Campos, Jr. v. City of Harlingen et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
SALOMON CAMPOS, JR., 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-cv-167
§
CITY OF HARLINGEN, et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DISMISSING ALL PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
I. 	Synopsis
On October 15, 2024, a jury in Cameron County, Texas found Salomon Campos,
Jr. 	not 	guilty 	of 	capital 	murder. 	He 	now 	complains 	this 	prosecution 	violated 	his
constitutional rights because of bad police work leading to bad lawyering. The Defendants,
all individuals involved in the investigation and unsuccessful prosecution of Mr. Campos,
ask this Court to dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim. The issue before the
Court is whether Mr. Campos has plead sufficient facts to support his claims of illegal
searches and seizures, an unfair trial, malicious prosecution and other violations of his civil
rights. This Court finds Mr. Campos presents only conclusions, not facts. Therefore, this
Court recommends the dismissal of his allegations.
II. 	Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
because Petitioner bring claims under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Dkt.
No. 1 at 9-18. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because all defendants are residents
of the State in which this district is located and at least one defendant resides in this district.
Additionally, because Plaintiff’s claim arises from a law enforcement investigation and
prosecution that occurred in Cameron County, Texas, a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 22, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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III. 	Factual History
Plaintiff was charged with capital murder in Cameron County, Texas.1 Dkt. No. 1
at 5. The Harlingen Police Department and the Texas Rangers led the investigation. Id. at
6. District Attorney Luis Saenz and Assistant District Attorneys Noe Garza and Adela
Kowalski-Garza were involved in Cameron County’s prosecution of Plaintiff’s case. Id. at
6-7; Dkt. No. 14 at 4. A jury found Plaintiff not guilty of all charges on October 15, 2024.
Dkt. No. 1 at 5.
IV. 	Procedural History
Plaintiff filed the instant suit in the United States District Court of the Southern
District of Texas, Corpus Christi Division. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff named the following nine
Defendants: the City of Harlingen, the Texas Department of Public Safety, Raul Roy Garza
(a Texas Ranger previously employed by the Texas Department of Safey), Scott Vega (a
police officer for the City of Harlingen), Manuel Tovar (a police officer for the City of
Harlingen), Adela Kowalski-Garza (an Assistant District Attorney in Cameron County at
the time)2, Noe Garza (a specially assigned Assistant District Attorney in Cameron
County), and Luis Saenz (the District Attorney in Cameron County). Plaintiff later
dismissed the Texas Department of Public Safety voluntarily. 3 Dkt. No. 43. Plaintiff sues
the individual defendants in their personal capacities. Dkt. No. 1 at 2.
Defendants Adela Kowalski-Garza, Noe Garza, and Luis Saenz filed a Motion to
Transfer Case to the Southern District of Texas, Brownsville Division. Dkt. No. 8.4
1 Plaintiff does not provide any date concerning when the charge was filed.
2 In the Motion to Dismiss, the Cameron County Defendants clarify that “Adela Kowalski-Garza, at the
time of the events in this suit, was an employee of the Cameron County District Attorney’s Office but has
since become the presiding judge of the 484th Judicial District of Texas.” Dkt. No. 14 at 4, n. 1. The Court
will refer to Defendant Kowalski-Garza as an Assistant District Attorney given the basis of the complaint.
3 Plaintiff never served the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the Texas Department of Public Safety
did not serve an answer or a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).
4 The Cameron County Defendants subsequently filed a Motion to Withdraw, Dkt. No. 9, the two exhibits
attached to the Motion to Transfer, Dkt. No. 8. The undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge orally granted the
Motion to Withdraw the exhibits filed in the Motion to Transfer, Dkt. No. 8, at the status conference held
on April 1, 2026. See Minute Entry at Dkt. Nos. 44, 45.
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Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Motion to Transfer.5 Dkt. No. 13. United
States District Judge David S. Morales granted the Motion to Transfer. Dkt. No. 21. The
case was then assigned to U.S. District Judge Fernando Rodriguez Jr. and referred6 to the
undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge to conduct all pretrial proceedings, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Dkt. No. 26.
Defendants Adela Kowalski-Garza, Noe Garza, and Luis Saenz filed a Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No.
