Martinez v. City of Brownsville, Texas et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
§
ESTEBAN MARTINEZ 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-cv-197
§
CITY OF BROWNSVILLE, et al., 	§
Defendant. 	§
§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT. NO. 25)
I. 	Synopsis
Mr. Martinez complains the City of Brownsville and its officers violated his rights
by arresting him during the investigation of a bar fight on August 13, 2023. He brings a
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for what he alleges is wrongful conduct.
Martinez sued the arresting officers for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
Constitutional rights and the City for policies which allowed these abuses to take place.
The City of Brownsville and its officers claim no such violating policies exist and they are
entitled to qualified immunity. 	The issue before the Court is whether Mr. Martinez has
sufficiently plead a case under federal law upon which relief can be granted to him. The
Court finds Mr. Martinez has no claim and recommends his case be dismissed.
II. 	Jurisdiction
This Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff Esteban
Martinez alleges a cause of action against the City of Brownsville and its officers Ricardo
Zepeda, Regino Garza and Cesar Castaneda, collectively the Defendants, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 based on violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution. See Dkt. No. 24 at 1; 28 U.S.C. §1331. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), this
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 25, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all pretrial
proceedings. Dkt. No. 4.
III. 	Venue
Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Brownsville Division, because the alleged events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in this
geographical jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 24 (Pl.’s Amended Compl.) at 2-7; 28 U.S.C.
§1391(b)(2). Venue is also proper in this court and division because Defendants properly
removed this case to the district and division where the state court suit was pending. 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a).
IV. 	Factual History
Plaintiff alleges the following facts. On August 13, 2023, Plaintiff called the
Brownsville Police Department. Dkt. No. 24 at 2. Plaintiff stood on a public walkway and
parking area of La Placita Plaza, a multi-tenant shopping center. Id. The walkway and
parking lot are not controlled by individual tenants. Id. at 2-3. The three officers named as
Defendants, Officers Zepeda, Garza, and Castaneda, responded to Plaintiff’s call. Id. at 3.
Officer Zepeda drafted the police report. Id. All three named officers participated in
Martinez’s arrest. Id. at 5. Officer Garza placed handcuffs on Martinez. Id. Plaintiff claims
he experienced “excessively tight handcuffs” and “unsafe transport” in part because he was
not secured by a seat belt. Id. From this, Plaintiff alleges he “suffered wrist pain, bruising,
swelling, and ongoing discomfort.” Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that jail personnel refused to document his injuries. Id.
Plaintiff states that jail surveillance footage “to corroborate that jail staff refused to
document his injuries” was destroyed. Id. at 6. Plaintiff attempted three times to file written
complaints soon after his arrest, but he alleges “[e]ach attempt was blocked by supervisors
and investigators.” Id. Additionally, Plaintiff filed “32 public-records requests” for what
he calls “exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff alleges that the City of Brownsville
took several actions in regard to these requests which “deprived Plaintiff of a meaningful
opportunity to defend himself in his pending criminal case.” Id. at 7.
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Plaintiff states he was charged with criminal trespass, and the case was dismissed
on October 11, 2024. Id. at 7.
V. 	Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action in state court on August 11, 2025, filing his Original
Petition in the 138th Judicial District Court of Cameron County, Texas. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1.1
Plaintiff alleged only torts at common law and causes of action arising under Texas law.
Dkt. No. 1-3 at 5-7.
Defendants the City of Brownsville and the three named officers removed the case
to the Southern District of Texas, Brownsville Division on September 8, 2025. Dkt. No.
1.2 Defendants based the removal on federal question jurisdiction “pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1441.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2. All Defendants consented to and joined in the removal.
Dkt. No. 2 at 3.3
Defendants first filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim on September
26, 2025. Dkt. No. 12. Defendant’s motion construed Plaintiff’s complaint as a suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 3-7. The undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge set a hearing to
determine whether the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case. Dkt. No.
16; see Minute Entry dated October 22, 2025. The Court granted Plaintiff’s oral motion to
amend his complaint to allege federal law claims. Minute Entry dated October 22, 2025.
Consequently, the Court mooted Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss. Minute Entry dated
October 22, 2025.
1 Plaintiff named the same defendants as named in the instant case, including the City of Brownsville, the
same three police officers, and John/Jane Does. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1.
