. Jubera attached Chain’s May 20, 2022 response to his email. See id. at 16–17.
Jubera did not attach or mention, however, Driskell’s April 18, 2022 corrected
notice of appeal.
On May 24, 2024, the State of Texas dismissed Reardon’s felony DWI charge
and recharged the offense as a misdemeanor DWI. See Dkt. 58 at 30. Before a trial
could be held on the misdemeanor charge, however, Reardon was extradited to
Mississippi for probation-revocation proceedings. See id. at 30–31.
On July 18, 2024, Reardon appeared in Lafayette County Circuit Court
before Judge Grady Tollison for a revocation hearing. During the hearing, a district
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attorney’s office investigator for Lafayette County testified that the Texas felony
DWI charge had been dismissed, and the dismissal order was admitted into
evidence. See Dkt. 58-7 at 16. Osteen then testified remotely by Zoom from Texas.
The hearing transcript shows that Osteen testified that “[t]here was alcohol
detected” in Reardon’s blood. Id. at 27. Osteen also testified that “besides alcohol
[there] was methamphetamine and the results were .13 milligrams per liter.” Id.
Ultimately, 	Judge 	Tollison 	found 	Reardon 	to 	have 	violated 	the 	terms 	and
conditions of his unsupervised probation “[b]ased on the testimony presented to
the 	Court 	and 	the 	evidence 	particularly 	Exhibit 	3 	showing 	.13 	level
methamphetamine in [his] system and being charged with a felony DUI.” Id. at 43.
Judge Tollison did not mention alcohol when stating his findings. Judge Tollison
sentenced 	Reardon 	to 	two 	years 	in 	prison 	and 	two 	years 	of 	post-release
supervision. See id. at 44.
On November 26, 2024, the MacArthur Justice Center filed a petition for
post-conviction relief on Reardon’s behalf in the Lafayette County Circuit Court,
asserting that a Texas misdemeanor DWI would be, at most, a technical violation
of probation and that the maximum term of imprisonment for a second technical
violation was only 120 days, not two years. See Dkt. 58 at 33–34; see also Miss.
Code Ann. § 47-7-37 (“If the court revokes probation for one or more technical
violations, the court shall impose a period of imprisonment to be served in either
a technical violation center or a restitution center not to exceed . . . one hundred
twenty (120) days for the second revocation.”).
On January 21, 2025, the Lafayette County Circuit Court granted Reardon’s
petition for post-conviction relief, vacated his two-year sentence, re-sentenced him
to 120 days with credit for time served, ordered his immediate release, and
reinstated unsupervised probation. See Dkt. 58 at 34.
On June 30, 2025, Reardon instituted this lawsuit against Osteen, Doraty,
James, Beavers, Busby, the City of Galveston, and John Doe officers. Reardon also
named as defendants UTMB and Jacob McDougle—the UTMB nurse who drew
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Reardon’s blood on August 11, 2023. Reardon asserts claims under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 	and 	1985 	(against 	all 	defendants), 	Title 	II 	of 	the 	Americans 	with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (against UTMB), and Texas common law (against all
defendants except UTMB). UTMB, the Galveston Defendants, and Busby appeared
and filed motions to dismiss. See Dkts. 26, 40, 46.
“In late 2025, . . . the Galveston County District Attorney moved to dismiss
Reardon’s remaining misdemeanor DWI charge.” Dkt. 58 at 35.
On February 24, 2026, the Mississippi Court of Appeals held that Reardon
“was 	improperly 	denied 	continuous 	representation 	of 	counsel,
. . . which . . . resulted in the dismissal of his appeal” of his November 2021 DUI
conviction. Dkt. 58-4 at 12. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s
dismissal of Reardon’s misdemeanor appeal and remanded his case to the circuit
court for proceedings consistent with the court of appeals’ decision. See id.
On March 23, 2026, Reardon filed an emergency motion seeking electronic
filing access, an extension of time to respond to all pending motions to dismiss, for
leave to file an amended complaint, to strike or deny as untimely Busby’s motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and to extend time for service on James,
Beavers, and McDougle. See Dkt. 52.
On March 30, 2026, this case was referred to me for all pretrial purposes.
See Dkt. 55.
On April 1, 2026, I denied Reardon’s request for electronic filing; granted
him leave to file an amended complaint; gave him until April 30, 2026, to serve
James, Beavers, and McDougle; and denied all pending motions to dismiss and
other requested relief as moot. See Dkt. 56 at 3.
On April 23, 2026, Reardon filed his Second Amended Complaint. See
Dkt. 58. On May 13, 2026, Busby renewed his motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. See Dkt. 65. On May 14, 2026, UTMB and the Galveston
Defendants renewed their motions to dismiss, respectively. See Dkts. 67, 68.
Beavers also filed a motion to dismiss on May 14, 2026. See Dkt. 69.
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On June 3, 2026, Reardon voluntarily dismissed all his claims against
McDougle and UTMB. See Dkt. 75. The dismissal of Reardon’s claims against
McDougle and UTMB means that there are no longer any Title II claims at issue in
this case.
On June 26, 2026, Reardon filed an emergency motion in this case for a TRO
seeking, among other things, an injunction against non-party Marty’s City Auto
from auctioning, selling, or destroying Reardon’s vehicle. See Dkt. 84-1 at 1. That
same day, Reardon also filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint,
see Dkt. 85, and a motion to expedite hearing and shorten Defendants’ response
time to Reardon’s emergency motion for a TRO. See Dkt. 86.
I turn my attention first to the motions to dismiss.
BUSBY’S RULE 12(b)(2) MOTION TO DISMISS
Rule 12(b)(2) allows a party to challenge the district court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The United States Supreme
Court has recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction 3 and
specific jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255,
262 (2017). Only specific jurisdiction is at issue in this case. Specific jurisdiction
demands a connection between the incident in question and the forum state. See
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014). This inquiry is fact intensive, and
its “touchstone is whether the defendant’s conduct shows that it reasonably
anticipates being haled into” a Texas court. McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759
(5th 	Cir. 	2009) 	(quotation 	omitted). 	Defendants 	“will 	not 	be 	haled 	into 	a
jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, or
of the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person.’” Electrosource, Inc. v.