14. These Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a claim against them, because his
complaints against the three defendants fall short of the requirements of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 8 and 9. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion
to Dismiss, arguing he meets the pleading standard established by Rule 8. Dkt. No. 39.7
Defendants the City of Harlingen, Texas, Manuel Tovar, and Scott Vega filed a
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 18. These Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to identify facts concerning
his allegation against these defendants. Id. at 2. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to
the Motion to Dismiss, arguing he pleads sufficient facts to meet the pleading standard of
FRCP Rule 8. Dkt. No. 39. Defendants filed a timely Reply. Dkt. No. 41.
Defendant Raul Roy Garza filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 24. Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to
allege Defendant Raul Roy Garza’s personal involvement in the case. Dkt. No. 24 at 4.
Plaintiff filed a Response, arguing he pleads sufficient facts and that Defendant is not
entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. Dkt. No. 42. Defendants filed a timely Reply.
Dkt. No. 42.
5 Plaintiff stated concerns that he could not “receive a fair and impartial trial in Brownsville.” Dkt. No. 13
at 1-2.
6 The case was first ordered referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge Ignacio Torteya, III, but was then referred to
the undersigned following the former Judge’s order of recusal, Dkt. No. 25.
7 Defendants Luis Saenz, Noe Garza, and Adela Kowalski-Garza did not file a Reply.
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The Court stayed discovery pending the resolution of the Motions to Dismiss as to
all Defendants who asserted a qualified immunity defense in their Motion to Dismiss,
including Raul Roy Garza, Scott Vega, Manuel Tovar, Adela Kowalski-Garza, Noe Garza,
and Luis Saenz. Dkt. No. 32. The Court later stayed discovery for the City of Harlingen as
well. Dkt. No. 46.
This Court held a status conference to discuss pending motions and outstanding
Court orders on April 1, 2026. 	All outstanding matters in this case were resolved at the
hearing, leaving the three Motions to Dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 14, 18 and 24, now ripe for the
Court’s consideration.
V. 	Applicable Law
The Court considers whether Plaintiff’s claims survive a 12(b)(6) analysis as to each
individually named defendant. The Court analyzes the claims for the City of Harlingen,
Texas, separately.
i. 	Standard of Review
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when the plaintiff has failed to plead
sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ferguson v. Bank of
New York Mellon Corp., 802 F.3d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 2015). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct,” then dismissal is proper. Id. at 679.
“In determining whether a plaintiff’s claims survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the factual information to which the court addresses its inquiry is limited to the (1)
the facts set forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matters
of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Walker v.
Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019). All well-pled facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Schweitzer v. Inv. Comm. of Phillips 66
Sav. Plan, 960 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2020).
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Still, “regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by
counsel, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions
will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.’ ” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d
376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Supreme Court of La., 252 F.3d
781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (2009) (clarifying
that the tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to
threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory
statements).
Dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a dismissal
on the merits and with prejudice. Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR, 385 F.3d 871, 874 n. 6
(5th Cir. 2004).
ii. 	Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff sues the individual defendants in their individual capacities. Dkt. No. 1 at
2. In their Motions to Dismiss, each individual defendant pleads qualified immunity.
Resultingly, it is the Plaintiff who bears the burden of establishing that qualified immunity
is inappropriate.
Qualified immunity protects government employees from civil liability when their
conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right. 	Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 	When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at the motion to
dismiss stage, a plaintiff must “have alleged facts sufficient to plausibly show that (1) the
defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Harmon v. City of Arlington,
Texas, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5 th Cir. 2021). The court is allowed to consider either inquiry
in whatever order it chooses. “[J]udges of the district courts and the courts of appeals are
in the best position to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the
fair and efficient disposition of each case [invoking qualified immunity].” Pearson, 555
U.S. at 242.
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VI. 	Analysis
The Court finds that based on the pleadings the conduct of the individual defendants
does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional action. Consequently, all individual
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and, accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims fail to
state a claim for which relief can be granted against Luis Saenz, Adela Kowalski-Garza,
Noe Garza, Raul Roy Garza, Scott Vega and Manuel Tovar.