2 Defendants did not submit any sort of filing to the state court.
3 The Court notes that although Plaintiff names John/Jane Does 1-10 in his Original Petition (Dkt. No. 1-3
at 1), the federal statute governing the procedure for removal of civil actions requires consent to removal
only from “all defendants who have been properly joined and served.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). Plaintiff
did not object to the removal procedure and has not provided proof of service on anyone other than the City
of Brownsville and the three named police officers.
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Plaintiff timely filed his First Amended Complaint, in which he alleges causes of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Dkt. No. 24.4 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 25.5 Plaintiff filed a timely Response
in Opposition. Dkt. No. 28. Defendants filed a timely Reply. Dkt. No. 30. Accordingly, the
Motion to Dismiss is ripe for the Court’s consideration.
VI. 	Standard of Review under FRCP 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when the plaintiff has failed to plead
sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ferguson v. Bank of
New York Mellon Corp., 802 F.3d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 2015). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct,” then dismissal is proper. Id. at 679.
“In determining whether a plaintiff’s claims survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the factual information to which the court addresses its inquiry is limited to the (1)
the facts set forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matters
of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Walker v.
Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019). All well-pled facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Schweitzer v. Inv. Comm. of Phillips 66
Sav. Plan, 960 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2020).
Still, “regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by
counsel, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions
will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.’ ” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d
376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Supreme Court of La., 252 F.3d
4 Because the Plaintiff’s amended complaint raises a federal question, the Court found it had jurisdiction to
entertain Plaintiff’s claims. See Subsection II. Jurisdiction of this Report and Recommendation.
5 The Court has stayed the deadline for the parties to file a joint discovery / case management plan pending
the resolution of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 26.
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781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (2009) (clarifying
“the tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to
threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory
statements.”).
Dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a dismissal
on the merits and with prejudice. Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR, 385 F.3d 871, 874 n. 6
(5th Cir. 2004).
VII. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983
As relevant here, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall
not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable.
Id.
Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States
Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144,
n. 3 (1979). To prevail upon a § 1983 claim a plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) a
constitutional violation; and (2) that the defendants were acting under color of state law
when they committed the constitutional violation. Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638
(5th Cir. 2013).
VIII. 	Analysis
a. 	Qualified immunity precludes Martinez’s suit for unlawful arrest.
Martinez’s first cause of action raises a claim of unlawful arrest under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments by City of Brownsville police officers Zepeda, Garza and
Castaneda for violating his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by arresting him for criminal
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trespass without probable cause. Dkt. No. 24 at 7. Martinez states that he was “arrested
without probable cause while standing on property not controlled by the nightclub,” and
he states that the Officer’s alleged acts “violated clearly established constitutional rights.”
Id.
“An arrest is unlawful unless it is supported by probable cause.” Flores v. City of
Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2004). “Probable cause exists when the totality of
facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was
committing an offense.” United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1996).
Martinez claims he was arrested after calling the Brownsville Police Department to
report an assault on a friend by a security guard at a nightclub. Martinez states upon arrival
of the officers, the security guard at the nightclub gave conflicting and fabricated
information to the officers that Martinez was either never in the nightclub or that he was
escorted out (Martinez does not say out of where) and was told not to walk on an area
around the nightclub. 	Martinez then pleads Officer Zepeda made a false statement
justifying Martinez’s arrest by claiming Martinez was asked several times to leave the
nightclub. 	He claims the officers found him standing outside of nightclub, such that the
officers the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for criminal trespass.
Martinez pleads facts which, taken as true under this FRCP 12(b)(6) analysis,
establish that he was on the sidewalk of a multi-tenant property at the time of his arrest.
However, even when a plaintiff asserts a claim against officers for an unlawful arrest, the
officer is entitled to immunity from the suit if a reasonable officer could “‘reasonably but
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present.’ ” Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226,
230 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991))6.
6 In fact, “the qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d at
230 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)).
