Mares et al v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 160 et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
ROSA MARES, et al., §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-069
§
NATIONAL TREASURY
EMPLOYEES UNION, CHAPTER
160 and
ROBERT BRISEÑO,
§
§
§
§
§
Defendants. §
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are: (1) Plaintiffs Rosa Mares, et al.’s “First Amended Original
Complaint;” (2) Defendants National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 160 and
Robert Briseño’s “Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment” (Defendants’ “Motion to Dismiss”); (3) Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss; (4) Defendants’ Reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss; and (5)
Plaintiffs’ Sur-reply to Defendants’ Reply. Dkt. Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22.
For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that the Court: (1) GRANT
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 22, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiffs2 are retired United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”)
officers. Dkt. No. 17 at 2. Defendants are the National Treasury Employees Union,
Chapter 160 (“NTEU Chapter 160”), representing CBP officers working in Brownsville,
Texas, and Robert Briseño, NTEU Chapter 160’s president. Id.
This case arises out of a dispute over the rightful distribution of funds awarded to
the NTEU by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (the “FLRA”). See Dkt. Nos. 17, 18.
On June 12, 2014, the NTEU filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Department
of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Brownsville, Texas (“CBP”),
asserting CBP failed to comply with certain arbitration awards. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2–3. The
NTEU claimed that CBP failed to comply with previous arbitration awards concerning the
reassignment of, and backpay owed to, CBP officers in Brownsville, Texas. Id. On
September 29, 2015, the Regional Director for the Dallas Region of the FLRA issued an
amended Complaint and Notice of Hearing claiming that CBP failed to comply with the
arbitration awards. Id. at 1–2.
On May 5, 2016, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ordered CBP to comply with
a final and binding award issued on October 7, 20113, which included backpay with
interest. Id. at 14. The following month, on June 30, 2016, Cabrina S. Smith, Chief of the
1 Information obtained from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and where necessary to obtain historical
dates, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. See Dkt.
Nos. 17, 18.
2 Rosa Mares; Gustavo E. Acosta; Sandra Marquez; Sandra Acres; Geoge Mandieta; Francisco Acres; Maria
A. McCollum; Ebony Adame; Daniel Rolando Mendoza; Eliseo Cabrera; Donald Cadriel; Juan Montiel;
Fernando Cano; Jose Mora; Luis A. Cantu; Francisco Morales; Ricardo Cardenas; Jose Moreno; Gustavo
Deleon; Rudy Ochoa; Angel Delgado; Oscar Parra; Steven Dorado; Jose A. Perez; Nicolas Fuentes; Joaquin
Ramos; Humberto Garcia Jr.; Norberto Rangel; Henry Garza; Luis Reyes; Noe Garza; Jonathan F. Rivera;
Jesus Gaspar; Justin Shafer; Kayla Gonzales; Jose Silva; Rolando Garza; Pedro Velazquez; Norma Grimes;
Jamie Vidal; Arnoldo Larrasquitu, Jr.; Everardo Villarreal; Vlima Larrasquitu; Samuel Villarreal; Mark E.
Lay; Robert Zepeda; Albert Mardiaga; and Roy Zepeda. Dkt. No. 1.
3 Later clarified on July 13, 2012, and December 21, 2013.
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Office of Case Intake and Publication, adopted the ALJ’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendations on behalf of the FLSA (the “2016 ALJ Decision”). Dkt. No. 18-3.
Due to CBP’s alleged failure to comply with the referenced award, on September
24, 2024, the FLRA petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit to enforce the 2016 ALJ Decision. See FLRA v. United States Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 24-1309, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30515 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 3, 2024). On
October 2, 2024, the NTEU filed a motion in support of the FLRA.4 On November 18,
2024, the FLRA approved a settlement agreement between CBP and the NTEU, resolving
the previous proceedings and subsequent action in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (the
“2024 Settlement Agreement”). Dkt. No. 17, Exh. B at 2.
Under the 2024 Settlement Agreement, CBP agreed to pay a lump sum amount of
$6,900,000. Id. The NTEU would provide CBP “with a dollar amount for each employee
it deem[ed] eligible to receive a portion of the settlement fund.” Id. On April 3, 2025,
Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint, alleging that they are due backpay under the 2016
ALJ Decision. Dkt. No. 1 at 14-15. On June 5, 2025, Defendants informed Plaintiffs about
the 2024 Settlement Agreement. Dkt. No. 18 at 4. On June 10, Plaintiffs filed their First
Amended Original Complaint acknowledging the 2024 Settlement Agreement. Dkt. No.
