Bautista-Medina v. Vergara, et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
VICTOR GENARO BAUTISTA-
MEDINA,
Petitioner,
§
§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-551
§
MIGUEL VERGARA, in his official
capacity, Field Office Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations, et
al.,
Respondents.
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§
§
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Victor Genaro Bautista-Medina’s “Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus” (Bautista-Medina’s “§ 2241 Petition”). Dkt. No. 1. For the reasons discussed
below, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Bautista-Medina’s § 2241 Petition; and
(2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Bautista-Medina, a citizen of Honduras, is in immigration custody at El Valle
Detention Facility (“El Valle”) located in Raymondville, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 9. In his § 2241
Petition, Bautista-Medina states that he has been detained at El Valle since April 21, 2026.
Id. at 9. 	The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) subsequently placed Bautista-
Medina into removal proceedings, detaining him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (hereinafter,
“§ 1225(b)(2)(A)”). Id. at 11. As a result, Bautista-Medina remains in detention pending his
removal proceedings.
1 Information obtained from Bautista-Medina’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1. 	Bautista-Medina’s A-
number is A-234515627, and his country of origin is Honduras. Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 9.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 26, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress authorized district courts to resolve habeas
petitions, including immigration-detention cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3); see also
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001). Habeas exists solely to “grant relief from
unlawful imprisonment or custody.” Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th Cir.
1976). 	Thus, for the writ to issue, the petitioner must be “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	A court
considering a habeas petition must “determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and
justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
B. 	28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, “if
the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
§ 1229a[.]” 	When an alien is held under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the statute mandates detention
pending the resolution of the alien’s removal proceedings, subject to certain narrow
exceptions2. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (hereinafter, “§ 1226(a)”), “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United States.” Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) allows, but
2 The Secretary of Homeland Security may temporarily parole into the United States “any alien applying
for admission” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022). However, once the purposes of the
parole have been served, the alien must immediately be returned to custody, and his case “shall continue
to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
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does not require, the Attorney General to release detained aliens on bond. 	28 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). 	Buenrostro-Mendez held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that DHS properly classified and detained noncitizens who are not admitted
to the United States under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 502. The Fifth
Circuit held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens] to be applicants for
admission.” Id. Further, the Fifth Circuit held that “seeking admission” is equivalent to being
an “applicant for admission” by operation of law. Id. As a result, aliens who do not show
“clearly and beyond a doubt that” they are entitled to be admitted to the United States “shall
be detained.” See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).
However, while Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses any statutory claim that might be
raised with respect to an alien’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), it does not address any
constitutional claims relating to the alien’s detention under the statute. Accordingly, a court
considering a habeas petition seeking relief with respect to § 1225(b)(2)(A) must still review
any constitutional claims raised by a petitioner.
C. 	Demore v. Kim
“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law
in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 	However, the
Supreme 	Court 	has 	recognized 	that 	detention 	during 	deportation 	proceedings 	is 	a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523
(2003); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); see also Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).
The Supreme Court reasoned that detention pending an alien’s removal proceedings
“serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during
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their removal proceedings.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. Further, the Supreme Court rejected
the petitioner’s arguments that mandatory detention was unnecessary to prevent aliens from
absconding during removal proceedings, stating that “the Due Process Clause does not
require [the Government] to employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its goal.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
In his § 2241 Petition, Bautista-Medina claims his continued detention by the
Government violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, stating that his due process
rights are violated by being detained without “a bond under § 1226(a)”. Dkt. No. 1 at 11.
A. 	Bautista-Medina is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), as he is an
“applicant for admission”.
Bautista-Medina’s Fifth Amendment Due Process claim challenges his detention
under § 1225(b)(2)(A), arguing that he should be detained under § 1226(a). Dkt. No. 1 at 11.
However, in light of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez, the Court finds that
Bautista-Medina is properly classified under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Bautista-Medina states that he initially entered the United States in 2014 as an
unaccompanied minor. 	Id. at 9. 	Critically, Bautista-Medina does not argue that he was
admitted to the United States prior to his detention. Bautista-Medina relies on his prolonged
presence in the United States to justify his eligibility for bond. As previously discussed, the
Fifth Circuit in Buenrostro-Mendez held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens]
to be applicants for admission.” 166 F.4th at 502. Further, “[a]n alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States […] shall be deemed for
the purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
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Bautista-Medina, then, appears to be properly classified as “an applicant for
admission” who is “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A); DHS “shall detain” Bautista-
Medina pending his removal proceedings.
B. 	Bautista-Medina’s 	continued 	detention 	does 	not 	violate 	the 	Fifth
Amendment’s 	Due 	Process 	Clause, 	as 	detention 	during 	removal
proceedings is constitutionally permissible.
The Court must then determine whether Bautista-Medina’s continued detention
violates his due process rights. Here, Bautista-Medina is being detained pending his removal
proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 at 9. However, Bautista-Medina asserts that his § 2241 Petition should
not be denied because he raises an independent constitutional challenge that “mandatory
detention violates his right to due process.” Id. at 10. Bautista-Medina claims his detention
is unwarranted, stating “detaining [Bautista-Medina] without an individualized assessment
of his flight risk and dangerousness deprives him of his constitutional right to procedural due
process.” Id. at 8.
As discussed above, Bautista-Medina’s detention is proper under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The
Court must then evaluate whether Bautista-Medina’s detention pending his removal
proceedings violates his Due Process rights. The Court finds the Supreme Court’s Demore
decision controlling in this instance. 	While the Demore decision focused on § 1226(c),
requiring mandatory detention for aliens convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, the
Supreme Court did not rely on a prior criminal conviction in reaching its decision. Instead,
the Supreme Court focused on the Government’s interest in ensuring that aliens did not
abscond prior to or during their removal proceedings. 	Id. at 528. 	Further, it explicitly
addressed the constitutional validity of mandatory detention during removal proceedings. Id.
at 531. 	The Court, then, finds that same reasoning applies to Bautista-Medina’s detention
under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
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The Court finds that Bautista-Medina’s continued detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)
without a bond hearing does not violate his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Accordingly, Bautista-Medina’s § 2241 Petition should be denied.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Bautista-
Medina’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
V. 	NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such
consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79
F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 26th day of June, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
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