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In his operative pleading, Plaintiff alleges the officers knew no probable cause
existed, but the facts he pleads mostly concern that the establishment was a multi-tenant
property and where Plaintiff was standing. Plaintiff also pleads facts on some of the
statements given to the police officers by security guards. However, stating that the officers
knew no probable cause existed at the time of the arrest is a conclusory statement, so the
Court does not accept it as true. The facts Martinez does plead concerning where he was
standing, the type of property, and some statements given by the security guards, even if
true, could show that the officer was mistaken about what the guards said, where Martinez
was, and the type of property at most. Significantly, these facts do not demonstrate that
even if mistaken, the officers’ belief that probable cause existed was unreasonable when
measured against the conduct of a reasonable officer.7 For this reason, even at the pleading
stage, 	Martinez 	cannot 	overcome 	the 	officers’ 	assertion 	of 	qualified 	immunity.
Accordingly, the officers have immunity from suit against Martinez’s claim of an unlawful
arrest.
b. Martinez pleads no constitutional violation for excessive force.
In his second cause of action, Martinez alleges “excessive force” and references the
Fourth Amendment and § 1983 when Officer Garza allegedly applied “excessively tight
7 	In his response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues his allegation that Officer
Zepeda fabricated a material statement precludes qualified immunity at the pleadings stage. Dkt. No. 28 at
3. However, even taking the facts Martinez pleads as true (that no security guard made the statement the
officer wrote down and this statement was the sole basis for alleging criminal trespass, Dkt. No. 24 at 4),
qualified immunity would still preclude suit if the Officer’s judgment was mistaken but reasonable.
Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d at 230. Plaintiff does not plead facts which, if true, establish that the Officer’s
conduct was mistaken and unreasonable or that the officer knowingly violate the law. Plaintiff argues that
his allegations concerning where he stood mean “nightclub security lacked authority to exclude [him] from
those areas, and no reasonable officer could conclude that Plaintiff committed criminal trespass.” Dkt. No.
28 at 3. Still, this is a recital of the element of his claim supported by a conclusory statement without
supporting facts. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
Additionally, Plaintiff points to his pleaded facts stating one of the officers told Plaintiff he would
face charges which were never filed. Dkt. No. 28 at 4. Again, the officer could have made a reasonable
mistake, and Plaintiff does not plead facts which, if true, could establish that no reasonable officer would
have concluded the same. Lastly, Martinez pleads that one of the officers stated that the person next to
Martinez was arrested for interfering, but the record of her arrest shows a different charge. Again, the officer
could have made a reasonable mistake, and Plaintiff does not plead facts which, if true, could establish that
no reasonable officer would have concluded that the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity.
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handcuffs, failed to double-lock them, and transported Plaintiff unsafely.” Dkt. No. 24 at
8. In support of this claim, Martinez states the overly tight handcuffs cause him immediate
pain and upon request for an adjustment the cuffs were not double-locked; then upon
transport Martinez complains a sharp turn caused further tightening of the handcuffs and a
fall in the vehicle because he was unrestrained by a seat belt causing pain, bruising,
swelling and ongoing discomfort. Id. at 5.
“To prevail on an excessive-force claim, [a plaintiff] must show (1) injury, (2) which
resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the
excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744
(5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016) (alteration in
original)). Excessiveness and unreasonableness can be considered together. See Darden v.
City of Fort Worth, Texas, 880 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 2018).
Generally, to maintain a claim for excessive force, a plaintiff need not demonstrate
a significant injury, but the injury must be more than de minimis. See Tarver v. City of
Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5 th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit has characterized the injury
requirement as “a sliding scale, not a hard cutoff.” Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 982 (5th
Cir. 2022). This approach treats the degree of injury—even if minor—as interrelated to the
reasonableness and excessiveness of the officer's force. “[A]lthough a de minimis injury is
not cognizable, the extent of injury necessary to satisfy the injury requirement is ‘directly
related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible under the circumstances.’ ”
Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brown v.
Lynch, 524 F. App'x 69, 79 (5th Cir. 2013)).
As to Martinez’s claims of being handcuffed too tightly, the 5 th Circuit maintains
“handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive force.” Glenn v. City
of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307 (5 th Cir. 2021). Therefore, no constitutional right of Martinez was
violated, and he cannot maintain his claim for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Similarly, no such constitutional violation supporting a § 1983 for a lack of seatbelt
in recognized by the 5 th Circuit. The 5 th Circuit holds there is no federally protected right
to safety restraints in prisoner transport. Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403 (5 th Cir. 2013).
