Torres v. Fort Worth, Texas et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
M ICHEAL CODY T ORRES,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-00737-P
CITY OF FORT W ORTH, ET AL .,
Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff Michael Cody Torres filed a complaint
against 	Defendants 	Chief 	Officer 	Robert 	Alldredge, 	Officer 	Rafael
Salazar, Officer Steven Rodriguez, Officer Lawrence Wolfe, Officer
Dutch Rovell, Officer Corporal Cox, Officer Fernando Galvan, Officer
Jason Kim, Sergeant Tyler, and the City of Fort Worth. ECF No. 1. The
Complaint, in short, alleges Defendants violated the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
when 	Defendants 	enforced 	Fort 	Worth 	Ordinance 	§ 	23-8 	against
Plaintiff’s speech in and around the Fort Worth Stockyards. ECF No. 1.
The Complaint also asserts Monell liability claims against the City of
Fort Worth. ECF No. 1. In response, on August 25, 2025, Officers Kim,
Rodriguez, Salazar, and Wolfe filed a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 25.
Then, on August 27, 2025, Corporal Cox, Dutch Rovell, and Sergeant
Tyler filed a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 29. That same day, Officer
Galvan filed a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 30. The City of Fort Worth
filed its own Motion to Dismiss on September 26, 2025. ECF No. 38.
Having considered the filings and for the reasons detailed below, the
Court finds that all Motions should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s claims against the City arise out of the actions of the
Officers—whom he also brings claims against. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff
specifically 	alleges 	that 	(1) 	all 	Defendants 	enforced 	Fort 	Worth
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Ordinance § 23-8 against Torres in violation of § 1983 and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the City specifically violated § 1983
and 	the 	First 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendments 	by 	maintaining 	an
unconstitutional 	custom, 	policy, 	or 	practice 	exhibiting 	deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of Christian evangelists and
have 	“systemic[ally] 	persecute[ed]” 	Christian 	street 	preachers,
“punishing them in order to suppress their religious message, based
solely on the content of their message,” ECF No. 1; (2) the Fort Worth
Ordinance is facially unconstitutional; (3) the Defendants violated
Texas Constitution Article I 	§ 8; and that (4) Defendants violated 42
U.S.C. § 1985 by conspiring to violate the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and Texas Constitution Article I § 8. ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff, Michael Cody Torres, is a Christian street preacher for
Proclaiming Christ Ministries. Proclaiming Christ has endeavored to
preach at the Fort Worth Stockyards—a busy entertainment and dining
district—for years. The City of Fort Worth Noise Ordinance, Chapter 23
§ 23-8, states: “[N]o person shall make, cause, suffer, allow or permit
unreasonable noise in such a manner, or with such volume, intensity or
duration, so as to disturb a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.
A decibel level shall not be a requirement for [its] enforcement.” Section
23-8 defines “unreasonable noise” as “[a]ny unreasonably loud and
unnecessary noise which causes material distress, discomfort or injury
to persons of ordinary sensibilities in the immediate vicinity thereof;” or
“[a]ny noise of such character, intensity and continued duration, which
substantially interferes 	with 	the 	comfortable 	enjoyment of private
homes by persons of ordinary sensibilities.” § 23-8(b).
Torres, Proclaiming Christ Ministries, and the Fort Worth Police
Department have a history of similar disputes dating back as far as at
least 2017. See Consent Order and Final Judgment, Grisham v. City of
Fort Worth, No. 4:15-cv-00324-A (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2015); Settlement
Agreement, Torres v. City of Fort Worth, No. 4:23-cv-00060-O (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 29, 2023) (Torres I). The particular facts leading to this action,
however, began in August 2023. Plaintiff alleges that on August 26,
2023, Proclaiming Christ Ministries went to the Stockyards to preach.
Plaintiff, although not himself preaching, was approached by Officers
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Rafael Salazar, Fernando Galvan, and Sgt. Tyler. The Officers allegedly
“informed Plaintiff that someone had complained that the preaching
was offensive to them.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Specifically, the Officers said “if
anyone is offended and complains, they must issue a citation.” ECF No.
1 at 10. Accordingly, Officer Galvan issued a citation, and the Officers
arrested Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 at 10. That citation was dismissed on May
1, 2024, in Fort Worth Municipal Court. ECF No. 1 at 10. On December
2, 2023, Officer Salazar again approached Plaintiff on East Exchange
Avenue and told Plaintiff that he could not preach there “because they
were disturbing the peace.” ECF No. 1 at 10.
