Cano v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
E.C.C.,1 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	4:25-CV-1057-O-BR
§
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
§
§
§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT WITH REMAND
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security, who denied Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II2 of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). (ECF 1). Plaintiff challenges the
Commissioner’s decision on one ground: that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to
develop the medical evidence in the case, resulting in an insufficiently supported disability
determination. (ECF 11 at 1).
Now before the Court is the Commissioner’s Unopposed Motion for Entry of Judgment
with Remand. (ECF 16). The Commissioner moves the Court to remand this case to the Social
Security Administration (the “Agency”) with directions that an ALJ be assigned to “to complete
the administrative record and issue a new decision.” (Id. at 1). Having considered the motion, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS that the presiding judge grant it.
1 It is the undersigned’s practice to identify the plaintiff using only the first and last initial in filings in social security
disability cases. This ensures that the public maintains access to the opinions (in compliance with Rule 5.2(c)(2)(B)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the E-Government Act of 2002) while still protecting the privacy of non-
government parties’ identities within the opinion.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–33.
Case 4:25-cv-01057-O-BR Document 17 Filed 02/26/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID <pageID>

2 of 5
I. 	APPLICABLE LAW
The Act grants United States District Courts the jurisdiction to review final decisions of
the Agency. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). As the Supreme Court has explained, two different sentences in
that provision establish two different kinds of remand from the Courts back to the Agency.
Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 97–98 (1991) (citing Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617,
623–29 (1990)). The fourth sentence of the provision authorizes “a judgment affirming, modifying,
or reversing the decision of the Commissioner[ ], with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing.” 42 U.S. § 405(g). The sixth sentence, by contrast, authorizes the Court in limited
circumstances to remand the case for the Agency to incorporate new evidence into the record, after
which the case returns to the Court. Id.; see Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98.
Unlike the adversarial proceedings in Article III courts, proceedings before an ALJ are
inquisitorial. Carr v. Saul, 593 U.S. 83, 89–90 (2021). The role of an ALJ is not to neutrally
adjudicate the better of two competing sides, but is rather to “ensure that [the] administrative
process is fair to claimants by conducting de novo, informal, non-adversarial hearings[.]” SSR 13-
1p, 2013 WL 633939, *2; accord 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b). This sometimes translates to an
obligation to seek out evidence beyond what is submitted by the applicant. “The ALJ has a duty
to develop the facts fully and fairly relating to an applicant’s claim for disability benefits. If the
ALJ does not satisfy his duty, his decision is not substantially justified.” Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d
552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
This duty prohibits an ALJ from assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”)3 in a way that contradicts all medical opinions in the record. Raper v. Colvin, 262 F.
Supp. 3d 415, 422–23 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (collecting cases). “Medical opinion” has a technical
3 RFC is defined as “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
Case 4:25-cv-01057-O-BR Document 17 Filed 02/26/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID <pageID>

3 of 5
meaning in this context; “[a] medical opinion is a statement from a medical source about what [a
claimant] can still do despite [their] impairment(s) and whether [they] have one or more
impairment-related limitations or restrictions in” performing physical, mental and other demands
of work, or in adapting to environmental conditions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2)(i)–(iii); accord
Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 (discussing “a medical source statement describing the types of work that
the applicant is still capable of performing”).
The law does not require, however, that the record contain any medical opinions in the first
place. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 (“The absence of such a statement, however, does not, in itself, make
the record incomplete.”); accord Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 1994289, *7–*8, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 17610, *20–*24 (5th Cir. 2005). If no medical opinion is provided, the inquiry of a
reviewing court “focuses on whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence
in the existing record.” Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. Notably, the substantial evidence4 needed is not
purely medical evidence, but is rather evidence that can compensate for the absence of a medical
opinion—i.e., evidence of the work-related functions a claimant can still perform despite their
limitations.
When reviewing disability determinations made by the Commissioner, a court is “limited
to two inquiries: whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, and whether the ALJ
applied the proper legal standards when evaluating the evidence.” Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600,
602 (5th Cir. 2012). Whether the record contained sufficient medical opinion evidence goes to
whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 (“If
the ALJ does not satisfy his duty, his decision is not substantially justified. Reversal of his decision,
4 “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion and
constitutes more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of evidence.” Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142,
147 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
Case 4:25-cv-01057-O-BR Document 17 Filed 02/26/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID <pageID>

4 of 5
however, is appropriate only if the applicant shows that he is prejudiced.”) (footnotes omitted);
accord Raper, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 422–23. If the ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s RFC is not
supported by substantial evidence of the limitations that a claimant’s impairments impose on the
claimant’s ability to work, and this lack of substantial evidence results in prejudice or harm5 to the
claimant, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed. Id.
II. 	THE COMMISSIONER’S MOTION
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record in this case. (ECF 11 at 1). Both
state agency medical sources who reviewed Plaintiff’s record concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to assess disability. (Id. at 3; accord ECF 10-1 at 31 (ALJ’s Decision)). The ALJ rejected
these conclusions, and no other medical opinions were evaluated in the ALJ’s Decision. (ECF 10-1
at 31). Plaintiff argues that, as a result, the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC was not
supported by substantial evidence. (ECF 11 at 5).
The Commissioner, by filing the instant motion, has conceded this argument. (See ECF 16
at 1–2). The Commissioner moves for judgment on the merits and for remand under sentence four
of § 405(g). (Id. at 1). On remand, the Commissioner intends to assign an ALJ to develop the
record and issue a new decision. (Id.). Plaintiff does not oppose the Commissioner’s motion. (Id.).
III. 	CONCLUSION
In summary, the parties agree that the decision of the ALJ in this case was unsupported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the decision of the
5 Prejudice and harm are closely related concepts; if a plaintiff can show prejudice, i.e., that “additional evidence
would have been produced if the ALJ had fully developed the record, and that the additional evidence might have led
to a different decision[,]” then an error is not harmless, because it will not be “inconceivable that a different
administrative conclusion would have been reached even if the ALJ did not err.” Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 n.22, and
Keel, 986 F.3d at 556.
Case 4:25-cv-01057-O-BR Document 17 Filed 02/26/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID <pageID>

5 of 5
Commissioner be VACATED, the case REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) for further administrative proceedings, and judgment entered accordingly.
ENTERED February 26, 2026.
* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *
Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the
event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is
fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the
signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by
electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the
fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the “entered” date. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections
with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A
party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds
of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal
conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district
court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS
Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857
F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1988).
Case 4:25-cv-01057-O-BR Document 17 Filed 02/26/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID <pageID>