GS Holistic, LLC v. AAR Management LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
GS HOLISTIC, LLC,
Plaintiff.
V.
AAR MANAGEMENT LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-00360
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before me is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as
to Certain Individual and Entity Defendants Under Rule 12(c) and, in the
Alternative, Motion to Drop Parties Under Rule 21 (“Motion for Judgment”).
Dkt. 56. Having reviewed the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, I
recommend that the motion be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND1
This is one of many trademark infringement lawsuits brought by GS across
the country. GS sells portable vaporizers and smoking accessories under the “G
Pen” brand name and infuser waterpipes and accessories under the “Stündenglass”
brand name. GS owns several federal trademarks related to both brands, and
claims it has spent substantial time and resources to prevent its products from
being counterfeited. GS also owns two patents related to the design of its
Stündenglass gravity infuser waterpipes. According to GS, the recognized quality
and innovation of the G Pen and Stündenglass products cause consumers to pay
high prices for genuine versions of those products. Because of the higher prices,
GS asserts that its products are targeted by counterfeiters.
Defendants are 39 individuals and 39 entities connected to retail smoke
shops, many of which operate under the “Bahama Mama” trade name. GS alleges
1 The facts in this section are taken from GS’s complaint.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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that Defendants, without authorization, offered for sale and sold counterfeit G Pen
and Stündenglass products bearing GS’s registered marks. GS also alleges that
several Defendants have misappropriated GS’s patented waterpipe design and sold
waterpipes imitating its patented design in their stores.
On December 13, 2024, GS instituted this suit against Defendants, asserting
claims for: (i) trademark counterfeiting and infringement of the G Pen and
Stündenglass trademarks, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (ii) false designation of origin and
unfair competition for use of the G Pen and Stündenglass trademarks, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a); and (iii) direct and contributory infringement of the Stündenglass
patents.
The instant motion for judgment is brought by 17 individuals and 11 entities.
I refer to Defendants Adrian Chowdhury, Dante Pineda, Junaid Abbasi, Jamil
Daudi, Mohammed Jafar, Abdus Sobhan, Azim Ahmed, Sadia Subrina, Towheed
Chowdhury, Maria Chowdhury, Ana Martinez, Nasreen Ghani, SK M. Jasib
Hossain, Anik Akhund, Monirun Chowdhury, Shahyan Karowadiya, and Hafizur
Rahman 	as 	the 	“Individual 	Defendants.” 	I 	refer 	to 	Defendants 	ICHOW
Investments LLC, I.AM Wellness LLC, Jamaq LLC, JBQ Investment LLC, MCN
Management LLC, MNM Holdings LLC, Navene Global Consulting LLC, GP MMS
LLC, Amity Management LLC, HMF Global LLC, and DNA Global Enterprises LLC
as the “Entity Defendants.” Collectively, the Individual and Entity Defendants are
the “Moving Defendants.”
In seeking dismissal, Moving Defendants argue that GS fails to state a claim
that would entitle it to relief. In the alternative, Moving Defendants ask this court
to drop them from this lawsuit as misjoined parties under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 21.
LEGAL STANDARD
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party
may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Like Rule 12(b)(6),
Rule 12(c) “is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in
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dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance
of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
The standard for a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as the standard for a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. See Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543–44 (5th Cir. 2010). A
Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the requirement
that the complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In
ruling on a motion to dismiss, my “review is limited to the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion
to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star
Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as
true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). 	I 	“do 	not, 	however, 	accept 	as 	true 	legal 	conclusions, 	conclusory
statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield
v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
CITATION ERRORS
Before I address the merits of Defendants’ motion, I need to briefly mention
one issue that concerns me greatly. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment is replete
with citation errors. For example:
• 	Defendants 	cite 	Ochoa 	v. 	P.A.M. 	Transport, 	Inc., 	2023 	WL
2674360, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2023). See Dkt. 56 at 4, 7.
The Westlaw identifier is incorrect, and the case was decided in the
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Western District of Texas in 2018, not in the Northern District of
Texas in 2023. See Ochoa v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., No. SA-17-cv-
787, 2018 WL 7297889 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2018).
• 	Defendants cite Royal v. Integreon, Inc., 2015 WL 3504856, at *2–
3 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2015). See Dkt. 56 at 7. The Westlaw identifier
is incorrect, and the case was decided in the Western District of
Texas in 2020, not the Northern District of Texas in 2015. See
Royal v. Integreon, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-822, 2020 WL 13836729
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2020).
