United States of America v. Montano

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-CV-719
FRANCISCO JAVIER MONTANO,
Defendant,
ORDER AND OPINION
In this lawsuit, Plaintiff United States of America seeks to revoke Defendant Francisco
Javier Montano’s United States citizenship. Montano became a naturalized United States citizen
in January 2000. Three years later, a jury convicted him of aggravated sexual assault of a child
and indecency with a child, crimes that he committed between 1996 and 1999.
Based on Montano’s criminal conduct, and the information he provided to officials during
his naturalization process, the United States alleges that Montano unlawfully obtained his United
States citizenship. More specifically, in Count I, the United States alleges that Montano illegally
procured his citizenship because when he applied for naturalization, he did not meet the statutory
requirement for good moral character.
The United States now moves for a consent judgment, based in large measure on a
declaration by Montano through which he admits the allegations and represents that he
understands doing so will result in the revocation of his citizenship. (See Motion, Doc. 7; Montano
Decl., Doc. 7–1) Based on the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the United
States is entitled to the requested relief.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
August 03, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. Factual Findings and Procedural Background1
Montano was born in Mexico and was admitted to the United States in 1987 as a
conditional permanent resident.
In June 1997, Montano applied to become a naturalized United States citizen. Question
15 of the Application asked whether Montano had “ever knowingly committed a crime or offense
for which you were not arrested?” (N-400 Form, Doc. 1–2, 4) He responded, “No.” (Id.)
In April 1999, the United States approved the application and Montano took his
citizenship oath in January 2000.
In May 2003, a Texas jury found Montano guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual assault
of a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii)&(iv), and four counts of
indecency with a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1). The crimes occurred
between July 1996 and July 1999. Montano was sentenced to 5 years in prison for the aggravated
sexual assault convictions and a probated 10-year sentence for the indecency with a child
convictions.
The United States then filed this action under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), seeking to revoke
Montano’s United States citizenship. In Count 1, the United States alleges that Montano was
ineligible for naturalization because he did not meet the requirement of being a person of good
moral character between June 1994–i.e., five years before he applied for naturalization–and
January 2000–i.e., the date he became a United States citizen.2 (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶¶ 46–53 (relying
on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B) and 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a))
II. Analysis
“To guard the integrity of th[e] priceless treasure [of United States citizenship], the
government must be accorded the authority to seek the denaturalization of those who, in
1 The Court reaches these findings based on Montano’s Declaration, the documents that the United States attaches to
the Complaint, and criminal proceedings of which the Court can take judicial notice.
2 The Complaint includes three other counts, but the United States bases its Motion solely on Count I.
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procuring citizenship, misstated or concealed facts that, if disclosed, would have led the
government to conduct an inquiry that might have resulted in denial of citizenship.” United States
v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 952 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
Federal law authorizes district courts to “revok[e] and set[ ] aside the order admitting [a]
person to citizenship and [to] cancel[ ] the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such
order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of
a material fact or by willful misrepresentation[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). “If a person manages to
become a citizen despite not meeting Congress’s requirements, his citizenship is illegally
procured.” United States v. Vasquez, 1 F.4th 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (concluding
that denaturalization was mandated for a naturalized citizen who would have been inadmissible
based on his participation in extrajudicial killings in his native country); United States v. Chang,
633 F. App’x., 601, 603 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpubl.) (finding that a naturalized citizen illegally
procured his citizenship when he did not disclose that he smuggled female aliens into the United
States to engage in forced labor).
“Because rights once conferred should not be lightly revoked, the government must meet
an exacting standard to denaturalize a citizen, proving its charges by clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence.” Vasquez, 1 F.4th at 359 (cleaned up). This standard requires a level of proof
“substantially identical” to the one governing criminal proceedings. Id. (citing Klapprott v. United
States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949)).
An applicant for naturalization must establish that he has been a person of “good moral
character” for the period of five years before his application through his date of naturalization.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3). A person lacks good moral character if he was “convicted of, or who
admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements
of a crime involving moral turpitude[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3).
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“Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being
inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties
owed between persons or to society in general.” Munoz-Rivera v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 587, 590–
91 (5th Cir. 2021). The concept includes acts that are “per se morally reprehensible and
intrinsically wrong, or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory
prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral turpitude.” Id. A court “focuses on the
inherent nature of the crime, as defined in the statute, rather than the circumstances surrounding
the particular transgression.” Id. at 591 (cleaned up) (finding that the unauthorized use of a Social
Security number was a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions,
874 F.3d 871, 881 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding that misprison of a felony was a crime involving
moral turpitude); but see Orosco v. Holder, 396 F. App’x. 50, 54 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpubl.) (“The
failure to report an accident involving a parked car to the local police department after leaving the
name and address to notify the driver of the parked car of the incident is not conduct that rises to
the level of moral turpitude.”). In judging the inherent nature of the crime, a court examines “the
minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute.” Garcia-
Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 2007).
The United States can move for denaturalization when, after an individual’s
naturalization, evidence arises that the person committed unlawful acts or crimes involving moral
turpitude less than five years before his application for naturalization. In such circumstances, if
the evidence demonstrates that within the relevant five-year period, the individual committed
such unlawful acts, a court must order the denaturalization of the individual. See, e.g., Vasquez,
1 F.4th at 361–62 (reversing the denial of the denaturalization petition because under the
undisputed facts that the district court found, the defendant illegally procured his citizenship).
Turning to the present matter, it is undisputed that in May 2003, a jury convicted Montano
of aggravated sexual assault of a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.021(a)(1)(B), and
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indecency with a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1). Some of Montano’s criminal
conduct took place in July 1996, less than five years before he applied for naturalization. (See
Judgment, Doc. 1–5, 10 (reflecting a conviction for indecency with a child that occurred on July
12, 1996))
The minimum criminal conduct necessary to violate Section 22.11(a)(1) requires the
offender to either engage in touching “of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child” or
to have the child engage in “the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a person” with the intent
to “arouse of gratify the sexual desire of any person[.]” The Court concludes that such conduct
represents a crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (“The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant
to the moral instincts of a decent people.”).
As a result, the undisputed facts demonstrate clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly that
Montano was ineligible for naturalization when he applied for and obtained approval of his
application. He illegally procured his naturalization, and the United States is entitled to the relief
it requests under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) as to Count I.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, it is:
ORDERED that the United States’s Motion Entry of Consent Judgment (Doc. 7) is
GRANTED.
The Court will separately issue a Final Judgment.
Signed on August 3, 2026.
____________________________
Fernando Rodriguez, Jr.
United States District Judge
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