Dressen et al v Flaherty et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
BRIANNE DRESSEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs.
V.
ROB FLAHERTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-cv-00155
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their constitutional rights by
pressuring social media companies to ban or limit their social media posts related
to the COVID-19 vaccine. Defendants have filed, in total, five motions to dismiss.
See Dkts. 85, 88, 89, 94, and 96. Having reviewed the First Amended Complaint,
the briefing on the motions to dismiss, and the applicable law, I recommend that
all five motions to dismiss be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are six individuals: Breanne Dressen, Shaun Barcavage, Kristi
Dobbs, Nikki Holland, Suzanna Newell, and Ernest Ramirez. All Plaintiffs, except
Ramirez, allege suffering from serious and debilitating injuries that arose after
receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. Ramirez alleges that his 16-year-old son died five
days after taking the COVID-19 vaccine.
Defendants are federal agencies, federal officials sued in their official
capacities, federal officials sued in their individual capacities, as well as private
entities and persons affiliated with Stanford University. The federal agencies
named as defendants are the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Centers 	for 	Disease 	Control 	and 	Prevention, 	the 	Department 	of 	Homeland
Security, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The federal
officials sued in their official capacities are President Donald J. Trump, Karoline
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 11, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Levitt, Dr. Dorothy A. Fink, Rear Admiral Denise Hinton, Kristi Noem, Bridget
Bean, and Robert F. Kennedy Jr.1 For simplicity sake, I will refer 	to the federal
agencies and the federal officials sued in their official capacities collectively as the
“Federal Defendants.” Seven former federal officials have also been sued in their
individual capacities: Becerra, Crawford, Easterly, Flaherty, Mayorkas, Murthy,
and Slavitt. I will refer to these individuals as the “Individual Defendants.” The
entities and persons associated with Stanford University that are named in the
operative complaint are: the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University, the Leland Stanford Junior University, Alex Stamos, and Renee
Diresta. These entities and individuals will be referred to collectively as the
“Stanford Defendants.”
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs provide specific instances, from
March 2021 through September 2024, where social media platforms moderated
Plaintiffs’ COVID-19 related content. Focusing on actions allegedly taken by
federal officials from early 2021 through 2022 (with the latest instance occurring
in March 2023), Plaintiffs claim that federal officials persuaded social media
companies to flag, label, or remove certain online content concerning the COVID-
19 vaccines. According to Plaintiffs, White House officials asked social media
platforms for information about their efforts to combat vaccine misinformation,
and publicly and privately criticized the platforms for what the officials perceived
1 Plaintiffs originally sued President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Karine Jean-Pierre, Dr. Vivek
Murthy, Xavier Becerra, Carol Crawford, Alejandro Mayorkas, Jen Easterly, Rob Flaherty,
and Andrew Slavitt in their official capacities. Pursuant to Rule 25(d), these individuals—
except for Flaherty and Slavitt—were automatically substituted as new officials took their
place with the change of presidential administrations.
The positions occupied by Flaherty (the White House Director of Digital Strategy) and
Slavitt (the Senior Advisor to the COVID-19 Response Coordinator) are currently vacant.
As a result, all claims brought against Flaherty and Slavitt in their official capacities are
no longer justiciable. See Am. Oversight v. Biden, No. CV 20-00716, 2021 WL 4355576,
at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2021) (dismissing claims brought against Jared Kushner in his
official capacity as Director of the White House Office of American Innovation after he
left the position and no replacement was named). I thus recommend that Plaintiffs’
official capacity claims against Flaherty and Slavitt be dismissed.
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as a lack of transparency and a failure to abide by the platforms’ commitments.
Plaintiffs also allege that “[t]he Stanford Defendants collaborated closely with
federal, state, and local government officials to moderate, target, and suppress
disfavored viewpoints concerning the Covid vaccine.” Dkt. 42 at 27. Plaintiffs
characterize Defendants’ efforts as “relentless pressure, inducement, coercion, and
collusion” that resulted in the platforms censoring Plaintiffs in violation of the First
Amendment. Id. at 102. Plaintiffs have not sued any of the social media platforms
that allegedly censored their posts.
Against the Federal Defendants, Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of the
First 	Amendment, 	ultra 	vires 	actions, 	and 	violations 	of 	the 	Administrative
Procedure 	Act 	(“APA”). 	Against 	the 	Individual 	Defendants 	and 	Stanford
Defendants, Plaintiffs allege a single claim: civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3). Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief as well as monetary
damages. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under Rules
12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6), and 25(c). For the reasons explained below, I
need to address only the Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) arguments.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	R ULE 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a district court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. “Subject matter jurisdiction defines the court’s authority to
hear a given type of case; it represents the extent to which a court can rule on the
conduct of persons or the status of things.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc., v. HIF Bio, Inc.,
556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (cleaned up). “Standing is a component of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Ortiz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 5 F.4th 622, 627 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation
omitted).
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” The “case or controversy” requirement is
“‘fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government.’” Raines
v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
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426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)). “If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts
have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006).
“[T]he 	irreducible 	constitutional 	minimum 	of 	standing 	contains 	three
elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action
of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.
Id. at 560–61 (cleaned up). The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing these elements. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S.
413, 430–31 (2021).
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, I accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Machete Prods., L.L.C.
v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2015). “Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that
the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle
plaintiff to relief.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
B. 	R ULE 12(b)(2)
Rule 12(b)(2) allows for dismissal when a court lacks personal jurisdiction
over a defendant. When a district court rules on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without an
evidentiary hearing, as is the case here, “the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing only a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.” Sangha v. Navig8
ShipManagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th Cir. 2018). “To determine
whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the court can consider the assertions in
the plaintiff’s complaint, as well as the contents of the record at the time of the
motion.” Frank v. P N K (Lake Charles) L.L.C., 947 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.
