Wright-Nasalski v. Warden, FCI Three Rivers

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
DEVON RASHAAD WRIGHT-
NASALSKI,
Petitioner,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00276
WARDEN, FCI THREE RIVERS,
Respondent.
ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Devon Rashaad Wright-Nasalski filed this petition for writ of habeas
corpus pro se, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. D.E. 1. He challenges the way the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) calculated his sentence and seeks to receive roughly two years of credit for time
served in state custody. Now pending before the Court is Respondent’s construed motion
for summary judgment (D.E. 12, 13). On September 22, 2025, United States Magistrate
Judge Jason B. Libby issued his Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R),
recommending that the Court deny the construed motion and grant the petition for writ of
habeas corpus. D.E. 19. Both parties were provided proper notice of, and opportunity to
object to, the Magistrate Judge’s M&R. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Respondent filed timely objections to the M&R (D.E. 24), and Petitioner filed a response
(D.E. 29).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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After review, the Court OVERRULES Respondent’s objections (D.E. 24),
ADOPTS the M&R in its entirety (D.E. 19), and DENIES Respondent’s construed motion
for summary judgment (D.E. 13). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ
of habeas corpus and ORDERS that Petitioner’s sentence be recalculated to credit his time
in state custody, as further explained below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court must review de novo any portion of a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings and recommendations on dispositive matters to which the parties have filed
specific, written objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections must point out with sufficient
particularity any alleged error in the magistrate judge’s analysis; otherwise, they do not
constitute proper objections and will not be considered. Id.; see Battle v. U.S. Parole
Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[P]arties filing objections must specifically
identify those findings objected to.”); Edmonds v. Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 293 n.7 (5th Cir.
1993) (finding that right to de novo review not invoked when petitioner merely re-urges
arguments contained in original petition).
After considering proper objections, the district court may accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, those portions of the proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b). As to any portion for which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for
clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864
F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
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THE ISSUE
There are three sentences at issue here, each imposed in 2019. First, Judge
O’Connor revoked Petitioner’s federal supervised release and sentenced him to 14 months
in custody, which under the law was presumed to run consecutively to Petitioner’s future
state sentence.1 Then Judge McBryde sentenced Petitioner to 100 months in custody on his
federal charge, to run concurrently with any future state sentence arising from his state
drug charge. This 100-month sentence was to also run consecutive to the 14-month
sentence. Last, upon conviction in state court, Petitioner was sentenced to 24 months in
custody. Because Petitioner was under the primary jurisdiction of the state, he served his
state sentence first, even though it was imposed last.
After completing the state sentence, Petitioner was returned to federal custody to
serve the federal sentences. The BOP, per statute, aggregated the 14-month federal
revocation sentence and the 100-month federal sentence, for a total of 114 months in
federal custody. It did this by considering the 14-month sentence first and then adding the
100-month sentence (14+100). Because the 14-month sentence was to run consecutive to
the state sentence and the 100-month sentence was to run consecutive to the 14-month
sentence, the BOP ran the 114-month aggregated sentence consecutive to the state
sentence. This is visually represented as:
24-month state
sentence
14-month
federal
revocation
sentence
100-month federal sentence
(114 months aggregated)
1 Judge O’Connor later responded to a BOP letter, clarifying that the sentence should run consecutively to the state
sentence.
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Consequently, Judge McBryde’s order that the 100-month federal sentence run
concurrently with the 24-month state sentence was not honored.
To give effect to Judge McBryde’s order that the state and federal sentence run
concurrently, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the 100-month sentence be
considered first and then add the 14-month sentence (100+14). Because the 100-month
sentence was to run concurrent with the state sentence, 24 months of the aggregated
sentence would run concurrent with the state sentence. D.E. 19, p. 9. This is visually
represented as:
100-month federal sentence
14-month
federal
revocation
sentence
24-month state
sentence
In that way, the term of the state sentence runs concurrent with the 100-month federal
sentence, as Judge McBryde intended.
RESPONDENT’S OBJECTIONS
Respondent objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation in several respects.
First, it notes that the recommendation does not comply with Judge McBryde’s order that
the 100-month sentence run consecutively to the 14-month sentence. D.E. 24, p. 10. It
argues that Judge McBryde’s order means that the 100-month sentence, ordered to run
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consecutive to the 14-month sentence, must follow the 14-month sentence, not precede it.
Id.
Second, Respondent objects that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation fails to
comply with the statutory mandates, namely the aggregation statute, that control how
sentences interact. Id. at pp. 6-7. Specifically, Respondent points to the following statutes:
• 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c): multiple terms of imprisonment ordered to
run consecutively or concurrently shall be treated for
administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of
imprisonment.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a): multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at
different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the
terms are to run concurrently.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a): a sentence to a term of imprisonment
commences on the date the prisoner is received into the exclusive
custody of the Attorney General of the United States.
Id. Respondent claims that it is not possible to comply with each of these statutory
commands and the orders from Judge McBryde and Judge O’Connor. Id. at pp. 10-11.
Third, Respondent objects that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation does not
comply with Judge O’Connor’s order that the 14-month sentence run consecutive to the
24-month state sentence. Id. at pp. 10-11.
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DISCUSSION
Respondent’s objections boil down to: (1) whether the sentencing judges’ orders to
run certain sentences consecutive require a specific ordering of the sentences, and (2)
whether the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation violates the aggregation statute.
Respondent argues that “to run consecutively to” “means the 100-month sentence
must follow the 14-month sentence, and the 14-month sentence must follow the 24-month
state sentence, in that order.” D.E. 24, p. 10. (“The BOP cannot flip the order of sentences
to give effect to one part of Judge McBryde’s order and not another.”).
The only authority Respondent provides to support the argument that “consecutive
to” implies a specific order is a citation to the term “consecutive sentences” in the Fifth
Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary. Id. There, the term’s definition is as follows: “When
one sentence of confinement is to follow another in point of time, the second sentence is
deemed to be consecutive.” Consecutive Sentences, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979).
Later editions, from the Seventh Edition onward, define the term as: “Two or more
sentences of jail time to be served in sequence. For example, if a defendant receives
consecutive sentences of 20 years and 5 years, the total amount of jail time is 25 years.”
Consecutive Sentence, Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). This definition does not
imply that “consecutive sentences” specifies an order among two sentences, just that they
be served in sequence, rather than concurrently or with time in between. Therefore, the
Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation regarding the sequencing of the
sentences.
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Respondent also argues that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation violates the
aggregation statute. However, Respondent fails to explain how the consideration of the 24-
month state sentence affects the aggregation of the federal sentences, as a single,
continuous 114-month sentence. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation achieves the fundamental intent of both sentencing orders, while
maintaining the ability to aggregate the federal sentences. The Court agrees with the
recommendation, and Respondent’s objections are thus OVERRULED.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations set
forth in the Magistrate Judge’s M&R, as well as Respondent’s objections and all other
relevant documents in the record, and having made a de novo review of the portions of the
Magistrate Judge’s M&R to which objections were specifically directed, the Court
OVERRULES Respondent’s objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and
conclusions of the Magistrate Judge (D.E. 19).
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Respondent’s construed motion for summary
judgment (D.E. 13). The petition for writ of habeas corpus is thus GRANTED, and IT IS
ORDERED that Petitioner’s sentence be recalculated to credit his time in state custody as
explained above.
ORDERED on March 20, 2026.
_______________________________
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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