Phan v. Benchmark Insurance Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
THUAN PHUC PHAN,
Plaintiff.
V.
BENCHMARK INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00120
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Because 	it 	is 	readily 	apparent 	that 	this 	court 	lacks 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction, I recommend that this case be remanded to the 405th Judicial District
Court of Galveston County, Texas.
BACKGROUND
On March 10, 2025, Plaintiff Thuan Phuc Phan filed suit in state court
against Defendant Benchmark Insurance Company, asserting claims for breach of
contract, violations of the Texas Insurance Code, and breach of the common-law
duty of good faith and fair dealing.
In his petition, Phan alleged monetary damages “aggregating $250,000 or
less, 	excluding 	interest, 	statutory 	or 	punitive 	damages 	and 	penalties, 	and
attorney’s fees and costs.” Dkt. 1-1 at 2. Phan also explained that, “in light of the
possibility that this suit may be removed from state court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction, Plaintiff has filed a binding stipulation of damages for less than
$75,000.00 concurrently with this pleading, attached hereto as Exhibit A.” Id.
Exhibit A is a five-paragraph document titled “Binding Stipulation of
Amount in Controversy.” Id. at 9 (cleaned up). It provides:
THUAN PHUC PHAN, Plaintiff, by and through Plaintiff’s attorney of
record, stipulates as follows:
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 05, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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1. 	The total sum or value in controversy in this civil action does not
exceed $75,000.00, inclusive of interests, costs, all statutory and
contract damages, extra-contractual damages, punitive damages,
and attorney’s fees.
2. Plaintiff 	will 	not 	seek 	an 	amount 	of 	damages 	that 	exceeds
$75,000.00 	from 	Defendant, 	inclusive 	of 	interests, 	costs, 	all
statutory 	and 	contract 	damages, 	extra-contractual 	damages,
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.
3. Plaintiff will not accept from Defendant an amount that exceeds a
total of $75,000.00, inclusive of interests, costs, all statutory and
contract damages, extra-contractual damages, punitive damages,
and attorney’s fees.
4. Plaintiff will not amend the petition giving rise to this litigation to
seek an amount in, controversy in excess of $75,000.00, inclusive
of interests, costs, all statutory and contract damages, extra-
contractual 	damages, 	punitive 	damages, 	and 	attorney’s 	fees.
Plaintiff will not authorize anyone on Plaintiff’s behalf or on behalf
of 	Plaintiff’s 	future 	heirs 	and/or 	assigns, 	to 	make 	such
amendment.
5. 	Plaintiff understands and agrees that any judgment in favor of
Plaintiff against Defendant can be no greater than the total amount
of $75,000.00, inclusive of interests, costs, all statutory and
contract damages, extra-contractual damages, punitive damages,
and attorney’s fees.
Id. The stipulation is signed by Phan’s counsel. Phan did not personally sign the
stipulation.
On April 24, 2025, Benchmark removed this lawsuit to federal court. See
Dkt. 1. A defendant may remove a case from state to federal court only if the case
is 	within 	the 	federal 	court’s 	original 	jurisdiction. 	See 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 1441(a).
Benchmark argues that removal was proper on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
For diversity jurisdiction to exist, the plaintiff and defendant must be citizens of
different states, and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Neither party disputes that there is
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complete diversity. 1 The propriety of removal in this case hinges on the amount in
controversy.
Benchmark 	argues 	that 	“the 	amount 	in 	controversy 	is 	far 	above 	the
$75,000.00 jurisdictional limit of this Court,” pointing to Phan’s allegation in his
petition that his damages do not exceed $250,000, as well as his claim for treble
damages, attorney’s fees, exemplary damages, and interest. Id. at 3. Phan insists
that the stipulation—which states that Phan will not seek and will not accept more
than 	$75,000 	from 	Benchmark—deprives 	a 	federal 	court 	of 	jurisdiction 	to
entertain this matter. In response, Benchmark insists that the stipulation is
ineffective because it “was made by counsel only and not signed or sworn to by the
Plaintiff.” Id. at 4.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction
conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). “Federal courts, both trial and
appellate, have a continuing obligation to examine the basis for their jurisdiction.
The issue may be raised by parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time.” MCG,
Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).
