Valdez v. Wysocki

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
RICARDO VALDEZ,
Petitioner,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00322
LARISSA WYSOCKI, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Ricardo Valdez is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(“TDCJ”) and is currently incarcerated at the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas. On
December 8, 2025, Valdez filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,1
asserting that he is not in custody pursuant to a state judgment because his combined
calendar time served and good time credits exceed the length of his sentence. (D.E. 1).
Respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Valdez has not responded.
(D.E. 9).
1 As an initial matter, Valdez’s petition should be construed as one under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 because he is a state prisoner who, despite his creative framing of the issue, is
ultimately challenging the length of his sentence. While Valdez frames his claim as
arguing that he is not in custody pursuant to a state judgment, his petition instead attacks
the constitutionality of the Texas good time statute and how it applies to his ongoing 17-
year sentence, which he is serving pursuant to a state judgment. (See D.E. 1 at 2-8).
Further, although the Fifth Circuit has not addressed the issue, several circuits have
concluded that any § 2241 petition filed by a state prisoner is necessarily also subject to
§ 2254. See, e.g, Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 785-86 (11th Cir. 2004); Allen v. White,
185 F. App’x 487, 489-90 (6th Cir. 2006).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 27, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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For the reasons discussed further below, it is recommended that Respondent’s
motion (D.E. 9) be GRANTED and Valdez’s petition be DISMISSED.
I. JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and venue is appropriate
because Valdez is in custody in Bee County, Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.
§ 124(b)(6); Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 2000).
II. BACKGROUND
a. Petition and Claims
In his petition, Valdez alleges that his actual calendar time served plus accrued good
conduct time exceeds 17 years, the total length of his sentence. (D.E. 1 at 2). Accordingly,
he argues that his sentence is no longer in operation and his continued incarceration is a
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. (Id. at 2-3, 7-8). Valdez
further raises a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
based on his allegation that certain good conduct time under Tex. Gov’t Code § 498.003 is
prohibited from reducing a sentence, while other good conduct time under the same statute
is not. (Id. at 5-7).
b. Evidence
In June 2013, Valdez was charged in an indictment with three counts of aggravated
sexual assault of a child under Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(a)(2)(B), one count of indecency
with a child by contact, and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. (D.E.
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8-2 at 2-4). Valdez pleaded guilty to the first count of aggravated sexual assault of a child
and was sentence to 17 years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 7-8).
Valdez’s sentence commenced on January 27, 2014, with an expiration date of
January 27, 2031. (D.E. 8-1 at 2). He became eligible for parole on July 29, 2022. (Id.).
The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles has reviewed Valdez for release to parole at least
two times, but has denied release to parole given Valdez’s criminal history and the elements
of his present offense of conviction. (D.E. 8-4 at 3-4).
III. DISCUSSION
In the motion for summary judgment, Respondent argues that Valdez’s claim is
entirely based on a misreading of Tex. Gov’t Code § 498.003. (D.E. 9 at 4). Respondent
contends that, contrary to Valdez’s argument, § 498.003 does not create different types of
good time and that good time never reduces an inmate’s sentence. (Id. at 5-6). Further,
Respondent argues that Valdez is ineligible for mandatory supervision and has no
constitutional entitlement to release on parole. (Id. at 7).
Valdez has not responded.
Under Texas law, inmates accrue good conduct time according to their
classification. Tex. Gov’t Code § 498.003(b), (c). An inmate may “accrue good conduct
time, in an amount determined by the department that does not exceed 15 days for each 30
days actually served, for diligent participation in an industrial program or other work
program or for participation in an agricultural, educational, or vocational program provided
to inmates by the department.” Id. § 498.003(d). “Good conduct time applies only to
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eligibility for parole or mandatory supervision … and does not otherwise affect an inmate's
term.” Id. § 498.003(a). “A Texas prisoner's sentence is not reduced by good-time credit.”
Palmer v. Texas Bd. of Paroles, 89 F. App'x 857, 858 (5th Cir. 2003).
States have no duty to establish a parole system and a prisoner has no constitutional
right to be released before the expiration of his sentence. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). There is no constitutional expectation of
parole in Texas. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, the Texas
parole statutes do not confer a liberty interest protected by due process. Orellana v. Kyle,
65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1995).
In Texas, some inmates are entitled to early release under a mandatory supervision
program in which a prisoner sentenced to the institutional division can serve the remainder
of his term outside the prison, not on parole, but under the supervision and control of the
pardons and paroles division. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 42.18 § 2(2)).2 Prisoners earn good time credits that are added to
their actual days served in prison to calculate their release date. Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 508.147(a). The Fifth Circuit has determined that prisoners have a constitutional
expectation of early release under the mandatory supervision program. Malchi, 211 F.3d
2 Currently located at Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.001(5).
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at 957-958.3 However, prisoners who commit certain offenses are excluded from eligibility
for mandatory supervision. See Tex. Gov't Code § 508.149(a) (listing offenses that render
an inmate ineligible for release to mandatory supervision). Aggravated sexual assault, in
violation of Tex. Penal Code § 22.021, is an excluded offense. Id. § 508.149(a)(8).
Here, Valdez’s claims are based on a misreading of the applicable Texas statutes.
As to his claim that his sentence is no longer in operation because his combined actual time
and good conduct time exceed the length of his sentence, his earned good-time credits do
not affect the length of his sentence and apply only to his eligibility for release on
mandatory supervision or parole. Palmer, 89 F. App'x at 858; Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 498.003(a). Thus, regardless of whether his actual time served and good-time credits
combined are greater than his 17-year sentence, that does not mean that he remains in
custody after the completion of his sentence in violation of his due process rights. Further,
Valdez is ineligible for mandatory supervision because he was convicted of aggravated
sexual assault. Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.149(a)(8). As to parole, the Texas parole laws do
not confer a constitutional right to be released before the full completion of a sentence.
Madison, 104 F.3d at 768; Orellana, 65 F.3d at 32. Thus, Valdez cannot show that he is
in custody in violation of the United States Constitution, as required to obtain relief under
§ 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Finally, as to Valdez’s equal protection claim
3 The Fifth Circuit’s holding applied to a previous version of the Texas mandatory
supervision program, which has since been amended. See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958. The
Fifth Circuit has concluded that prisoners have a protected liberty interest under the
amended version as well. Teague v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 769, 776 (5th Cir. 2007).
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regarding different types of good conduct time, the statute he cites does not create different
types of good conduct time. Under Texas law, all good conduct time “applies only to
eligibility for parole or mandatory supervision … and does not otherwise affect an inmate's
term.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 498.003(a).
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas
corpus proceeding “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Although Valdez has not yet filed a notice of appeal, the issue
of whether he is entitled to a COA will be addressed. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d
895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that a district court may sua sponte rule on a COA).
A COA “may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “The COA determination under
§ 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general
assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Where a
district court rejects the constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must show that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong. Slack v. Daniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Here, because reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that Valdez failed to
state a claim for a violation of a constitutional right, it is recommended that a COA be
denied.
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V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that Respondent’s motion (D.E. 9) be GRANTED
and Valdez’s petition be DISMISSED.
Respectfully submitted on April 27, 2026.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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