On December 30, 2023, Officer Rafael Salazar, Officer Dutch Rovell,
and Corporal Cox approached Plaintiff in the Stockyards. ECF No. 1 at
10. Based on a noise complaint, the Officers instructed Plaintiff to stop
preaching. ECF No. 1. at 10. Although Plaintiff tried to persuade Officer
Salazar of the lawfulness of the preaching, Officer Salazar persisted,
and the preachers stopped preaching. ECF No. 1 at 10.
On April 13, 2024, Officer Rafael Salazer, Officer Cantu, Commander
Jason 	Kim, 	and 	other officers, 	approached 	Plaintiff while he 	was
preaching in the Stockyards yet again. The Officers informed Plaintiff
that he could not speak with amplification “if the amplification could be
heard over the ambient noise.” ECF No. 1 at 11. Under threat of citation,
Plaintiff accordingly stopped preaching. ECF No. 1 at 11.
On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff and others went to a public sidewalk—
this time in Sundance Square in downtown Fort Worth—to preach. ECF
No. 1 at 11. Following a complaint, the Officers again informed Plaintiff
and others that they needed to stop preaching or else face criminal
charges, and they obliged. ECF No. 1 at 11.
On May 1, 2024, Plaintiff again went to the Stockyards to preach,
and a group of unnamed officers asked Plaintiff to lower the volume.
ECF No. 1 at 11. The Plaintiff obliged, and the Officers left. A few
minutes later, following some complaints, the Officers told Plaintiff that
he needed to stop preaching altogether or else face a citation. ECF No.
1 at 12. One of the officers allegedly said “when someone is offended by
something, [they] ha[ve] to take action because that is their job.” ECF
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No. 35 at 5. Those charges were ultimately dismissed. ECF No. 1 at 12.
On August 3, 2024, Plaintiff went to the Stockyards to preach with
others using a speaker. ECF No. 1 at 12. Officer Rafael Salazar noticed
and—along with Officers Steven Rodriguez and Lawrence Wolfe—wrote
up a disorderly conduct citation for using voice amplification. ECF No.
1 at 12. Office Wolfe said the speaker was the problem—not the content
of the preaching. ECF No. 1 at 12. Plaintiff soon thereafter started to
preach without noise amplification, but Officers Salazar, Wolfe, and
Rodriguez, nevertheless, arrested Plaintiff for disorderly conduct by
“elevated voice volume.” ECF No. 1 at 12. Plaintiff then spent the night
in jail. ECF No. 1 at 13. When Plaintiff went to contest the August 3,
2024 citations, the charges were dismissed by the prosecutor. ECF No.
1 at 13.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially
plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to 	reasonably 	infer 	that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the 	alleged
misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Unlike a
“probability requirement,” the plausibility standard instead demands
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. Where a complaint contains facts that are “‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557).
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all
well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.,
509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the Court is not bound to
accept legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. To avoid
dismissal, pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts rather than
conclusory allegations. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281
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(5th Cir. 1992). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should 	assume 	their 	veracity 	and 	then 	determine 	whether 	they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
B. Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity
Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation,
under color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by 	the 	Constitution 	and 	laws’ 	of 	the 	United 	States.” 	Livadas 	v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege facts that show that he has been deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and the
defendants were acting under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
1. 	The Monell standard
To hold a city liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “the
municipality itself caused” the constitutional violation at issue. City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. New
York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)). Such
constitutional violations may occur due to the municipality’s official,
promulgated policies; its pervasive customs or practices; its failure to
train, supervise, or discipline employees; or decisions or acts by final
municipal policymakers. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690‒95. To state a Monell
claim, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which
(2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge,
and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or
custom.” Thompson ex rel. Neveah T. v. Martinez, 789 F. Supp. 3d 491,
529 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536,
541–42 (5th Cir. 2020)). If an official policy is not explicit, “widespread
practice of city officials” can suffice if the practice is “so common and
well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal
policy.” Id. If no constitutional violation occurred, the plaintiff’s Monell
claim necessarily fails. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986).
A Monell claim predicated on a failure-to-train theory requires a
plaintiff to show “(1) that the municipality’s training procedures were
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inadequate, (2) that the municipality was deliberately indifferent in
adopting its training policy, and (3) that the inadequate training policy
directly caused the violations in question.” Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., Tex.,
948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020). Such a claim must be brought against
the municipality’s final policymaker. Harris, 489 U.S. at 389. And “[a]
municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most
tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).