A. 	Plaintiff’s Claims against the individual defendants
i. 	Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment violation claim alleging an illegal search
and seizure by Defendants Raul Roy Garza, Scott Vega, and Manuel
Tovar
Plaintiff alleges that “[d]uring the execution of search warrants at Mr. Campos’
property, defendants conducted illegal searches and seizures, destroyed property and
evidence, and engaged in theft.” Dkt. No. 1 at 11. Defendant Raul Roy Garza, Texas
Ranger, argues that Campos neither alleges that the search warrant was issued without
probable cause nor that Defendant Raul Roy Garza participated in executing the search
warrant. Dkt. No. 24 at 6. Defendants Scott Vega and Manuel Tovar, Harlingen police
officers, argue that Campos “only makes general allegations . . . and does not identify facts
that can establish an illegal search and seizure or a wrongful arrest claim.” Dkt. No. 18 at
22.
Typically, an officer is insulated from a claim that a warrant lacked probable cause
where an independent intermediary (here, the state-court judge) reviews the facts of the
case and allows it to go forward, thereby “break[ing] the chain of causation for false arrest.”
Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 170 (5th Cir. 2009). An officer may lose this protection
when he taints the actions of the intermediary—that is to say, if “the warrant application is
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable,” the officer will not be protected from suit. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
(1986) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, (1984)). Thus, a Fourth
Amendment violation occurs when “an officer intentionally, or with reckless disregard for
the truth, includes a false statement in a warrant application.” Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d
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1104, 1113 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57
L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) ). “Likewise, the intentional or reckless omission of material facts from
a warrant application” also violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Hale v. Fish, 899
F.2d 390, 400 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) ).
As previously noted, the Court must consider whether these Defendants violated
Campos’s constitutional rights.8 The Court finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient
factual matters to support his claim of an illegal search and seizure. Plaintiff alleges
“Defendant Texas Rangers and police officer falsified reports and grand jury subpoenas”
and “engaged in illegal search and seizure.” Dkt. No. 1, at 5. The Plaintiff further alleges
“Raul Roy Garza repeatedly lied in his reports, affidavits, and under oath during court
proceedings.” Id. at 6. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges “Tovar knowingly and falsely stated
on an affidavit of probable cause that he copied Defendant Garza’s report without any due
diligence” and “Tovar’s knowingly false statement were used to obtain defective search
warrants.” Id. at 8.
Plaintiff pleads that a search warrant existed, without raising any issue to which the
officers would lose qualified immunity because of lack of independent intermediary
review. Although Plaintiff later states that Defendant Tovar made false statements in an
affidavit of probable cause to obtain search warrants against Campos, Plaintiff does not
allege what search and/or seizure was based upon a false statement. 	Neither does Plaintiff
allege any false statement, just a vague, general, conclusionary allegation. Further, even if
there were false statements from Tovar, this would not be enough to establish that probable
cause for the warrants did not exist because no intentional or reckless omission of a material
fact is alleged. At most, Plaintiff asks the Court to infer misconduct. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at
679.
Additionally, Plaintiff does not plead any factual matter that identifies the areas or
properties searched, and Plaintiff does not plead any facts to show what was allegedly
seized illegally. Plaintiff does state that “hard drive evidence” was destroyed and that
8 The Court exercises its discretion “to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the
fair and efficient disposition of each case [invoking qualified immunity].” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242.
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defendants “cropped and edited body cam videos from a search in June 2020 to remove
exculpatory evidence.” Dkt. No. 1 at 11. While Plaintiff identifies some evidence, Plaintiff
does not identify why the evidence is “exculpatory,” and the Court is not required to accept
conclusory statements as true.
For the reasons explained above, the Court does not find that any of these
Defendants violated Campos’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
ii. Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment violation claim alleging a violation of
Plaintiff’s right to a fair trial by Defendant’s Raul Roy Garza, Scott Vega,
Manuel Tovar, Luis Saenz, Noe Garza, and Adela Kowalski-Garza.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions “were intended to influence the court in
violation of Mr. Campos’ Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial with the misstatement of
facts before the court.” Dkt. No. 1 at 12. Defendant Raul Roy Garza argues that Plaintiff
presents only “a broad, sweeping allegation” which fails to directly name Garza. Dkt. No.
