Longoria v. United States of America

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
LUIS LONGORIA 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-cv-198
§ 	CR DKT 1:19-CR-00915-1
§
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	§
Respondent. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY
PETITIONER’S 28 U.S.C. § 2255 MOTION
I. 	Synopsis
Luis Longoria 1 complains the judge at sentencing got it wrong when he assessed an
enhancement for firearms connected to his drug trafficking offense. Longoria uses a motion under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 to pursue this claim well over two years after his sentence was imposed. The
issues before the court are first, whether Longoria’s motion is timely and second, whether he can
complain in a § 2255 motion of an alleged technical error at sentencing. The Court recommends
the denial of Longoria’s § 2255 motion because it is both untimely and not cognizable under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
II. 	Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court has jurisdiction over Luis Longoria’s (“Longoria”) 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
against the United States of America (“Government”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question) and § 2255 (federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence). Further, “[a] 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion must be filed in the district court which imposed the sentence.” Morris v.
Prescott, 92 Fed. Appx. 79, 2004 WL 298448 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Solsona v.
Warden, F.C.I., 821 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th Cir. 1987); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (stating a prisoner “may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”) (emphasis
added). A United States District Judge in the Brownsville Division of the Southern District of
Texas sentenced Longoria to 151 months imprisonment. See United States of America v. Luis
1 Longoria proceeds without a legal representative. Plaintiffs without a legal representative are considered
pro se plaintiffs and receive the benefit of liberal construction of their claims. See Kaltenbach v. Richards,
464 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2006).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 22, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Longoria Criminal Record Minute Entry in 1:19-cr-915-001 (“CR”) dated April 20, 2023
(Sentencing before Judge Fernando Rodriguez, Jr.) and CR Dkt. No. 135 (Judgment). Jurisdiction
and venue are, therefore, proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Brownsville Division.
III. 	Background
On May 31, 2022, Longoria plead guilty to Count 1 of a two-count superseding indictment
to the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a quantity exceeding 5 kilograms of cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). CR Minute Entry dated May 31,
2022. There was no plea agreement. Id.
In the final Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), a United States Probation Officer
(“USPO”) assessed Longoria with a base offense level of 32, predicated upon a finding that he was
responsible for smuggling 8,892.06 kilograms of converted drug weight. CR Dkt. No. 103, ¶ 64.
The USPO assessed Longoria with a two-point specific offense characteristic for possessing a
dangerous weapon, a two-point specific offense characteristic for maintaining premises for the
purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, and a three-point adjustment for
role. Id. at ¶¶ 65, 66, 68. After receiving acceptance of responsibly, Longoria’s offense level was
36. Id. at ¶¶ 72, 74.
Specifically, the two-level point assessment pursuant to United States Sentencing
Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possessing a dangerous weapon applied because agents discovered
multiple firearms in a residence linked to Longoria at 31063 Adams Road, Los Fresnos, Texas.
CR Dkt. No. 103, ¶¶ 43, 65. Longoria complains in his § 2255 motion that these additional two
points were incorrectly assessed. Dkt. No. 1.
Regarding his criminal history, Longoria had many convictions as an adult, but none
qualified for criminal history points. CR Dkt. No. 103, ¶¶ 76-90. Longoria was assessed a criminal
history category of I. Id. at ¶ 91.
A total offense level of 36 and a criminal history category of I produced a sentencing
guideline imprisonment range of 188 to 235 months. Id. at ¶ 129.
On April 20, 2023, Longoria was sentenced to 151 months imprisonment. CR Minute Entry
dated April 20, 2023. Judgement was entered on April 26, 2023. CR Dkt. No. 135.
Neither the District Court docket, nor the Fifth Circuit docket, reflect the filing of a direct
appeal. A notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days from the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP.
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P. 4(b)(1)(A), 26(a)(2). Therefore, Longoria’s deadline for filing a notice of appeal passed on May
10, 2023.
Beginning on November 3, 2023, and continuing through September 17, 2024, Longoria
filed multiple motions and reconsiderations for a sentencing reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
3582(c)(2) and amendment 821 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”). CR Dkt.