Horizon Battery Techs., Ltd., 176 F.3d 867, 871–72 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
3 “Because [ABFM] is neither incorporated in Texas nor has its principal place of business
there, there is no general jurisdiction over [ABFM] in Texas.” Ethridge v. Samsung SDI
Co., 137 F.4th 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2025).
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“The reach of [personal] jurisdiction is delimited by: (1) the state’s long-arm
statute; and (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution.” Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 646–47 (5th Cir. 1994).
“Because the Texas long-arm statute extends to the limits of federal due process,
the two-step inquiry reduces to only the federal due process analysis.” Halliburton
Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., 921 F.3d 522, 539 (5th Cir.
2019). Three conditions must be met to establish specific personal jurisdiction over
Busby: (1) Busby must have “purposefully availed [himself] of the privilege of
conducting activities in [Texas]”; (2) Reardon’s claims must arise out of or relate
to Busby’s purposeful contacts with Texas; and (3) “the exercise of personal
jurisdiction must be fair and reasonable.” Ethridge, 137 F.4th at 314.
Reardon bears the burden on the first two conditions. See Herman v.
Cataphora, Inc., 730 F.3d 460, 464 (5th Cir. 2013). “To determine whether the
plaintiff has met this burden, the court can consider the assertions in the plaintiff’s
complaint, as well as the contents of the record at the time of the motion.” Frank
v. P N K (Lake Charles) L.L.C., 947 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). “Where, as here, the court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, that burden requires
only that [Reardon] make a prima facie showing.” Herman, 730 F.3d at 464. In
determining whether Busby has sufficient minimum contacts with Texas, I
“construe all disputed facts in [Reardon’s] favor and consider them along with the
undisputed facts.” Walk Haydel & Assocs. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d
235, 241 (5th Cir. 2008).
Busby attached to his motion an affidavit stating that he never “personally
responded to a request from the Galveston County District Attorney’s Office for a
status update on Matthew Reardon’s Mississippi DUI conviction in the Lafayette
Circuit Court.” Dkt. 65-1 at 1. Busby also attached an affidavit from Lafayette
County Assistant District Attorney, Steven Jubera. See Dkt 73-2. Jubera’s affidavit
conclusively establishes that Busby himself sent nothing to Texas. Rather, Jubera
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requested that Busby prepare a statement regarding Reardon’s prior convictions
and the status of any appeals. See id. at 1. Busby, however, did not send that
statement to anyone in Texas—he sent it to Jubera. It was Jubera who sent Busby’s
March 25, 2024 letter to ADA Serinash in Texas. See id. Reardon does not allege
that Busby has any other contacts with Texas beyond the March 25, 2024 letter.
Because the record shows that Busby, a Mississippi citizen, did not send his March
25, 2024 letter to Texas, Busby has no contacts with Texas that would confer
specific personal jurisdiction on him. Accordingly, Busby’s motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction should be granted.
RULE 12(b)(6) MOTIONS TO DISMISS
A. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails “to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Conversely, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point
of 	minimum 	expenditure 	of 	time 	and 	money 	by 	the 	parties 	and 	the
court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (cleaned up).
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as
true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). 	I 	“do 	not, 	however, 	accept 	as 	true 	legal 	conclusions, 	conclusory
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statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield
v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Fifth Circuit “hold[s] pro se plaintiffs to a
more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing complaints, but pro se
plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the
speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir.
2016); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
B. 	A NALYSIS
Because this is federal court, I will evaluate Reardon’s federal claims before
determining whether this court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his
state law claims.
Reardon 	asserts 	numerous 	constitutional 	claims 	against 	Defendants
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 provides a remedy against any person
who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the
Constitution.” 	Collins 	v. 	City 	of 	Harker 	Heights, 	503 	U.S. 	115, 	120
(1992) (quotation omitted). “To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
(1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir.
2013) (quotations omitted). It is undisputed that Osteen, Doraty, James, Beavers,
and Busby (the “Individual Defendants”) were all acting under color of state law at
the time of their actions that Reardon says give rise to his claims. Thus, concerning
Reardon’s § 1983 claims, the only question is whether Reardon has plausibly stated
that each of these defendants violated one of his constitutional rights.
1. 	Due 	Process—Malicious 	Prosecution, 	Suppression 	of
Evidence, Fabrication of Evidence, Presentation of False
Testimony
Reardon alleges that, in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to due process, the Individual Defendants “acted individually and in concert
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under color of state law to initiate and continue felony criminal proceedings
against [him] without probable cause, culminating in the December 7, 2023 grand
jury indictment for Driving While Intoxicated Third or More Offenses.” Dkt. 58 at
39. Reardon alleges that Osteen and Doraty further violated his due process rights
when they “initiated and maintained a recharged misdemeanor prosecution
against [Reardon] without probable cause.” Id. at 41. Reardon also alleges that
Osteen further violated his due process rights by the “deliberate withholding of
material exculpatory evidence and the affirmative presentation of false testimony
to the grand jury and to the Mississippi revocation court.” Id. at 44. Although
Reardon styles each of these allegations differently, they are all, essentially,
constitutional malicious prosecution claims.
To state a constitutional malicious prosecution claim, Reardon must allege:
(1) the 	commencement 	or 	continuance 	of 	an 	original 	criminal
proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant against
plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona
fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of
probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and (6) damages.
Espinal v. City of Houston, 96 F.4th 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2024).
a. 	James and Beavers
Reardon 	believes 	that 	James 	and 	Beavers 	wronged 	him 	by 	falsely
representing to Texas authorities that he had a final DUI conviction in Mississippi.