24 at 8. Defendants Scott Vega and Manuel Tovar argue that Campos improperly
characterizes the claim for a Sixth Amendment violation. They further argue that Plaintiff
“does not identify any specific actions of any specific Defendants” concerning the
allegation that Defendants “lost or caused to be lost exculpatory evidence during trial.”
Dkt. No. 18 at 23. Defendants Luis Saenz, Noe Garza, and Adela Kowalski-Garza argue
that Campos’s allegation that Defendant Kowalski-Garza “called Mr. Campos a ‘murderer
and a killer’ on a recorded Zoom call” fails to give context and that Plaintiff’s allegation
that Defendants “negligently and recklessly lost or cause to be lost exculpatory evidence”
fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference.
Again, 	the 	Court 	must 	consider 	whether 	Defendants 	violated 	Campos’s
constitutional rights.9 Because Plaintiff refers to “misstatement of facts before the Court,”
(Dkt. No. 1 at 12) this Court notes that in regard to police officers, the Fifth Circuit Court
9 The Court exercises its discretion “to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the
fair and efficient disposition of each case [invoking qualified immunity].” Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 242.
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of Appeals has stated that both “a criminal prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence” and a “police officer’s deliberate concealment of exculpatory evidence violates”
a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 237-38 (5th Cir. 2008).
This violation “can give rise to liability under § 1983.” Id. at 238. However, as previously
noted, Plaintiff does not plead facts which show that any of the evidence allegedly
destroyed or tampered with was exculpatory evidence. The Plaintiff merely makes a vague,
conclusory statement that “they didn’t have anything on the phone because they didn’t do
anything to get the information.” 	Dkt. No. 1 at 12. 	Plaintiff alleges “Defendant Vega
negligently failed to protect evidence in his custody that was potentially exculpatory to Mr.
Campos.” Id. at 6. The Plaintiff does not allege what evidence and what facts support any
evidence of an exculpatory nature.
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient fact to show his right to a fair
trial was violated. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
iii. Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against Defendants Raul Roy
Garza, Scott Vega, Manuel Tovar, Luis Saenz, Noe Garza, and Adela
Kowalski-Garza.
Defendant Raul Roy Garza argues that although Campos alleges that he “lied in
reports and affidavits[,]” Campos does not identify what the purported “lies” are or any of
the “reports.” Dkt. No. 24 at 9. Defendants Scott Vega and Manuel Tovar argue that under
the Texas Tort Claims Act, Campos can only pursue his claim against the City of
Harlingen. Dkt. No. 18 at 28-31. Defendants Luis Saenz, Noe Garza, and Adela Kowalski-
Garza argue that Campos failed to show they did not have probable cause to initiate the
prosecution, that they acted with malice, or that he cannot overcome absolute and official
immunity. Dkt. No. 14 at 16.
Again, 	the 	Court 	must 	consider 	whether 	Defendant’s 	violated 	Campos’s
constitutional rights.10 Though not framed as a Fourth Amendment claim in the Complaint,
10 The Court exercises its discretion “to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the
fair and efficient disposition of each case [invoking qualified immunity].” Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 242.
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in his reply Plaintiff states his “malicious prosecution claim is primarily pursued as a
federal constitutional claim under Section 1983, not solely as a state law tort claim.” Dkt.
No. 42 at 16. Additionally, as a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983, a two-year statute
of limitations applies. Because the prosecution was terminated on October 15, 2024, and
Campos filed the instant § 1983 claim on October 13, 2025, his claim is timely under §
1983. Dkt. No. 1 at 13.
U. S. District Judge Hanen neatly explained the law concerning a federal malicious
prosecution claim as follows:
The United States Supreme Court officially elucidated the elements of a
malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 in 2022. Thompson v. Clark, 596
U.S. 36, 44 (2022). For a valid malicious prosecution claim, the Court
required “(i) the suit or proceeding was ‘instituted without any probable
cause’; (ii) the ‘motive in instituting’ the suit ‘was malicious,’ which was
often defined in this context as without probable cause and for a purpose
other than bringing the defendant to justice; and (iii) the prosecution
terminated in favor of the accused.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 278
(5th Cir. 2023).