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Third, Martinez alleges “Denial of Access to Exculpatory Evidence” and references
the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983. Id. Martinez states that “[a]ccess to exculpatory
evidence during a pending criminal prosecution is a protected liberty interest, and the
City’s actions deprived Plaintiff of that interest.” Id. Fourth, Martinez alleges “Monell
Municipal Liability” and references § 1983. 	Id. Martinez states that the “City of
Brownsville, through Chief Sauceda, maintained customs,” and lists the alleged customs
asserting those customs “were the moving force behind Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest,
excessive force, and denial of due process.” Id.
The Court notes that although Martinez’s First Amended Complaint claims to sue
Officers Zepeda, Garza, and Castaneda in their official capacity, Martinez states in his
Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that he “voluntarily dismisses official-capacity
claims against the individual officers as redundant.” Dkt. No. 28 at 6. Because Martinez
proceeds pro se, the Court accepts this declaration and this Court proceeds to analyze
Martinez’s remaining claims against the City of Brownsville.8
c. 	Martinez’s Monell Claim under § 1983 for Municipal Liability fails.
Martinez 	alleges 	that 	the 	City 	of 	Brownsville 	“maintained” 	the 	following
“customs”:
• 	Fabrication or misattribution of facts in police reports;
• 	False statements in supplemental reports;
• 	Charge-shopping and retaliatory arrest practices;
• 	Blocking written citizen complaints;
• 	Withholding or destroying exculpatory evidence;
• 	Failure to train officers on probable cause in multi-tenant properties;
• 	Ratifying misconduct by refusing to discipline officers.
Dkt. No. 24 at 8. To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
8 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit recognizes that claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a state actor in their
official capacity are functionally duplicative with the claims against the municipality. See Castro Romero
v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Flores v. Cameron County, Tex., 92 F.3d 258, 261
(5th Cir. 1996).
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misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must be able to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id. at 679.
“Local governments are liable for a policy or custom that causes a constitutional
injury under Section 1983,” which is colloquially known as a Monell claim. Austin v. City
of Pasadena, Texas, 74 F.4th 312, 332 (5th Cir. 2023). 	To establish municipal liability
under Section 1983, a plaintiff generally must identify an official policy or custom that
caused constitutional injury. 	Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847-48 (5th
Cir. 2009). “A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat
superior.” Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). 	Accordingly, a municipality can be
subjected to civil liability only if the allegedly illegal conduct is “directly attributable to
the 	municipality 	through 	some 	sort 	of 	official 	action 	or 	imprimatur; 	isolated
unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.”
Robinson v. Hunt Cty., Texas, 921 F.3d 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2019).
“Municipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a
policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force
is the policy or custom.” Brinsdon v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist., 863 F.3d 338, 346 (5th Cir.
2017) (cleaned up). These elements “are necessary to distinguish individual violations
perpetrated by local government employees from those that can be fairly identified as
actions of the government itself.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th
Cir. 2001).
The first element, an official policy or custom, may be proved through either a
policy “officially adopted and promulgated” by the municipality or an official with policy
making authority,” or “persistent widespread practice of city officials or employees, which,
although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and
well settled as to constitute of custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Burge v. St
Tammany Parish (Burge II), 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003). Less commonly, a “single
decision by a policy maker may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy for which
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a [municipality] may be liable.” Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000)
(alteration in original).
The second element requires the identification of a policy maker and proof of that
policymaker’s actual or constructive knowledge of the policy or custom. Fennell v. Marion
Independent School Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 413 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Moore,
958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992)). The third element requires that a plaintiff show either that
the policy itself was unconstitutional or that it was adopted with deliberate indifference to
the known or obvious fact that a specific constitutional violation would follow.” Liggins v.
Duncanville, 52 F.4 th 953, 955 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal citation omitted). Municipalities
do not have an affirmative obligation to have policies which prevent constitutional torts;
they have an obligation not to maintain policies which create or condone constitutional
torts. Thompson v. Upshur Cty., Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 462 (5th Cir. 2001).