Even if I assume that all other elements of a malicious prosecution claim are met,
Reardon’s malicious prosecution claims against James and Beavers fail because
Reardon has not pleaded legal causation (element two) or the absence of probable
cause (element four).
“In general, if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent
intermediary such as a . . . grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain
of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.” Loftin v. City of
Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 782 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). Reardon admits
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that a Galveston grand jury indicted him. Thus, the grand jury is an independent
intermediary that breaks the chain of legal causation.
Reardon contends that the independent-intermediary doctrine does not
apply because the Mississippi Court of Appeals’ February 24, 2026 opinion
demonstrates that the appeal of his Mississippi DUI conviction was not final and
therefore he should not have been charged with a felony DWI in Texas. 4 This
argument misses the mark. Lafayette County’s position for over a year before
Reardon was arrested in Galveston was that Reardon’s appeal was “untimely and
unperfected.” Dkt. 58-4 at 6. Thus, James and Beavers—and, in turn, the Galveston
grand jury—all had probable cause to believe that Reardon’s nearly two-year-old
(as of the date of his Galveston arrest) Mississippi DUI conviction was final.
Presenting a plausible version of disputed facts to the independent intermediary
does not taint the resulting indictment. See Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 992 (5th
Cir. 2022) (“And an affiant’s presentation of one plausible version of disputed facts
to the magistrate judge does not taint the resulting warrant.” (cleaned up)). The
whole purpose of the Mississippi Court of Appeals’ opinion was to settle the
question of whether Reardon’s Mississippi DUI conviction appeal was “untimely
4 I have already established that this court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction
over Busby. But I want to note that, even if this court could exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over Busby, Reardon would still fail to state a claim against Busby. Reardon
contends that “the independent intermediary doctrine does not break causation” because
“the Galveston grand jury and Texas prosecutors acted on Busby’s false certification.”
Dkt. 58 at 39–40. Under Reardon’s own factual chronology, this simply cannot be true.
The Galveston grand jury indicted Reardon on December 7, 2023. Busby’s letter was not
written until March 25, 2024—more than three months later. Accordingly, Busby’s letter
cannot have caused the Galveston grand jury to indict Reardon. Nor could Busby’s March
25, 2024 letter have caused the proceedings stemming from that indictment to continue.
Busby’s letter stated that “there has not been a properly filed appeal.” Dkt. 58-2 at 1
(emphasis added). That statement was consistent with Lafayette County’s position, which
since May 20, 2022, had been that Reardon’s “requests [to appeal] were untimely and
unperfected.” Dkt. 58-4 at 6. A mere two months after Busby’s letter, “[o]n May 24, 2024,
the State of Texas dismissed the felony DWI charge in its entirety, stating explicitly it
‘cannot prove up jurisdictional enhancements.’” Dkt. 58 at 30 (emphasis added). Thus,
none of Busby’s actions legally caused the commencement or continuation of Galveston’s
criminal proceedings against Reardon for felony DWI.
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and not perfected.” Dkt. 58-4 at 1. Yes, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed
the dismissal of Reardon’s appeal. But until that opinion was issued, Reardon’s
conviction and Lafayette County’s position regarding what it believed to be an
untimely and unperfected appeal constituted probable cause to believe that there
were predicate offenses with which to enhance Reardon’s DWI charge.
Regarding charging a defendant with an enhanced offense, like DWI (Third
Offense), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has said: “It [is] sufficient to charge
that he had been convicted of an offense of like character prior to the commission
of the primary offense charged. A conviction means a final conviction. If the
conviction was not final, it could be shown as a matter of defense.” Broughton v.
State, 188 S.W.2d 393, 395 (1945) (emphasis added). In other words, the court
contemplated that a defendant may be indicted on an enhanced offense based on
a conviction that is later shown not to be final. All that matters at the grand-jury
stage is that Reardon “had been convicted of an offense of like character prior to
the commission of the primary offense charged.” Id. It is undisputed that Reardon
had been convicted of two DUIs prior to being arrested for DWI in Galveston. That
constitutes probable cause.
Because Reardon cannot show legal causation or a lack of probable cause,
his malicious prosecution claims against James, Beavers, and Busby must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
b. 	Doraty
Reardon does not allege any specific conduct by Doraty. Reardon’s only
allegations against Doraty are that he: “participated in and supervised the August
11, 	2023 	arrest 	and 	warrant 	application 	process, 	and 	bears 	supervisory
responsibility 	for 	the 	constitutional 	violations 	alleged”; 	“caused 	[Reardon’s]
vehicle to be towed from what [Reardon] asserts was private property over his
explicit objection and notwithstanding the presence of willing private custodians”;
“initiate[d] 	and 	continue[d] 	felony 	criminal 	proceedings 	against 	[Reardon]
without probable cause”; “initiated and maintained a recharged misdemeanor
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DWI prosecution against [Reardon] without probable cause”; and participated in
a conspiracy to deprive Reardon of his constitutional rights. Dkt. 58 at 8, 29, 39,
41. I will discuss Reardon’s vehicle being towed and sold below in the section
concerning First Amendment retaliation. As to malicious prosecution, however,
none of these conclusory allegations put Doraty on notice of what he did, and none
of them allege conduct that would give rise to a plausible malicious prosecution
claim. Accordingly, Reardon’s malicious prosecution claims against Doraty must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
c. 	Osteen
Reardon alleges that Osteen “manufactured probable cause by testifying
falsely before the Galveston grand jury that [Reardon]’s blood tests were positive
for alcohol, despite having received the zero blood-alcohol toxicology report from
the Texas Department of Public Safety on September 6, 2023.” Dkt. 58 at 40.