Barfield v. Osbey, No. 4:24-CV-2581, 2025 WL 816718, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13,
2025).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has reasoned that the following two elements are
required under Thompson:
The first is that “[b]ecause a [Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution]
claim is housed in the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff also has to prove that
the malicious prosecution resulted in a seizure of the plaintiff.” Id. at 1337
n.2; see, e.g., Jones v. York, 34 F.4th 550, 564 n.8 (7th Cir. 2022). The second
is that the traditional favorable termination element of a common law
malicious prosecution claim “does not require the plaintiff to show that the
criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence.”
Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at 1341.
Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 278–79 (5th Cir. 2023).
In the present case, it is undisputed that Campos was seized because he was in jail,
and though unnecessary to a malicious prosecution claim, it is undisputed that the
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prosecution of Campos was terminated in his favor with a verdict of not guilty. See id. Still,
Campos has not shown that malicious prosecution existed.
In the present case, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants manufactured probable cause for
the prosecution, as it was based on falsified reports, fabricated evidence, and perjured
testimony.” 	Dkt. No. 12 at 13. 	The Plaintiff refers to lies, malice, edits, falsehoods and
fabrications without pleading a single fact against any Defendant. However, Campos
pleads no facts to show no probable cause for his prosecution existed. Again, Plaintiff’s
allegations are supported only by conclusory allegations, and the Court cannot even infer
from the pleading that no probable cause existed. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Because the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim concerning his federal
law claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claim to the extent it is brought as a Texas tort claim. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3) (stating “the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim [of which it has original jurisdiction] if . . . the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]”)).
iv. Plaintiff’s claim of conspiracy to violate civil rights against Defendants
Raul Roy Garza, Scott Vega, Manuel Tovar, Luis Saenz, Noe Garza, and
Adela Kowalski-Garza.
Plaintiff argues that all Defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights
under the First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments by maliciously prosecuting him. Dkt. No.
1 at 16. The Defendants named above all essentially argue that Campos failed to plead an
agreement 	existed 	between 	the 	Defendants 	and 	that 	Campos 	relies 	on 	conclusory
allegations. Dkt. No. 14 at 18; Dkt. No 18 at 25; Dkt. No. 24 at 10.
While Plaintiff purports to state a claim for conspiracy under “42 USCS § 1983,”
Dkt. No. 28 at 18, the statute that provides an avenue for this complaint is 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (stating that “two or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act
in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
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property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.”)).
The Fifth Circuit has summarized the elements for a claim of a conspiracy to deprive
an individual of their civil rights as follows:
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a
conspiracy involving two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of depriving,
directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes
injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States. In so doing, the plaintiff must show that the
conspiracy was motivated by a class-based animus.
Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652–53 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff pleads facts which at
most 	require 	the 	Court 	to 	infer 	Defendants 	coordinated 	to 	create 	the 	conspiracy.
Additionally, Plaintiff does not plead any facts that show any of the Defendants’ actions
were 	motivated 	by 	class-based 	animus. 	Accordingly, 	Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	show
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
v. 	Plaintiff’s claim alleging a failure to intervene against Defendants Raul
Roy Garza, Scott Vega, Manuel Tovar, Luis Saenz, Noe Garza, and Adela
Kowalski-Garza.
The Plaintiff claims all Defendants “observed or had reason to know that Mr.
Campos’ constitutional rights were being violated.” 	Dkt. No. 1 at 16. 	Defendants all
essentially argue that Campos failed to plead sufficient facts to support his allegations that
Defendants all observed or had reason to know that his constitutional rights were being
violated, that they had a realistic opportunity to intervene, and that they failed to intervene.
Dkt. No 14 at 19; Dkt. No. 18 at 24; Dkt. No. 24 at 10.
“[A]n officer may be liable under § 1983 under a theory of bystander liability where
the officer (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights;
(2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” Whitley
v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Clearly established federal law does not prohibit a reasonable officer who
arrives late to an ongoing police action in circumstances like this from assuming that proper
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procedures ... have already been followed.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 80, (2017) (per
curiam).
Plaintiff purports to state a claim for a failure to intervene against all Defendants,
including law enforcement agents as well as prosecutors. However, Plaintiff does not cite
any law or make any claim as to why his failure to intervene claim can be alleged against
the prosecutors. Plaintiff states that “[m]ultiple law enforcement officers were present
during searches where evidence was destroyed or tampered with.” Dkt. No. 1 at 17.