“The party seeking to remove bears the burden of showing that federal
jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper.” Scarlott v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,
771 F.3d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). “Because removal raises
significant federalism concerns, the removal statute is strictly construed and any
doubt 	as 	to 	the 	propriety 	of 	removal 	should 	be 	resolved 	in 	favor 	of
remand.” Gutierrez v. Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation
omitted); see also Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723
(5th Cir. 2002) (“Any ambiguities are construed against removal.”).
1 At the time of removal, Phan was a Texas citizen. See Dkt. 1-1 at 1. Benchmark was and
is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Kansas with its principal place
of business in Minnesota. See Dkt. 1 at 2.
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If a defendant can demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000, a plaintiff can still defeat diversity jurisdiction by showing that it is a
“legal certainty” that his recovery will not exceed $75,000. De Aguilar v. Boeing
Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir. 1995); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v.
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938) (If a plaintiff “does not desire to try his case
in federal court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than the
jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the
defendant cannot remove.”). A plaintiff may establish such “legal certainty” by
filing “a binding stipulation or affidavit” with his lawsuit, stating that he seeks less
than the jurisdictional threshold and further stating that he will not accept an
award that exceeds that amount. De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1412; see also Standard
Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 595 (2013) (“[F]ederal courts permit
individual plaintiffs, who are the masters of their complaints, to avoid removal to
federal court, and to obtain a remand to state court, by stipulating to amounts at
issue that fall below the federal jurisdictional requirement.”); Espinola-E v.
Coachoma Chem. Co., 248 F.3d 1138, 2001 WL 85834, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 19, 2001)
(“[A] binding stipulation that a plaintiff will not accept damages in excess of the
jurisdictional amount defeats diversity jurisdiction.”).
ANALYSIS
The stipulation attached to Phan’s petition is clear and unequivocal. It
provides that Phan “will not seek an amount of damages that exceeds $75,000”
from Benchmark, “will not accept from [Benchmark] an amount that exceeds a
total of $75,000,” and “will not amend the petition giving rise to this litigation to
seek an amount in . . . excess of $75,000.” Dkt. 1-1 at 9. On its face, this language
appears sufficient to establish to a legal certainty that the $75,000 amount-in-
controversy requirement has not been met. See Ditcharo v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 376 F. App’x. 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2010) (Plaintiffs may establish legal certainty
“by submitting a binding stipulation or affidavit with their complaint, stating that
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they affirmatively seek less than the jurisdictional threshold, and further stating
that they will not accept an award that exceeds that threshold.”).
In opposing remand, Benchmark’s sole argument is that the stipulation
“lacks the procedural and substantive force required to divest this Court of federal
jurisdiction” because it “was made by counsel only and not signed or sworn to by
the Plaintiff.” Dkt. 1 at 4 (emphasis omitted).
I am not the first judge to address this particular legal issue. A surprising
number of jurists across this great nation have opined on whether a stipulation
signed by a plaintiff’s counsel, and not the plaintiff himself, is binding for purposes
of determining the amount in controversy. The case law is divided.
I will start with those courts holding that the plaintiff themself must sign the
stipulation to limit the amount in controversy and defeat federal jurisdiction.
In the Southern District of West Virginia, a plaintiff seeking to use an
amount-in-controversy stipulation to avoid federal jurisdiction must provide
a “formal, truly binding, pre-removal stipulation signed by counsel and his client
explicitly limiting recovery.” McCoy v. Erie Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp.2d 481, 485 (S.D.
W. Va. 2001). Although Southern District of West Virginia district courts have
never explained the rationale behind this rule, it is routinely applied to render
amount-in-controversy stipulations signed by the lawyer, and not the client,
invalid. See Raw Bar LLC v. ADT LLC, No. 2:18-cv-0492, 2019 WL 3559414, at *1
(S.D. W. Va. Aug. 5, 2019) (a “stipulation in the complaint” is “ineffective” when it
is “signed only by counsel”); Hatcher v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc., No. 2:10-
cv-00677, 2010 WL 2330392, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. June 7, 2010) (a “stipulation is
[deficient 	when 	it 	is] 	signed 	by 	Plaintiffs’ 	counsel, 	but 	not 	by 	Plaintiffs
themselves”).
Following their southern neighbors’ lead, the Northern District of West
Virginia also requires that stipulations submitted to defeat federal jurisdiction be
signed by a lawyer and their client. See, e.g., Jersey Subs, Inc. v. Sodexo Am., LLC,
No. 1:18-cv-191, 2019 WL 208882, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 15, 2019) (citing McCoy,
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147 F. Supp. 2d at 485); Kittredge v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 3:15-cv-81, 2016
WL 	47877, 	at 	*2 	(N.D. 	W. 	Va. 	Jan. 	4, 	2016) 	(same); 	Asbury-Castro 	v.
GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733 (N.D. W. Va. 2005) (same).
Unfortunately, the district courts in the Northern District of West Virginia also
have not offered a cogent explanation for adopting such a requirement.
Moving closer to home, the district courts in Mississippi seem to face this
issue frequently—at least based on the number of decisions from the Magnolia
State 	addressing 	the 	signature 	requirements 	for 	an 	amount-in-controversy
stipulation. Like their brethren in the Mountaineer State, the federal judges in
Mississippi universally require a stipulation explicitly limiting recovery to be
signed by both the lawyer and the client. See, e.g., Rhodes v. FDJ Trucking, LLC,
No. 4:22-cv-128, 2022 WL 17620281, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 13, 2022); King v.
Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:18-cv-672, 2021 WL 1202333, at *8 (S.D. Miss.
Mar. 30, 2021); Swanson v. Hempstead, 267 F. Supp. 3d 736, 741 (N.D. Miss.
2017); Brown v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-125, 2012 WL 4027312, at *4
(S.D. Miss. Sept. 12, 2012). Thankfully, the judges in Mississippi offer some
rationale for this approach. “[A] binding stipulation or affidavit must be made by
the plaintiff himself as opposed to his counsel since the plaintiff could hire
different counsel and later seek more than $75,000.” Holmes v. Citifinancial
Mortg. Co., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 829, 832 (N.D. Miss. 2006). Put another way, the
Mississippi judges believe that “[a] stipulation signed by counsel ‘does not and
could not’ bind a plaintiff, ‘who can circumvent the [stipulation’s] intended affect
by finding another attorney to amend the complaint.’” Scirocco v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 5:13-cv-128, 2014 WL 5817543, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 10, 2014) (quoting Boyd
v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 5:12-cv-48, 2012 WL 3779952, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 31,
2012)). I will explain below why I do not find this argument convincing.
There are also a series of opinions from the Western District of Texas holding
that a stipulation purporting to reduce the amount of damages sought below the
jurisdictional threshold must be signed by the lawyer and his client. See Thomson
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v. Orr, No. 1:18-cv-794, 2018 WL 7286486, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2018); Rios v.
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. DR-16-cv-0031, 2017 WL 3274456, at *5 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 18, 2017); Johnson v. Carmax Auto Superstore, Inc., No. CIVA SA-08-CA-
820, 2008 WL 5686083, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2008). In those cases, the judges
expressed concern that the stipulations at issue were signed only by lawyers, with
no statement or recital that counsel discussed the stipulation with their client, nor
any other indication of the clients’ consent. See Thomson, 2018 WL 7286486, at
*3; Rios, 2017 WL 3274456, at *5. Because “the client, not the attorney, has the
ultimate say as to whether an offer of settlement for less than $75,000 would be
accepted,” the Thompson and Rios courts concluded that the binding effect of a
stipulation signed only by counsel “is open to debate and far from a legal certainty.”
Rios, 2017 WL 3274456, at *5; see also Thomson, 2018 WL 7286486, at *3 (“[I]t is
far from legally certain that . . . an affidavit [signed only by counsel limiting the
amount of damages sought] would bind” a plaintiff.). 2
On the other end of the spectrum, the federal judges in Louisiana have
summarily dismissed arguments that an attorney’s signature alone is insufficient
to establish to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy is limited to
$75,000, finding that these arguments “elevate the stipulation’s form over its
substance.” Alvis v. Denka Performance Elastomer LLC, No. CV 20-0794, 2020
WL 4199910, at *3 (E.D. La. July 21, 2020). Addressing the argument advanced by
the Mississippi judges that a plaintiff, whose lawyer signs a stipulation on his
2 In one case from the Southern District of Texas, a district judge refused to honor a
stipulation signed by the plaintiffs’ counsel because “[t]he document was not signed by
Plaintiffs themselves, nor was it signed by Defendant, and thus cannot constitute a
binding stipulation.” Razo v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 7:17-cv-00352, 2017 WL 11318849,
at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2017). As far as my research reveals, no other court in America
has followed Razo and required a stipulation to be executed by the plaintiff, plaintiff’s
counsel, and the defendant. And for good reason. It is a bedrock legal principle that the
plaintiff is “the master of the complaint,” and therefore “gets to determine which
substantive claims to bring against which Defendant” and the amount in controversy.
Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025). It simply cannot be that
a stipulation limiting the amount of damages sought is ineffective so long as the defendant
refuses to assent.
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behalf, might change lawyers and seek to escape the grasp of the stipulation, the
Louisiana federal courts note that “[t]he discharging of an attorney does not revoke
a stipulation made while that attorney had the proper authority to bind his
client. . . . It is well settled that an attorney with proper authority, acting on behalf
of his client, can bind his client.” Degeyter v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 09-1582,
2009 WL 3335959, at *2 (W.D. La. Oct. 15, 2009); see also Lachney v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIV.A. 14-476, 2014 WL 1514172, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2014)
(rejecting the argument “that, to be legally binding, any stipulation must be
accompanied by an affidavit or some sort of statement sworn to by the individual
plaintiffs” because defendant “cites no authority for its position that an attorney
cannot bind her clients,” and finding “that the plaintiffs are bound by the
stipulation signed by their attorney”); Bryant v. Rosser, No. CIV.A. 13-6125, 2014
WL 379147, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014) (holding that plaintiffs’ stipulation that
they will not execute a judgment greater than $75,000 “is signed by plaintiffs’
attorney and thus is binding on plaintiffs”). As one court perfectly explained:
The 	defendants 	suggest 	that 	the 	incorporated 	stipulation 	is
insufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs’ legal certainty obligation because
plaintiffs’ attorney cannot bind the plaintiffs to the stipulation. The
Court disagrees: the defendants would impose a formal signature or
affidavit requirement where none exists. Again, the key consideration
is whether the stipulation is legally binding. . . . [S]tipulations on
damages contained in state court petitions are judicial confessions
under Louisiana [law], which cannot be revoked except as an error of
fact. . . . An enforceable judicial confession is present here; each
plaintiff is legally bound by counsel’s stipulation in the state court
petition.
Alvis, 2020 WL 4199910, at *4 (quotation omitted).
Outside of Louisiana, a few courts have accepted an amount-in-controversy
stipulation executed solely by the lawyer handling the matter. See, e.g., Adams v.
Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. CV 15-184, 2016 WL 6986892, at *4 n.3 (E.D.
Ky. Jan. 5, 2016) (“Although Adams’ complaint is not signed by Adams himself, it
is signed and submitted by his attorney. The Court believes that this is sufficient to
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create a binding stipulation.”); Brice v. Member Select Ins. Co., No. SA-12-CA-153,
2012 WL 13029370, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 11, 2012) (holding that a stipulation
signed by plaintiff’s lawyer and not plaintiff is sufficient to prevent removal if it
promises that plaintiff will not seek or obtain a judgment in excess of $75,000).
The reasoning offered by the judges who authored these decisions is stout, and I
am persuaded. Take, for example, Judge Henry J. Bemporad’s explanation for
allowing an amount-in-controversy stipulation to be signed solely by counsel:
Defendant’s 	argument 	that 	counsel’s 	signature 	invalidates 	or
diminishes the binding nature of the Stipulation is likewise without
merit. Attorneys regularly sign documents on behalf of their clients.
Defendant cites no case nor makes any argument to explain why an
attorney’s signature would not be binding here. Indeed, the original
Petition, 	which 	Defendant 	relies 	upon 	to 	show 	the 	amount 	in
controversy, is signed only by Plaintiff’s attorney. Therefore, the
Stipulation is valid and appropriately clarifies both the scope of
Plaintiff’s damages and limits award she may seek or otherwise
obtain.
Brice, 2012 WL 13029370, at *4. The Eleventh Circuit has similarly noted that the
stipulations made by an attorney on behalf of his client should be given “great
deference” and “presume[d] to be true.” Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon
Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 808 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (counsel’s statement in a
motion to remand sufficient to limit damages for purposes of determining the
amount on controversy). This is because “lawyers are officers of this court and
subject to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for making a
representation to the court for an improper purpose, such as merely to defeat
diversity jurisdiction.” Id.3
3 	Similarly, 	Texas 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	13 	prevents 	a 	lawyer 	from 	making
representations that are untrue. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13 (“The signatures of attorneys or
parties constitute a certificate by them that they have read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry the instrument is not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and
brought for the purpose of harassment.”).