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2020) (cleaned up). The district court must accept all jurisdictional allegations as
true and resolve factual disputes in favor of the plaintiffs. See Ethridge v. Samsung
SDI Co., Ltd., 137 F.4th 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2025). But the court “need not credit
conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted.” Id. If plaintiffs make a prima facie
case, the burden then shifts to the defendants to present “a compelling case that
the 	presence 	of 	some 	other 	considerations 	would 	render 	jurisdiction
unreasonable.” Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
The Supreme Court has recognized two kinds of personal jurisdiction:
general and specific. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S.
255, 262 (2017). General jurisdiction exists over a non-resident defendant when
its “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 317 (1945)). “That is a high bar.” Johnson v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 21
F.4th 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2021).
The specific jurisdiction inquiry “focuses on the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284
(2014) (quotation omitted). For this reason, “specific jurisdiction is confined to
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that
establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (quotation omitted). Specific
jurisdiction is proper when the plaintiffs allege a cause of action that arises out of
or relates to a contact between the defendant and the forum state. See Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
The 	Fifth 	Circuit 	uses 	a 	three-step 	analysis 	for 	specific 	jurisdiction:
(1) whether “the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum State,” (2) whether “the plaintiff’s claim arises out of or
relates to those purposeful contacts with the forum,” and (3) whether “the exercise
of personal jurisdiction [is] fair and reasonable.” Ethridge, 137 F.4th at 314.
“Specific jurisdiction should be determined on a case-by-case basis under the facts
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of each individual case.” Zoch v. Magna Seating (Germany) GmbH, 810 F. App’x
285, 293 (5th Cir. 2020).
ANALYSIS
“[A] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first
determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-
matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction).” Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007). At the same time, there
is no mandatory “sequencing of jurisdictional issues.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999). A federal court has leeway “to choose among
threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.” Id. at 585.
Exercising my discretion, I will address subject matter jurisdiction before I turn to
personal jurisdiction.
A. 	S UBJECT M ATTER JURISDICTION
1. 	Federal Defendants
“Generally, a lawsuit against [a government agency or] an officer of the
United States in his official capacity is considered a lawsuit against the United
States.” Alexander v. Trump, 753 F. App’x 201, 205 (5th Cir. 2018). “Because the
United States is sovereign, it is generally immune from suit—and courts are
without jurisdiction to hear a suit against the United States—unless it has waived
its immunity.” Id. The APA “waives the United States’ sovereign immunity in suits
against federal agencies requesting nonmonetary relief.” Id. (emphasis added); see
5 U.S.C. § 702. Here, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity that would allow
Plaintiffs 	to 	recover 	monetary 	relief, 	even 	nominally, 	against 	the 	Federal
Defendants. Further, Plaintiffs admit that they only “seek compensatory and
punitive damages against several defendants in their individual capacities.”
Dkt. 103 at 44 (emphasis added). Thus, the following analysis addresses solely
Plaintiffs’ 	request 	for 	injunctive 	and 	declaratory 	relief 	against 	the 	Federal
Defendants, which is the only relief available to Plaintiffs absent a waiver of
sovereign immunity.
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My discussion of standing must begin with Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43
(2024). In Murthy, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs—two states and five
individuals—lacked standing to sue various federal government defendants for
allegedly pressuring social media platforms to censor their posts. The high court
explained that injunctive relief is warranted only when there is “a substantial risk”
of harm “in the near future.” Id. at 49. “To obtain forward-looking relief, the
plaintiffs must establish a substantial risk of future injury that is traceable to the
[Federal Defendants] and likely to be redressed by an injunction against them.” Id.
at 69. “To carry that burden, the plaintiffs must proffer evidence that the
defendants’ allegedly wrongful behavior would likely occur or continue.” Id.
(cleaned up). Thus, Plaintiffs “must show a substantial risk that, in the near future,
at least one platform will restrict the speech of at least one plaintiff in response to
the actions of at least one [Federal] defendant.” Id. at 58.
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury must
be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and that allegations of possible
future injury are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409
(2013) (cleaned 	up). 	When 	a 	plaintiff 	seeks 	forward-looking 	relief 	against
government coercion of social media platforms based on past episodes of coercion,
the plaintiff must show “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury” based on
continued government pressure. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (quotation omitted). Past
injury 	alone 	is 	insufficient 	because 	“without 	proof 	of 	an 	ongoing 	pressure
campaign, it is entirely speculative that the platforms’ future moderation decisions
will be attributable, even in part, to the defendants.” Id. at 69.
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that certain Federal Defendants pressured
social media platforms like Facebook to continually demote and remove posts even
when the posts were not violative of the platforms’ rules and guidelines. This alone,
however, is insufficient to establish standing to seek prospective relief. While
“past” 	conduct 	is 	not 	entirely 	irrelevant, 	it 	can 	establish 	standing 	to 	seek
prospective equitable relief “only insofar as it is a launching pad for a showing of
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imminent future injury.” Id. at 59. Plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient “to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). Plaintiffs’ general concern that the government may repeat its
prior conduct—without concrete factual allegations indicating a likelihood of
recurrence—does not satisfy Article III.
Although Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the Federal Defendants from coercing or
encouraging social media platforms to suppress Plaintiffs’ protected COVID-19
related speech, they fail to plausibly assert that any future censorship directed at
Plaintiffs is imminent or substantially likely to occur. Despite the length of their
lawsuit (a whopping 156 pages), Plaintiffs describe only past interactions between
the Federal Defendants and third-party social media platforms, most of which
occurred from 2021–2022. As the Federal Defendants note: Plaintiffs “have not
alleged a single instance of communication over the past two years between any
Federal Defendant and any social-media platform regarding the moderation of any
(let alone COVID-19) content.” Dkt. 107 at 18. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not identify
any ongoing or future actions targeting them or their speech.