To the extent that Reardon bases his malicious prosecution claim on
anything that Osteen said to the Galveston grand jury, that claim must fail. The
United States Supreme Court has held:
a grand jury witness has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim
based on the witness’ testimony. In addition, . . . this rule may not be
circumvented by claiming that a grand jury witness conspired to
present false testimony or by using evidence of the witness’ testimony
to support any other § 1983 claim concerning the initiation or
maintenance of a prosecution.
Rehberg 	v. 	Paulk, 	566 	U.S. 	356, 	369 	(2012). 	Thus, 	Reardon’s 	malicious
prosecution claim can be based only on Osteen’s false statements in documents
that were presented to the Galveston grand jury, like his blood warrant affidavit. It
cannot be based on Osteen’s testimony before the grand jury.
The false statements at issue concern whether Reardon’s pupils were dilated
or pinpoint when Osteen arrested Reardon, and whether Osteen smelled alcohol
coming from Reardon’s breath or only from his car. On the blood warrant affidavit,
Osteen checked the box for “Dilated” to describe Reardon’s eyes. See Dkt. 68-6 at
3. Osteen also checked the box for “Moderate” to indicate the odor of alcohol on
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Reardon’s breath. See id. Before Judge Tollison, however, Osteen testified that he
“could not smell alcohol on [Reardon]’s breath and described [Reardon]’s pupils
as ‘pinpoint’ rather than dilated.” Dkt. 58-7 at 24. These statements are admittedly
inconsistent. 5 I will assume, for the sake of argument, that these inconsistent
statements rise to the level of deliberate falsehoods.
As to the first element of a malicious prosecution claim, Reardon has alleged
that the Galveston grand jury continued the criminal proceeding against him by
indicting him on a felony DWI charge. Taking Reardon’s allegations as true, it is
plausible that Osteen legally caused—through his false statements in his blood
warrant affidavit—the Galveston grand jury to indict Reardon on a felony DWI,
which would satisfy the second element. Reardon’s felony DWI charge was
dismissed on May 24, 2024, which is “bona fide termination” in Reardon’s favor—
satisfying the third element. Espinal, 96 F.4th at 748. Unfortunately, Reardon’s
malicious prosecution claim against Osteen fails on the fourth and fifth elements:
the absence of probable cause for the Galveston grand jury proceeding and malice,
respectively.
I hate to use a double negative, but Reardon fails to allege the absence of
probable cause for his DWI arrest. Reardon alleges that “[p]robable cause for the
felony enhancement never existed,” Dkt. 58 at 39, but he never alleges that
probable cause for a DWI never existed. As established above, Reardon’s previous
convictions and debates about whether he had timely perfected an appeal meant
that probable cause existed for the felony enhancement. Probable cause also
existed for the DWI arrest itself, and Reardon never alleges otherwise—in more
than a conclusory fashion. The blood warrant affidavit shows that Osteen also
found probable cause because Reardon failed to maintain a single marked lane,
5 The boxes that Osteen checked on the blood warrant affidavit are not a model of clarity.
For example, Osteen checked boxes indicating that Reardon was both cooperative and
uncooperative, in addition to indifferent. See Dkt. 68-6 at 3. Osteen’s written statements
and oral testimony—as opposed to his checkmarks about his observations—have never
been inconsistent.
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failed to signal when conducting a lane change, and refused a field sobriety test. 6
“A person’s refusal to participate in field sobriety testing is a factor that may be
considered 	in 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances 	when 	determining 	whether
probable cause exists.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Castro, 406 S.W.3d 782, 788
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.).
The video footage of Reardon’s arrest shows him refusing a field sobriety test
but enthusiastically offering to submit to a breathalyzer, which can only detect the
presence of alcohol. 7 See Dkt. 68 at 4. As Osteen has explained, Reardon’s
insistence on taking a breathalyzer made Osteen suspicious that Reardon was
under the influence of something other than alcohol. See Dkt. 58-7 at 24. “Probable
cause is a state of mind in which the facts are regarded from the point of view of
the prosecuting party. The question is not what the actual facts were, but what the
prosecuting party honestly believed them to be.” Zess v. Funke, 956 S.W.2d 92, 94
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (cleaned up). Reardon’s failure to adhere
to traffic rules, his refusal to take a field sobriety test, and his insistence on taking
a test that only detects alcohol are facts that, in totality, amount to probable cause.
Because probable cause existed for the Galveston grand jury proceeding, Reardon
cannot state a malicious prosecution claim against Osteen.
The presence of probable cause means that Reardon also cannot plausibly
suggest malice. “Malice” is “often defined in this context as without probable cause
and for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice.” Armstrong, 60
F.4th at 278. Even if I assume that Osteen acted for a purpose other than bringing
Reardon to justice, the fact that Osteen had probable cause for Reardon’s DWI
arrest makes it impossible for Osteen to have acted with malice.
6 Reardon references this affidavit in his complaint, and it is central to his claims. See
Dkt. 58 at 7, 24, 26, 32, 35, 42, 48, 50. Accordingly, I may consider this affidavit without
converting Galveston Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. See Collins, 224 F.3d at 498.
7 Reardon references these videos in his complaint, and they are central to his claims. See
Dkt. 58 at 23, 30. Accordingly, I may consider the footage from Osteen’s body camera.
See supra.
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I take no pleasure in this result. The record shows that Osteen lied to Judge
Tollison. That is disturbing. But the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are
clear, and Reardon’s claim fails as to the fourth and fifth elements.
2. 	Unlawful Search
Reardon claims that his right against unreasonable search was violated
because “[t]he blood draw warrant was procured through Osteen’s materially false
statements regarding prior final convictions and fabricated contemporaneous
intoxication 	observations 	that 	his 	own 	subsequent 	testimony 	directly
contradicted.” Dkt. 58 at 43. Again, the false statements at issue concern whether
Reardon’s pupils were dilated or pinpoint, and whether Osteen smelled alcohol
coming from Reardon’s breath or only from his car. I assume, for the sake of
argument, that these inconsistent statements rise to the level of deliberate
falsehoods. Reardon argues that the blood warrant is “void” pursuant to Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), because it was based on a “deliberate material
falsehood.” Dkt. 58 at 43. This misstates Franks’s holding.