To establish inadequate training procedures, “a plaintiff must allege
with specificity how a particular training program is defective.” Zarnow
v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010). “The
inadequacy of training must be closely related to the injury.” Pineda v.
City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2002).
Additionally, deliberate indifference is a stringent standard under
§ 1983. To show deliberate indifference, “[n]otice [to the municipality] of
a pattern of similar violations is required.” Sanders-Burns v. City of
Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). “A
pattern is tantamount to official policy when it is so common and well-
settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.”
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks omitted). Thus, the municipal employees’ actions
“must have occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of
conduct warrants the attribution to the governing body of knowledge
that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice of city
employees.” Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir.
1984); cf. Fuentes v. Nueces County, 689 F. App’x 775, 778 (5th Cir. 2017)
(holding that twenty-seven prior incidents of excessive force over a
three-year 	period 	were 	not 	sufficiently 	numerous 	to 	constitute 	a
pattern). A narrow exception to the pattern of similar violations exists
but “is generally reserved for those cases in which the government actor
was provided no training whatsoever” with respect to the relevant
constitutional duty. Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624
(5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).
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2. 	The Qualified Immunity Standard
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly 	established 	statutory 	or 	constitutional 	rights 	of 	which 	a
reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009) (citation omitted). The qualified immunity inquiry
involves two prongs that the Court must answer affirmatively before an
official is subject to liability: (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has
alleged constitute a violation of a constitutional right and (2) whether
the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of defendant’s
alleged misconduct. Id. at 232. The second prong of the test can be
sometimes “better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the
allegedly violated constitutional right was clearly established at the
time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants
was objectively unreasonable in light of that then clearly established
law.” Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). When confronted with a qualified
immunity defense at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff carries the burden
to identify facts which, if proven, defeats the claim of immunity. Waller
v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
C. Fourth Amendment
The 	Fourth 	Amendment 	of 	the 	United 	States 	Constitution
guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
and that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S.
CONST . amend. IV. “[I]t is well established that a warrantless arrest
without probable cause violates an individual’s constitutional rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Joseph v. Allen, 712
F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2013). “[A] Fourth Amendment seizure occurs
in one of two ways: either an officer applies physical force or an officer
makes a show of authority to which an individual submits.” Sauceda v.
City of San Benito, 78 F.4th 174, 187 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotations
omitted). Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable unless
the government shows that an exception applies. United States v.
Aguirre, 664 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 2011).
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D. First Amendment
The First Amendment provides a fundamental right to share views
in public forums. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,
452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981). That’s because the “First Amendment protects
the right of every citizen to reach the minds of willing listeners and to
do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.” Id. at 655
(cleaned up). In public forums, regulations on speech must be content-
neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interests,
and leave open ample alternative channels for communication to pass
constitutional muster. Houston Chron. Pub. Co. v. City of League City,
488 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2007).
ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	that 	Defendant 	Officers
plausibly violated the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment,
and Fourteenth Amendment as-applied to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff accuses Defendants of interfering with their free speech
rights by enforcing Chapter 23 § 23-8(d)(2), depriving them of equal
protection therein, and violating their Fourth Amendment rights by
confiscating their amplification equipment.
1. 	Plaintiff fails to overcome qualified immunity because he did not
have a clearly established constitutional right to preach at a loud
volume.
No clearly established law precluded the Officers from enforcing the
Fort Worth Sound Ordinance against Plaintiff. Police Officers have the
duty of enforcing laws, such as city ordinances that have not been held
to be unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979).
So without a declaration of unconstitutionality, the odds are stacked
against Plaintiff’s argument that the law was clearly established to put
the Officers on notice. See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d
437, 441 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never denied
qualified immunity to a public official who enforced a properly enacted
statute that no court had invalidated. This indeed would seem to be the
paradigmatic way of showing objectively reasonable conduct by a public
official.”). 	For a law to be considered clearly established, the plaintiff
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“bear[s] the burden of showing that the right was clearly established”
based on “existing precedent” that “squarely governs the specific facts
at issue.” Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020). So the
constitutional or statutory question at issue must be “beyond debate.”
Id. at 600–01. Otherwise, only in extreme circumstances wherein the
law is “so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of
reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws” does an exception
exist. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38.
