Avila v. Placido et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
ISRAEL AVILA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:26-CV-00065
SAMINIEGO JR. PLACIDO, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS AND TO RETAIN CASE
Plaintiff Israel Avila is a Texas inmate appearing pro se and in forma pauperis. He
filed this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s case is subject
to screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28
U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2), 1915A.
For purposes of screening, Plaintiff has stated Eighth Amendment claims of failure
to protect against Major Aaron M. Cavazos in his individual capacity. Accordingly, it is
respectfully recommended that this claim be RETAINED. The undersigned further
recommends that: (1) Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against all of the Defendants
in their official capacities be DISMISSED without prejudice as barred by the Eleventh
Amendment; and (2) all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims be DISMISSED with prejudice
for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 14, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a Texas inmate currently assigned to the TDCJ Alfred Hughes Unit1 in
Gatesville, Texas, however, the facts giving rise to this case arose out of his assignment to
the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas in 2025 and 2026. Plaintiff filed this action on
March 3, 2026, utilizing a prisoner civil rights complaint form. (D.E. 1). Plaintiff named
the following defendants: (1) Assistant Warden Placido Saminiego2, Jr.; (2) Senior
Warden Larissa Wysocki;3 and (3) Major Aaron M. Cavazos. A Spears4 hearing was held
on April 7, 2026, at which Plaintiff was given an opportunity to explain his claims. For
purposes of evaluating Plaintiff’s allegations, the undersigned has considered Plaintiff’s
Original Complaint (D.E. 1), the attachments (D.E. 1-1, D.E. 1-2), and Plaintiff’s testimony
1 The Court’s electronic docket reflects Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas.
However, the TDCJ inmate locator indicates Plaintiff is currently assigned to the Hughes Unit in Gatesville, Texas.
The undersigned admonished Plaintiff at the Spears hearing and in writing (D.E. 6, ¶ 9), and does so again, that he
must always keep the Court aware of his current address by immediately filing a notice of a change of address which
includes his name, the case number of this action, and his new address. Failure to do so may result in the case being
dismissed for want of prosecution. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a notice of change of address within seven (7) days
of receiving this order and within seven (7) days of any subsequent transfer or change of address.
2 The correct spelling of this defendant may be Samaniego, but the misspelling is not important because the
undersigned is recommending dismissal as to this defendant.
3 Plaintiff lists Warden Wysocki as the assistant warden. However, she is currently listed as the McConnell Unit’s
senior warden on the TDCJ Unit Directory. See www.tdcj.texas.gov/unit_directory/ml.html
4 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
that testimony given at a Spears hearing is incorporated into the pleadings).
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at the Spears hearing. The factual summary contained herein does not include input from
the defendants and is therefore set forth from Plaintiff’s perspective and solely for purposes
of judicial screening and evaluating Plaintiff’s allegations.
III. PLAINTIFF=S ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
Plaintiff was convicted of a felony offense in Cameron County, Texas in 2011. He
is serving a 40-year prison sentence. Plaintiff’s allegations in this action arise in connection
with his housing assignment at the McConnell Unit in late 2025 through early 2026. In
approximately September or October 2026, Plaintiff was being transferred to the TDCJ
Memorial Unit in Rosharon, Texas. However, for reasons unclear to Plaintiff he was taken
to the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas. Being brought to the McConnell Unit presented
a serious risk to Plaintiff’s safety because Plaintiff has, or had, certain prison problems
with other inmates that make him a target to being assaulted by other inmates. Plaintiff
testified these problems are documented, reflected in his inmate file, and are known to
TDCJ officials. During the transportation, Plaintiff was identified by another inmate who
knew of Plaintiff’s identity and history. Plaintiff knew there were inmates who presented
a danger to himself at the McConnell Unit, and he knew the inmate would notify those
inmates of Plaintiff’s identity. Thus, Plaintiff was a marked man when he arrived at the
McConnell Unit.