Nos. 137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 149. The trial court denied these motions. CR Dkt. Nos. 141, 144,
150. The first order denying Longoria’s requests for a reduction in his sentence notes Longoria
“receive[d] a two-level enhancement to his total offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), based
on his possession of a firearm in connection with the offense.” CR Dkt. No. 141, p. 1. For this
reason, Longoria “does not qualify for the two-point departure under 4C1.1.” Id.
Longoria filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion on September 8, 2025. Dkt. No. 1. His
complaint concerns the trial court’s assessment of two-points to his offense level for the possession
of weapons. Id. at 4. The relief Longoria seeks is that “the two point enhancement be vacated.” Id.
at 12. Pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS, the
Court has not ordered the Government to respond to Longoria’s § 2255 motion.
IV. 	Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a convicted defendant/petitioner may move to vacate, set
aside or correct his sentence if: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
the laws of the United States; (2) the district court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
(3) the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is
otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
A petitioner who seeks to challenge a final conviction by collateral attack, can do so on
constitutional or jurisdictional grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); U.S. v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 233 (5th
Cir. 1991). “In a habeas action, federal courts stand willing to review issues of jurisdiction,
allegations of substantial constitutional violations, and claims that exceptional circumstances
resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Lawrence v. McCarthy, 344 F.3d 467, 474 (5th
Cir. 2003). Where a § 2255 petitioner exhausts or waives his direct appeal, courts may presume
that he was fairly convicted. U.S. v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001).
The 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion is time limited to one-year. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The one-
year period runs from the latest of “the date on which the judgement of conviction becomes final[.]”
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Additional filing time is granted when an impediment to making a § 2255
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motion is plead, when a newly recognized right applies, or when claims could have been
discovered through due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2)-(4).
The Court has an independent obligation to review the record and the pleadings; “if it
plainly appears . . . that the moving party is not entitled to relief,” the Court “must dismiss” the
motion. Rule 4(b) of the RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS. The Court is
not required to order the Government to respond. Rule 5(a) of the RULES GOVERNING
SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS. A court may determine a § 2255 motion without requiring the
production of the petitioner. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(c).
V. 	Analysis
On September 8, 2025, Longoria filed this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, requesting
the district court vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Dkt. No. 1. In his motion, Longoria
asserts only one ground for relief, referring to “the two point enhancement for the weapons.” Dkt.
No. 1, p. 4.2 He writes, “The weapons were not found near me or at my residence at time of arrest
where the weapons were found I do not reside or do not own such residence nor was my
fingerprints on those weapons or proven that my fingerprints were on the weapons.” Id. He does
not argue that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to seek such a benefit, but merely that the
benefit should have been afforded to him.
a. 	Longoria’s Motion is barred as untimely.
Longoria’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is untimely. This Court recommends its denial
based on its late filing.
The District Court entered judgment sentencing Longoria to 151 months imprisonment on
April 26, 2023. CR. Dkt. No. 135. Longoria did not file a direct appeal of his criminal conviction
upon which his motion is based. See CR Dkt. in 1:19-cr-915. Longoria filed his motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 on September 8, 2025. Dkt. No. 1. Because final judgement in his criminal case
was entered on April 26, 2023, Longoria’s deadline for filing a notice of appeal passed on May 10,
2023. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A), 26(a)(2). (“A notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days
from the entry of judgment.”). See also U.S. v. Scruggs, 691 F. 3d 660, 669 (5 th Cir. 2012) (“When
a defendant does not file a direct appeal, his conviction becomes final on the day when the time
for filing a direct appeal expires.").
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the one-year period of limitation applies to Longoria’s motion.
2 Refers to the Bates-stamped number at the top of the document.
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28 U.S.C. § 2255 (f)(1). The one-year period runs in Longoria’s case from the date on which his
judgement is final, as no other condition granting time outside of one-year are alleged or discerned
by this Court, reading the motion in the light most favorable to Longoria. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (f)(2)-
(4). Longoria’s conviction became final on May 10, 2023. Accordingly, his motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 was due by May 10, 2024. Longoria filed his § 2255 motion on September 8, 2025. It is
therefore untimely under the statute and, therefore, this Court recommends its dismissal.