4 See D.C. Circuit Case Docket.
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17. Plaintiffs, then, claim that they are entitled to backpay under both the 2016 ALJ
Decision and the 2024 Settlement Agreement. Id. at 17.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a trial court must dismiss an action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court is without the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of
Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The party seeking the federal forum bears
the burden of establishing facts supporting federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence. Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., 567 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2009);
Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998).
A 12(b)(1) motion challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). Federal courts possess limited jurisdiction—they “possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994). One way that a federal district court may acquire subject matter
jurisdiction is via federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pursuant to Section 1331,
the district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
“[A] 12(b)(1) factual attack” challenging subject matter jurisdiction may be based
on “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the
court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Kling v. Hebert, 60 F.4th 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2023).
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When a 12(b) motion is on point, the court must construe the facts in favor of the
nonmoving party. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 104 (1998).
B. FED. R. CIV. P. 56
A party may move for summary judgment by “identifying each claim or defense —
or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(a). The Court shall grant summary judgment when the movant shows there is
no genuine dispute of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id. Summary judgment is designed to “isolate and dispose” of factually unsupported
claims which “no reasonable jury” would resolve in the claimant’s favor. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Apache Deepwater, L.L.C. v. W&T Offshore, Inc., 930
F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 649
(2019).
Because summary judgment is not intended to deprive litigants of their right to try
genuinely contested issues, the movant bears the heavy burden to show the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1968);
Pitts v. Shell Oil Co., 463 F.2d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1972); Wise v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 58 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1995). Only after such a showing does the burden shift to
the nonmoving party to demonstrate, through competent evidence in the record, that a
genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved. Wise, 58 F.3d at 195.
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction
District courts have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
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same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Manguno v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Supplemental jurisdiction exists over state claims, “when the state and federal claims
‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact’ and are so linked that the plaintiff ‘would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.’” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 580 (2005).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs allege eight grounds for relief in their First Amended Original Complaint
(hereinafter, Plaintiffs’ “Complaint5”). See generally, Dkt. No. 17. Namely, Plaintiffs
allege three causes of action under federal law: (a) breach of fiduciary duty; (b) breach of
duty of fair representation; and (c) breach of arbitration award. Id. at 8–14. Plaintiffs also
allege four causes of action under Texas state law: (a) breach of contract; (b) unjust
enrichment; (c) conversion; and (d) money had and received. Id. at 14–16. Finally,
Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment, finding that they are “affected officers” under
both the 2016 ALJ Decision and the 2024 Settlement Agreement. Id. at 16. The Court will
address each claim in turn, though not necessarily in the order presented.
A. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ causes of
action for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of duty of fair
representation because both are unfair labor practices, justiciable by
the Federal Labor Relations Authority.
Prior to 1978, a 1962 Executive Order administered by a Federal Labor Relations
Council governed labor relations in the federal sector. Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed. Of Fed.
5 An amended pleading supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended pleading
specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading. King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d
344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Emps., Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 531. Then in 1978, Congress overhauled the civil service
system with the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”). See id.; Abbott v. U.S., 144 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 1998) (citing U.S. v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443 (1988).
Title VII of the CSRA, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute
(“Title VII”) became the controlling authority over labor relations in the federal sector.
Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 531. The CSRA contains an “elaborate remedial system that has
been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations”
and largely omits mention of the district courts. Montplaisir v. Leighton, 875 F.2d 1, 2–3
(First Cir. 1989) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983)).
Title VII limits judicial review to three instances: (1) an aggrieved party may
request review of “final” FLRA orders in the courts of appeals; (2) the FLRA may petition
a court of appeals for enforcement of its orders; and (3) the FLRA may seek an injunction
in district court after issuing a complaint. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7123); Columbia Power
Trades Council v. U.S. Dep’t. of Energy, (9th Cir. 1982). However, in judicial review of
Title VII matters, the proper forum is typically the appropriate court of appeals, not a
district court. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a).
A labor union has a duty of fair representation to “serve the interests of all
members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with
complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 177 (1967); 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1). Under Title VII, a breach of duty of fair
representation is an “unfair labor practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 7116; Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 532
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(finding that Title VII “provides that it is ‘an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
… to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter.’”).