If anything, Plaintiffs’ own allegations suggest that social media platforms
will make independent decisions and resist government pressure in the future.
Indeed, 	Plaintiffs 	point 	out 	that 	Facebook 	Chief 	Executive 	Officer 	Mark
Zuckerberg wrote in an August 2024 letter to the House Judiciary Committee: “I
believe the government pressure was wrong, and I regret that we were not more
outspoken about it. I also think we made some choices that, with the benefit of
hindsight and new information, we wouldn’t make today.” Dkt. 42 at 82 (quotation
omitted). Given this statement by the head of one of the largest and most
influential social media platforms, it is speculative at best to suggest that social
media platforms would again submit to alleged governmental pressure rather than
implement their own platform policies and guidelines. Remember, it is Plaintiffs’
burden to show “they are likely to face a risk of future censorship traceable to the
[Federal Defendants].” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 73. Plaintiffs fail to clear this hurdle.
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Setting aside the dearth of factual allegations indicating a substantial risk
that Plaintiffs’ speech will be restricted in the future, Plaintiffs face another
formidable roadblock: an Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump on
January 20, 2025, titled “Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal
Censorship.” See 90 Fed. Reg. 8243. According to President Trump, “[i]t is the
policy of the United States to . . . ensure that no Federal Government officer,
employee, 	or 	agent 	engages 	in 	or 	facilitates 	any 	conduct 	that 	would
unconstitutionally abridge the free speech of any American citizen.” Id. § 2(b).
Moreover, “no taxpayer resources [may be] used to engage in or facilitate any
conduct that would unconstitutionally abridge the free speech of any American
citizen.” Id. § 2(c). The Executive Order expressly denounced “coercive pressure
[by the Federal Government] on third parties, such as social media companies, to
moderate, deplatform, or otherwise suppress speech.” Id. § 1. It is difficult to read
that Executive Order and then claim, with a straight face, that there is a real threat
that the Federal Defendants will, in the near future, pressure social media
platforms to suppress protected speech in violation of the First Amendment.
Plaintiffs argue that “nothing (including the Executive Order) currently
prevents federal officials from resuming the same unconstitutional tactics” and
“[a]ll it takes is a change in administration or a shift in personnel for the
Government to revert to the same conduct that unlawfully silenced Plaintiffs.”
Dkt. 103 at 43. That might technically be true, but fear that a future administration
might reinstate a past directive is pure speculation that does not give rise to Article
III standing. See Mayor of Phila. v. Edu. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 622
(1974) (“[T]he issuance of prospective coercive relief against the successor to the
office must rest, at a minimum, on supplemental findings of fact indicating that
the new officer will continue the practices of his predecessor.”); Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc. v. Abbott, 58 F.4th 824, 833 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he mere
power to reenact a challenged law is not a sufficient basis on which a court can
conclude that a reasonable expectation of recurrence exists.” (quotation omitted)).
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Were this not the case, litigants could flood the judicial system with lawsuits
seeking to enjoin the conduct of past administrations without any evidence that
such conduct is likely to reoccur. As the Supreme Court has explained, injunctive
relief is warranted only when there is “a substantial risk” of future harm “in the
near future.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 49–50 (emphases added).
Plaintiffs also contend that they face “ongoing harm stemming from the
censorship . . . that persists under policies adopted in response to Defendants’
unconstitutional pressure campaign.” Dkt. 103 at 42. This argument is rooted in
speculation and fails to consider the independent role of the third-party social
media platforms. Absent “evidence of continued pressure from the [Federal
Defendants], . . . the platforms remain free to enforce, or not to enforce, those
policies—even those tainted by initial governmental coercion.” Murthy, 603 U.S.
at 73. “[W]here a causal relation between injury and challenged action depends
upon the decision of an independent third party,” standing is generally lacking.
California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 675 (2021). Accordingly, Plaintiffs must allege
more than just past governmental coercion; they must allege that future coercion
will likely occur and that the platforms will likely acquiesce to such coercion. They
have failed to do this.
Lastly, Plaintiffs’ “assertion that [they] may again be subject to [content
moderation on social media platforms caused by pressure from the Federal
Defendants] does not create the actual controversy that must exist for a declaratory
judgment to be entered.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 104 (1983).
Declaratory relief “would amount to an advisory opinion without the possibility of
any judicial relief.” California, 593 U.S. at 673 (quotation omitted). Declaratory
relief “cannot alone supply jurisdiction otherwise absent.” Id. Because speculative
fears of future injury do not confer standing, Plaintiffs’ claims seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Federal Defendants should be dismissed without
prejudice. See Mitchell v. Bailey, 982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[A]ny
dismissal predicated on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) must be without prejudice.”).
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2. 	Stanford Defendants
Against 	the 	Stanford 	Defendants, 	Plaintiffs 	seek 	injunctive 	relief,
declaratory relief, and monetary damages.
The analysis in the preceding section as to why Plaintiffs’ request for
injunctive and declaratory relief against the Federal Defendants fails for a lack of
standing applies with equal force to the Stanford Defendants. Accordingly, I
recommend that all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief brought against the
Stanford Defendants be dismissed for lack of standing.
Turning to the claim for monetary relief, the Stanford Defendants argue that
“[t]he amended complaint does not remotely satisfy the standards set forth in
Murthy—or even some lesser standard for alleging standing.” Dkt. 85 at 24. The
Supreme 	Court 	has 	explained 	that 	when, 	as 	here, 	Plaintiffs 	are 	“seeking
compensatory relief, the traceability of [Plaintiffs’] past injuries [is] the whole ball
game” as far as the standing analysis is concerned. Murthy, 603 U.S. at 59. To show
traceability, Plaintiffs must “demonstrate[] that a particular . . . defendant was
behind [their] past social-media restriction.” Id. Plaintiffs cannot “treat[] the
defendants, plaintiffs, and platforms each as a unified whole,” but instead must
offer facts establishing a causal relationship between actions by each “particular
defendant,” “particular platform,” and “particular topic” involved in each alleged
instance of content moderation. Id. at 61.