Longoria’s criminal docket in 1:19-cr-915-001 details filings and rulings dating from
November 3, 2023, to October 4, 2024. However, those filings and rulings relate to his motions
to reconsider and reduce his sentence based on the November 2023 retroactive amendments to the
U.S.S.G. for which the District Court ruled Longoria does not qualify because he received the
weapons sentencing enhancement complained of in his § 2255 motion. CR Dkt. Nos. 141, 150.
Longoria did not file an appeal of the District Court’s denials of his requests to reconsider his
sentence. See CR Dkt. in 1:19-cr-915. Longoria does not raise in his § 2255 motion that the
November 2023 sentencing amendments are newly recognized rights applicable to him; nor are
the November 2023 sentencing amendments applicable to him as ruled by the District Court. See
28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3). Therefore, his motions for sentencing reduction and motions to reconsider
their denial does not affect this Court’s application of the statutory limitations period under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.
b. 	Longoria’s claim is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Even if Longoria’s § 2255 motion was timely, he cannot seek the relief to overturn the
District Court’s ruling on his firearms enhancement through the motion. Longoria seeks relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Dkt. No. 1. That section provides, as relevant here:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Where a petitioner exhausts or waives his direct appeal, the Court is entitled to presume
that he was fairly convicted. U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982); U.S. v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592,
595 (5th Cir. 2001). A petitioner who seeks to challenge a final conviction by collateral attack, can
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do so on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); U.S. v. Shaid, 937 F.2d at
233.
A court may entertain and decide a § 2255 motion without requiring the production of the
prisoner at a hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(c). Further, a district court may deny a § 2255 motion
without an evidentiary hearing “if the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” U.S. v. Bartholomew, 974 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. 1992). The
record in this case satisfies this requirement. For this reason, the motion can be decided without a
hearing.
In analyzing Longoria’s claim that he was incorrectly given a sentencing enhancement for
weapons, the Court is required to construe allegations by pro se litigants liberally and to ensure
that their claims are given fair and meaningful consideration, despite their unfamiliarity with the
law. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
The Court begins by noting that a claim which involves a technical application of the
sentencing guidelines is not cognizable in a § 2255 motion. U.S. v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368
(5th Cir. 1992). Actions that amount to a technical application of the guidelines are defined by the
case law. See, e.g. Vaughn, 955 F.2d at 368; U.S. v. Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 1999)
(issue of whether career offender sentencing enhancement properly applied was a technical
application of the Guidelines); U.S. v. Smith, 170 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1999) (relevant conduct
finding regarding drug weight was a technical application of the Guidelines); U.S. v. Cervantes,
132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1998) (error in calculating sentence was a technical application of
the Guidelines); Hawkins v. U.S., 706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir.2013) (technical errors in calculating
guideline sentencing range are not cognizable on collateral attack after U.S. v. Booker, 542 U.S.
220 (2005) made the guidelines advisory).
Longoria’s claim that he should not have been assessed a two-point enhancement on his
offense level for possessing weapons in connection with his drug offense involves a similar
technical application of the sentencing guidelines. Longoria does not raise grounds that his
sentence was imposed in violation of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. law, or that there were any
jurisdictional violations when his sentenced was imposed. Therefore, his § 2255 claim is not a
claim for which his sentence can be vacated, set aside, or corrected. Accordingly, his claim as
presented should be denied as non-cognizable.