In the present case, Martinez may establish the first element of a Monell claim by
pleading sufficient facts which, taken as true, would show that an official policy or custom
exists is through a policy officially adopted and promulgated by the City of Brownsville or
an official with policy making authority. Burge v. St Tammany Parish (Burge II), 336 F.3d
at 369. Plaintiff’s operative complaint does not plead facts which meet this first element,
alleging “an official policy or custom,” even when the Court views the facts in the light
most favorable to him. Burge v. St Tammany Parish (Burge II), 336 F.3d at 369.
In his response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that “[a]t the
pleadings stage, a plaintiff is not require to identify prior adjudicated incidents involving
other citizens[.]” Dkt. No. 28 at 6. While it may be the case that Plaintiff need not show
“prior adjudicated incidents,” Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to establish the elements
of his claim on the face of his pleadings. Martinez argues that in his response that in the
present case “the alleged policy or custom is demonstrated through multiple coordinated
acts, ratification, and obstruction occurring within a single course of conduct.” Dkt. No. 28
at 6. The Court disagrees.
Martinez does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate coordinated acts, ratification,
or obstruction. Although he pleads the involvement of three police officers working for the
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City of Brownsville, the other alleged facts do not show coordination beyond these officers
working together at the scene. Further, Martinez alleges jail personnel “refused” to
document his injuries, but Martinez does not plead facts which, if true, would show that
the jail staff coordinated with anyone. Martinez’s characterization that they “refused” is
also a conclusory statement not a well-pleaded fact, so the Court is not obligated to accept
as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (2009). Martinez pleads he attempted three
times to file written complaints. However, he does not plead facts which, if true, would
show that City of Brownsville’s “supervisors and investigators” interfered with his
attempts. The allegation that each attempt was “blocked” by those individuals is also a
conclusory statement, which the Court is not obligated to accept as true.
Similarly, regarding his public-records requests, Martinez does not support most of
his allegations with facts. The Court accept as true for the purpose of this 12(b)(6) analysis
that partial footage was provided to Martinez, because Martinez pleads exactly that. Aside
from this statement, the other allegations contain conclusory statements. For instance,
Martinez states that the City “misrepresented system capabilities,” Dkt. No. 24 at 7, but
Martinez does not plead any factual content which, if true, would show a misrepresentation
occurred. Collectively, Martinez does not plead any factual content to try and show that
these different departments worked together in any way, shape, or form. The Court cannot
infer even the possibility of misconduct from Martinez’s pleadings, or that a policy
officially adopted and promulgated by the City of Brownsville possibly violated one of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Martinez may also prove an official policy or custom was officially adopted and
promulgated by an official with policy making authority. Martinez refers to Chief Sauceda,
but he does not plead any facts related to Chief Sauceda, much less facts which would show
he is an official with policy-making authority who officially adopted and promulgated an
official policy or custom which violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
The second way Plaintiff may prove that an official policy or custom exists is
through pleading sufficient facts, which would show that there is a “persistent widespread
practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted
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and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute of custom that fairly
represents municipal policy” from which the court can do more than infer the mere
possibility of misconduct. Id. Martinez alleges that the City of Brownsville maintained
customs “through Chief Sauceda.” Dkt. No. 24 at 8. As noted above, Martinez’s complaint
does not plead any facts which show a widespread practice of municipal employees.
Martinez’s allegations do not show a consistent practice among the employees he notes,
the officers, jail staff, personnel who managed his written complaints or his public-records
requests. To reiterate, although Martinez may not need to show prior adjudicated incidents,
at the pleading stage, Martinez needs to pleads facts on the face of his complaint which, if
true, could establish every element of his claim. Martinez, if anything, asks the Court to
accept his conclusory statements infer misconduct from these conclusory allegations
unsupported by factual content.
With the facts plead in his operative complaint, Martinez fails to meet the first
element of his § 1983 Monell Claim alleging municipal liability, and Martinez has failed
to state a claim for which relief can be granted on these grounds. For this reason, the Court
does not analyze the remaining elements of this claim.
d. Martinez’s § 1983 Monell Claim for Failure to Supervise fails.
Martinez alleges that the City of Brownsville, through Chief Sauceda, failed to train
officers on probable cause in muti-tenant properties. Although Martinez includes this
allegation as part of his argument that the City “maintained customs,” granting liberal
construction of his claims, the Court analyzes this claim as a separate issue. The Court
finds that Martinez fails to establish the first element on a claim that a municipality is liable
for failing to supervise or train an employee.