In connection with the Stanford Defendants, Plaintiffs complain about the
Vitality Project (“VP”), a research project launched in 2021 by the Stanford
Internet Observatory. According to Plaintiffs, the purpose of the VP was to provide
“real-time detection, analysis, and response to COVID-19 anti-vaccine and mis-
and disinformation and to support information exchange between public health
officials, 	government, 	and 	social 	media 	platforms.” 	Dkt. 42 	at 	9 	(quotation
omitted). Stanford University operated the Stanford Internet Observatory.
The First Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts that, when
construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, allow the court to infer that
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Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are traceable to the Stanford Defendants. Sure, Plaintiffs
allege that “the Stanford Defendants collaborated closely with federal, state, and
local government officials to moderate, target, and suppress disfavored viewpoints
concerning the Covid vaccine through” the VP. Id. at 27. But there are no
substantive 	allegations 	to 	support 	this 	naked 	assertion. 	As 	the 	Stanford
Defendants note: “There is not a single allegation in the amended complaint that
attempts to connect the specific content moderation Plaintiffs challenge to any
particular conduct by any particular Stanford Defendant, or even the Stanford
Defendants as a group.” Dkt. 85 at 24. Indeed, “Plaintiffs do not allege that they
were mentioned in the final VP report summarizing the project’s operations and
conclusions, that the VP flagged any of their posts to any social media company, or
that any Stanford Defendant flagged any of their posts to any social media
company.” Id. at 13. Simply put, the operative complaint is devoid of any
substantive allegations—plausible or otherwise—that the Stanford Defendants
caused any social media platform to censor content in a manner inconsistent with
the platform’s misinformation policies.
Plaintiffs 	recount 	voluminous 	communications 	between 	the 	Federal
Defendants, the Individual Defendants, and social media companies. But those
communications have nothing to do with the Stanford Defendants, and Murthy
expressly forbids lumping the Stanford Defendants in with other defendants and
treating them as a “unified whole.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 61. What is plainly lacking
in the First Amended Complaint are allegations that link any actions by the
Stanford Defendants, as a group or individually, to any content moderation of
Plaintiffs’ social media posts.
Only one Plaintiff, Dressen, alleges any connection whatsoever to the
Stanford Defendants. And those allegations do not come close to establishing
standing. Dressen merely identifies a VP weekly briefing that allegedly “expresses
skepticism of her claims of life-altering injuries,” cites an article about her, “and
concludes that: An injury story that does not have a proven causal link to the
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vaccine nevertheless garnered high spread because it was picked up by a major
anti-vaccine activist and by conservative politicians engaged in prior anti-vaccine
activities.” Dkt. 42 at 105 (cleaned up). Dressen does not, however, allege that the
VP briefing encouraged or demanded any action be taken by platforms. She also
does not allege that platforms took any adverse action against her based on the
weekly briefing. In short, Dressen—and the other Plaintiffs—fail to trace any harm
they suffered to the Stanford Defendants’ actions. I thus recommend that the
claims for monetary relief brought against the Stanford Defendants be dismissed
without prejudice for lack of standing.
3. 	Individual Defendants
Turning to the Individual Defendants, only Flaherty and Slavitt contend that
Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief should be dismissed for a lack of standing. 2
Even so, the “court is obliged to raise the jurisdictional issue of standing sua sponte
despite the parties’ failure to raise it.” Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 379 (5th
Cir. 2002). Thus, against Murthy’s backdrop, I must evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims for
monetary damages as to each of the Individual Defendants.
a. 	Becerra, Easterly, and Mayorkas
As already noted, “plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that
they press against each defendant, and for each form of relief that they seek.”
Murthy, 603 U.S. at 61 (quotation omitted). Plaintiffs fail to allege any actions
taken by Becerra, Easterly, or Mayorkas to encourage or compel social media
platforms to suppress content regarding the COVID-19 vaccine. Although Plaintiffs
allege that each played some role in tracking COVID-19 vaccine-related content,
2 The Individual Defendants all argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief
against them. I agree with the Individual Defendants. Given that the Individual
Defendants are all former government officials, Plaintiffs cannot “show a substantial risk,
that in the near future, at least one platform will restrict the speech of at least one plaintiff
in response to the actions of at least one [Individual] defendant.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at
58; see id. at 69 (“[W]ithout proof of an ongoing pressure campaign, it is entirely
speculative that the platforms’ future moderation decisions will be attributable, even in
part, to the defendants.”).
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Plaintiffs do not allege that Becerra, Easterly, or Mayorkas “pressured a particular
platform to censor a particular topic.” Id. In fact, Plaintiffs fail to allege that any of
these defendants—Becerra, Easterly, and Mayorkas—ever communicated directly
with any social media platforms regarding content moderation. Because there are
no 	allegations 	tracing 	Plaintiffs’ 	alleged 	harm 	to 	these 	defendants’ 	actions,
Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue relief against Becerra, Easterly, and Mayorkas.
Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages against Becerra, Easterly, and Mayorkas
should be dismissed without prejudice for a lack of standing.
b. 	Murthy
Plaintiffs allege that Murthy, the former Surgeon General, pressured social
media 	platforms 	to 	censor 	COVID-19 	“misinformation” 	while 	in 	direct
communication with platforms from 2021 through 2022. Plaintiffs allege that
Murthy began coercing Facebook as early as May 2021 and in response, Facebook
began expanding its censorship policies. On July 15, 2021, the Surgeon General
released an advisory aimed at censoring certain COVID-19 content and called on
platforms to “impose clear consequences for accounts that repeatedly violate
platform policies” because platforms “have enabled misinformation to poison our
information environment.” Dkt 42 at 63. The next day, Facebook emailed Murthy
to explain that Facebook understands “what the White House expects of us on
misinformation going forward.” Id. at 64. After Facebook executives met with
Murthy on July 23, 2021, Facebook “amended its censorship policies to make them
more restrictive,” acknowledging that Facebook “hear[d] [Murthy’s] call for [it] to
do more.” Id. at 71. On December 21, 2021, Murthy spoke on a podcast “in which
he publicly threatened to hold social media platforms ‘accountable’ for not
censoring misinformation” because such action “can’t be allowed to continue.” Id.
at 77–78. Overall, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Murthy actively pressured
Facebook 	to 	continually 	alter 	its 	guidelines 	and 	policies 	regarding
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“misinformation.” 	With 	one 	exception, 	Plaintiffs 	have 	standing 	to 	pursue
monetary damage claims against Murthy. 3
c. 	Crawford
Plaintiffs allege that during 2021, “Crawford, the CDC’s Division Director of
Digital 	Media, 	organized 	and 	ran . . . meetings 	[regarding] 	COVID-19
misinformation with representatives of social media platforms . . . in which she
and other federal officials colluded with [the] platforms about speech to monitor
and target for suppression.” Dkt. 42 at 95 (quotation omitted). In March 2021,
Crawford met with Facebook to discuss Facebook’s policies and approach to
“misinformation” posted on its platform. Id. at 96. Through use of a “social media
listening tool,” Crawford could monitor posts made on Facebook and provided
Facebook with a statement on behalf of the CDC to use when flagging content. Id.
at 99. Crawford actively encouraged Facebook to censor content and requested
updates on Facebook’s plan to label or otherwise moderate certain content.
Plaintiffs allege that such coercive tactics were also employed against Twitter and
YouTube.
Taking these facts as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Crawford’s actions pressured
platforms to enforce policies against alleged misinformation that the platforms
may not have otherwise moderated. Thus, Plaintiffs have established standing to
seek monetary relief from Crawford.
3 One plaintiff, Barcavage, alleges that the first instance of censorship he faced occurred
in March 2021, which is before Murthy allegedly began pressuring platforms to censor
content in May 2021. See Dkt. 103 at 37 (Barcavage began posting on Facebook in March
2021 and was censored “almost immediately.”). Because Barcavage alleges censorship
before Murthy is alleged to have communicated with various platforms, Barcavage cannot
establish that his alleged injuries from this first instance of censorship are traceable to
Murthy’s conduct. Other than Barcavage, the Plaintiffs have adequately traced the alleged
harm arising from the censorship of their social media posts to Murthy’s alleged coercion
beginning in May 2021. Dressen faced censorship on Facebook “for the first time in June
2021”; Dobbs “was not censored [on Facebook] until June 28, 2021”; YouTube censored
Newell’s post for the first time in September 2022; and Holland and Ramirez allege that
they began facing censorship on Facebook in the summer of 2021. Id. at 37–38.
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d. 	Flaherty and Slavitt
According 	to 	the 	First 	Amended 	Complaint, 	Flaherty 	and 	Slavitt
communicated heavily with platforms, specifically Facebook, to encourage content
moderation beginning in at least March 2021. To summarize the allegations,
Flaherty and Slavitt pressured Facebook regarding its plans “for reducing virality
of vaccine hesitancy content” and sought an active role in Facebook’s “plan [for]
tackling 	vaccine 	hesitancy 	spread 	on 	[the] 	platform.” 	Id. 	at 	42. 	Facebook
reportedly stated in an email “that, in direct response to White House demands, it
was censoring, removing, and reducing the spread of content that did not violate
its policies.” Id. In April 2021, Flaherty even requested “assurances” regarding how
Facebook was handling misinformation. Id. at 43. Facebook “provided Slavitt with
a detailed report about [a] post, explaining that [the] content did not violate
Facebook policies, but assuring the White House that Facebook would censor it
anyway.” Id. at 47. Similar allegations support Plaintiffs’ claims that Flaherty and
Slavitt 	pressured 	Twitter 	and 	YouTube 	to 	censor 	certain 	misinformation
regardless of the platforms’ independent policies on the topic. See id. at 49–50.
Each Plaintiff alleges that their posts were censored on at least one of the three
platforms that Flaherty and Slavitt were actively engaged with—Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube—after Flaherty and Slavitt’s coercive communications began in the
spring of 2021. At this stage, allegations that Plaintiffs’ posts were removed at or
near the time that Flaherty and Slavitt pressured platforms to censor such content
sufficiently evinces a causal link between Flaherty’s and Slavitt’s actions, the
platforms’ censorship decisions, and Plaintiffs’ harm to satisfy Article III standing.
Because Plaintiffs have established Article III standing as to Flaherty and Slavitt,
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against these two defendants for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction would be inappropriate.
B. 	PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Having determined that this court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over
Crawford, Flaherty, Murthy, and Slavitt, I will now focus on personal jurisdiction.
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Crawford, Flaherty, Murthy, and Slavitt all argue that personal jurisdiction over
them is lacking.
As mentioned above, a defendant’s contacts with the forum can give rise to
either general or specific jurisdiction. Plaintiffs assert no basis for general
jurisdiction, arguing only that the court has specific personal jurisdiction over the
Individual Defendants.
To establish specific jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that the
Individual Defendants “purposefully availed [themselves] of the benefits and
protections of the forum state such that [they] should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.” Carmona v. Leo Ship Mgmt., Inc., 924 F.3d 190, 193 (5th
Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). This requirement ensures that the Individual Defendants
will not be subjected to personal jurisdiction “solely as a result of random,
fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or a
third person.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (cleaned up). Each Plaintiff’s claims
must also “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts” with Texas. Bristol-
Myers, 582 U.S. at 262 (cleaned up). Finally, “[e]ach defendant’s contacts with the
forum state must be assessed individually.” Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 781 n.13 (1984).