That rarely-used exception does not apply here though, and the law
at issue is not clearly established as unconstitutional. First, the Fort
Worth Sound Ordinance has never been declared to be unconstitutional.
Second, it is true—as Plaintiff says, the “First Amendment right to free
speech is clearly established in general terms” as is the right to speak
“in public.” ECF No. 34 at 15. But that description does not delineate
the right particularly enough to apply to this set of facts—and to clearly
establish the right to preach at the volume Plaintiff preached at in Fort
Worth. In other words, it is important for the Court “not to define clearly
established law at a high level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S.
100, 104 (2018)(cleaned up).
2. 	Plaintiff also fails to overcome qualified immunity because the
Officers did not violate his First Amendment rights.
Although concluding that this right is not clearly established is
sufficient to grant qualified immunity, the Court also rules that the
Officers did not violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Because the
Officers had probable cause to arrest and/or cite him, they lawfully
infringed on Plaintiff’s preaching activity. Here, the Stockyards where
Plaintiff preached constitute a traditional public forum. Therefore,
restrictions on Plaintiff’s speech must be content-neutral, narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open
adequate alternative means of communication to pass constitutional
muster. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 488 F.3d at 622. But, Defendants’
actions clear this legal threshold.
Plaintiff expresses concern that the Officers cited noise levels as a
pretext 	for 	enforcing 	a 	“heckler’s 	veto”—a 	ban 	on 	speech 	one
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substantively disagrees with—but fails to provide a plausible basis for
making such an inference. To the contrary, on various occasions, the
Officers cited noise levels as the basis for either instructing Plaintiff to
stop preaching through a loudspeaker or for citing him altogether.
Perhaps the best fact Plaintiff asserts is that on one occasion an Officer
said he was compelled to act because someone was “offended.” But being
offended in no way necessitates that the religious message created the
offense—as opposed to the volume of the message. And coupled with the
numerous other encounters with the Police that all concerned excessive
noise levels, the only plausible inference to make is that the Officers
were concerned about noise levels alone.
What’s 	more, 	the 	“government 	has 	a 	substantial 	interest 	in
protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.” Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (cleaned up). Such regulations are “justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, [and must be]
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and [they
must] leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.” Id. (cleaned up). In light of that caselaw, the Officers did
not 	violate 	Plaintiff’s 	First 	Amendment 	rights 	by 	enforcing 	a
constitutionally 	sound 	regulation. 	See 	infra, 	Section 	B. 	Indeed,
Plaintiff’s Complaint mentions many instances in which Defendants
concerned themselves with the volume and amplification of the speech.
Accordingly, they believed Plaintiff violated the Fort Worth Sound
Ordinance, 	which 	gave 	them probable 	cause 	to 	arrest and/or cite
Plaintiff.
3. 	The Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims are
conclusory and thus fail to overcome qualified immunity.
As for the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims,
they also fail to overcome qualified immunity because the pleadings are
overly conclusory. Plaintiff claims the Defendants violated the Fourth
Amendment when they confiscated preaching equipment. But shotgun
pleading is inadequate—which is what Plaintiff did here by generally
and vaguely accusing all (or perhaps some) Defendants of confiscating
equipment. See Roe v. Johnson Cnty., Tex. No. 3-18-cv-2497-B-BN, 2019
WL 5031357, at *5 (N.D. Tex., July 29, 2019), rec accepted, 2019 WL
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3980737 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2019) (cleaned up). And “[t]he Court
disregards bare assertions of collective responsibility, unsupported by
concrete factual allegations.” Martinez v. City of N. Richland Hills, 846
F. App’x 238, 243 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d
154, 174 (5th Cir. 2015) (“In accordance with our case law, we examine
each 	individual’s 	entitlement 	to 	qualified 	immunity 	separately.”)
(cleaned up). The same analysis applies to the Fourteenth Amendment
claim, as Plaintiff has only vaguely asserted that Defendants failed to
provide him with equal protection under the law.
B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim that the Fort Worth Sound
Ordinance violates the First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment on its face.
Plaintiff seeks a court order for declaratory and injunctive relief
declaring that the Fort Worth Sound Ordinance, § 23-8(d) (1), is
unconstitutional on its face. To win a facial challenge, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that there is “no set of circumstances [] under which the
challenge ordinance would be valid,” or “that the statute lacks any
plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472
(2010) (cleaned up). But because Plaintiff (1) fails to plausibly show that
the Fort Worth Sound Ordinance is content-based and (2) fails to
plausibly 	assert 	that 	the 	Fort 	Worth 	Sound 	Ordinance 	is
unconstitutionally vague in application, he fails to state a claim.