To succeed on a claim that a municipality is liable for failing to supervise or train
an employee, a plaintiff must plead facts plausibly establishing “(1) that the municipality's
training procedures were inadequate, (2) that the municipality was deliberately indifferent
in adopting its training policy, and (3) that the inadequate training policy directly caused
the violations in question.” Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., Texas, 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir.
2020) (citing Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010)).
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As to the first element – the existence of inadequate training – the plaintiff can meet
this standard “by alleging facts related to the locality’s actual training program.” Speck
Wiginton, 606 Fed. App’x 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2015). 	The plaintiff cannot simply ask the
Court “to make the inference that a single alleged incident of misconduct means officers
are inadequately trained.” Id.
Martinez pleads facts which, taken as true, support that his arrest occurred on a
multi-tenant property. However, Martinez does not plead any facts which relate to the City
of Brownsville’s actual training program for its police officers. Martinez’s pleaded facts
and allegations against the officers are specific to the officers. For instance, regarding
Officer Castaneda, Martinez states, “Castaneda’s report demonstrates: his participation in
Plaintiff’s arrest; [and] Knowledge of the lack of probable cause . . .” Dkt. No. 24 at 6.
Even if the Court were to find that Officer Castaneda had knowledge of the lack of probable
cause, this allegation, to reemphasize, is specific to the officer. Plaintiff pleads no facts
related to the municipality’s training program.
With the facts plead in his operative complaint, Martinez fails to meet the first
element of his § 1983 failure to supervise claim—the existence of an inadequate training
program. Accordingly, the Court finds Martinez has failed to state a claim for which relief
can be granted on these grounds and does not analyze the remaining elements of the claim.
e. 	Martinez’s § 1983 claim for a Right to a Fair Trial fails.
Martinez also bases his Section 1983 claim on a violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Dkt. No. 15, pp. 6-7, 9.
But Martinez claims that Defendants deprived him of his liberty interest by denying him
access to exculpatory evidence during a pending criminal prosecution. Given that Martinez
is concerned with exculpatory evidence, a legal term of art, the Court analyzes his claim as
a violation of his right to a fair trial. “The government must disclose material, exculpatory
evidence to a [criminal] defendant.” United States v. Walters, 351 F.3d 159, 169 (5th Cir.
2003) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963)). However, a “police officer's
deliberate concealment of exculpatory evidence violates [a defendant’s right to a fair trial],
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and can give rise to liability under § 1983.” Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir.
2008).9
The Court notes that there was no actual prosecution of Martinez’s criminal trespass
charge and no trial was conducted.10 Without prosecution of the charge, the officers were
not obligated to present Martinez with any exculpatory evidence should any have existed.
Moreover, because there was no prosecution, Martinez’s right to a fair trial could not have
been violated.11
Further, if a defendant claims qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to establish that the defendant is not entitled to its protections. Lincoln v. Turner, 874 F.3d
833, 847 (5th Cir. 2017). “When confronted with a qualified-immunity defense at the
pleadings stage, the plaintiff must plead facts which, if proved, would defeat the claim of
immunity.” Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
The two-part test for qualified immunity requires the Court to determine: (1)
whether the defendants’ actions violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2)
whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the defendant’s actions.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). In determining whether the law was clearly
established, the Court cannot simply “define clearly established law at a high level of
generality.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam). Rather, the Court must
focus on “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Id.
(emphasis original).
Martinez fails to plead facts which, if true, support a violation of his constitutional
right to a fair trial, or of his constitutional right to be provided with exculpatory evidence
as a criminal defendant. Additionally, Martinez fails to plead sufficient facts to establish
the first claim for qualified immunity —that the City, the officers, and/or Jane and John
9 Because Martinez proceeds pro se, the Court construes his claims liberally.
10 See Dkt. No. 24 (document showing dismissal of charge).
11 Martinez’s pleaded facts pertain to public-records requests he made between August 2023 and July 2025
for the allegedly exculpatory evidence. Dkt. No. 24 at 6. Because Martinez’s charge of criminal trespass
was dismissed on October 11, 2024, at least some of these requests do not pertain to a pending criminal
prosecution.
