Brown v. Trulite Glass & Aluminum Solutions LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
TOMMY EUGENE BROWN, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-872-P
§
TRULITE GLASS & ALUMINUM 	§
SOLUTIONS LLC, 	§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Pending before the Court is Defendant Trulite Glass & Aluminum Solutions LLC’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”) [doc. 29], filed
November 26, 2025. 	In pro se Plaintiff Tommy Eugene Brown’s Second Amended Complaint
[doc. 28], which is the live pleading before this Court, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of
action 	against 	Defendant 	for 	being 	terminated 	on 	June 	28, 	2023, from 	his 	position 	as
Transportation Manager: (1) “Wrongful Termination/Pretextual Discharge” in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment 	Act 	(“ADEA”); 	(2) 	race 	discrimination 	in 	violation 	of 	Title 	VII; 	(3) 	age
discrimination in violation of the ADEA; (4) gender discrimination in violation of Title VII; and
(5) “Deceptive Employment Practices/Pretext”. (Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“Pl.’s
Sec. Am. Compl.”) [doc. 28] at 2, 5-6.)
In its motion, Defendant argues that all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant should be
dismissed for insufficient service of process. (Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1-8.) In addition, Defendant argues that, even if Defendant
had been properly served, Plaintiff’s age-related claims under the ADEA should be dismissed for
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failure to exhaust administration remedies. (Id. at 1-4, 8-11.) As to the issue of service, the Court,
having considered the motion, response, and reply, FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has
not properly served Defendant for the reasons stated in Defendant’s motion. However, based upon
Plaintiff’s attempts to properly serve Defendant, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) 1 that Plaintiff should be given another opportunity to effect
and file proper proof of service on Defendant.
As to the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to Plaintiff’s age-related
claims under the ADEA, the Court notes that, “before an individual can pursue an ADEA claim in
federal court, he must exhaust his available administrative remedies by filing a charge with the
EEOC.” Grant v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. 3:22-CV-0439-S-BH, 2023 WL 6278912, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2023), rep. & rec. adopted, 2023 WL 6276735 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2023).
“To satisfy exhaustion, a claim generally must arise out of the Plaintiff’s EEOC charge.” Awe v.
Harris Health Sys., No. 4:22-CV-03119, 2025 WL 1843723, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2025)
(noting that the same exhaustion requirements that apply under Title VII also apply to claims under
the ADEA).
“When determining if a litigant exhausted her administrative remedies before the EEOC,
‘the crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained therein[.]’”
Jones v City of Dallas, Tex., No. 24-10803, 2025 WL 2491127, at *6 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025)
(quoting Melgar v. T.B. Butler Publ’g Co., Inc., 931 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2019) (alterations in
1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) states:
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion
or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that
defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good
cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
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original)). “The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that this requirement ‘relates to a key purpose of an
employment-discrimination charge,’ which is to inform the employer of the existence and general
substance of the discrimination allegations.” 	Weber v. McDonough, No. 23-1200, 2024 WL
5246610, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 2024) (quoting Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 337
(5th Cir. 2021)). “The court focuses on the facts alleged in the charge, construing the EEOC charge
in its broadest reasonable sense and asking whether the claim can reasonably be expected to grow
out of the charge of discrimination.” Jones, 2025 WL 2491127, at *7 (internal quotations marks
and citations omitted). “The Fifth Circuit . . . instructs that the scope of an EEO complaint should
be ‘construed liberally’ and the Court should ‘look slightly beyond its four corners.’” Weber, 2024
WL 5246610, at *4 (quoting Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788-89 (5th Cir. 2006)).
In this case, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC Charge”) on January 18, 2024.2 	(Appendix in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“Def.’s App.”) at 3-4.)
Plaintiff, in his EEOC Charge, stated, as relevant here:
I am an African-American male, who worked as a Transportation Manager
for Trulite Glass and Aluminum Solutions. I was terminated on or around June 26,
2023, as a result of a fuel audit investigation. I have worked for my employer for
nearly 18 years and have had no disciplinary action held against me until this time.
On or around June 7, 2023, I was informed I was being investigated
regarding a fuel audit. It was discovered that several drivers, who have quit, been
terminated, or suspended, were involved in selling fuel and manipulating the fuel
receipts. My role as a transportation manager[ ] is to gather the receipts from the
drivers and provide it to the receptionist, who verifies the receipts and creates a
monthly fuel audit report. This has been done by receptionists since 2010 or 2011.
I have always done it this way the past few months until it was revealed by a driver
that this has been going on and they informed my supervisor, John Morris, who is
a white male.
2 “Judicial notice of [an EEOC charge] may be taken as a matter of public record when deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, especially since its authenticity is uncontested.” King v. Life Sch., 809 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579 n.1
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2011).
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. . . .
I was suspended and terminated, but the receptionist and the director, both
females were not terminated or disciplined or suspended.
I am the only African-American male who was disciplined, suspended, and
terminated as a result of this investigation. . . .
. . . .
I believe that I was discriminated against because of my race, African-
American, and sex, Male, in violation of Title VII . . . .
(Appendix in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
(“Def.’s App.”) at 3-4.)3
In this case, it is clear, based on the foregoing, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his age-related
claims under the ADEA. In his EEOC Charge, Plaintiff fails to mention anything relating to his
age or the age of other employees. See Payne v. Hammond City, No. 24-1857, 2025 WL 549360,
at *10 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2025). 	While such failure is not dispositive on its own, Plaintiff also
fails to mention any facts relating to his age or acts of age-related discrimination or any facts that
could reasonably be expected to raise or include such claims. See Jones, 2025 WL 2491127, at
*7. Consequently, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff’s age-related claims under
the ADEA should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE4 for failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies.
3 Plaintiff’s right to sue letter from the EEOC was dated June 2, 2025. 	(Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint [doc. 28] at Exhibit (“Ex.”) A.)
4 In this case the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s age-related claims under the ADEA be dismissed with
prejudice because Plaintiff can no longer exhaust his administrative remedies as to such claims as they are time-barred
since more than 300 days have passed since Plaintiff was terminated from his job on June 28, 2023. See Tyler v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Under the ADEA, . . . the limitations period for filing an
age discrimination charge with the EEOC is effectively 300 days.”); Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm Service Agency,
504 F.3d 592, (5th Cir.2007) (“While failure to exhaust administrative remedies usually results in a dismissal without
prejudice, . . . when exhaustion is no longer possible, dismissal may be with prejudice.”)
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss [doc. 29] be PARTIALLY GRANTED in that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant under
the 	ADEA 	for 	“Wrongful 	Termination/Pretextual 	Discharge” 	and 	age 	discrimination 	be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.5 	The Court further RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss be PARTIALLY DENIED in that Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 4(m), be given
an additional thirty (30) days to effect and file proper proof of service on Defendant.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific
written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has
been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
conclusions and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). 	Failure to file, by the date stated above, a specific written objection to a proposed
factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) (extending time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).
5 See footnote 4, supra.
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ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until February
11, 2026, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings, conclusions and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed
and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days
of the filing date of the objections.
SIGNED January 28, 2026.
____________________________________
JEFFREY L. CURETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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