Plaintiffs do not allege that any Individual Defendant has “traveled to,
conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone” to
Texas. Walden, 571 U.S. at 289. Plaintiffs also do not claim that any Individual
Defendant directed that Plaintiffs’ social media posts be flagged or taken down, or
that the alleged censorship occurred in Texas. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that this
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants because
they all “engaged in intentional, forum-directed conduct that foreseeably caused
harm in Texas, singling out Texas as a hotspot for ‘misinformation,’ monitoring
Texas-based speech and speakers, and pressuring platforms to suppress content
emanating from the State.” Dkt. 103 at 10.
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The only person identified in the First Amended Complaint—on Plaintiffs’
side or Defendants’ side—that has any direct connection to Texas is Ramirez, who
resides in the Lone Star State. 4 The other five Plaintiffs reside outside of Texas, 5 as
do all the Individual Defendants. Importantly, the five nonresident Plaintiffs fail
to allege that any Individual Defendant purposefully directed conduct at Texas that
gave rise or relates to their specific claims of censorship. Keep in mind that specific
jurisdiction is claim and party specific. See Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262. In
Bristol-Myers, though the defendant had sold Plavix, an antiplatelet medication,
in California, the nonresident plaintiffs could not sue in California because they
“were not prescribed Plavix in California, did not purchase Plavix in California, did
not ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix in California.” Id. at
264. “The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested
Plavix 	in 	California—and 	allegedly 	sustained 	the 	same 	injuries 	as 	did 	the
nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over the
nonresidents’ claims.” Id. at 265. This principle bars the claims brought by the five
nonresident Plaintiffs in this case. As in Bristol-Myers, even if the Individual
Defendants had sufficient contacts with Texas to support a claim by Ramirez (a
Texas resident), that would “not allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over
the nonresidents’ claims.” Id.
Plaintiffs “appear to believe that their civil conspiracy claim is enough to
establish personal jurisdiction over 	[the 	Individual 	Defendants]. 	There 	is 	no
authority from [the Fifth Circuit] supporting [this] belief.” Chow v. United States,
No. 20-30503, 2021 WL 3438365, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2021). The Fifth Circuit
has 	“implicitly 	recognized 	that personal 	jurisdiction over 	one 	defendant
4 The First Amended Complaint mentions “Texas” only twice, noting that “Ramirez
resides in Edinburg, Texas,” Dkt. 42 at 12, and that he spoke “locally in Texas to raise
awareness and share his son’s story.” Id. at 133.
5 Dressen resides in Utah; Barcavage resides in Pennsylvania; Dobbs resides in Missouri;
Holland resides in Tennessee; and Newell resides in Minnesota. See id. at 11–12.
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conspirator is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
coconspirator.” Id. (citing Thomas v. Kadish, 748 F.2d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 1984)).
Personal jurisdiction must be based on each defendant’s individual contacts with
the forum “and not as part of the conspiracy.” Delta Brands, Inc. v. Danieli Corp.,
99 F. App’x 1, 6 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Bar Grp., LLC v. Bus. Intel. Advisors, Inc.,
215 F. Supp. 3d 524, 539 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (“Allegations of conspiracy will not
establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction; a plaintiff must show that each
defendant individually, and not as part of a conspiracy, purposely established
minimum contacts with Texas that would satisfy due process.”). “[B]are allegations
of conspiracy without factual support do not suffice to establish minimum contacts
for personal jurisdiction purposes.” Am. 	Realty 	Tr., 	Inc. 	v. 	Hamilton 	Lane
Advisors, Inc., 115 F. App’x 662, 666 n.16 (5th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, to establish
that this court has personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants, Plaintiffs
must show that the alleged conspiracy was “related to or arose out of [the
Individual Defendants’] contacts with Texas.” Delta Brands, 99 F. App’x at 6; see
also Pearson v. Shriners Hosps. for Child., Inc., 133 F.4th 433, 442 (5th Cir.
2025) (Given that “each defendant’s contacts with the forum state must be
assessed individually . . . , plaintiffs may not aggregate defendants’ forum contacts
and may not establish personal jurisdiction without specifying who did what.”).
So, what are the alleged contacts the remaining Individual Defendants—
Crawford, Flaherty, Murthy, and Slavitt—have with Texas? Let’s look, defendant-
by-defendant, at the contacts Plaintiffs allege in their response to Defendants’
motion to dismiss. 6
6 Ordinarily, a motion to dismiss considers only the four corners of the operative
complaint, any attachments thereto, and any documents in the record that are central to
the complaint. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir.
2000). When evaluating personal jurisdiction, however, the court “can consider the
assertions in the plaintiff’s complaint, as well as the contents of the record at the time of
the motion.” Frank, 947 F.3d at 336 (cleaned up).
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Crawford and Murthy: As far as Crawford and Murthy are concerned,
Plaintiffs fail to allege a single contact between them and Texas. Not one. Thus,
Crawford and Murthy are not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas.
Slavitt: Plaintiffs allege that Texas has specific personal jurisdiction over
Slavitt because of the following five Twitter posts he made that mention Texas:
(1) 	On June 25, 2020, Slavitt wrote “HEY TEXAS: You’re a COVID
hot spot with 78% case growth in the last 2 weeks. Donald
Trump filed papers to take coverage from 1,958,000 Texans
today by repealing the ACA.” Dkt. 103-2 at 2.
(2) 	On July 9, 2021, Slavitt wrote “In the case of Texas, they are
going to flout CDC guidance.” Dkt. 103-3 at 2.
(3) 	On July 22, 2021, Slavitt wrote “40% of COVID cases are
coming from 3 states—Florida, Texas, and Missouri.” Dkt. 103-
4 at 2.