For reasons unclear to Plaintiff, his inmate classification was changed when he
arrived at the McConnell Unit from being G4 to G5. The G5 level is more restrictive than
G4. Plaintiff did not explain this well, but he believed being classified as a G5 level inmate
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presented a greater risk of danger to his safety. Major Cavasos was the correctional officer
who escorted Plaintiff from closed custody to general population. During this walk,
Plaintiff explained the risk of danger and his affiliation to Major Cavazos and that he had
enemies on the unit who were out to get him. Plaintiff testified he told Major Cavazos
Plaintiff’s life was in danger and Major Cavazos was aware of those dangers but ignored
them. According to Plaintiff, Major Cavazos told Plaintiff to write an I-60 complaint form
rather than handling the situation at the time. Within an hour of being taken to his cell by
Major Cavazos, Plaintiff was assaulted by his new cellmate. Plaintiff was knocked
unconscious by his cellmate while Plaintiff had his back turned. Plaintiff does not know
the exact manner or means of the assault because it was a sneak attack that was rapid and
violent. When he regained consciousness, he was being removed from the cell by other
officers. After this first assault, Plaintiff was placed in restrictive housing while unit
officials conducted an inmate protection investigation (IPI).
Plaintiff testified the IPI investigation determined Plaintiff was in danger and he
should be transferred to a different unit for his safety. However, while Plaintiff was waiting
to be transferred, for reasons unclear to Plaintiff, the unit officials changed their mind and
determined that the IPI investigation should not have been substantiated. Plaintiff’s custody
was reduced from G5 to G4, and he was returned to general population. Major Cavazos
was on the Committee that made this decision. The other defendants were not on the
committee.
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By January 15, 2026, Plaintiff had filed appropriate grievances and a separate
federal lawsuit.5 In the grievances and prior lawsuit, Plaintiff named Major Cavazos as a
person being responsible for his attack. Nevertheless, on January 16, 2026, Plaintiff was
transferred out of restrictive housing back to general population. On February 12, 2026,
Plaintiff was inside his cell when another inmate entered his cell with a weapon. The
weapon was a sock with a fan motor or other heavy object in the bottom. The inmate swung
the object striking Plaintiff in the head and body. Plaintiff suffered a fractured rib,
contusions to his head, and he was bleeding from multiple locations. Plaintiff was then
taken to the medical department for treatment and placed back in restrictive housing. About
a month after the second assault, Plaintiff was transferred from the McConnell Unit.
Plaintiff names Major Cavazos as a defendant because Major Cavazos knew of the
serious risk of danger to Plaintiff, failed to take reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from
being assaulted, and made decisions regarding Plaintiff’s custody that made the risk of
serious danger to Plaintiff greater.
Plaintiff names Wardens Samaniego and Wysocki because they knew of the danger
to Plaintiff and as supervisors they were in charge of notifying the officials who could
arrange for Plaintiff’s transfer from the McConnell Unit before the assaults occurred.
Plaintiff believes the evidence will show these defendants knew that Plaintiff was not
supposed to be assigned to the McConnell Unit. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Warden
Wysocki was involved in approving Plaintiff’s change in inmate classification without
5 See Avila v. Placido, et al., No. 2:26-CV-00023 (S.D. Tex. 2026). Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that action and it
was dismissed without prejudice.
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providing Plaintiff notice or an opportunity to be heard and Plaintiff’s custody level was
made more severe without Plaintiff having received a disciplinary hearing.
Plaintiff also appears to allege that each of the defendants retaliated against him for
his filing grievances and an earlier lawsuit.
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis the Court shall evaluate the
complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds the complaint
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A
claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly
does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998). A claim has no
arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional
facts, when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211,
213 (5th Cir. 1998).
“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not
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dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give rise
to a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief above
the level of mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As long as the complaint, taken
as a whole, gives rise to a plausible inference of actionable conduct, Plaintiff’s claim should
not be dismissed. Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section provides a vehicle
for redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law. Nelson
v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must
prove that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988). A defendant acts under color of state law if he misuses or abuses official
power and if there is a nexus between the victim, the improper conduct, and the defendant’s
performance of official duties. Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).
B. Failure to Protect
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const.
amend. VIII. It is well settled that the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
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unusual punishment requires prison officials to protect inmates from violent attacks by
other inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). However, not every injury
suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another translates into constitutional liability for
prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety. Id.
In order for prison officials to be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for failure
to protect, a prisoner must prove that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk
to the inmate’s safety; was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm existed and also drew the inference; and failed to take
reasonable remedial action. Id. at 842-45; Cantu v. Jones, 293 F.3d 839, 844 (5th Cir.