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It should come as no surprise that Texas “Courts favor stipulations to
expedite litigation, and as a general rule valid stipulations are binding on the
parties and the Courts.” New v. First Nat. Bank of Midland, 476 S.W.2d 121, 124
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Martinez v. Bally’s La.,
Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2001) (Judicial admissions are “binding on
the party making them” if they are made “intentionally as a waiver.”); Wright v.
Normandy Terrace Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., No. SA-12-CA-0622, 2012 WL
2979040, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2012) (“The binding nature of Plaintiff’s
stipulation is derived from settled Texas law. . . . A party making a stipulation or
judicial admission is barred from disputing it.”); Walker v. City of Georgetown,
86 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (stipulations in
petitions that purport to limit prospective theories of recovery are binding judicial
admissions).
Here, it makes no difference that the stipulation is signed by Phan’s lawyer
and not Phan. In Texas, attorneys may ordinarily bind their clients to agreements
by signing on the clients’ behalf. See Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n v. Wermske, 349 S.W.2d
90, 93 (Tex. 1961) (“The general rule is that the relationship of attorney and client
is one of agency. Under this rule, the omissions, as well as the commissions, of an
attorney are to be regarded as the acts of the client whom he represents.”); Am.
Home Assur. Co. v. Rodriguez, 749 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1988, no writ) (“The attorney-client relationship is one of principal and agent, and
the acts of one ordinarily binds the other.”); United States v. State of Texas, 523 F.
Supp. 703, 711 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (“Unless all of the attorney’s efforts on his client’s
behalf are binding in a legal sense, the entire judicial process, including the
outcome 	of 	that 	process, 	is 	devoid 	of 	validity 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	parties
themselves.”). For example, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
lawyers’ written agreements executed on behalf of their clients are enforceable
without the clients affixing their signatures to such agreements. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
11. Similarly, a lawyer can file papers on behalf of his client—without a formal
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signature from the client—jettisoning a particular cause of action or dismissing an
entire lawsuit with prejudice. I see no reason to adopt a totally different rule in the
context of removals. Accordingly, I will not require a client to sign an amount-in-
controversy disclaimer. A stipulation signed by counsel is sufficient to establish to
a legal certainty that the client cannot recover more than the federal jurisdictional
threshold.
In sum, the stipulation submitted with the Original Petition creates a legal
certainty that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. Although
signed only by counsel, the stipulation reflects that it is made by “Plaintiff, by and
through Plaintiff’s attorney of record.” Dkt. 1-1 at 9. It is titled “Binding Stipulation
of Amount in Controversy,” which unmistakably establishes that it cannot be
revoked. See Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 667 (2010) (describing a stipulation as “binding and
conclusive” and “not subject to subsequent variation”) (quotation omitted). The
stipulation’s wording provides that Phan will not seek, will not ask for, and will not
accept an amount of damages in excess of $75,000. 4 As an added bonus, the
stipulation states that Phan will not amend the lawsuit to seek more than $75,000.
Because the stipulation signed by Phan’s lawyer legally binds Phan to a recovery
4 Approximately three and half months after this case was removed to federal court,
Phan’s counsel filed another stipulation. See Dkt. 11. The new stipulation, like the
stipulation submitted with the Original Petition, is signed by Phan’s counsel, but not by
Phan himself. Both stipulations limit Phan’s damages to below the federal jurisdictional
threshold. The new stipulation is a tad longer than the original stipulation, but it is not
materially different.
Generally, post-removal stipulations cannot be considered because “[t]he jurisdictional
facts that support removal must be judged at the time of the removal.” Gebbia v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000). The only time that post-removal
stipulations may be considered is when the amount in controversy was ambiguous at the
time of removal, and the stipulation seeks to clarify, rather than adjust, the amount
sought. See id. Because this test is not met, I will disregard the new stipulation and rely
on the original stipulation filed at the outset of the case in state court.
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below the jurisdictional threshold, this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. 5 This case
must be remanded to state court.
CONCLUSION
As explained, Phan has submitted a stipulation that establishes to a legal
certainty that he will not seek or accept damages in excess of $75,000. Because the
amount in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional amount, I recommend
that this case be remanded to the 405th Judicial District Court of Galveston
County, Texas.
The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of January 2026
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
5 Because I conclude that the original stipulation signed by Phan’s counsel satisfies the
legal certainty standard, it is unnecessary to determine whether, absent the stipulation,
the claimed damages actually exceed the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold.
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