TRX Dynasty Express Trust v. Prestige Default Services, LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
TRX DYNASTY EXPRESS TRUST, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-01458-O-BP
§
PRESTIGE DEFAULT SERVICES, 	§
et al., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the Complaint in this case, purportedly filed pro se by the
“representative and trustees” of a trust. Because Plaintiff cannot proceed pro se on behalf of the
trust he purports to represent, and because Plaintiff has not complied with a Court Order requiring
him to correct this legal deficiency, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief United States
District Judge Reed O’Connor DISMISS this case without prejudice.
On December 29, 2025, the pro se Plaintiff, Zaimick Milhouse, filed this civil action in his
capacity as “power of attorney in charge” of TRX Dynasty Express Trust (the “Trust”). ECF No. 1
at 1. Because “a non-attorney trustee may not represent a trust pro se,” Dillard Fam. Tr. v. Chase
Home Fin., LLC, No. 3:11-cv-1740-L, 2011 WL 6747416, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2011), the
Court entered a Notice of Deficiency and Order (“NOD”) directing Milhouse to either: (a) retain
legal counsel to represent the Trust; or (b) file an amended complaint that asserts only his personal
claims. ECF No. 4 at 2. The Court warned Milhouse that if he did not do so by January 23, 2026,
his case would be subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
Rule 41(b) permits a court to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or follow
court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir.
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1988). “This authority flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and prevent
undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., 756 F.2d 399,
401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962)). The dismissal
may be made with or without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). However, a dismissal with
prejudice is an extreme sanction that should be employed only where a litigant’s acts or omissions
are “the result of purposeful delay or contumaciousness and the record reflects that the district
court employed lesser sanctions before dismissing the action.” Long v. Simmons, 77 F.3d 878, 880
(5th Cir. 1996).
In lieu of retaining counsel for the Trust or filing an amended complaint, Milhouse filed a
First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 8. But this filing does not comply or purport to comply with
the Court’s NOD. The First Amended Complaint continues to present the claims of the trust, “by
and through its Representative and Trustees” and continues to show that Milhouse is proceeding
“By: Power of Attorney/Authorized Representative.” Id. at 1, 6. Milhouse cannot legally present
the claims of the trust pro se as its “representative and trustee.” Dillard Fam. Tr., No. 3:11-cv-
1740-L, 2011 WL 6747416, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2011). Moreover, the First Amended
Complaint does not assert only Milhouse’s potential claims filed in his individual capacity.
As the deadline to comply with the Court’s NOD has passed, Milhouse’s case is subject to
dismissal under Rule 41(b). But because the record does not reflect his non-compliance results
from purposeful delay or contumaciousness, the Court should dismiss his case without prejudice.
Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief Judge O’Connor DISMISS
this case without prejudice under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute the case or obey a court
order.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties
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in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions,
and recommendation must file specific written objections within fourteen days after being served
with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). To be specific, an objection
must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which the objection is made, state the
basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates
by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file
specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except
upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the
time to file objections to 14 days).
SIGNED on March 2, 2026.
______________________________________
Hal R. Ray, Jr.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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