To start, Franks merely entitles a warrant’s challenger to an evidentiary
hearing. Franks does not mandate the automatic disregard of a warrant and its
fruits simply because the challenger makes a preliminary showing of a deliberate
falsehood. Second, under Franks, “if, when material that is the subject of the
alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient
content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing
is required.” 438 U.S. at 171–72. In this case, Reardon’s unlawful search claim fails
for the same reason as Reardon’s malicious prosecution claim: for the reasons
discussed in the preceding section, there was probable cause for Reardon’s DWI
arrest even without Osteen’s false statements.
Osteen has testified consistently that Reardon was stopped because Reardon
failed to maintain a single marked lane, that Osteen smelled the odor of alcohol
from the vehicle that Reardon was driving, that Reardon’s eyes were watery, that
Reardon refused a field sobriety test, and that Osteen suspected Reardon to be
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under the influence of something other than alcohol. Compare Dkt. 58-7 at 22–24,
with Dkt. 68-6 at 2–3. Setting Osteen’s false statements aside, there is still more
than enough probable cause for the blood warrant that was issued. Wood v. Bexar
County, 147 F.4th 534, 548 (5th Cir. 2025) (“We have also determined—without
considering [the false statements]—that Deputy Gereb had probable cause to
arrest 	Wood 	for 	driving 	while 	intoxicated. 	. . . So 	even 	if 	those 	were 	false
statements, they were not necessary to the finding of probable cause.”). Thus,
Reardon cannot state an unlawful search claim based on the blood warrant.
3. 	Unlawful Seizure
Reardon contends that “[t]he impoundment of [his] vehicle from private
property, over his explicit objection, despite the presence of willing private
custodians who would have eliminated any community caretaking rationale,
constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Dkt. 58 at 54.
“Impounding a vehicle qualifies as a seizure subject to a Fourth Amendment
analysis.” Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2024). Galveston
Defendants respond that Reardon cannot state a constitutional violation for
unreasonable seizure due to the community caretaking exception, but even if he
could, Osteen and Doraty are entitled to qualified immunity, and Reardon cannot
make out a claim for municipal liability against the City.
a. 	Reardon states a claim for unreasonable seizure
To 	support 	their 	contention 	that 	impounding 	Reardon’s 	vehicle 	was
reasonable, 	Galveston 	Defendants 	cite the 	seminal 	Supreme 	Court 	decision
regarding 	the 	community 	caretaking 	exception 	to 	warrantless 	searches 	and
seizures: South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). “In Opperman, the
Court noted that impoundments by the police may be in furtherance of ‘public
safety’ 	or 	‘community 	caretaking 	functions,’ 	such 	as 	removing 	‘disabled 	or
damaged vehicles,’ and ‘automobiles which violate parking ordinances, and which
thereby jeopardize both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular
traffic.’” United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting
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428 U.S. at 368–369). “The Court further noted that the ‘authority of police to seize
and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety
and convenience is beyond challenge.’” McKinnon, 681 F.3d at 208 (quoting
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369). But nothing in this case suggests that Reardon’s
vehicle was disabled, damaged, violating parking ordinances, impeding traffic, or
threatening public safety. Without some explanation, it is unclear to me why the
community caretaking exception would apply.
Galveston Defendants also assert that Reardon “had no driver’s license, the
vehicle did not have valid registration plates, and [Reardon] had driven the vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating substances.” Dkt. 68 at 28–29. Only one
of these statements, all of which are unsupported by the pleadings and exhibits, is
even relevant to whether the impoundment of Reardon’s vehicle was reasonable.
Whether Reardon had a driver’s license and whether Reardon had driven under
the influence have nothing to do with whether the other private citizens present
during Reardon’s arrest could have lawfully taken possession of the vehicle, as
Reardon requested, instead of it being impounded. This much is true: if the vehicle
did not have valid registration plates, then it was indeed reasonable to impound
the vehicle because it “could not lawfully be driven away from the scene.” United
States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir. 2012). But Reardon does not
admit to having an expired registration, and there is no indication from the many
exhibits attached to the pleadings and the motion to dismiss briefing that
Reardon’s registration was expired. Because it was unreasonable to impound
Reardon’s vehicle, Reardon has stated a constitutional claim for unreasonable
seizure. That does not, however, end the inquiry.
b. 	Doraty and Osteen are entitled to qualified immunity
Government officials sued in their individual capacity under § 1983 are
entitled to qualified immunity, which is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). “[T]he qualified-
immunity inquiry has two prongs: (1) whether an official’s conduct violated a
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constitutional 	right 	of 	the 	plaintiff, 	and 	(2) whether 	that 	right 	was 	clearly
established at the time of the violation.” Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 990–
91 (5th Cir. 2011).
At the motion to dismiss stage, “a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified
immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a
qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 416
(5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “Once an official pleads the defense, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact
issue as to whether the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly
established law.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). “Again,
both prongs must be satisfied, and courts may choose which prong to consider
first.” Bernabe v. Rosenbaum, No. 21-10396, 2023 WL 181099, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan.
13, 2023); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (Courts “should
be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs
of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.”).
“The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right
in question was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Tolan v. Cotton,
572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quotation omitted). While Supreme Court precedent
“does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established,
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (cleaned up). Existing
precedent places statutory or constitutional questions beyond debate “only when
[the district court] can ‘identify a case where an [official] acting under similar
circumstances was held to have violated’” a constitutional right. 	Surratt v.
McClarin, 851 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (cleaned up) (citing
Pauly, 580 U.S. at 552). “It is the plaintiff’s burden to find a case in his favor that
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does not define the law at a ‘high level of generality.’” Vann v. City of Southaven,
884 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cass, 814 F.3d at 732–33).