• 	Defendants cite Louisiana State Conference of the NAACP v.
Louisiana, 	2022 	WL 	173515, 	at 	*5–7 	(M.D. 	La. 	Jan. 	18,
2022). See Dkt. 56 at 8. The Westlaw identifier is incorrect, and the
case was decided in 2020, not 2022. See La. State Conf. of the
NAACP v. Louisiana, 490 F. Supp. 3d 982 (M.D. La. 2020).
• 	Defendants cite People’s Workshop, Inc. v. FEMA, 2018 WL
3642581, at *6–8 (M.D. La. July 31, 2018). See Dkt. 56 at 9. The
Westlaw identifier is incorrect, and the case was decided in 2019,
not 2018. See People’s Workshop, Inc. v. FEMA, No. CV 17-107,
2019 WL 1140196 (M.D. La. Mar. 12, 2019).
• 	Defendants cite Jimenez v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2017 WL 2362015,
at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2017). See Dkt. 56 at 9. The Westlaw
identifier is incorrect, and the date of the opinion is incorrect. See
Jimenez v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. CV SA-17-ca-00134, 2017 WL
11236934 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2017).
I cannot tell whether these errors are the result of shoddy work by
Defendants’ counsel or the use of artificial intelligence without any effort to check
the citations before filing. Either way, the actions of Defendants’ counsel are
troubling. Defendants’ counsel should take care to ensure citations offered to the
court are accurate. I do not want to confront this issue again.
ANALYSIS
A. 	R ULE 12(c): F AILURE TO S TATE A CLAIM
1. 	Individual Defendants
The Individual Defendants assert that:
[T]he 	Complaint 	does 	nothing 	more 	than 	identify 	[Individual
Defendants] by name. Beyond listing them in the caption and parties
section, the pleading is silent as to their alleged conduct.
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Specifically, the Complaint does not allege:
1. 	what role, if any, any [Individual] Defendant played in any
business entity;
2. which, if any, retail locations they were affiliated with;
3. what 	actions 	they 	personally 	took 	with 	respect 	to 	the
products at issue; or
4. what knowledge they allegedly possessed regarding any
infringement.
Dkt. 56 at 8. In response, GS contends that it has properly pleaded “individualized
facts showing that each [Individual] Defendant is an owner, managing member,
officer, or controlling person of one or more entity defendants—and that they
directed those entities’ infringing activities.” Dkt. 72 at 4.
An individual can be held personally liable for trademark infringement or
unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). See Mead
Johnson & Co. v. Baby’s Formula Serv., Inc., 402 F.2d 19, 23 (5th Cir. 1968). “A
corporate officer may be personally liable for trademark infringement when an
individual performs the act or does things that the patent or trademark law
protects against.” GS Holistic, LLC v. Sublime Smoke & Vape LLC, No. 4:23-cv-
241, 2024 WL 4273581, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2024) (quotation omitted). Thus,
any corporate officer who “directs, controls, ratifies, participates in, or is the
moving 	force 	behind 	the 	infringing 	activity, 	is 	personally 	liable 	for 	such
infringement without regard to piercing of the corporate veil.” John Crane Prod.
Sols., Inc. v. R2R & D, LLC, No. 3:11-cv-3237, 2012 WL 1571080, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
May 4, 2012) (quoting Babbit Elecs., Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161, 1184
(11th Cir. 1994)). Additionally, “[a]n individual can be held personally liable if he
actively and knowingly caused the infringement.” Taylor Made Golf Co. v. MJT
Consulting Grp., 265 F. Supp. 2d 732, 746 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (quotation omitted).
GS has failed to allege specific facts related to each Individual Defendant’s
involvement 	in 	or 	direction 	of 	the 	alleged 	infringing 	activities 	and 	unfair
competition.
