Ceballo Rubio v. Warden, El Valle Detention Center

1/6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
ADONIS CEBALLO RUBIO, §
Petitioner, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-672
§
WARDEN, in his/her official capacity,
El Valle Detention Center,
Respondent.
§
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Adonis Ceballo Rubio’s “Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” (Rubio’s “§ 2241 Petition”). Dkt. No. 1. For the reasons
discussed below, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Rubio’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE
this case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
On December 12, 2025, Rubio, a citizen of Cuba, was taken into immigration
custody. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. On February 4, 2026, an immigration judge ordered Rubio’s
removal. Automated Case Information, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
(last visited June 17, 2026), https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (search “A-Number” field as
“240318268” and “Nationality” field as “Cuba”). On February 13, 2026, Rubio appealed
the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”); the appeal remains
1 Information obtained from Rubio’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 29, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 1:26-cv-00672 Document 9 Filed 07/29/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 6

2/6
pending. Id.; Dkt. No. 1 at 4–5. Rubio is currently detained at the El Valle Detention
Facility (“El Valle”) in Raymondville, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. On June 15, 2026, Rubio,
proceeding pro se, filed his § 2241 Petition. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Standing and Ripeness
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts presume that any given case lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, and the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of
showing otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796
F.2d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, federal courts have an independent obligation
to examine their own subject matter jurisdiction, even sua sponte. Rivero v. Fid. Invs.,
Inc., 1 F.4th 340, 344 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1670 (2022) (quoting
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
The United States Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to the resolution of
“cases” and “controversies.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Standing is an “essential and unchanging part” of the
Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. Standing
requires, in part, an “actual or imminent” injury, i.e., one that is “ripe for decision.” Id. at
560; Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Schuehle
v. Norton, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002). For a claim to be ripe, it must have “matured sufficiently
to warrant judicial intervention.” Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 779
F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). A premature claim for relief
Case 1:26-cv-00672 Document 9 Filed 07/29/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 6

3/6
is not judicially ripe and falls outside the federal courts’ limited jurisdiction. Shields, 289
F.3d at 835; see also Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(noting that standing and ripeness are “essential components of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.”).
Without subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts have no authority to adjudicate
a case and must dismiss it. Goodrich v. United States, 3 F.4th 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2021);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without
prejudice. Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021).
B. Zadvydas v. Davis
Immigration judges are authorized to issue orders of removal, which become final
once the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has acted or the time to seek review of a
removal order expires. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1; Texas v. United States, 524 F.
Supp. 3d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (Tipton, J.). Generally, the Government has 90 days
to execute a final removal order and remove the unauthorized immigrant from the United
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
Though § 2241 proceedings “remain available as a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention,” the detainee’s ability to seek
habeas relief is subject to certain time constraints. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688. When the
Government fails to execute a removal order within the 90-day period, post-removal
detention must be limited to a period “reasonably necessary” to effectuate removal;
indefinite detention is impermissible. Id. at 689.
This does not mean that any amount of post-removal-period of confinement is
unlawful; rather, the Government’s obligation to rebut a presumption of indefinite
detention does not activate until after detention has been ongoing longer than six months,
Case 1:26-cv-00672 Document 9 Filed 07/29/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 6

4/6
and only after the immigrant detainee first makes a showing that “there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. Up to six months
of immigration detention after entry of a final removal order is, therefore, “presumptively
reasonable.” Id.; Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F. App'x 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
In arriving at the six-month presumption, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the sensitive interplay of separation of powers concerns and national
interests in the immigration context. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. The six-month
presumption, then, reflects a reasoned judgment that earlier review of post-removal-
period detention poses too great a risk to institutional interests to properly warrant
judicial scrutiny.
C. Pro Se Filings
A pleading by a pro se litigant is liberally construed under a less stringent standard
of review than a formal pleading drafted by a lawyer. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (2007).
Nevertheless, a pro se filing must still “abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.”
E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Frazier v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 541 Fed.Appx. 419, 421 (5th Cir. 2013)). The Court need not develop
the plaintiff’s argument on his own behalf. See United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23
(5th Cir. 1993).
Case 1:26-cv-00672 Document 9 Filed 07/29/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 6

5/6
III. DISCUSSION
Rubio alleges that his detention is “illegal” and that he has “been in ICE custody
for more than 180 days.” Dkt. No. 1 at 6–7. The Court, then, liberally construes Rubio’s
claim for relief under Zadvydas. Id.; E.E.O.C., 767 F.3d at 484. However, as he admits
in his § 2241 Petition, Rubio has an appeal pending decision with the BIA. Dkt. No. 1 at
5; Automated Case Information, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, (last
visited June 17, 2026), https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/. Accordingly, Rubio is not
subject to a final order of removal and his § 2241 Petition [Dkt. No. 1] is unripe. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1241.1(a) (an order of removal becomes final once the BIA has acted upon it); 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(i)(B)(i) (“The removal period begins … [t]he date the order of removal becomes
administratively final.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (stating that the post-removal-period
detention statute applies only after a noncitizen has been ordered removed).
As a result, judicial intervention at this stage is premature and, for the reasons
explained in Zadvydas, would be imprudent considering the Executive branch’s primary
prerogative over the administration of immigrant removal. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
700. Accordingly, Rubio’s claim is not ripe and is subject to dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Rubio’s § 2241 Petition [Dkt. No. 1]; and (2) DIRECT the
Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
Case 1:26-cv-00672 Document 9 Filed 07/29/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 6

6/6
V. NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 29th day of July, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:26-cv-00672 Document 9 Filed 07/29/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 6