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Does failed to provide him with allegedly exculpatory evidence, thus, violating one of his
constitutional. Accordingly, the City of Brownsville and the individual defendants are
immune from suit in regard to this claim.
f. 	Martinez’s § 1983 – Due Process claim under the 14 th Amendment
fails.
Martinez also bases his Section 1983 claim on a violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Dkt. No. 15, pp. 6-7, 9.
“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998). “Historically, this
guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials
to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.” See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986) (emphasis in original). Martinez claims that the City of Brownsville deprived him
of his liberty interest by denying him access to exculpatory evidence during a pending
criminal prosecution. As the Court analyzed above, access to exculpatory evidence
implicates a plaintiff’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Nevertheless, because Martinez
expressly refers to the Fourteenth Amendment and because he proceeds pro se, the Court
considers whether he has pled sufficient facts to establish a claim under Section 1983 for
deprivation of his liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Martinez alleges this claim against the City of Brownsville and against the three
named officers involved in his arrest in their individual capacity. Because the Court
considered Martinez’s claim concerning exculpatory evidence above, the Court considers
Martinez’s Fourteenth Amendment claim in conjunction with his allegations of excessive
force, “where the complained-of harm is a particular act or omission of one or more
officials.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir.1997) (en banc ))
For the claims against the officers as individual defendants, the plaintiff “must
establish that the official(s) acted with subjective deliberate indifference to prove a
violation of [his] constitutional rights.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d at
526 (citing Flores v. County of Hardeman, 124 F.3d 736, 738-39 (5th Cir.1997)).
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“Subjective deliberate indifference means ‘the official had subjective knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate
indifference to that risk.’ ” (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th
Cir.1996) (en banc )).
In the present case, Martinez pleads that an officer applied overly tight handcuffs
and pleads that he was not secured by a seat belt. Martinez pleads that he requested
adjustment of the handcuffs but does not plead any facts which, if true, would show that
the Officer had subjective knowledge that the handcuffs were applied tightly or that
Martinez was not secured by a seat belt. Given Martinez’s insufficient facts, the face of his
pleadings, if true.
Second, “To succeed in holding a municipality liable, the plaintiff must demonstrate
a municipal employee's subjective indifference and additionally that the municipal
employee's act ‘resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or maintained with
objective deliberate indifference to the [plaintiff]'s constitutional rights.’” (quoting Hare v.
City of Corinth, 74 F.3d at 649 n. 14). As analyzed above, Martinez fails to plead factual
content which, if true, would show there a municipal policy or custom was adopted.
Additionally, Martinez fails to plead sufficient facts which would demonstrate subjective
indifference from the officers, municipal employees. Martinez mentions the jail personnel
but merely provides a conclusory statement, that the personnel refused his requests for
injury documentation. Again, Martinez fails to plead factual content which, if true, would
show the jail personnel were subjectively indifferent to the constitutional violation he
alleges or that they were following a municipal policy or custom.
Martinez fails to plead facts which, if true, support a violation of his constitutional
right under the Fourteenth Amendment, so Martinez fails to state a claim for which relief
could be granted on these grounds. Additionally, Martinez fails to plead sufficient facts to
establish the first claim for qualified immunity that any of the officers’ actions or that of
the City and/or Jane and/or John Does violated one of his constitutional rights. Accordingly,
the City of Brownsville and the individual defendants are immune from suit in regard to
this claim.
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IX. 	Recommendation
Because the Court finds Plaintiff Esteban Martinez fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court (1) GRANT Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 25); (2) DISMISS the instant case with prejudice12; and (3)
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to close this case.
X. 	Notice to Parties
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of
this Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with United
States District Judge Fernando Rodriguez, Jr. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party filing
objections must specifically identify the factual or legal findings to which objections are
being made. The District Judge is not required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or general
objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). This
Report and Recommendation shall serve as notice of the Plaintiffs’ procedural defaults,
and the objection period shall serve as opportunity to respond to these defects. Alexander
v. Trump, 753 F. App’x 201, 208 (5th Cir. 2018).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the
record before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings
without conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings
on appeal, except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs.,
L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on June 25, 2026.
__________________________
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
12 Because the Court recommends dismissal on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the recommended dismissal on these grounds is “a dismissal on the merits and
with prejudice. Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR, 385 F.3d 871, 874 n. 6 (5th Cir. 2004).
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