(4) 	On September 12, 2021, Slavitt shared a news story from NBC
titled “Texas sues 6 school districts that defied governor’s mask
order” and wrote with it “[t]he virus has no better friends than
these heavyweights.” Dkt. 103-5 at 2.
(5) 	On October 11, 2021, Slavitt wrote that Texas Governor Greg
“Abbott cares about his radical ideology, but nothing about
Texans.” Dkt. 103-6 at 2. In the same post, Slavitt shared a New
York Times article titled “Gov. Greg Abbott Bars Vaccine
Mandates in Texas.” Id.
These social media posts in which Slavitt referred to the spread of COVID-
19 in Texas and criticized COVID-19 policy in Texas do not amount to purposeful
availment. Social media posts “are circulated to the public by virtue of their
universal accessibility, which exists from their inception. That’s why clicks, visits,
and views from forum residents cannot alone show purposeful availment. They are
not evidence that the defendant has formed a contact with the forum state.”
Johnson, 21 F.4th at 325 (quotation omitted). Further, the latter four posts are “not
directed at Texas readers as distinguished from readers in other states.” Revell v.
Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002). Even assuming that Slavitt’s first Twitter
post stating “HEY TEXAS” is purposefully directed at Texas, Plaintiffs fail to show
how their claims against Slavitt for violating § 1985(3) arise out of or relate to this
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post. See Johnson, 21 F.4th at 326 (“And even if those acts did target Texas, neither
relates to Johnson’s claim, so neither supports specific jurisdiction.”). Slavitt
publicly declaring that Texas is a COVID-19 hotspot on Twitter has nothing to do
with censoring Texans’ social media posts about COVID-19. “There must be an
affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, an
activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject
to the State’s regulation.” Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262 (cleaned up). In short,
Plaintiffs fail to allege that Slavitt has any contacts with Texas that would establish
specific personal jurisdiction. 7
Flaherty: 	Flaherty 	previously 	served 	as 	the 	Deputy 	Assistant 	to 	the
President and Director of Digital Strategy. Plaintiffs allege that Flaherty has
purposefully availed himself of jurisdiction in Texas based on one conversation
with a Facebook representative in which Flaherty merely mentioned Texas. See
Dkt. 103 at 19 (“Flaherty, in a conversation with Facebook officials on April 5, 2021,
discussed the need to target and identify pockets of the country where vaccine
hesitancy is more of a problem, pointing to Texas with no mask mandate as a prime
example.” (quotation omitted)).
This one alleged contact does not evince purposeful activity directed at
Texas, nor does it have anything to do with Plaintiffs, their specific social media
posts, or any content moderation that may be the basis of their claims for violations
of their right to free speech. “The only relevant activities of the defendant are those
that relate to the plaintiff’s suit. That crucial link is missing here.” Johnson, 21
F.4th at 325.
* * *
7 Plaintiffs have filed a motion to strike or disregard portions of Slavitt’s reply brief that
cites to—and attaches as an exhibit—a Wall Street Journal article to support Slavitt’s
argument that Plaintiffs’ § 1985(3) conspiracy claim is time barred. See Dkt. 108.
Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is a non-dispositive pretrial matter on which a magistrate judge
may rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Because I have determined that Texas lacks
personal jurisdiction over Slavitt, I need not even address Slavitt’s statute of limitations
argument. As such, I deny Slavitt’s motion to strike as moot.
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Plaintiffs fail to allege that their claims “arise out of or relate to” any
defendants’ 	alleged 	contacts 	with 	Texas, 	precluding 	the 	exercise 	of 	specific
personal jurisdiction. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351,
359 (2021). Because I have determined that minimum contacts are lacking, I need
not assess whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over any Individual
Defendant in Texas would be fair and reasonable. See Johnson, 21 F.4th at 323
(The element requiring that Plaintiffs’ claims relate to or arise from Defendants’
forum contacts “may preclude [the court’s] power even when all other factors—the
burden on the defendant, the forum state’s interest in applying its own law, and
the convenience of the forum—strongly favor [the court’s] jurisdiction.”); Allred v.
Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Only if the nonresident
defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state will the fairness
of the exercise of personal jurisdiction be evaluated.”). I thus recommend that
Plaintiffs’ claims against the Individual Defendants be dismissed without prejudice
because they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas. 8
8 The Stanford Defendants, Becerra, Easterly, and Mayorkas argue that even if the court
had subject matter jurisdiction, they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas. I
agree. Plaintiffs allege that the Stanford Defendants have contacts with Texas arising from
their roles in COVID-19 misinformation initiatives, but Plaintiffs fail to allege a
connection between 	these 	defendants’ 	alleged 	contacts 	with 	Texas 	and 	Plaintiffs’
§ 1985(3) claim.
As far as Easterly, Becerra, and Mayorkas are concerned, personal jurisdiction is also
lacking.
Easterly: According to Plaintiffs, Easterly’s sole connection to Texas is that, in her role
as the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, she appointed
two Texans to the 23-member Cybersecurity Advisory Committee in December 2021. This
purported connection to Texas is legally insufficient to support a finding of specific
jurisdiction. To satisfy the specific jurisdiction inquiry, Easterly’s contacts with Texas
must be purposeful “and not merely fortuitous.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. 	Moreover,
Plaintiffs fail to explain how the alleged injuries they suffered—the censoring of their
social media posts—arise out of the appointment of two Texans to an advisory committee.
Becerra: For Becerra, the former Secretary of Health and Human Services, the best
Plaintiffs can muster is that he oversaw an agency that awarded four grants to third
parties in Texas aimed at combating COVID-19 misinformation. These allegations
likewise do not support specific personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction does not exist
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PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO
CONDUCT JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
There is one final matter I must address. Plaintiffs ask this court for leave to
conduct jurisdictional discovery. See Dkt. 103 at 30–32 (regarding personal
jurisdiction), 	44–45 	(regarding 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction). 	As 	a 	group,
Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery on the basis that
Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish the requisite need for such
discovery. Additionally, the Stanford Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have waived
their right to seek jurisdictional discovery.