1. 	The Fort Worth Sound Ordinance is content-neutral and passes
constitutional muster.
The Fort Worth Sound Ordinance is content-neutral because it only
regulates the manner of expression—that is the volume of speech and
not the substance of the speech. In a public forum, “the government may
impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. Those restrictions pass constitutional
muster as “reasonable” if they (1) “are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech,” (2) are “narrowly tailored to serve a
significant 	governmental 	interest,” 	and 	(3) 	“leave 	open 	ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.” Id. The
Ordinance could also be unconstitutional even if it is content-neutral in
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its text, if the underlying governmental purpose was to regulate the
content of speech it disagreed with. Id. But not so here.
The Ordinance accordingly only prohibits “unreasonable loud noise.”
It contains no reference to content. And the preamble to the Ordinance
demonstrates this neutral purpose: “This section is designed to regulate
noise by various alternative means in order to allow the enforcement of
noise regulations at times when and by persons for whom noise meters
are not available.” § 23-8(a)(2). “A noise may be in violation of this
section because it is disturbing to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities or because it exceeds the decibel level restrictions below.”
Id.
Regulating overly loud noises in public places is considered a valid
governmental interest. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 42, 48 (1994).
Accordingly, 	the 	Fort 	Worth 	Sound 	Ordinance 	promotes 	a 	valid
governmental interest without reference to the content of speech. And it
is narrowly tailored and leaves open ample alternative channels by still
allowing citizens to exercise their right to free speech in a variety of ways
at the appropriate volume.
2. 	The Fort Worth Sound Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague
because it imposes an objective legal standard.
The Void for Vagueness doctrine poses no constitutional problems to
the Ordinance as well because the law sets an objective legal standard
for officers to draw from when enforcing the statute. Plaintiff argues,
however, that they have satisfied all that is needed at the 12(b)(6) stage
by asserting that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it
merely prohibits “unreasonably loud noises.” His concern is that this will
lead to the loss or substantial impairment of critical constitutional
liberties due to its potentially overly broad sweep, chilling effects, and
inconsistent enforcement.
But, the standard imposed by the Ordinance is not subjective, and
Plaintiff has asserted no facts to make one believe that it has been
disproportionately 	enforced in 	a grossly inconsistent manner. And
Plaintiff certainly fails to show that is lacks “any plainly legitimate
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sweep” 	in 	application 	to 	speakers—particularly 	considering 	the
amplification used by street preachers here.
The Fifth Circuit has upheld a similar noise ordinance—one that
prohibited noise that would “annoy a reasonable person” and held that
it was not unconstitutionally vague. Munn v. City of Ocean Springs,
Miss., 763 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2014). In that case, the concern was
whether the phrase “annoy a reasonable person” imposed a subjective
standard or not. The Fifth Circuit held that it did not, because it is clear
that the “reasonable” person must be annoyed. The “reasonable person”
and that person’s preferences are distinct from any other random
individual’s atypical preference, a “non-reasonable” person one may say.
Here, 	the 	Ordinance 	is 	similarly 	objective. 	The 	definition 	of
unreasonable noise is as follows: “any unreasonably loud, disturbing and
unnecessary noise which causes material distress, discomfort or injury
to persons of ordinary sensibilities in the immediate vicinity thereof; or
any noise of such character, intensity and continued duration, which
substantially interferes 	with 	the 	comfortable 	enjoyment of private
homes by persons of ordinary sensibilities.” 	ECF No. 1 at 7 (emphasis
added). Here, the objective standard emanates likewise from “persons of
ordinary sensibilities.” So it’s sufficiently objective to overcome legal
scrutiny. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim that the
Fort Worth Sound Ordinance may be facially unconstitutional.
C. Plaintiff fails to state a claim of Monell liability against the
City under § 1983.
Plaintiff also brings claims against the City for allegedly ratifying a
custom that led to the asserted constitutional violations in this case.
Because of the various lawsuits against the City concerning similar
disputes with Christian preachers, Plaintiff alleges that the City must
have been deliberately indifferent and motivated by anti-Christian
animus in its alleged failure to train officers to respect the First
Amendment. Under his theory, that failure led to the First Amendment
violation here. To pass the 12(b)(6) stage, the Plaintiff must plausibly
plead that there was “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a
policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and
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(3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or
custom.” Thompson ex rel. Neveah T. Martinez, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 529
(quoting Valle, 613 F.3d at 541–42). Here, Plaintiff fails to plausibly
allege (1) any constitutional violation or (2) a sufficiently widespread
custom that the City can be charged with constructive knowledge of.
