Richardson v. Guerrero

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
STEPHEN WAYNE RICHARDSON,
Petitioner,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00222
ERIC GUERRERO, DIRECTOR, TDCJ-
CID,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mitchel
Neurock for pre-trial management and recommendations on dispositive matters,1
but with Judge Neurock’s consent and in accordance with Special Order C-2023-
1,2 United States Magistrate Judge Julie K. Hampton enters this memorandum and
recommendation.
Petitioner Stephen Wayne Richardson, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, has filed an action that the Court has construed as a petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) For the reasons discussed below, the
undersigned recommends that the district court DISMISS Petitioner’s action.
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 636.
2 Special Order C-2023-1 is a standing order concerning civil matters referred to magistrate judges in this division.
The order allows magistrate judges to assist each other on any referred matter by agreement, including entering
orders, notices, recommendations, and presiding over judicial proceedings.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 23, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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A. Jurisdiction.
This Court has jurisdiction over this habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
and 2241. A habeas action may be filed either in the district in which the petitioner is in
custody or in the district in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(d); Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 2000). In this case,
Petitioner is custody at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional
Institutions Division’s (“TDCJ’s”) McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas. Beeville is
located in Bee County, in the Corpus Christi Division of the Southern District of Texas.
See 28 U.S.C. § 124(b)(6). Thus, this matter is properly before this Court.
B. Procedural history and summary of Petitioner’s filing.
On June 11, 2012, Petitioner was convicted, contrary to his plea, and was
sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment in Bexar County, Texas, for manslaughter.3
Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Richardson v. State, No.
04-12-00379-CR, 2013 WL 5653400 (Tex. Ct. App. – San Antonio Oct. 16,
2013). Petitioner has filed at least one state habeas action: most recently, on
November 6, 2024, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed as
“subsequent” Petitioner’s bid for state habeas relief. (Doc. No. 17-1.) Petitioner
was considered for parole, but the board denied release on parole on August 26,
2024. (Doc. No. 16-1, p. 3.) The parole board also denied release to discretionary
3 Texas Department of Criminal Justice, TDCJ Inmate Information Details (SID No. 03281990),
https://inmate.tdcj.texas.gov/InmateSearch/viewDetail.action?sid=03281990 (last visited Feb. 22, 2026); see also
Doc. No. 17-2, p. 45.
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mandatory supervision, on May 27, 2025. Id. at 4. Petitioner’s projected release
date is August 1, 2045.4
Petitioner filed this action, which the Court construed as a petition pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) The Court ordered a response to that
construed petition. (Doc. No. 7.) Respondent Eric Guerrero filed an answer
containing a request for dismissal of Petitioner’s action. (Doc. No. 16.)
Respondent also submitted an affidavit from a supervisor in TDCJ’s Classification
and Records Department, (Doc. No. 16-1), and the state court records regarding
Petitioner’s criminal conviction and state habeas action. (Doc. No. 17.) Petitioner
did not respond to Respondent’s answer.5
Petitioner’s construed § 2241 action contends that TDCJ failed to release
him to discretionary mandatory supervision in July 2025 when it was allegedly
required to do so. See Doc. No. 1, p. 4. Petitioner claims that his continued
detention is unlawful because TDCJ should have released him on his projected
release date, which he contends was July 11, 2025. See id.6
4 See TDCJ Inmate Information Details (SID No. 03281990), supra n.3.
5 Petitioner did file a motion to amend his petition, (Doc. No. 20), but the Court denied the motion as futile because
Petitioner was challenging his underlying conviction, a challenge that would have been considered under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 and would have been second or successive. (Doc. No. 21.)
6 Petitioner’s next parole review is scheduled for January 31, 2028. See TDCJ Inmate Information Details (SID No.
03281990) supra n.3.
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B. Law, analysis, and recommendation.
Habeas relief under § 2241 is not available to a prisoner unless, among other
things, he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to
be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). And in Texas, there is no
constitutional expectancy of parole. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir.
1997) (citing Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1991)). Thus, Texas parole statutes
do not confer a liberty interest in parole that is protected by Fourteenth Amendment due
process. See Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause [the plaintiff]
has no liberty interest in obtaining parole in Texas, he cannot complain of the
constitutionality of procedural devices attendant to parole decisions.”).
Some inmates are entitled to early release under a mandatory supervised
release program7 and the Fifth Circuit has determined that prisoners have a
constitutional expectation of early release under such programs, thus creating a
liberty interest with respect to their good time. Teague v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d
769, 775-76 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Madison, 104 F.3d at 769; Malchi v. Thaler,
211 F.3d 953, 957-58 (5th Cir. 2000)). There is such a “mandatory supervision”
program in Texas, see Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.147, but Petitioner is not eligible for
7 “Mandatory supervision is the release of an eligible prisoner … so that the prisoner may serve the remainder of his
sentence not on parole, but under the supervision and control of the pardons and paroles division.” Malchi, 211 F.3d
at 957 (quoting Madison, 104 F.3d at 768) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that program. In Texas, prisoners may not be released to mandatory supervision if
a parole panel determines that “(1) the inmate’s accrued good conduct time is not
an accurate reflection of the inmate’s potential for rehabilitation; and (2) the
inmate’s release would endanger the public.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.149(b).
This determination is not subject to judicial review. Id. § 508.149(d).
Here, Petitioner was last denied parole on August 26, 2024. (Doc. No. 16-
1, p. 3.) The reasons the parole board gave for denial were: (1) Petitioner had
repeatedly committed criminal episodes that indicate a predisposition to commit
criminal acts upon release; (2) Petitioner’s offense had elements of brutality,
violence, assaultive behavior, or conscious selection of the victim’s vulnerability;
and (3) unsuccessful periods on previous parole or mandatory supervision. Id.
Petitioner was also considered for, but denied, release to mandatory supervision on
May 27, 2025. Id. at 4. On that occasion, the parole board cited as reasons for its
decision the same factors it cited when denying parole, plus: (4) the time Petitioner
had served was “not congruent with offense severity, criminal history;” (5)
accrued good time was not an accurate reflection of potential for rehabilitation;
and (6) release would endanger the public. Id. at 4-5. Therefore, despite the
existence of a mandatory supervised release program in Texas, the evidence in this
case indicates that Petitioner is not entitled to release under that program.
In sum, because Petitioner has no constitutional right to be released before
the full completion of his sentence, and because the parole board did not vote to
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grant discretionary release to mandatory supervision, Petitioner’s assertions do not
allege a constitutional violation, and he is not entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). The district court should DISMISS Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
C. Notice.
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a
copy to each party or counsel. Within 14 days after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve
on the United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and General Order No. 2002-13,
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. A failure to file
written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14 days after being served
with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking
on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Respectfully submitted on February 23, 2026.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
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