Morrison v. Hinajosa

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
ARTHUR ROY MORRISON,
Petitioner,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00312
RENE HINAJOSA, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) and
is currently incarcerated at the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas. Proceeding pro se,
Petitioner filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 25, 2025,
challenging the denial of his release to parole. (D.E. 1). Pending is Respondent’s Motion
for Summary Judgment to which Petitioner has responded. (D.E. 14 and D.E. 15). For the
reasons discussed below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion for
Summary Judgment be GRANTED and this case be DISMISSED.
I. JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. A habeas action may be filed either in the district where
petitioner is in custody or in the district in which petitioner was convicted. 28 U.S.C. §
2241(d); Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 2000). Jurisdiction is proper
in this Court because Petitioner is currently incarcerated in Bee County, Texas which is
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 24, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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within the Southern District of Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 124(b)(6); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d);
Wadsworth, 235 F.3d at 961.1 This case has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court must determine
whether the pleadings, discovery materials, and the summary judgment evidence show
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Once the movant presents a properly
supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show
with significant probative evidence the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000).
Generally, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs summary
judgment procedure, applies with equal force to federal habeas corpus cases. Clark v.
Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
81(a)(4) (“These rules apply to proceedings for habeas corpus…”). However, Rule 56
applies only to the extent that it does not conflict with the federal rules governing habeas
proceedings. Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other
grounds by Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004). Accordingly, § 2254(e)(1), mandating
1Petitioner requests this case be transferred to the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas
“where parole is headquartered.” (D.E. 6). This Motion is DENIED as jurisdiction is appropriate
here.
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that a state court’s findings are presumed to be correct, overrides the summary judgment
rule that all disputed facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
Smith, 311 F.3d at 668. Unless a petitioner can rebut the presumption of correctness of a
state court’s factual findings by clear and convincing evidence, such findings must be
accepted as correct by the federal habeas court. § 2254(e)(1); Id.
B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 28
U.S.C. §2254
Federal habeas corpus petitions are governed by the AEDPA. Relief shall not
extend to a prisoner unless he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) & § 2254(a); Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993). Under AEDPA, a state prisoner may not obtain relief with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim:
(a) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(b) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner was found guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and
sentenced by a jury to 35 years incarceration on February 21, 2008. (D.E. 13-1, Pages 46-
48). In the pending Petition, Petitioner does not challenge his underlying conviction but
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rather the denial of his release to parole. (D.E. 1 and D.E. 15).2 Texas offenders are not
entitled to parole. Release on parole is entirely speculative and therefore, there is no
constitutional expectancy of parole in Texas. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). As such, an assertion that he was or is being improperly
denied parole does not implicate due process or provide a basis for federal habeas corpus
relief. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979) (States
have no duty to establish a parole system and a prisoner has no constitutional right to be
released before the expiration of his sentence); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir.
1995) (There is no liberty interest in obtaining parole in Texas and therefore prisoners
“cannot complain of the constitutionality of procedural devices attendant to parole
decisions”). Petitioner has no constitutionally protected liberty interest to be released
before the completion of his sentence. Therefore, the undersigned recommends
Petitioner’s case be DISMISSED.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
An appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals from a final order in a habeas
2In his response, Petitioner asserts he “has not challenged release to parole but [illegible] of the
motion for special review sham letter in response to request for status special review letter.” (D.E.
15, Page 4). However, it is clear Petitioner is challenging the parole board’s denial of his release,
asserting the decision is based on purportedly fraudulent judgments. (D.E. 1, Pages 1 and 6 and
D.E. 15, Page 4). Petitioner specifically states, in response to “Name and location of court that
entered the judgment of conviction you are challenging” that he is challenging the “Board of
Pardons and Paroles” decision and “For Writ of Habeas Corpus for Parole Denial.” (D.E. 1, Page
1). To the extent Petitioner now seeks to challenge any disciplinary convictions or his underlying
conviction, such challenges must be brought in separate actions.
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corpus proceeding “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Although Petitioner has not yet filed a notice of appeal, it is
respectfully recommended that this Court nonetheless address whether he would be entitled
to a certificate of appealability (“COA”). A district court ruling on a petitioner’s relief may
sua sponte rule on a COA because it “is in the best position to determine whether the
petitioner has made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right on the issues
before that court. Further briefing and argument on the very issues the court has just ruled
on would be repetitious.” Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam).
A COA “may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “The COA determination under
§ 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general
assessment of their merits.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). As to claims
the Court rejects solely on their merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). As to claims the Court rejects solely
on procedural grounds, the Petitioner must show both that “jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Id. (emphasis added).
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In Petitioner’s case, it is recommended Petitioner does not demonstrate these
standards. If the District Judge orders that Petitioner’s habeas petition be denied and
Petitioner seeks a COA in order to proceed with his case, it is further recommended the
COA be denied because he has not made the necessary showing for issuance.
V. RECOMMENDATION
As discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s claims do not
warrant federal habeas relief and Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment be
GRANTED. (D.E. 14). The undersigned further RECOMMENDS the Court deny a
certificate of appealability.
ORDERED on March 24, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(c); Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and Article IV, General
Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendations in a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs.
Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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