Plaintiff does not need to identify a specific policymaker at the
motion to dismiss stage, rather Plaintiff “need only plead facts that show
that the defendant or defendants acted pursuant to a specific official
policy, which was promulgated or ratified by the legally authorized
policymaker.” Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2016).
The City, on the other hand, alleges that Plaintiff fails to allege enough
facts to identify the final policymaker. Here, the Plaintiff does more than
is needed by identifying the Chief of the Fort Worth Police Department
as responsible for enforcing Fort Worth’s policies. Regardless, the “final
policymaker” inquiry is one more well-suited for the summary judgment
stage.
1. 	No constitutional violation can be attributed to the City.
But, 	“[a]s 	is 	well 	established, 	every 	Monell 	claim requires 	an
underlying constitutional violation.” Hicks-Fields v. Harris County, 860
F.2d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Here, no such violation
occurred, and the Fort Worth Sound Ordinance remains constitutional
on its own. That alone disposes of this claim. As discussed in Section B,
supra, 	the 	Fort 	Worth 	Sound 	Ordinance 	is 	content-neutral 	and
sufficiently balanced to allow for constitutional expression; as discussed
in Section A, supra, the Officers did not unconstitutionally apply the
noise ordinance.
2. 	No pervasive custom ratified by the City caused a constitutional
violation.
With that said, it remains clear that Plaintiff has not pled facts to
show 	that 	the 	City 	ratified 	a 	widespread 	custom 	of 	suppressing
Christian street preaching “with deliberate indifference to the known or
obvious 	consequences 	that 	constitutional 	violations 	would 	result.”
Edwards v. City of Balch Springs, Tex., 70 F.4th 302, 308 (5th Cir. 2023).
In other words, the next problem with Plaintiff’s Complaint is its failure
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to 	plausibly 	allege 	an 	official 	policy 	of 	arresting 	Christian 	street
preachers after content-based complaints are made. The Court holds
that no such custom has been identified by Plaintiff and thus the City
did not ratify such a custom as official policy.
Here, Plaintiff lists a scattered history of encounters between the
Fort Worth Police Department and Christian street preachers. First,
Plaintiff himself names at least seven run-ins with the police—starting
in 	August 	2023—concerning 	his 	preaching. 	In 	only 	one 	of 	those
encounters is there any allusion to a content-based citation/arrest, and
as explained in Section A, that comment cannot be reasonably construed
as motivation to suppress Christian preaching instead of motivation to
properly enforce volume restrictions. Otherwise, Plaintiff reminds the
Court of encounters between Christian street preachers and Fort Worth
police in 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2022. And one of those encounters led to
a lawsuit that ended in a consent decree. ECF No. 1, Ex. B. In that
consent 	decree, 	this 	Court 	held 	that 	“[t]he 	City 	must 	allow 	the
constitutionally-protected expression of [speakers] [in public]” but that
“[n]othing in this consent order and final judgment prevents the City
from enforcing 	reasonable 	time, 	place 	and 	manner restrictions 	as
allowed by law.” ECF No. 1, Ex. B.
But those previous encounters generally did not concern preaching
amplified by equipment. That key difference means that no custom of
unconstitutionally suppressing Christian street preaching exists. Here,
it is Plaintiff’s burden to plausibly allege that the “pattern of events has
occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants
the 	attribution 	to 	the 	governing 	body 	of 	knowledge 	that 	the
objectionable 	conduct 	is 	the 	expected, 	accepted 	practice 	of 	city
employees.” Davidson v. City of Stafford, Tex.¸ 848 F.3d 384, 396 (5th
Cir. 2017), as revised (Mar. 31, 2017).
Starting in the middle of the timeline, in 2021, the City of Fort Worth
amended the noise ordinance to be as it is now, following the previous
disputes mentioned by Plaintiff. The City changed the noise provision
from categorically banning amplification equipment to banning noise at
a problematic volume, for instance over ambient noise. ECF No. 1 at 8.
Before 	that amendment, 	the 	City 	allegedly 	banned 	any 	amplified
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Christian preaching. ECF No. 1 at 7–9. Now, the ban is on preaching
above an objectively-defined level of volume. See supra Section B. And
that new ban was enforced here.