Here, Reardon fails to even address Doraty’s and Osteen’s assertion of
qualified immunity as to the unreasonable seizure claim, 8 much less point the
court to case law suggesting that the right to be free from vehicle impoundment
after arrest when private citizens were available to take possession of the vehicle
was a clearly-established right at the time that Reardon’s vehicle was impounded.
This is fatal to Reardon’s unreasonable seizure claim against Doraty and Osteen.
See Degenhardt, 117 F.4th at 757 (holding that officers were entitled to qualified
immunity, 	despite 	finding 	that 	the 	impoundment 	of 	plaintiffs’ 	vehicle 	was
unreasonable, because plaintiffs “cite only to caselaw standing for the proposition
that an unreasonable seizure is generally unlawful” and “[s]uch precedent is too
general for purposes of qualified immunity”); Chuttoo v. Horton, 627 F. Supp. 3d
655, 676 (E.D. Tex. 2022) (granting judgment on the pleadings where the plaintiff
“identifies no factually analogous precedent of the Supreme Court or the Fifth
Circuit (or any other circuit) clearly establishing that any reasonable officer in
[defendants’] shoes would have known” they were violating a clearly established
right).
c. 	Reardon cannot state a Monell claim against the City
or Galveston County
“In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), the Supreme Court held that Congress intended § 1983 to apply to local
government entities as well as to persons.” Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d
443, 452 (5th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). The Fifth Circuit has explained the contours
of Monell liability:
Under the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court,
municipal 	liability 	under 	section 	1983 	requires 	proof 	of 	three
elements: 	a 	policymaker; 	an 	official 	policy; 	and 	a 	violation 	of
8 Reardon argues that “qualified immunity does not protect officers who fabricate
evidence, commit perjury, and suppress exculpatory statements.” Dkt. 74 at 19 (cleaned
up). But Reardon does not mention his unreasonable seizure claim.
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constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom.
Monell and later decisions reject municipal liability predicated on
respondeat superior, because the text of section 1983 will not bear
such a reading. Consequently, the unconstitutional conduct must be
directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official
action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal
employees will almost never trigger liability. The three attribution
principles identified here—a policymaker, an official policy and the
“moving force” of the policy—are necessary to distinguish individual
violations perpetrated by local government employees from those that
can be fairly identified as actions of the government itself. Mistakes in
analyzing section 1983 municipal liability cases frequently begin with
a failure to separate the three attribution principles and to consider
each in light of relevant case law.
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).
Official policy exists in two forms. “First, a plaintiff may point to a policy
statement formally announced by an official policymaker.” Zarnow v. City of
Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2010). Second, an official policy may
“arise in the form of a widespread practice that is ‘so common and well-settled as
to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.’” Peterson v. City of
Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at
579). “A policy or custom is official only ‘when it results from the decision or
acquiescence of the municipal officer or body with “final policymaking authority”
over the subject matter of the offending policy.’” Peterson, 588 F.3d at 847
(quoting Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). “State law
determines whether a particular individual is a county or municipality final
decision maker with respect to a certain sphere of activity.” Bennett v. Pippin, 74
F.3d 578, 586 (5th Cir. 1996).
Proof of a custom or policy can be shown by “a pattern of unconstitutional
conduct . . . on the part of municipal actors or employees,” or where “a final
policymaker took a single unconstitutional action.” Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169. “A
customary policy consists of actions that have occurred for so long and with such
frequency 	that 	the 	course 	of 	conduct 	demonstrates 	the 	governing 	body’s
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knowledge and acceptance of the disputed conduct.” Id. “Allegations [or proof] of
an isolated incident are not sufficient to show the existence of a custom or policy.”
Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992). To plausibly “plead
a practice so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law,
[Lowry] must do more than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury.”
Ratliff v. Aransas County, 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Reardon does not identify an official policymaker. Nor does he show that the
circumstances under which his vehicle was impounded are part of a widespread
practice so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that represents
municipal policy. Accordingly, Reardon cannot state a municipal liability claim
against the City or Galveston County 9 for unreasonably seizing his vehicle. 10
4. 	Excessive Force
Reardon asserts that being “handcuffed behind his back, held face down on
a hospital bed by approximately six law enforcement officers, [and] subjected to
multiple 	forced 	and 	traumatic 	needle 	insertions 	over 	explicit
objection[]constituted excessive force in the execution of a void warrant.” Dkt. 58
at 43. Reardon claims that this “forced, traumatic blood extraction” caused him
“severe physical injury” and “acute and chronic psychological harm.” Id. at 58–59.
Reardon does not specify the nature of his physical injury or psychological harm.
He alleges injury labels, but pleads no facts describing the physical injury,
treatment, symptoms, duration, or psychological harm sufficient to move the
allegation that he was injured from conclusory to plausible.
“Although [the Fifth Circuit] no longer require[s] significant injury for
excessive force claims, the injury must be more than de minimis.” Tarver v. City
9 It does not appear that Galveston County has ever been served in this case. Even so,
Galveston County should be dismissed for the same reason that all the other defendants
should be dismissed: failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
10 Reardon asserts other municipal liability claims, too, but a municipal liability claim
rests 	upon 	a 	constitutional 	violation. 	See 	Piotrowski, 	237 	F.3d 	at 	578. 	Because
unreasonable seizure is the only constitutional violation that Reardon has alleged, it is the
only constitutional claim for which I must discuss municipal liability.
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of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). “[H]andcuffing too tightly,
without more, does not amount to excessive force.” Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d
307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001). Nor is the mere extraction of blood itself a qualifying
injury. See Wood, 147 F.4th at 550 (finding plaintiff’s allegation that “officers at
the jail ‘resorted to medieval torture’ to extract her blood” to be insufficient to
establish a constitutional violation where the plaintiff “refused to voluntarily
comply with the warrant” and “officers had to restrain her” to draw her blood).
