Jennings v. Naman Howell Smith & Lee PLLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
CHRISTIAN L. J ENNINGS ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-0821-P
N AMAN, H OWELL , SMITH , & L EE , PLLC,
Defendant.
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On October 20, 2025, the United States Magistrate Judge issued
Findings, Conclusions, and a Recommendation (“FCR”) in this case.
FCR, ECF No. 18. The FCR recommended the Court dismiss all claims
against Defendant with prejudice. ECF No. 18 at 1. Plaintiff filed an
Objection to the FCR on October 20, 2025. Objection, ECF No. 19. The
Court accordingly conducted a de novo review of the FCR.
As detailed below, the Court will DISMISS with prejudice all
claims, ADOPT the reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR and
OVERRULE Plaintiff’s Objections.
BACKGROUND
On July 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff
soon thereafter moved for leave to amend her complaint, which was
granted. ECF No. 8. Then, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. ECF No. 15. On August 20, 2025, the Court ordered
Plaintiff to file a form amended complaint. ECF No. 16. In so doing, the
Court said, “the Court cannot ascertain whether Plaintiff has stated
claims upon which relief may be granted and whether this Court has
jurisdiction.” ECF No. 16.
Plaintiff then filed her Second Amended Complaint on August 30,
2025. ECF No. 17. She brought claims for Abuse of Process, Negligent
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Supervision, Fraud and Misrepresentation, and a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for deprivation of her Constitutional rights against Defendant
Naman, Howell, Smith, & Lee PLLC. ECF No. 17 at 4. Plaintiff’s state
law claims are premised on Defendant being liable for the conduct of two
of Defendant’s employees, Jordan Alexander Mayfield, an attorney, and
Christina Chambers, a legal assistant, under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. ECF No. 17. At 2. Plaintiff’s allegations stem from Mayfield
and Chambers’ work for a client in a Texas state court case against
Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges Defendant committed the state law claims set
forth by allowing its employees to file “motions with false certificates” of
conference and file motions that contained other false information in
that state-court case. ECF No. 17 at 4. Plaintiff also believes that
Defendant’s employees and Defendant violated § 1983 by “colluding with
court personnel and misusing legal procedures.” ECF No. 17 at 4.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court shall, sua sponte,
dismiss a case proceeding IFP if the court determines that, inter alia, it
is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted when, assuming that all the allegations in the complaint are
true even if doubtful in fact, such allegations fail “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 	555 	(2007) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citations 	omitted).
Generally, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend
his complaint before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764,
767–68 (5th Cir. 2009). “Granting leave to amend is not required,
however, if the plaintiff has already pleaded his ‘best case.’” Id. at 768
(citation omitted). An opportunity to amend is also not required if
amending the complaint would be futile. See Legate v. Livingston, 822
F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016). “Futility is determined under Rule 12(b)(6)
standards, meaning an amendment is considered futile if it would fail to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Legate, 822 F.3d at
211. Similarly, if a court determines that dismissal of a claim is
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appropriate, it should be with prejudice if amending the claim would be
futile or “the plaintiff has alleged his best case.” Jones v. Greninger, 188
F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999); see Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc.,
342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir.2003).
ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff appears to raise four objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
FCR. For the following reasons, the Court will OVERRULE these
objections.
First, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	the 	FCR 	wrongly 	applies 	attorney
immunity “sua sponte at screening.” ECF No. 19 at 2. It argues that
“filing false certificates of conference and misusing court processes is
foreign to an attorney’s duties and not immune.” ECF No. 19 at 2. But,
in Texas, attorney immunity is a “comprehensive affirmative defense
protecting attorneys from liability to non-clients.” Cantey Hanger, LLP
v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). Attorney immunity applies to
all “actions taken in connection with representing a client in litigation,”
even if the action is wrongful as long as it is not “entirely foreign to the
duties of an attorney.” Ironshape Europe DAC v. Schiff Hardin, LLP,
912 F.3d 759, 767 (5th Cir. 2019). Filing certificates of conference and
other lawful motions—even with false information—are not actions
foreign to attorney duties. Thus, attorney immunity applies.
Next, 	Plaintiff 	objects 	that 	“[t]he 	FCR 	summarily 	concludes
Defendant is not a state actor without applying the joint-action/nexus
tests.” ECF No. 19 at 2. But private parties are only considered state
actors for § 1983 in rare circumstances not at issue here. See Harvey v.
Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). And at the motion to
dismiss stage here, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden of pleading enough
facts to plausibly allege that Defendant satisfies any exceptions or
wrinkles to the state action requirement. So, Defendant is not a state
actor, and the joint-action/nexus test does not alter the analysis.
Third, 	Plaintiff 	objects 	that 	“[r]ecommending 	dismissal 	with
prejudice at screening disregards the Fifth Circuit’s requirement to
afford a meaningful opportunity to amend unless futile.” ECF No. 19 at
2. But, the Court has already permitted the Plaintiff to amend her
complaint, and despite Plaintiff taking advantage of the opportunity,
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Plaintiff’s complaint is still nowhere near sufficient to state a claim. So
permitting leave to amend yet again would be futile.
Lastly, Plaintiff objects that the Court “should direct the Clerk or
U.S. Marshal to issue and serve summons on Defendant.” ECF No. 19
at 2. This objection has no relevance to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s
allegations at the motion to dismiss stage.
The 	Court, 	therefore, 	agrees 	with 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	and
disagrees with Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Having conducted a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s FCR
and Plaintiff’s Objections, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice all
claims against Defendant, ADOPTS the reasoning in the Magistrate
Judge’s FCR, and OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections.
SO ORDERED on this 17th day of November 2025.
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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