2002). Deliberate indifference describes a state of mind “more blameworthy than
negligence;” there must be “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests
or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Only deliberate indifference will suffice to state a
failure to protect claim; mere negligence is not sufficient. Id. at 837. Additionally, the
Eighth Amendment protects against both present and future dangers to inmates. Prison
authorities must protect not only against current threats but also must guard against
“sufficiently imminent dangers” that are likely to cause harm in the “next week or month
or year.” Alexander v. Beach, No. 2:17-CV-125-Z, 2020 WL 2813527, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
May 29, 2020) (quoting Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to indicate he was actually in danger from being
assaulted by other inmates. The facts alleged by Plaintiff indicate Major Cavazos was
made aware of the danger because Plaintiff told Cavazos in person while Cavazos was
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transporting Plaintiff to the new housing assignment. Rather than taking action to prevent
the assault, Major Cavazos placed Plaintiff in a dangerous housing assignment and told
Plaintiff to write an I-60 complaint. Within an hour Plaintiff was knocked unconscious by
his cellmate. Plaintiff further alleges Major Cavazos was aware Plaintiff had been assaulted
and then personally participated in the decision to place Plaintiff back in general population
where plaintiff was again at risk. Plaintiff wrote additional grievances and named Major
Cavazos as a defendant in a separate lawsuit. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was violently
assaulted a second time. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to raise a reasonable
inference, or plausible claim, that Major Cavazos knew of and disregarded an excessive
risk to Plaintiff’s safety and further that Major Cavazos failed to take reasonable remedial
action.
However, regarding Wardens Samaniego and Wysocki, Plaintiff fails to allege these
defendants were aware of the serious risk to Plaintiff. To the extent Plaintiff alleges
Samaniego and Wysocki were aware of the danger, Plaintiff has not alleged these
defendants were personally involved in the decision-making process that placed Plaintiff
in danger. It appears Plaintiff names Samaniego and Wysocki because of their supervisory
positions, which under the facts alleged in this case is not enough to state plausible claims
against them.
“Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.”
Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). There is no vicarious or respondeat
superior liability of supervisors under section 1983. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303–
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04 (5th Cir. 1987). See also Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 2011)
(the acts of subordinates do not trigger individual § 1983 liability for supervisory officials).
“Supervisory officials may be held liable only if: (1) they affirmatively participate in acts
that cause constitutional deprivation; or (2) implement unconstitutional policies that
causally result in plaintiff’s injuries.” Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Tex., 977 F.2d 924, 929
(5th Cir. 1992). “Mere knowledge and acquiescence on a supervisor’s part is insufficient
to create supervisory liability under § 1983.” Doe v. Bailey, No. H-14-2985, 2015 WL
5737666, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677).
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends the Court retain Plaintiff’s
failure to protect claims against Major Cavazos in his individual capacity and dismiss the
failure to protect claims against Wardens Samaniego and Wysocki.
C. Retaliation
Retaliation is not expressly referred to in the Constitution; however, it is nonetheless
actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill an individual’s exercise of
constitutional rights. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Retaliation is
actionable “only if the retaliatory act ‘is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness
from further exercising his constitutional rights.’” Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267, 270 (5th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2006)).
The purpose of allowing retaliation claims under § 1983 is to ensure prisoners are
not unduly discouraged from exercising their constitutional rights. Morris, 449 F.3d at
686. Thus, “[a] prison official may not retaliate against or harass an inmate for exercising
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the right of access to the courts, or for complaining to a supervisor about a guard’s
misconduct.” Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995). “Filing grievances and
otherwise complaining about the conduct of correctional officers through proper channels
are constitutionally protected activities, and prison officials may not retaliate against
inmates for engaging in such protected activities.” Reese v. Skinner, 322 F. App’x 381,
383 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Morris, 449 F.3d at 684).
The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that “prisoners’ claims of retaliation are regarded
with skepticism and are carefully scrutinized by the courts.” Adeleke v. Fleckenstein, 385
F. App’x 386, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166). In addition, the Fifth
Circuit has concluded that some acts, even though they may be motivated by retaliatory
intent, are so de minimis that they would not deter the ordinary person from further exercise
of his rights. Morris, 449 F.3d at 686. Such acts do not rise to the level of constitutional
violations and cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim. Id.
To state a valid § 1983 claim for retaliation, “a prisoner must allege (1) a specific
constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her
exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Jones, 188 F.3d at
324-25 (citing McDonald v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998)). An inmate must
allege more than his personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation. Johnson v.
Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
In the present case, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are conclusory and are not
supported by sufficient factual allegations. While Plaintiff has alleged a claim of deliberate
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indifference, the nature of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is that of extreme
neglect. However, the allegations do not raise a plausible claim that any defendant acted
against Plaintiff with a retaliatory intent. Thus, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s
retaliation claims be dismissed.
D. Inmate Classification
Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his rights when his inmate classification
level was changed or made more restrictive without notice to him or an opportunity to be
heard. He alleges the normal TDCJ procedures require that he receive a disciplinary case
before his classification would be made more severe and that he did not receive a
disciplinary case to trigger the change.
It is well settled that a prisoner has no liberty interest in his custodial level or
classification unless he can demonstrate that it imposes “an atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Hernandez v.
Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
484 (1995)). “[A]n inmate’s placement in administrative segregation, without more, does
not constitute the deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.” Id. (citing
Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, fail to state a claim. His placement in a
more restrictive housing environment after being reclassified fail to constitute atypical or
significant hardships. See Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999); Martin
v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998). Compare Blair v. Davis, No. 5:17-CV-276,
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2018 WL 1083620, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2018) (holding that prisoner’s G5 custody
status and placement in restrictive housing with no windows and constant fluorescent
lighting fails to meet the Sandin standard); with Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214
(2005) (holding that prisoner’s confinement in a super-max facility created a liberty interest
in being free from such conditions where almost all human contact was prohibited, inmates
were kept in single cells behind solid doors for 23 hours a day, lights remained on at all
time, visitation was rare, and inmates were disqualified from parole consideration). The
undersigned also finds it important that Plaintiff alleges both that his classification was
made more severe and then lowered. Plaintiff may in fact be correct that the initial inmate
classification change to G5 at the McConnell Unit was made in error, but it was later
corrected. The nature of the change in custody level was not so severe to give rise to a
constitutional claim. Because Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a liberty interest in
maintaining a G4 inmate classification, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
Plaintiff’s claim regarding his inmate classification against Defendants be dismissed for
failure to state a claim and/or as frivolous.
E. Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Official Capacity
A suit against a state officer in his or her official capacity is effectively a suit against
that state official’s office. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
The Eleventh Amendment, however, bars claims for money damages against a state or state
agency. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Aguilar v. Texas
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). As such, an action for
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monetary damages against a state official in his or her official capacity is one against the
state itself and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985). The Fifth Circuit has extended the Eleventh Amendment immunity
specifically to TDCJ officers and officials acting in their official capacities. See Oliver v.
Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) (Eleventh Amendment bars prisoner’s suit for
money damages against prison officials in their official capacities).
To the extent Plaintiff sues any of the Defendants in their official capacities for
money damages, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, it is
respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Defendants
in their official capacities be dismissed with prejudice.
F. Other Claims Not Specifically Addressed in this Memorandum
To ensure justice and access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of pro se
litigants liberally. See United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983)). Pro se actions will not be
dismissed based on technical pleading defects and should be construed to ensure such
claims are given fair and meaningful consideration despite the unrepresented litigant’s
unfamiliarity with the law. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); See also
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (Pro se parties are normally accorded more
leniency in the construction of their pleadings).
The undersigned has attempted to articulate and analyze Plaintiff’s claims in an
impartial manner consistent with providing appropriate leniency to pro se litigants while at
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the same time requiring compliance with applicable pleading and screening standards. To
the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise a claim not specifically addressed by the
undersigned in this Memorandum and Recommendation, Plaintiff has failed to state such
claim with sufficient factual detail or clarity to allow the claim to be identified, understood,
or analyzed by the Court.
As stated previously, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Again,
Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give rise to a
reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Further, the
factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief above the level of mere
speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Plaintiff is advised that any claim not addressed in this Memorandum and
Recommendation is not currently before this Court because Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts or state such claims clearly.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff has stated Eighth Amendment claims of failure to protect against Major
Aaron M. Cavazos in his individual capacity. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended
that this claim be RETAINED. The undersigned will separately order service on Major
Cavazos.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned further recommends that: (1)
Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against all of the Defendants in their official
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capacities be DISMISSED without prejudice as barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and
(2) all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state
a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).
The Clerk of Court is directed to obtain Plaintiff’s current address from the TDCJ
inmate locater website, and mail this M&R to him in a manner that will establish service
(i.e. CMRRR, Federal Express, etc.).
Respectfully submitted on May 14, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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