Plaintiff’s claim is too vague for the Court to do anything more than infer misconduct on
the part of some defendants, so it cannot survive a motion for failure to state a claim.
B. Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Harlingen
“A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat
superior.” Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). “Local governments are liable for a policy
or custom that causes a constitutional injury under Section 1983,” which is colloquially
known as a Monell claim. Austin v. City of Pasadena, Texas, 74 F.4 th 312332, 2023 WL
4569562, at *12 (5th Cir. July 18, 2023). Accordingly, a municipality can be subjected to
civil 	liability 	only 	if 	the 	allegedly 	illegal 	conduct 	is 	“directly 	attributable 	to 	the
municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated unconstitutional
actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.” Robinson v. Hunt Cty.,
Texas, 921 F.3d 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2019).
“Municipal 	liability 	under 	section 	1983 	requires 	proof 	of 	three 	elements: 	a
policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force
is the policy or custom.” Brinsdon v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist., 863 F.3d 338, 346 (5th
Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). These elements “are necessary to distinguish individual violations
perpetrated by local government employees from those that can be fairly identified as
actions of the government itself.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th
Cir. 2001).
Municipalities do not have an affirmative obligation to have policies which prevent
constitutional torts; they have an obligation not to maintain policies which create or
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condone constitutional torts. Thompson v. Upshur Cty., TX, 245 F.3d 447, 462 (5th Cir.
2001).
The Supreme Court has held that “a municipality can be liable for failure to train its
employees when the municipality’s failure shows a deliberate indifference to the rights of
its inhabitants.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 	The Supreme Court has also warned that municipal liability “is at its most
tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61
(2011). 	The Fifth Circuit has stated that failure to train is “a notoriously difficult theory
on which to base a Monell claim.” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 749 (5th Cir. 2023). The
Court notes that “a failure-to-supervise claim is evaluated in the same way as a failure-to-
train claim.” Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 344 n 11 (5th Cir. 2017).
“A claim for failure to train must allege sufficient facts to show that (1) the
municipality adopted inadequate training policy procedures, (2) acted with deliberate
indifference in doing so, and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused the
plaintiff’s injury.” Speck v. Wiginton, 606 Fed. App’x 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing
Sanders–Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010)).
As to the first element – the existence of inadequate training – a plaintiff meets this
standard “by alleging facts related to the locality’s actual training program.” Speck, at 736.
The plaintiff cannot simply ask the Court “to make the inference that a single alleged
incident of misconduct means officers are inadequately trained.” Id.
As to the second element – that the municipality acted with deliberate indifference
– “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily
necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Parker v. LeBlanc, 73 F.4th 400, 402
(5th Cir. 2023). “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect,
decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will
cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62).
The Supreme Court has left open “the possibility that a plaintiff might succeed in
carrying a failure-to-train claim without showing a pattern of constitutional violations,” by
demonstrating “that, in a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights may
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be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with
specific tools to handle recurring situations.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). 	This possibility has been referred to as the “single
incident exception.” Edwards v. City of Balch Springs, Texas, 70 F.4th 302, 312 (5th Cir.
2023). The hypothetical example given by the Supreme Court was that if a municipality
gave its officers no training at all on the use of deadly force and an untrained officer used
deadly force without justification, the decision to forego training would be so derelict that
it would constitute deliberate indifference. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
390, n. 10 (1989). 	The Fifth Circuit has stated that the single incident exception “is
extremely narrow, and as an exception to the pattern requirement, it is generally reserved
for those cases in which the government actor was provided no training whatsoever.”
Edwards, 70 F.4th at 312–13 (cleaned up).
i. 	Plaintiff’s claim alleging the City of Harlingen’s failure to train
Plaintiff alleges the City of Harlingen failed to train and supervise, and this
“amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come
into contact.” Dkt. No. 1 at 18. Plaintiff claims the Texas Rangers and Harlingen Police
Department “falsified reports, tampered with evidence, and committed perjury.” Dkt. No.