Finally, while “psychological injuries can serve as a basis for § 1983 liability,”
Reardon “does not demonstrate that he suffered psychological injury” from the
handcuffing or the blood draw. Tarver, 410 F.3d at 752. Thus, Reardon’s excessive
force claim should be dismissed.
5. 	First Amendment Retaliation
Reardon 	asserts 	a 	First 	Amendment 	retaliation 	claim 	against 	James,
Beavers, and Osteen in connection with his August 10, 2023 arrest. As to James
and Beavers, he alleges that they “initiated unsolicited interstate telephone contact
with 	Galveston 	authorities 	and 	transmitted 	fabricated 	criminal 	history
information that resulted in [Reardon’s] felony detention.” Dkt. 58 at 45. As to
Osteen, Reardon alleges Osteen arrested Reardon solely because Osteen identified
Reardon as “an auditor.” Id. at 46.
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Reardon must show that
(1) he was “engaged in constitutionally protected activity”; (2) the defendant’s
actions caused him “to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in that activity”; and (3) the defendant’s
“adverse actions were substantially motivated against [Reardon’s] exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct.” Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir.
2002). “[A] ‘plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim’ based on speech protected
by the First Amendment generally ‘must plead and prove the absence of probable
cause for the arrest.’” Grisham v. Valenciano, 93 F.4th 903, 909 (5th Cir.
2024) (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 402 (2019)). As discussed above,
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there was probable cause for Reardon’s arrest, despite his assertions to the
contrary.
There is one exception to the rule that a plaintiff must plead the absence of
probable cause: “[A] plaintiff asserting a retaliatory arrest claim does not have to
establish the absence of probable cause ‘when [the] plaintiff presents objective
evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not
engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.’” Grisham, 93 F.4th at
909 (emphasis added) (quoting Nieves, 587 U.S. at 407). This exception stems
from the principle that “‘where officers have probable cause to make arrests[,]’ they
may not disproportionately or unfairly ‘exercise their discretion not to do so.’”
Grisham, 93 F.4th at 910 (quoting Nieves, 587 U.S. at 406). Because the alleged
retaliatory injury is Reardon’s arrest, which he contends was unsupported by
probable 	cause, 	Nieves/Grisham 	causation 	principles 	apply 	to 	all 	three
defendants, even though James and Beavers did not personally arrest Reardon.
Reardon does not allege facts that plausibly suggest that individuals who
failed to maintain a single marked lane, had glossy and watery eyes, and refused a
field sobriety test would not also have been arrested for DWI, even if they were not
engaged in protected speech. Because Reardon has “failed to plead comparator
evidence,” his First Amendment retaliation claim must be dismissed. Degenhardt,
117 F.4th at 759; see also Frey v. Town of Jackson, 41 F.4th 1223, 1238 (10th Cir.
2022) (“Because Plaintiff failed to allege . . . that Karnes usually does not detain
similarly situated arrestees not engaged in the same speech, Plaintiff failed to state
a valid retaliation claim against Karnes. The district court thus properly dismissed
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.”).
6. 	Denial of Access to Courts
Reardon asserts a claim for denial of access to courts against all named
Defendants:
The [alleged civil rights] conspiracy caused the destruction of three
specific, identified, nonfrivolous legal proceedings: (1) [Reardon’s]
$27.5 million federal civil rights action in the N.D. Miss., destroyed
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when the manufactured prosecution incarcerated and banished him
from the county containing the courthouse, while the defendants who
ordered the prosecution were the same officials against whom the suit
was pending; (2) [Reardon]’s child custody proceeding, permanently
derailed when he was arrested while walking into the courthouse for
that 	hearing; 	and 	(3) [Reardon’s] 	Mississippi 	DUI 	appellate
proceeding, suppressed for years through false certifications about its
status—certifications 	that 	directly 	sustained 	the 	Texas 	felony—
depriving 	[Reardon] 	of 	the 	appellate 	mandate 	that 	would 	have
established from 2022 onward that the enhancement predicate did
not exist.
Dkt. 58 at 55–56. Reardon recognizes that this is a “backward-looking access
claim.” Id. at 55.
A backward-looking denial-of-access claim “covers claims not in aid of a
class of suits yet to be litigated, but of specific cases that cannot now be tried (or
tried with all material evidence), no matter what official action may be in the
future.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413–14 (2002). “The official acts
claimed to have denied access may allegedly have caused the loss or inadequate
settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an opportunity to sue, or the loss of an
opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.” Id. (cleaned up). “The ultimate
object of these sorts of [backward-looking] access claims, then, is not the judgment
in a further lawsuit, but simply the judgment in the access claim itself, in providing
relief obtainable in no other suit in the future.” Id. As the Supreme Court has
explained:
[B]ecause these backward-looking cases are brought to get relief
unobtainable 	in 	other 	suits, 	the 	remedy 	sought 	must 	itself 	be
identified to hedge against the risk that an access claim be tried all the
way through, only to find that the court can award no remedy that the
plaintiff could not have been awarded on a presently existing claim.
Id. at 416.
Here, Reardon does not identify any remedy for his access claim. Although
Reardon seeks damages generally, he does not identify a nonduplicative remedy
unavailable through his other claims, and he does not plausibly explain how this
court 	could 	remedy 	the 	Mississippi 	custody, 	appellate, 	or 	closed 	federal
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proceedings. As to the Mississippi DUI appeal, it is not clear what remedy this
court could offer given that the Mississippi Circuit Court has already reinstated
Reardon’s appeal. Nor would this court have jurisdiction to do anything about
Reardon’s child custody proceedings in Mississippi. As for Reardon’s civil rights
action in the Northern District of Mississippi, that case was dismissed and closed
on June 28, 2023, more than six weeks before Reardon was arrested in Galveston
on August 10, 2023. See Reardon, 2023 WL 4241668, at *14. Accordingly, it is
difficult to fathom how any of the events that took place in Texas could have denied
Reardon access to the court in the Northern District of Mississippi. For these
reasons, Reardon’s denial of access claim fails.