Accordingly, any claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation is properly
adjudicated by the FLRA. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 532. Once the FLRA issues a final
decision, an “aggrieved party” may request review by the appropriate federal court of
appeals, pursuant to Section 7123. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). Said another way, an “aggrieved
party” must first exhaust their administrative remedies before they bring suit in federal
court.
i. Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of duty of fair representation.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached their duty of fair representation by
mismanaging the funds awarded by the ALJ. Dkt. No. 12. However, the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of duty of fair representation because
such claims are unfair labor practice claims, properly adjudicated by the FLRA.
Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 532; see 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). Plaintiffs, then, must first bring such
unfair labor practice claims to the FLRA. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 532. If Plaintiffs are
unsatisfied with the FLRA decision, then they may seek relief in the appropriate court of
appeals. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a).
ii. Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty also fails to fall under one of Title VII’s
three statutory exemptions allowing for judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 7123. Plaintiffs
represent their claim as one for breach of fiduciary duty justiciable under the LMRDA.
Dkt. No. 17 at 8–11. However, where a plaintiff alleges a violation of a fiduciary duty based
on distribution of funds from a settlement involving a union that represents federal
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employees, that claim is for breach of duty of fair representation. Leal v. Woodley &
McGillivary, H-08-cv-3452, 2009 WL 1704311 at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (Ellison, J).
The Supreme Court has made clear that plaintiffs cannot circumvent the CSRA’s
enforcement provisions by recharacterizing what is otherwise a breach of fair
representation claim. U.S. v. Fausto, 108 S.Ct. 668, 677 (1988) (holding that the CSRA’s
“comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal employees”
bars a federal worker from suing for backpay on wrongful suspension grounds); Bush v.
Lucas, 462, U.S. 367, 385–90 (1983) (prohibiting a federal employee from bringing a
damages action against his superior based on an alleged First Amendment violation in
the workplace). Courts of appeals have precluded plaintiffs from doing so as well.
Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 228-29 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that the CSRA
precludes a Bivens action premised on conduct amounting to a prohibited personnel
practice); Warren v. Local 1759, American Federation of Government Employees, 764
F.2d 1395, 1399 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the FLRA possesses exclusive jurisdiction
over a federal employee’s unfair representation claim); and Columbia Power Trades, 671
F.2d 325, 327 (holding that the FLRA has “exclusive jurisdiction over federal labor
relations matters”).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by: (1)
mismanaging funds awarded to the NTEU; and (2) failing to provide each Plaintiff with
their pro rata share. Dkt. No. 17 at 10. The Court, then, finds Plaintiffs’ claim is effectively
a breach of duty of fair representation claim properly adjudicated by the FLRA. See Leal,
H-08-cv-3452, 2009 WL 1704311 at *4. Though artfully pled, accepting Plaintiffs’ claim
for breach of fiduciary duty as anything but a claim for breach of fair representation would
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likely represent a break both from the policy of the CSRA, and the court’s interpretation
of the Act’s enforcement procedures.
The Court finds that even if it accepts Plaintiffs’ claim as presented, it does not
belong in the district court because the LMRDA does not apply to unions like the NTEU
that only represent federal employees.6 Local 1498, Am. Fed. Of Gov’t Emps. v. American
Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 522 F.2d 486, 489 (3rd Cir. 1975); see also Chao v. Bremerton
Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 294 F.3d 1114, 1117 (holding that “[b]ecause the
LMRDA’s definition of ‘employer’ excludes the United States … a union that exclusively
represents federal government employees is not subject to the LMRDA.”).
Plaintiffs assert that the CSRA incorporated the LMRDA’s fiduciary duties,
pointing to prior CSRA holdings adopting the LMDRA’s principles regarding fiduciary
duties owed to its federal employee unions. Dkt. No. 19 at 6 (citing Wildberger, 86 F.3d
at 1192–93; Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA, 800 F.2d 1165, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
But the question in this case is not whether Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief. Instead,
the question is whether Plaintiffs may pursue such a claim for relief in a district court.
The CSRA and the LMRDA do grant certain similar rights to federal union
members. Martinez v. American Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 980 F.2d 1039, 1041, n.1 (5th Cir.
1993). However, Congress did not adopt the LMRDA’s enforcement principles when it
established the CSRA in 1978. In contrast to the LMRDA, the CSRA does not grant federal
union members the right to sue their unions in a district court. Id. Instead, as discussed
6 There is an exception for so-called “hybrid” unions, which represent both federal and private employees.
Wildberger v. American Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 86 F.3d 1188, 1192–93 (finding that a plaintiff did not lose
LMRDA protection when his union represented private and federal employees, even though his local only
represented government employees). But the parties here do not allege, and the Court does not find, that
the NTEU represents even a single private-sector employee; it does not, then, fall into a hybrid category.