1 at 17. Plaintiff also alleges that the police “officers involved in destroying evidence were
promoted rather than disciplined.” Dkt. No. 1 at 18.
As to the inadequacies of a training program, Plaintiff has pled no facts that the City
of Harlingen failed to train its officers concerning filing reports, tampering with evidence,
or committing perjury. The complaint alleges these matters occurred but does not identify
a policy which the officers were following. Although Plaintiff states that the officers who
allegedly destroyed evidence “were promoted rather than disciplined,” the Court finds this
is a conclusory statement. The Court does not need accept conclusory statements as true,
and the Court can do little more with that statement than infer misconduct on the part of
the City. Ashcroft, 559 U.S. at 679. The Supreme Court has stated that “adequately trained
officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training
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program or the legal basis for holding the city liable.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. As
such, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts showing inadequacies in the training program.
Plaintiff has also failed to plead facts showing that the training program was
undertaken with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the people that the
police would encounter. Deliberate indifference is normally shown by pleading a “pattern
of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Parker, 73 F.4th at 402.
District courts throughout the Fifth Circuit have held that while a plaintiff must do more
than 	generically 	restate 	the 	elements 	of 	municipal 	liability, 	“only 	minimal 	factual
allegations should be required at the motion to dismiss stage,” given that many of the details
would only be available through discovery. Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas, 800 F.
Supp. 2d 826, 842–43 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Alexander v. City Police of Lafayette, 2021 WL
4396016, at *8 (W.D. La. Sept. 24, 2021); Edwards v. Oliver, 2019 WL 4603794, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4597573 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 23, 2019); Valadez v. City of San Antonio, 2022 WL 1608016, at *11 (W.D.
Tex. May 20, 2022); Mitchell v. City of New Orleans, 184 F. Supp. 3d 360, 373 (E.D. La.
2016); Shelton v. Bonham Indep. Sch. Dist., 2018 WL 2236924, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 16,
2018).
A plaintiff can satisfy this standard by pleading such facts as “past incidents of
misconduct to others, multiple harms that occurred to the plaintiff himself, misconduct that
occurred in the open, the involvement of multiple officials in the misconduct, or the
specific topic of the challenged policy or training inadequacy.” Thomas, 800 F. Supp. 2d
at 843–44. 	Plaintiff does not meet this standard. Though Plaintiff claims multiple harms
occurred to himself and that at least three officers were involved in the misconduct, as
previously stated, Plaintiff’s claims are supported by conclusory statements or bare facts
that at most ask the Court to infer misconduct.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has stated that the single incident exception is a
“extremely narrow” one. Edwards, 70 F.4th at 312–13. To paraphrase the Sermon on the
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Mount11, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than it is for a plaintiff to
use the single incident exception to prove municipal liability. 	The Fifth Circuit has
consistently 	rejected 	nearly 	every 	attempt 	to 	use 	the 	single 	incident 	exception 	to
demonstrate a constitutionally inadequate training program. 	Henderson v. Harris Cnty.,
Texas, 51 F.4th 125, 131 (5th Cir. 2022); Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Texas, 994 F.3d 477,
483 (5th Cir. 2021); Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351, 367 (5th Cir. 2020);
Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 808 Fed. App’x 246, 250 (5th Cir. 2020); Blanchard-
Daigle v. Geers, 802 Fed. App’x 113, 117 (5th Cir. 2020); Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534,
553 (5th Cir. 2018); Leal v. Wiles, 734 Fed. App’x 905, 908 n 11 (5th Cir. 2018); Pena v.
City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir. 2018); Saenz v. City of El Paso, 637
Fed. App’x 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2016); Anderson v. Marshall Cnty., Miss., 637 F. App’x 127,
135 (5th Cir. 2016); Hobart v. Estrada, 582 Fed. App’x 348, 358 (5th Cir. 2014); Clyce v.
Hunt Cnty., Tex., 515 F. App’x 319, 324 (5th Cir. 2013); Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d
536, 549 (5th Cir. 2010); Sanders-Burns v. City Of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 382 (5th Cir.