7. 	Claims Against Doe Officers
Reardon names John Doe Officers 1–5 as defendants in his pleading.
Reardon does not, however, assert a single specific allegation against any Doe
defendant beyond impermissible, undifferentiated group pleading. Accordingly,
the court should sua sponte dismiss Reardon’s claims against the Doe defendants
for failure to state a claim. See Century Sur. Co., 799 F.3d at 372.
8. 	Civil Rights Conspiracy
Reardon alleges that “James, Beavers, Busby, Osteen, Doraty, and their
institutional principals reached a mutual understanding, agreement, and meeting
of the minds to deprive [Reardon] of his clearly established constitutional rights.”
Dkt. 58 at 47. For all the reasons discussed above, Reardon has stated only one
constitutional claim—unreasonable seizure—against only two defendants: Doraty
and Osteen. Doraty and Osteen, however, are entitled to qualified immunity on
that claim. Where “all officers alleged to have violated [Reardon]’s [constitutional]
rights 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity . . . , 	the 	conspiracy 	claim 	is 	not
actionable.” Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 921 (5th Cir. 1995). Thus, the court
should dismiss Reardon’s civil rights conspiracy claim.
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9. 	State Law Claims
Having 	established 	that 	Doraty 	and 	Osteen 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified
immunity on Reardon’s unreasonable seizure claim, and that Reardon fails to
otherwise state a claim under federal law, I recommend that this court decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Reardon’s state law claims for malicious
prosecution, conversion of property, false imprisonment, abuse of process, assault,
battery, civil conspiracy, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Duncan v. City of Freeport, No. 3:23-cv-255,
2024 	WL 	2819118, 	at 	*4 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	Jan. 	23, 	2024) (declining 	to 	exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims after dismissing all
federal claims).
OTHER PENDING MOTIONS
Before Reardon’s claims can be dismissed, I must address Reardon’s
outstanding motions: (1) Reardon’s motion to strike Busby’s affidavit and for
sanctions (Dkt. 61); (2) Reardon’s motion for a TRO (Dkt. 84); (3) Reardon’s
motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint (Dkt. 85); and (4) Reardon’s
motion to expedite consideration of his motion for a TRO (Dkt. 86).
A. 	M OTION TO S TRIKE AND FOR S ANCTIONS (DKT . 61)11
Reardon moves to strike an affidavit that Busby submitted on November 12,
2025, 	in 	connection 	with 	his 	first 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	for 	lack 	of 	personal
jurisdiction. 12 Reardon also moves for sanctions, arguing that Busby misled this
court when he said that he never “personally responded to a request from the
Galveston County District Attorney’s Office for a status update on Matthew
Reardon’s Mississippi DUI conviction in the Lafayette Circuit Court.” Dkt. 46-1 at
1. Although Reardon’s motion is directed to the affidavit that Busby filed in
11 A motion to strike an affidavit is a non-dispositive motion on which a magistrate judge
may rule. See Lloreda v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00171, 2022 WL 203258,
at *1 n.2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2022).
12 I denied Busby’s first motion to dismiss as moot when I granted Reardon leave to file a
second amended complaint. See Dkt. 56 at 3.
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connection with his first motion to dismiss, the language that Reardon finds
misleading appears verbatim in the affidavit that Busby submitted with his second
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Dkt. 65-1. Thus, I will
consider the motion to strike in reference to both affidavits.
Admittedly, the word “personally” is doing some heavy lifting. But the record
shows that Busby did not lie: Jubera is the one who personally communicated with
Galveston authorities, not Busby. Accordingly, Busby did not mislead this court,
neither of his affidavits should be struck, and sanctions are not warranted.
B. 	M OTION FOR L EAVE (DKT . 85)13
Reardon requests leave to file a supplemental complaint. The allegations
that Reardon wants to add to his pleading concern recent events by non-parties:
United States Marshals, unknown Galveston police officers, and Marty’s City Auto.
See Dkt. 85-1. If Reardon wants to assert a claim against these individuals, he
should do so in a separate action. Reardon’s motion for leave to file a supplemental
complaint is denied.
C. 	TRO R EQUEST (DKT . 84) & M OTION TO E XPEDITE (DKT . 86)
Finally, Reardon requests a TRO (Dkt. 84) and expedited consideration of
the same (Dkt. 86). I recommend that the court deny Reardon’s request for a TRO.
I deny the request to expedite consideration as moot.
A TRO is a type of preliminary injunction. See Cooper v. Raissez, No. 5:24-
cv-278, 2025 WL 2844781, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2025). “To obtain injunctive
relief under Texas or federal law, [Reardon] must show a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits or a probable right to relief; this standard necessarily
requires a valid cause of action.” Speakman v. Shellpoint Mortg. Servicing, No.
3:26-cv-00039, 2026 WL 1333404, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 13, 2026). Because I have
recommended dismissal of all Reardon’s constitutional claims, and for the court to
13 A motion for leave to amend is a non-dispositive matter on which a magistrate judge
may rule. See Talbert v. Am. Risk Ins. Co., 405 F. App’x 848, 851 (5th Cir. 2010).
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decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Reardon’s state law claims, the
court should deny Reardon’s request for a TRO.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I deny Reardon’s motion to strike (Dkt. 61),
his motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint (Dkt. 85), and his motion to
expedite (Dkt. 86). I recommend that the court: (1) grant Busby’s motion to
dismiss 	for 	lack 	of 	personal 	jurisdiction 	(Dkt. 65); 	(2) grant 	the 	Galveston
Defendants’ and Beavers’s motions to dismiss (Dkts. 68, 69); (3) sua sponte
dismiss James, Galveston County, and the Doe defendants for failure to state a
claim; (4) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Reardon’s state law
claims; and (5) deny Reardon’s request for injunctive relief (Dkt. 84).
The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of July 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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