I will start with the waiver argument. The Stanford Defendants insist that
Plaintiffs waived the opportunity to pursue jurisdictional discovery. I concur.
Although Plaintiffs certainly knew that Defendants’ motions to dismiss would
focus on standing and personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs agreed to proceed with
dispositive motions and “stay discovery pending the resolution of Defendants’
dispositive motions.” Dkt. 39 at 2; see also Dkt. 23 at 5 (joint case management
plan explaining that the Stanford Defendants are challenging subject matter and
personal jurisdiction). It would be fundamentally unfair to allow Plaintiffs to
switch positions now to seek discovery they previously agreed not to pursue. See
over an agency head simply because of his oversight and supervisory responsibilities. See
e.g., Hill v. Pugh, 75 F. App’x 715, 719 (10th Cir. 2003) (“It is not reasonable to suggest
that federal prison officials may be hauled into court simply because they have regional
and national supervisory responsibilities over facilities within a forum state.”); Nwanze
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Mere supervision over
[a federal agency], the reach of which extends into every state, is insufficient to establish
a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”). “If a federal agency head could be sued
personally in any district within his or her official authority merely for supervising acts of
subordinates . . . the minimum contacts requirement would be rendered meaningless.”
Wag-Aero, Inc. v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 1479, 1486 (E.D. Wis. 1993), aff’d, 35 F.3d
569 (7th Cir. 1994).
Mayorkas: Plaintiffs do not allege that Mayorkas has a single contact with Texas.
Thus, the Stanford Defendants, Becerra, Easterly, and Mayorkas are not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Texas. This is an independent reason that dismissal of this case is
appropriate as to these defendants.
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Zevoli 243 (Pty) Ltd. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 1:17-cv-03059, 2018 WL 1626544, at
*5 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 4, 2018) (plaintiff waived jurisdictional discovery by previously
informing the district court that it would not need discovery for purposes of the
motion to dismiss).
Even if Plaintiffs had not waived the opportunity to seek jurisdictional
discovery, Plaintiffs fail to make an adequate showing to justify such discovery on
personal jurisdiction or standing. As the Fifth Circuit has explained:
To merit jurisdictional discovery, [Plaintiffs] must show that [they
are] 	likely 	to 	produce 	the 	facts 	needed 	to 	withstand 	dismissal.
[Plaintiffs] must make clear which specific facts [they] expect[]
discovery to find. We will not authorize a jurisdictional fishing
expedition 	based 	on 	a 	plaintiff’s 	general 	averments 	that 	more
discovery will prove our jurisdiction.
Johnson, 21 F.4th at 326 (quotations omitted).
With respect to personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs argue that discovery would
allow them to uncover: (1) Defendants’ communications that reference Texas,
including communications with or about social media companies regarding
content 	originating 	from 	Texas; 	(2) records 	of 	communications 	between
Defendants 	and 	third 	parties 	referencing 	“Texas-based 	concerns, 	users, 	or
speech”; and (3) information illustrating Defendants’ “geographic reach and [the]
impact 	of 	Defendants’ 	censorship 	activities” 	to 	determine 	if 	Texas 	was
disproportionately targeted for content moderation. Dkt. 103 at 31. This is nothing
more than a “jurisdictional fishing expedition” that the Fifth Circuit has rejected.
Johnson, 21 F.4th at 326; see also Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 284 (5th Cir.
1982) (“When the lack of personal jurisdiction is clear, discovery would serve no
purpose and should not be permitted.”). “Discovery on matters of personal
jurisdiction need not be permitted unless the motion to dismiss raises issues of
fact.” Kelly v. Syria Shell Petrol. Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 855 (5th Cir. 2000)
(cleaned up). Because I have accepted Plaintiffs’ allegations (and the evidence they
attach to their response) as true in determining whether personal jurisdiction
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exists, 	there 	are 	no 	factual 	issues 	to 	address. 	Jurisdictional 	discovery 	is
unwarranted.
With respect to standing, Plaintiffs are “not entitled to jurisdictional
discovery if the record shows that the requested discovery is not likely to produce
the facts needed to withstand a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.” Freeman v. United States,
556 F.3d 326, 342 (5th Cir. 2009). This is because “the imposition of jurisdictional
discovery places an undue and unnecessary burden on the parties when the
proponent of such discovery only supports the request by conjecture, speculation,
or suggestion.” NL Indus., Inc. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 558,
566 (N.D. Tex. 2006). Here, Plaintiffs fail to identify what facts they believe
discovery would uncover and how those facts would support standing.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery
is denied. 9
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that Defendants’ motions to
dismiss (Dkts. 85, 88, 89, 94, 96) be granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction.10 Additionally, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike or Disregard
Portions of Defendant Slavitt’s Reply (Dkt. 108) is denied as moot. I also deny
Plaintiffs’ request for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
The 	parties 	have 	14 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
9 Plaintiffs’ request for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery is a non-dispositive
pretrial matter on which a magistrate judge may rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
10 Even if the court had subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit and personal
jurisdiction over the Individual and Stanford Defendants, Plaintiffs’ sole claim against the
Individual and Stanford Defendants under § 1985(3) would not survive the pleading
stage. In their response brief, “Plaintiffs concede that under governing Fifth Circuit
precedent, [the] ‘only conspiracies actionable under section 1985(3) are those motivated
by racial animus.’” Dkt. 103 at 53 (quoting Cantú v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir.
2019)). Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that the Individual Defendants’ or the Stanford
Defendants’ actions were motivated by racial animus dooms their § 1985(3) claims as
matter of law.
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Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this 	day of December 2025.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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