Chintagunta v. John Peter Smith Hospital et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
A NILA CHINTAGUNTA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-806-P
J OHN P ETER SMITH HOSPITAL ,
ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On November 18, 2025, the United States Magistrate Judge issued
an Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation (“FCR”) in
this case. ECF No. 34. The FCR recommended the Court dismiss the
present action against Defendants Tarrant County Hospital d/b/a John
Peter Smith Hospital (“JPS”), Karen Duncan, University of North Texas
Health 	Science 	Center—Texas 	College 	of 	Osteopathic 	Medicine
(“UNTHSC-TCOM”), 	Ken 	Paxton, 	and 	Lisa 	Nash. 	Id. 	The 	Court
accordingly conducted a de novo review of the FCR. As detailed below,
the Court will DISMISS all claims, ADOPT the reasoning in the
Magistrate Judge’s FCR, and OVERRULE Plaintiff’s Objections.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from Plaintiff Anila Chintagunta’s involuntary
dismissal from medical school. As a result of this dismissal, Plaintiff
filed 	the 	present 	action 	against 	various 	defendants 	alleging
constitutional 	violations. 	Following 	Plaintiff’s 	third 	attempt 	at 	a
complaint, the Magistrate Judge issued the recommendation to dismiss
claims against the above Defendants.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A Magistrate Judge’s FCR regarding a dispositive matter is reviewed
de novo if a party timely objects. FED. R. CIV . P. 72(b)(3). The district
court may then accept, reject, or modify the recommendation or findings,
in whole or in part. Id.
ANALYSIS
A. Karen Duncan and Ken Paxton
Regarding the dismissal of claims against Defendants Karen Duncan
and Ken Paxton, Plaintiff does not object. See ECF No. 36 at 1. The
Court 	reviews 	any 	unobjected-to 	findings, 	conclusions, 	and
recommendations for plain error. The Court has thoroughly examined
the record and the unobjected-to portion of the FCR for plain error.
Having found none, the Court expressly accepts and adopts the portion
of the Magistrate Judge’s FCR regarding the claims against Duncan and
Paxton.
B. John Peter Smith Hospital
Plaintiff objects that the claims were dismissed “for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.” ECF No. 36 at 2. However, the Magistrate Judge
recommended dismissal for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 34 at 11.
Nevertheless, the Court will construe this objection as one on the merits
of the failure to state claim argument. Considering these objections, the
Court has conducted a de novo review of the FCR and the record of this
case.
Plaintiff’s objection does not dispute that the Second Amended
Complaint was deficient for failing to lay out sufficient facts to satisfy
the Monell elements. Instead, Plaintiff attempts to overcome dismissal
by now providing specific facts. ECF No. 36 at 2. However, as the Fifth
Circuit has consistently held, facts or legal arguments raised for the first
time in objections to a magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendations are “not properly before the district court.” United
States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992); Shambaugh &
Son, L.P. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 91 F.4th 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2024).
Plaintiff’s claims against JPS were recommended to be dismissed for
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doing just that: raising factual and legal arguments for the first time in
response to the motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 34 at 10–11. But once
again, under Rule 12(b)(6), “the court considers, of course, only the
allegations in the complaint.” Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. City of Houston, 529
F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2008).
To state a claim against a local government entity under Monell,
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must contain allegations of “(1)
an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a [policymaker] can be charged
with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation
whose moving force is that policy (or custom).” Pineda v. City of Houston,
291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
failed to allege a policymaker, an official policy or custom, and the
moving force of any policy. See ECF No. 14. Plaintiff’s attempt to
overcome this pleading deficiency by now alleging new facts fails to cure
this deficiency, as those facts are not properly before the Court.
To the extent that Plaintiff objects that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment overrides sovereign immunity, and for the first time, raises
an Equal Protection Clause argument, it similarly fails. Arguments not
raised before a magistrate judge are considered forfeited. Stanley v.
Morgan, 120 F.4th 467, 470 n.2 (5th Cir. 2024). Nevertheless, the
argument misses the mark. The Magistrate Judge did not recommend
dismissal of the claims against JPS on sovereign immunity grounds;
instead, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal for failure to
state a claim. ECF No. 34 at 11. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
is entirely devoid of any factual allegations that would give rise to a
Monell claim and consequently fails to state a plausible claim for relief.