The most recent encounter prior to the facts giving rise to this
lawsuit, in 2022, is arguably the most problematic—as alleged by
Plaintiff. There, officers told Plaintiff that he could not use a sound
amplifier, seemingly at all, and that led to a settlement agreement and
payment to Plaintiff. Torres I, No. 4:23-cv-00060-O (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29,
2023). But, again, that concerned an absolute ban on amplification. That
ban is sufficiently distinct from the constitutional volume limit enforced
here. 	So, 	the 	City 	was 	not 	deliberately 	indifferent 	to 	Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights and thus did not fail to adequately train its officers.
While 	Plaintiff 	complains 	that 	the 	2023 	settlement 	agreement
required roll call training concerning the noise ordinance, Plaintiff still
must 	plausibly 	allege 	inadequate 	training. 	But, 	Plaintiff’s 	factual
assertions manifest a lawful change in approach by the City’s Officers
from categorical bans on specified speech to protecting speech until it
becomes unlawfully loud. And because of that change, Plaintiff’s “failure
to train” allegations—failure to train the Officers, concerning the First
Amendment rights of citizens in public forums—fall flat.
D. Plaintiff fails to state a claim that all Defendants violated
Article I § 8 of the Texas Constitution.
Plaintiff claims Defendants deprived him of his Texas Constitutional
rights to liberty and speech. Plaintiff accordingly seeks declaratory and
equitable relief. To the extent this claim may seek damages, it fails.
Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 147 (Tex. 1995) (“We hold there
is no implied private right of action for damages arising under the free
speech 	and 	free 	assembly 	sections 	of 	the 	Texas 	Constitution.”).
Otherwise, the claim fails for the same reasons set forth in Sections A
and B, supra.
To the extent this claim is against the City, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails
to plausibly allege a claim. Plaintiff’s response claims that governmental
immunity is waived against the City because it seeks to challenge the
construction or validity of the Fort Worth Sound Ordinance to the extent
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it might make constitutional speech unlawful. ECF No. 42 at 22. But
this is a new argument not mentioned in Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF No
1 at 21. Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that Plaintiff was deprived of
rights due to the threat and ultimate arrest of Plaintiff in its two-
sentence allegation of a state constitutional violation. ECF No. 1 at 21.
Nowhere in that short and conclusory claim does Plaintiff challenge
the validity of the statute; he only references officer Conduct. ECF No.
1 at 21. So the Court need not address any concerns about whether
governmental 	immunity 	was 	waived 	under 	the 	Texas 	Declaratory
Judgments Act because the elements of Plaintiff’s claim have not been
properly alleged and only declaratory relief is sought on this claim.
E. Plaintiff fails to state a claim that Defendants conspired to
violate the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and
Texas Constitution Article I § 8 in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Plaintiff claims that the Officer Defendants “exhibited an express
agreement” between them to enforce the Fort Worth Sound Ordinance
against him based on his Christian message and thereby deprived them
of their constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiff claims the Officers and the
City are liable.
To the extent the claim is against the City, municipalities cannot
legally agree to conspiracies under § 1985. See Benningfield v. City of
Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding a corporate entity
and its employees are a single legal entity); Batiste v. City of Beaumont¸
421 F. Supp. 2d 969, 986 (E.D. Tex. 2005). And there is no assertion of a
conspiracy 	between different departments 	within the 	City 	of Fort
Worth.
To the extent the claim is against the Officers, it cannot stand also
because of the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine. “It is a long-standing
rule in this circuit that a ‘corporation cannot conspire with itself
anymore that a private individual can, and it is the general rule that
acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation.” Hilliard v. Ferguson,
30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994). That doctrine also held that it extends
to “multiple defendants employed by the same governmental entity.”
Konan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 96 F.4th 799, 805 (5th Cir. 2024) (cleaned
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up). And these Officers are all colleagues working for the City of Fort
Worth.
The other glaring problem is that the Complaint alleges religious
discrimination 	instead 	of 	racial 	discrimination. 	And 	“in 	this
circuit . . . the only conspiracies actionable under section 1985(3) are
those motivated by racial animus.” Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Sav. Bank, 820
F.2d 754, 757 (5th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up). So the Court dismisses this
claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS all Motions to Dismiss.
Accordingly, 	all 	claims 	against 	the 	Officers 	and 	the 	City 	are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 27th day of February 2026.
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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