Bradley v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
STEVEN BRADLEY ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-1077-P
CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A.,
Defendant.
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On November 25, 2025, the United States Magistrate Judge issued
Findings, Conclusions, and a Recommendations (“FCR”), ECF No. 30, to
the Court regarding Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint 	in 	the 	above-captioned 	case, 	ECF 	No. 	13. 	The 	FCR
recommended that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss should be granted
in part and denied in part. Defendant filed an Objection to the FCR on
December 9, 2025. ECF No. 31. Plaintiff then filed a Response and
Objections 	on 	December 	17, 	2025. 	ECF 	Nos. 	34, 	35. 	The 	Court
accordingly conducted a de novo review of the FCR.
As 	detailed 	below, 	the 	Court 	will 	AFFIRM 	and 	ADOPT 	the
reasoning 	in 	both 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	FCR 	and 	OVERRULE
Defendant and Plaintiff’s Objections.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Steven Bradley, proceeding pro se, brings claims that
Defendant Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
(“FDCPA”). 	Plaintiff 	claims 	Defendant 	violated 	the 	FCRA 	by
“continui[ing] to furnish, report, or permit recording of the dispute
tradeline to consumer reporting agencies [“CRA’s”] or otherwise treated
the disputed tradeline as valid” and then failed to conduct a reasonable
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investigation in response to the dispute of the violation. ECF No. 8 at 2,
4. Plaintiff next alleges Defendant violated the FDCPA because it did
not “provide sufficient validation and continued collection/reporting
activity” even after positing his dispute. ECF No. 8 at 4. Plaintiff asserts
that Capital One willfully disregarded its obligations and thus asserts
aggravating 	factors. 	Plaintiff 	thus 	requests 	statutory, 	actual, 	and
punitive damages adding up to $250,000, costs and expenses, and an
order requiring permanent deletion of the disputed tradeline. ECF No.
8 at 5–6. Capital One counters that Plaintiff failed to state an FCRA
claim because he did not properly allege that any CRA sent it notice of
Plaintiff’s dispute. ECF No. 13 at 1–2. Capital One also argues Plaintiff
fails to state an FDCPA claim because it is not a “debt collector”
according to the statute. ECF No. 13 at 2.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Magistrate Judge’s FCR regarding a dispositive matter is reviewed
de novo if a party timely objects. FED. R. CIV . P. 72(b)(3). The district
court may 	then 	accept, 	reject, 	or modify 	the 	recommendations 	or
findings, in whole or in part. Id.
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails “to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV . P. 12(b)(6).
This rule must be interpreted in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim
for relief in federal court. Rule 8(a) calls for “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV .
P. 8(a)(2); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002)
(holding that Rule 8(a)’s simplified standard applies to most civil
actions). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded, non-conclusory
allegations in the complaint and liberally construe the complaint in
favor of the plaintiff. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale
Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff must, however, plead specific facts, not mere conclusory
allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278,
281 (5th Cir. 1992). Indeed, Plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
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right to relief above the speculative level, … on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id.
at 	555 	(cleaned 	up). 	The 	Court 	need 	not 	credit 	bare 	conclusory
allegations or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Id. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only
the complaint and its proper attachments.” Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities,
Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). A “court may
consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss that are referred to
in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim.”
Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010) (cleaned
up). If a court determines that dismissal of a claim is appropriate, it
should be with prejudice if amending the claim would be futile or “the
plaintiff has alleged his best case.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327
(5th Cir. 1999).
The Court grants pro se litigants leeway compared to parties with
counsel. “[A] pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held
to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, “even a liberally-
construed pro se . . . complaint must set forth facts giving rise to a claim
on which relief may be granted.” Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 847
F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825–
26 	(1977)). 	Thus, 	a 	court 	asks 	“whether 	within 	the 	universe 	of
theoretically provable facts there exists a set which can support a cause
of action under [the] complaint, indulgently read.” Covington v. Cole, 528
F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1976). However, “conclusory allegations or
legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to
state a claim for relief.” Masika Brown Ray v. Anthony Boone et al., No.
24-40169, 2024 WL 4372692, *1 (5th Cir. 2024)(cleaned up).
ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIONS
A. 	Plaintiff Properly States its FCRA Claim.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions that
Plaintiff successfully states its FCRA claim. “To recover against a
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furnisher for violations of § 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff must show that: (1) he
disputed the accuracy or completeness of information with a [CRA]; (2)
the agency notified the furnisher of the consumer’s dispute; (3) and the
furnisher failed to conduct an investigation . . . .” Shaunfield v. Experian
Info. Sols., Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 786, 805 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (cleaned up).