Thus, having conducted a de novo review, the Court expressly accepts
and adopts the portion of the Magistrate Judge’s FCR regarding the
claim against JPS.
C. UNTHSC-TCOM
Plaintiff objects to the dismissal of the claim against UNTHSC-
TCOM on the grounds that Congress has abrogated the state’s sovereign
immunity. ECF No. 36 at 7. UNTHSC-TCOM is a state agency and thus
is entitled to sovereign immunity unless “the state consents to suit or
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Congress 	has 	clearly 	and 	validly 	abrogated 	the 	state’s 	sovereign
immunity.” U.S. Oil Recovery Site v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 898 F.3d 497,
501 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d
318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff fails to allege any waiver of state
sovereign immunity, so the only possible ground is through abrogation.
The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	made 	clear 	that 	Congress 	did 	not
unequivocally express an intent to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity
when enacting § 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
Because UNTHSC-TCOM is a state agency, and Congress has not
waived 	sovereign 	immunity 	under 	§ 	1983, 	Plaintiff’s 	objection 	is
overruled. The Court expressly accepts and adopts the portion of the
Magistrate Judge’s FCR regarding the claim against UNTHSC-TCOM.
D. Lisa Nash
Regarding the claim against Nash, Plaintiff claims not to object to
the merits of the dismissal, but rather, to the specific wording used by
the Magistrate Judge. ECF No. 36 at 7. Nevertheless, Plaintiff appears
to then object to the conclusion that Nash is entitled to sovereign
immunity. ECF No. 36 at 7–8. Next, Plaintiff seemingly conflates her
claim against Nash with that against UNTHSC-TCOM and concludes
that she was not afforded an opportunity to meaningfully dispute the
dismissal. ECF No. 36 at 8. As to the last argument, the Court notes
that this very objection provides a meaningful opportunity to contest the
dismissal of her claim, and Plaintiff did so in her Objection to the FCR.
Regardless of the convoluted objection, the Court conducted a de novo
review 	of 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	findings, 	conclusions, 	and
recommendations.
The Eleventh Amendment applies equally to the state and to state
employees sued in their official capacity for damages because the claim
remains one against the state treasury. Stem v. Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1, 3
(5th Cir. 1990). Consequently, the same basis for dismissal on sovereign
immunity applies equally to both UNTHSC-TCOM and Nash in her
official capacity. As previously discussed, the State has not waived
immunity, and Congress has not abrogated immunity through § 1983.
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Thus, 	the 	Court 	expressly 	accepts 	and 	adopts 	the 	portion 	of 	the
Magistrate Judge’s FCR regarding the claim against Lisa Nash.
E. Further Amendment Would Be Futile
Last, Plaintiff simply objects to the finding “that further amendment
to my complaint would be futile.” ECF No. 36 at 8. The Magistrate Judge
noted that “Plaintiff has had the opportunity to file a total of three
complaints” and found that “Chintagunta has alleged her best case and
further amendment would be futile.” ECF No. 34 at 14 n.15.
The 	action 	of a 	court granting 	leave 	to 	amend 	“is 	in 	no way
automatic.” Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381,
391 (5th Cir. 2017). This is because district courts are “entrusted with
the 	discretion 	to 	grant 	or 	deny 	a 	motion 	to 	amend 	and 	may
consider . . . repeated 	failures 	to 	cure 	deficiencies 	by 	amendments
previously allowed.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014). Here, as the Magistrate Judge
notes, Plaintiff was afforded every opportunity to plead her best case,
and the Court is unpersuaded by the single-sentence objection that the
issues inherent in the prior complaints would be remedied by further
amendment.
CONCLUSION
Having 	conducted 	a 	de novo 	review 	of the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s
Findings, 	Conclusions, 	and 	Recommendations, 	and 	Defendant’s
Objections, both Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, and the Court
ADOPTS 	the 	reasoning 	in 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	FCR 	and
OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections.
Accordingly, 	all 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	the 	remaining
Defendants are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 19th day of February 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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