2010); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir. 2009); Thompson
v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 563 U.S. 51 (2011);
Plemons v. Amos, 306 F. App’x 160, 164 (5th Cir. 2009); Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d
322, 329 (5th Cir. 2008); Waltman v. Payne, 535 F.3d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 2008); Est. of
Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 386 (5th Cir. 2005);
Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2005); Burge v. St. Tammany
Par., 336 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2003); Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 334 (5th
Cir. 2002); Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council--President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 288 (5th
Cir. 2002); Hover v. Brenner, 229 F.3d 1147, n 21 (5th Cir. 2000); Conner v. Travis Cnty.,
209 F.3d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 2000); Gabriel v. City of Plano, 202 F.3d 741, 745 (5th Cir.
2000). The only time that the Fifth Circuit found municipal liability for a single incident
involved a sheriff hiring his great-nephew as a reserve deputy, even though the great-
nephew had an extensive criminal history, including an active warrant for his arrest and
11 M ATTHEW 19:24 (King James).
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unleashed him on the public with no training. Brown v. Bryan Cnty., OK, 219 F.3d 450,
458 (5th Cir. 2000). 	Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reserve deputy used excessive force in
arresting a suspect that he pursued across state lines into Texas. Id. The Fifth Circuit found
that it was highly predictable that unleashing an untrained officer on the general public was
likely to result in constitutional violations. Id.
The instant complaint does not clear the high hurdle to use the single incident
exception. 	The Fifth Circuit has stated that the single incident exception is “generally
reserved for those cases in which the government actor was provided no training
whatsoever.” Edwards, 70 F.4th at 312–13 (cleaned up).
ii. Plaintiff’s claim alleging the City of Harlingen’s failure to supervise
To establish a failure to supervise claim, Plaintiff must plead facts showing that (1)
a supervisor failed to supervise the subordinate, (2) there is a causal link between the lack
of supervision and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights and (3) the failure to supervise
amounts to deliberate indifference. Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir.
2009). Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify any supervisor who failed to supervise the
named officers. Even if the Court assumes a supervisor failed to supervise the named
officers and goes even further to assume a causal link, Plaintiff has not shown that the
failure to supervise amounted to deliberate indifference.
As previously noted, deliberate indifference typically requires a pattern of similar
violations that put the City of Harlingen on notice that its supervision was inadequate.
Wilson v. Baucom, 2023 WL 4288350, at *5 (5th Cir. June 30, 2023). Plaintiff has pleaded
no facts showing that any other individual was subjected to the type of investigation and
prosecution he alleges. Thus, the Plaintiff can only rely on the single incident exception.
The only time that the Fifth Circuit has upheld the single incident exception for
municipal liability for failure to supervise came under shocking circumstances. 	In
Covington v. City of Madisonville, Texas, 812 F. App’x 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2020), the chief
of police was informed that one of his officers was fabricating evidence against his ex-wife
in order to bring false criminal charges to win a custody battle. The chief responded that
he didn’t believe it and refused to investigate further. 	The Fifth Circuit found that those
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factual allegations were sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability for failure to
supervise based on the single incident exception. There have been no similar facts alleged
in this case to show that a supervisor was potentially aware that their subordinates were
consciously choosing to tamper with evidence, for example, and chose to ignore it. Indeed,
Plaintiff has pled no actual facts about the supervision – or lack thereof – during the
investigation of his criminal charges, instead relying on the ipse dixit that Plaintiff’s harm,
or possibly even Plaintiff’s verdict of not guilty, must have been the result of a failure of
supervision. This is not enough. This claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
VII. 	Recommendation
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim of a constitutional
violation, it is recommended that the Court:
(1) GRANT the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendants
Adela Kowalski-Garza, Noe Garza, and Luis Saenz (Dkt. No. 14);
(2) GRANT the Motion to Dismiss filed by the City of Harlingen, Texas, Manuel
Tovar, and Scott Vega (Dkt. No. 18);
(3) GRANT the Motion to Dismiss filed by Raul Roy Garza (Dkt. No. 24);
(4) DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice; and
(5) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to close this case.
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VIII. 	Notice to the Parties
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of
this Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with the United
States District Judge assigned to the instant case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When filing an
objection, a party must object to specific facts or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation. The District Judge is not required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or
general objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.
1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the
record before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings
without conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings
on appeal, except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs.,
L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on July 22, 2026.
__________________________
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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