But, “a private right of action under section 1681s-2(b) does not arise
from communications between the consumer and furnisher.” Henry v.
Capital One bank 	(USA), 	N.A., 	No. 	3:17-cv-2962-M0BK, 2018 WL
4346727, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2018), rec. adopted, No. 3:17-cv-2962-
M, 2018 WL 4335834 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2018). “[D]irect notification by
the consumer does not trigger a furnisher’s duties under § 1681s-2(b).”
Hunsinger v. Sko Brenner Am., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-0988-D, 2014 WL
1462443, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2014). “Instead . . . ‘any liability for a
violation of section 1681s-2(b) would not arise unless [Defendants] had
been notified of an inaccuracy [by a CRA] and failed to correct the error.’”
Henry, 2018 W: 4346727 at *2.
There is a disagreement over whether a CRA notified Defendant
about the dispute instead of Plaintiff. Defendant claims Plaintiff only
directly notified it about the disputed tradeline instead of via a CRA.
But, Plaintiff alleged in its response that a TransUnion credit report
contained a notation of a relevant “[a]ccount previously in dispute” that
would make it plausible that the CRA notified Defendant about the
tradeline at issue. ECF No. 25 at 5. Such a notation arises when the
CRA has transmitted the dispute notification to the furnisher—which
would be the Defendant here. ECF No. 25 at 5. While traditionally it
would not be proper to make such an allegation for the first time in a
response, the recommendation properly construed the allegation in the
Response as a Motion to Amend because the litigant proceeds pro se.
And despite Defendant’s counter-assertion that the notation did not
arise from a CRA notification, because the Court construes allegations
at the motion to dismiss stage in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff states a
claim.
Defendant objects that Plaintiff failed to allege any facts that he sent
the Dispute Letter to any CRA and instead the Dispute Letter was sent
to Capital One. But the notation provides a plausible basis to believe
that Plaintiff was the means by which the dispute was brought to the
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CRA’s attention in the first instance even if Capital One was also
directly notified.
Defendant also objects that a consumer dispute submitted to the
CRA in accordance with the FCRA is not the only means by which such
a dispute notation could arise on Plaintiff’s credit report. It argues that
Plaintiff fails to cite a basis for asserting that it is the exclusive means
by which such a dispute notation would be inserted into a credit report.
But—even so—it is plausible that the dispute notation arose from such
a letter.
B. 	Plaintiff Fails to State its FDCPA Claim.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions that
Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, however, should be dismissed. But, in order for
the FDCPA to apply to Defendant, Defendant must be a “debt collector”
under the statute except for under rare circumstances. But Plaintiff does
not plausibly allege Defendant to be a debt collector.
A “debt collector is one whose principal purpose … is the collection of
debts” or who regularly collects or attempts to collect … debts owed or
due or asserted to another.” Infante v. Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka,
P.C., 735 F. App’x 839, 842 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6))
(cleaned up). But a “creditor” is “any person who offers or extends credit
creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4).
Plaintiff alleges its FDCPA claim based on one of its accounts with
Defendant because Defendant extended credit to Plaintiff and thus
created a debt. Bradley contends that Capital One used other names
when 	collecting 	debts 	via 	“separate 	departments 	and 	third-party
servicing 	names” 	and 	thus 	the 	FDCPA 	requirements 	apply 	to 	it.
Plaintiff fails, however, to demonstrate that Defendant could plausibly
be construed as a debt collector under the statute because it is a creditor
under the statute and is attempting to collect a debt that belongs to
itself. § 1692a(6)(f).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a FDCPA claim.
C. 	The Court Does Not Grant Plaintiff Leave to Amend.
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to
deny leave to amend the FDCPA claim. Because Plaintiff has essentially
been granted two opportunities to amend its complaint, granting leave
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to amend yet again would be futile. Therefore, any request for leave to
amend the complaint is denied.
CONCLUSION
Having conducted a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s FCR,
and Plaintiff and Defendant’s Objections, the Court AFFIRMS the
Decisions, ADOPTS the reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR, and
OVERRULES Defendant and Plaintiff’s Objections. Accordingly, the
Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion
to Dismiss. The FDCPA claim is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
Any request for leave to amend the complaint is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 21st day of January 2026.
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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