See generally id.; see also Dkt. No. 19.
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above, an aggrieved party must first bring his complaint to the FLRA. Karahalios, 489
U.S. at 532.
B. The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
claim for breach of arbitration award because it lacks statutory
authority to preside over arbitration enforcement proceedings
involving Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act.
Plaintiffs assert that Karahalios does not strictly preclude a district court from
having jurisdiction over claims related to a duty of fair representation concerning
enforcement of arbitration awards and settlement agreements. Dkt. No. 19 at 7 (citing
Dep’t of Navy v. FLRA, 962 F.2d 48, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). But Dep’t of Navy does not
involve district court review. See 962 F.2d at 49. Critically, that case involves the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals’ review of an FLRA decision. Id. Such judicial review complies
with the procedures defined in Section 7123. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 532; 5 U.S.C. §
7123(a) (any person “aggrieved” by a final order of the FLRA can institute an action for
judicial review of the order in the U.S. court of appeals in which the person resides).
Unlike in Dep’t of Navy, Plaintiffs’ claims have not been adjudicated by the FLRA.
Even if they had, the proper forum for judicial review would be “the United States court
of appeals in the circuit in which [Plaintiffs] reside or [transact] business or in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.” 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a).
Plaintiffs also assert that Karahalios does not divest the district courts of
jurisdiction to enforce arbitration awards or settlement agreements that create
contractual obligations. Dkt. No. 19 at n.3. Plaintiffs cite to United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960) as evidence that the district
courts have “authority to enforce arbitration awards under federal law.” Dkt. No. 19 at
n.3. However, Plaintiffs’ reliance on United Steelworkers of Am. is misplaced. Unlike the
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United Steelworkers of America, the NTEU serves federal employees. See generally Dkt.
No. 17 at 9; see also Dkt. No. 19 (Plaintiffs admit that the NTEU is a federal employee
union and nowhere assert that it serves even a single private employee).
Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the district courts may enforce arbitration awards
under Title VII when contractual rights are at issue. Dkt. No. 19 at 8 (citing Devine v.
White, 697 F.2d 421, 429, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). But Devine does not involve district court
review. See 962 F.2d at 49; see also 697 F.2d at 429. Rather, Devine involves a court of
appeal’s review of an arbitrator’s award. 962 F.2d at 49.
C. This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
claims against Defendant Briseño because he is an agent of the NTEU.
A union is the “sole source of recovery for injury inflicted by it.” Atkinson v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249. Union liability cannot be evaded by suing a
union’s agent or member. Id. The Atkinson rule applies to unions, like the NTEU, which
represent federal employees. See Montplaisir, 875 F.2d at 7–8.
Here, serving as its president, Briseño is an agent of the NTEU Chapter 160. Dkt.
No. 17 at 2. Briseño, then, cannot be personally liable for Plaintiffs’ claims under federal
law. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 249. Yet despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Atkinson,
Plaintiffs allege this district court has jurisdiction, claiming Briseño is liable because
union officers of federal sector unions are subject to fiduciary duties incorporated from
the LMRDA through the CSRA. Dkt. No. 19 at 13 (citing Wildberger, 86 F.3d at 1192–93).
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But as discussed above, the LMRDA and its enforcement principles are not applicable
here.
D. Due to this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
federal law claims, it also lacks supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims.
A court has supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, “when the state and
federal claims ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact’ and are so linked that the
plaintiff ‘would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.’”). Exxon
Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 580.
Critically, here, there is no such common nucleus of operative fact because the
Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal law claims (breach of fiduciary duty;
breach of duty of fair representation; and breach of arbitration award). This Court, then,
may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs’ state law claims (breach
of contract; unjust enrichment; conversion; and money had and received).
IV. CONCLUSION
This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of duty of fair representation. As discussed above,
they are unfair labor practice claims justiciable by the FLRA. Further, this Court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of arbitration award
because it lacks the statutory authority to review such claims. Finally, this Court may not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims because there is no
common nexus to any remaining claim under federal law. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
then, should be GRANTED.
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V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) GRANT
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 19]; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to
CLOSE this case.
VI. NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 22nd day of December, 2025 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
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