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In the “Parties” section of the complaint, GS alleges that each Individual
Defendant “directs the infringing activities of” the respective entity that they own
or are affiliated. Dkt. 1 at 29–38. Although GS maintains that these allegations,
taken 	by 	themselves, 	are 	sufficient 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	against 	the 	Individual
Defendants, I strongly disagree. GS’s cursory allegations merely repeat the legal
standard for individual liability and are the epitome of “naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Benfield, 945 F.3d at 336–37 (cleaned up). GS’s
complaint fails to “plead facts that specifically tie [any Individual Defendant] to
the infringing conduct and show they knowingly and substantially participated in
such conduct.” Apple Hill Growers v. El Dorado Orchards, No. 2:17-cv-02085,
2019 WL 5827365, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2019); see also GS Holistic, LLC v.
Nevada Tobacco Distrib., No. 2:24-cv-09689, 2025 WL 1754949, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
June 23, 2025) (dismissing Lanham Act claims against an individual when the
operative pleading “makes only the bare legal assertion that [the individual] was
the active, conscious, moving force behind the Lanham Act violations and that he
directed and/or participated in such violations” without identifying “any specific
factual allegations regarding [the individual’s] role in decisions to engage in the
alleged infringement.”).
Instead of attributing any specific conduct to each Individual Defendant, GS
relies almost entirely on impermissible group pleading. In the complaint, GS
defines the Individual Defendants and several others, collectively, as “Owners.” See
Dkt. 1 at 39. GS proceeds to make threadbare, conclusory allegations with respect
to the “Owners” involvement in the alleged infringement and unfair competition.
For 	example, 	GS 	alleges 	that 	“[t]he 	OWNERS authorized, 	directed, 	and/or
participated in” Bahama Mama’s sale of the alleged counterfeit goods, and that the
Owners acts “were a moving, active, and conscious force” behind Bahama Mama’s
alleged 	infringement. 	Id. 	at 	84; 	see 	also 	id. 	at 	54 	(alleging 	that 	the
“OWNERS knowingly offered counterfeit products bearing the fake Stundenglass
Marks”). Such generalized allegations that lump defendants together without
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identifying 	each 	defendant’s 	alleged 	personal 	involvement 	constitute
impermissible group pleading. See Callier v. Nat’l United Grp., LLC, No. EP-21-
cv-71, 2021 WL 5393829, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2021) (“General allegations
lumping all defendants together and failing to identify specific actions of individual
defendants will not suffice to raise an inference of plausible liability against any
individual defendant.”); Tow v. Bulmahn, No. 15-3141, 2016 WL 1722246, at *17
(E.D. La. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815,
818 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Because the notice pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ‘entitle each defendant to know what he or she did that is
asserted to be wrongful,’ allegations based on a ‘theory of collective responsibility’
cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.”).
GS cites GS Holistic, LLC v. Flavorz Smoke, LLC, No. 2:24-cv-12254, 2026
WL 1330947 (E.D. Mich. May 13, 2026), for the proposition that an allegation that
the Owners possessed specialized knowledge of the tobacco industry suffices to
establish 	each 	Individual 	Defendant’s 	personal 	involvement 	in 	the 	alleged
infringement. See Dkt. 72 at 9. This argument is unpersuasive. The complaint
provides no specific facts suggesting that any Individual Defendant possesses
specialized tobacco-industry knowledge. GS simply assumes this is true because
each Individual Defendant owns a limited liability company that sells tobacco-
related products. But ownership alone does not make someone an expert in the
tobacco industry. Moreover, GS alleges that the Entity Defendants conducted the
sales of alleged counterfeit products without tying those sales to any specific
Individual Defendant. See Dkt. 1 at 55–83. Accordingly, GS’s allegations against
the Individual Defendants are insufficient to state a claim.
2. 	Entity Defendants
Although the Entity Defendants ask that they be dismissed from this lawsuit,
they offer little, if any, analysis or explanation as to why the allegations against
them in the complaint are insufficient.
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To state a claim for infringement of a registered mark, GS must plead that
“(1) it possesses a legally protectable trademark and (2) [the defendant]’s use of
this trademark ‘creates a likelihood of confusion as to source, affiliation, or
sponsorship.’” Rex Real Est. I, L.P. v. Rex Real Est. Exch. Inc., 80 F.4th 607, 616
(5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Streamline Prod. Sys. Inc. v. Streamline Mfg., Inc., 851
F.3d 440, 450 (5th Cir. 2017)). To state a Lanham Act unfair-competition claim,
GS must allege:
(1) A false or misleading statement of fact about a product;
(2) Such statement either deceived, or had the capacity to deceive a
substantial segment of potential consumers;
(3) The deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the
consumer’s purchasing decision;
(4) The product is in interstate commerce; and
(5) The plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the
statement at issue.
Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000).
GS has sufficiently alleged plausible claims against all but one of the Entity
Defendants. GS identifies each Entity Defendant—with one exception discussed
below—as the entity operating a storefront directly involved in the alleged unlawful
activity and provides supporting facts and evidence. See Dkt. 1 at 52, 55–83. GS
alleges that it hired an investigator to visit many of these storefronts, purchase the
suspected counterfeit products, and inspect them. GS also provides photographs
to support these contentions. For entities the investigator did not visit in person,
GS identifies online photographs showing alleged counterfeit products offered for
sale at their storefronts along with short descriptions as to why the products appear
to be counterfeit. Finally, GS alleges that several storefronts have misappropriated
its patented waterpipe designs and sold them to its investigator. See id. at 95–107.
Taken together, these factual allegations plausibly suggest that each Entity
Defendant—with one exception—is “liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 678. This is sufficient to survive the Moving Defendants’ Motion for
Judgment.
Now let me address the one exception I have mentioned. After a careful
review of the complaint, I find that GS has not sufficiently alleged any wrongful
conduct against HMF Global LLC. According to the complaint, HMF Global is one
of the owners of Sauce Group, LLC. See Dkt. 1 at 23. Sauce Group operates a retail
store that allegedly participated in the sale of counterfeit goods. Even if Sauce
Group acted unlawfully, that does not mean that HMF Global is liable for Sauce
Group’s actions. Under Texas law, individual members of a limited liability
company 	are 	typically 	insulated 	from 	liability 	for 	the 	actions 	of 	the
company. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.114 (“Except as and to the extent the
company agreement specifically provides otherwise, a member or manager is not
liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of a limited liability company, including a
debt, obligation, or liability under a judgment, decree, or order of a court.”). “The
statutory protections afforded to members and managers of an LLC give way only
when a plaintiff can show that the LLC was used for the purpose of perpetrating,
and did perpetrate, an actual fraud for the member or manager’s direct personal
benefit.” Metroplex Mailing Servs., LLC v. RR Donnelley & Sons Co., 410 S.W.3d
889, 896 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). Because GS makes no allegations that
HMF Global caused Sauce Group to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and
did perpetrate an actual fraud, no viable claim has been pleaded against HMF
Global. As such, HMF Global should be dismissed from this lawsuit.
B. 	R ULE 21: M ISJOINDER
In addition to asserting that GS has failed to properly state a claim, the
Moving Defendants argue that this court should “drop the Moving Defendants as
misjoined parties [under Rule 21] and dismiss them from this action.” Dkt. 56 at
11.
Rule 21 provides the remedy for misjoinder, stating that “the court may at
any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. The decision to
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drop a party as a defendant pursuant to Rule 21 is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court. See Williams v. Hoyt, 556 F.2d 1336, 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The
district court has broad discretion in determining the propriety of joining or
continuing a particular party as a defendant.”).
There is no basis to find misjoinder here. GS alleged that each Entity
Defendant, with one exception, “sold counterfeit products bearing its protected
trademarks” and “worked together as an ‘interrelated group’ to knowingly sell the
counterfeit products.” Viahart, L.L.C. v. GangPeng, No. 21-40166, 2022 WL
445161, at *4 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022) (cleaned up). I have already concluded that
the Individual Defendants and one Entity Defendant should be dismissed from this
case for failure to state a claim. As for the remaining Entity Defendants, I
recommend that their effort to latch onto Rule 21 be rejected. With a lone
exception, GS has plausibly stated legally cognizable claims against the Entity
Defendants, and GS should be permitted to proceed with those claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that Defendants’ Motion for
Judgment (Dkt. 56) be granted in part and denied in part. Defendants Adrian
Chowdhury, Dante Pineda, Junaid Abbasi, Jamil Daudi, Mohammed Jafar, Abdus
Sobhan, Azim Ahmed, Sadia Subrina, Towheed Chowdhury, Maria Chowdhury,
Ana Martinez, Nasreen Ghani, SK M. Jasib Hossain, Anik Akhund, Monirun
Chowdhury, Shahyan Karowadiya, Hafizur Rahman, and HMF Global LLC should
be dismissed from this lawsuit.
The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of July 2026.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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