Even if this Court were to construe a timely filed § 2255 motion based on Longoria’s
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motions requesting reconsideration and reduction of his sentence based on the November 2023
sentencing amendments, the claim fails. Longoria’s complaint that he should have received a
sentencing reduction under the November 2023 amendments on the premise that he did not possess
the weapons for which he received a two-level enhancement would be a technical application of
the guidelines. Thus, any claim based on the denial of his motions to reconsider his sentence is not
cognizable on collateral attack and not a claim for which his sentence can be vacated, set aside, or
corrected. His sentencing complaint against the District Court fails, and his § 2255 motion should
be dismissed as the sentencing enhancement application cannot be collaterally attacked. Therefore,
as Longoria fails to raise a claim this Court can review, this Court recommends dismissal.
c. 	Longoria’s claim fails on its merits.
Furthermore, even if the claim was timely and cognizable, it is meritless.
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) provides a two-level enhancement of a defendant's offense
level “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” The
enhancement applies “if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable
that the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.
11(A). “[T]he government must prove weapon possession by a preponderance of
the evidence.” United States v. Zapata–Lara, 615 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2010). If
the government satisfies this burden, then the burden shifts and the defendant must
show that it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense. Id.
at 391 n.5.
The government can prove that the defendant personally possessed the weapon “by
showing a temporal and spatial relationship of the weapon, the drug trafficking
activity, and the defendant.” Id. at 390. “Alternatively, when another individual
involved in the commission of an offense possessed the weapon, the government
must show that the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that possession.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted). A defendant involved in a “jointly undertaken criminal
activity” is responsible for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others
in 	furtherance 	of 	the 	jointly 	undertaken 	criminal 	activity.” 	U.S.S.G. 	§
1B1.3(a)(1)(B). “Thus, a sentencing court may often infer foreseeability from a
coconspirator's knowing possession of a weapon.” Zapata–Lara, 615 F.3d at 390
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Rodriguez-Guerrero, 805 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2015).
The PSR shows that multiple weapons were found at 31063 Adams in Los Fresnos. CR
Dkt. No. 103, ¶ 43. Through investigation, the Government found “that Longoria would repackage
and load the narcotics Guerrero was transporting at a residence located at 31063 Adams Road, Los
Fresnos, Texas.” CR Dkt. No. 103, ¶ 35. The PSR stated no one resided at the Adams Road address.
Id. “Rather, Longoria utilized the residence as a stash house where Longoria would repackage and
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conceal narcotics.” Id. Therefore the PSR correctly reflected a two-level enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) as a specific offense characteristic.
Nothing in Longoria’s claim of this sentencing error rises to a violation of U.S. law or the
U.S. Constitution. Longoria’s claim is a complaint concerning the application of the sentencing
guidelines. United States v. Vaughan, 955 F.2d at 368. Nor does Longoria’s complaint regarding
a perceived sentencing error raise a fundamental defect inherently resulting in a complete
miscarriage of justice. 	United States v. Smith, 844 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1992). Accordingly,
Longoria’s claim should be denied.
Thus, irrespective of how the claim is viewed, Longoria’s claim is both untimely and
foreclosed as a matter of law.
VI. 	Recommendation
It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Luis Longoria’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct his Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. No. 1) be DENIED as meritless.
VII. 	Certificate of Appealability
Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”), a petitioner
may not appeal the denial of a § 2255 motion to the Fifth Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a),(c)(1). A
petitioner may receive a COA only if he makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2); Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). This requires
a “showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the motion
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 475 (2000) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). In other words, if Petitioner’s claims have been dismissed on the
merits, the movant/petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. at 484. Where claims have
been dismissed on procedural grounds, the movant/petitioner must show that “jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the motion states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Id.
District courts may deny certificates of appealability sua sponte, without requiring further
briefing or argument. Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
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After reviewing Longoria’s § 2255 motion and the applicable Fifth Circuit precedent, the
Court is confident that no outstanding issue would be debatable among jurists of reason. Although
Longoria’s § 2255 motion raises issues that the Court has carefully considered, he fails to make a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that a COA should be denied.
VIII. 	Notice to the Parties
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report
and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with United States District Judge
Fernando Rodriguez, Jr. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When filing an objection, a party must object to
specific facts or legal findings in this Report and Recommendation. The District Judge is not
required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Battle v. United States Parole
Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the record
before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings without
conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings on appeal,
except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243,
248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on January 22, 2026.
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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